


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# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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**THE  
CAVALRY JOURNAL**

**Vol. V.**

**JANUARY to OCTOBER, 1910.**









**GENERAL SIR BANASTRE TARLETON, Bt., G.C.B.**

1754-1833.

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

WITH SANCTION OF THE ARMY COUNCIL, AND UNDER DIRECTION OF  
GENERAL SIR J. D. P. FRENCH, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.  
INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FORCES  
ASSISTED BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.  
AND MAJOR-GENERAL E. H. H. ALLENBY, C.B., INSPECTOR OF CAVALRY

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## INDEX

- Airship and Flying Machine in War, The. By *Captain E. ff. W. Lascelles*  
(*Illustrated*), 208
- 'An Infantry Transfer': Impressions, 348
- Arthur, Sir George, Bart, M.V.O.: Prince Rupert as a Cavalry Leader  
(*Illustrated*), 429
- 'Asp': Balance, 314
- Balance. By 'Asp,' 314
- Barrow, Lieut-Colonel G. de S.: Cavalry under Napoleon (*with Maps*), 34
- Barrow, Lieut-Colonel G. de S.: Some Reflections on the Employment of  
Cavalry in Battle, 295
- Battine, Captain Cecil: Charge of the 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera, 354
- Bernhardi, General von: A Consideration of Opposite Views concerning  
Cavalry, 466
- Bernhardi, General von: Principles to be observed in the Preparation and  
Execution of Tactical Exercises for Cavalry Divisions (*Illustrated*), 288
- Brilliant Cavalry Exploit, A. By *Captain H. Garbett, R.N.*, 507
- 'C. B.': Cavalry in France and Germany in 1909, 220
- Cavalry, A Consideration of Opposite Views concerning. By *General of*  
*Cavalry, von Bernhardi*, 466
- Cavalry, Further Letters on, 138
- Cavalry in France and Germany, 1909. By 'C. B.', 220
- Cavalry in Frontier Warfare. By *Captain D. C. Crombie*, 358
- Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War. By *Captain R. S. Hamilton-Grace*, 213
- Cavalry, The Rôle and Employment of, 484
- Cavalry, The Work of the Egyptian, during the Atbara and Omdurman Cam-  
paigns (*with Maps*), 55, 159
- Cavalry under Napoleon. By *Lieut.-Colonel G. de S. Barrow* (*with Maps*), 34
- Charge of Bredow's Brigade (Vionville, August 16, 1870). By *Major P. A.*  
*Charrier* (*with Plans*), 462



*Charrier, Major P. A.*: Charge of Bredow's Brigade, Vionville, August 16, 1870 (*with Plans*), 462

'Contact Squadron.' By *Major E. C. Haag*, 309

*Crombie, Captain D. C.*: Cavalry in Frontier Warfare, 358

Egyptian Cavalry and the Atbara and Omdurman Campaigns: A Short Account (*with Maps*), 55, 159

Employment of Cavalry in Battle: Some reflections. By *Lieut-Colonel G. de S. Barrow*, 295

*Esebek, Baron v.*: The Shortcomings of the Russian Cavalry on the Yalu in the Spring of 1904, 47

*Farquhar, Captain F. D.*, D.S.O.: Spanish Operations at Melilla (*with Map and Illustrations*), 8

Frazer, Colonel Sir Augustus S., K.C.B., F.R.S., R.H.A. By *Colonel R. Holden Mackenzie*, 131

Further Letters on Cavalry, 138

*Garbett, Captain H.*, R.N.: A Brilliant Cavalry Exploit, 507

Grant, Sir Hope. By *Colonel H. W. Pearse*, D.S.O. (*Illustrated*), 423

*Haag, Major E. C.*: 'Contact Squadron,' 309

*Hamilton-Grace, Captain R. S.*: Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War, 213

*Head, Major C. O.*: Horsemastership, 337

Horse Artillery, Employment of, with the Cavalry Division, 91

Horsemastership. By *Major C. O. Head*, 337

Impressions. By 'An Infantry Transfer,' 348

'Lancer': Some Notes on 'Reiterdienst,' 342

'Lancer': The Question of Mounted Infantry, 228

*Landis, Major J. E. Reynolds*: Machine Guns with Cavalry, 370

*Lascelles, Captain E. ff. W.*: Influence of the Ground on Shock Action, 492

*Lascelles, Captain E. ff. W.*: The Airship and Flying Machine in War (*Illustrated*), 208

Local Forces in the four Self-Governing Colonies of South Africa, 188

Local Forces in our West and East African Colonies and Protectorates, 320

*Lumley, Colonel the Hon. O. V. G. A.*: Territorial Mounted Brigade Training, 201

Machine Guns. By *Captain V. Mierka*, 499

Machine Guns with Cavalry. By *Major J. E. Reynolds Landis*, 370

- Mackensie, Colonel R. Holden:* Colonel Sir Augustus S. Frazer, K.C.B.,  
F.R.S., 131
- Mierka, Captain V.:* Machine Guns, 499
- Mounted Infantry, The Question of. By 'Lancer,' 228
- Notes (*Illustrated*), 117, 250, 389, 519
- Pearse, Colonel H. W., D.S.O.:* Sir Hope Grant, G.C.B. (*Illustrated*), 423
- Pearse, Colonel H. W., D.S.O.:* General Sir Banastre Tarleton, Bart.,  
G.C.B. (*Illustrated*), 2
- Prince Rupert as a Cavalry Leader. By Sir George Arthur, Bart., M.V.O.  
(*Illustrated*), 429
- Problem No. 9, 114
- Problem No. 9. Result, 376
- Recent Publications, 104, 232, 378, 511
- 'Reiterdienst,' Some Notes on. By 'Lancer,' 342
- R.H.A. : Employment with the Cavalry Division, 91
- Russian Cavalry : Their Shortcomings on the Yalu. By Baron v. Esebek, 47
- Shock Action, Influence of the Ground on. By Captain E. ff. W. Lascelles, 492
- South Africa, The Local Forces in the four Self-Governing Colonies, 188
- Spanish Operations at Melilla. By Captain F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O. (*with  
Map and Illustrations*), 8
- Sporting Notes (*Illustrated*), 124, 265, 414, 543
- Tactical Exercises for Cavalry Divisions : Principles to be observed in their  
Preparation and Execution. By General von Bernhardt (*Illustrated*), 288
- Tactical Formations (*with Plans*), 94
- Talavera, Charge of the 23rd Light Dragoons at. By Captain Cecil Battine,  
354
- Tarleton, General Sir Banastre, Bart, G.C.B. By Colonel H. W. Pearse,  
D.S.O. (*Illustrated*), 2
- Territorial Mounted Brigade Training. By Colonel the Hon. O. V. G. A.  
Lumley, 201
- 'The Alfonso Chasseurs.' By Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., 306
- 'The Editorship,' 1
- War and the 'Arme Blanche,' 283
- West and East Africa, The Local Forces in our Colonies and Protectorates,  
321
- Wylly, Colonel H. C., C.B.: 'The Alfonso Chasseurs' (*Illustrated*), 306

# PLATES

GENERAL SIR BANASTRE TARLETON, BART., G.C.B. . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
SPANISH OPERATIONS AT MELILLA . . . . .	<i>To face page 8-9</i>
THE 2ND LANCERS (GARDNER'S HORSE) . . . . .	54
THE WEST KENT (Q.O.) YEOMANRY, 1832 . . . . .	55
TWO HISTORIC HELMETS . . . . .	116
'ON GUARD,' HAMPTON COURT . . . . .	117
COLONEL SIR AUGUSTUS S. FRAZER, K.C.B. (ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY), 1776-1835 . . . . .	131
THE BRUNSWICK HUSSARS, 1809-1817 . . . . .	158
'AFTER THE ATBARA' . . . . .	159
'PURSUIT,' 3RD (K.O.) LIGHT DRAGOONS, 1833 . . . . .	212
THE 3RD (FRENCH) HUSSARS, 1815 . . . . .	213
ROAD SKETCH FROM S. END OF EERSTE RANDJES . . . . .	260
ST. GEORGE AND THE DRAGON . . . . .	264
DICK TURPIN . . . . .	265
CHARGE OF THE 23RD LIGHT DRAGOONS AT TALAVERA, 1809 . . . . .	283
A PRUSSIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE IN MANŒUVRES . . . . .	308
A ROYAL REVIEW ON BLACKHEATH, 1759 . . . . .	309
16TH (THE QUEEN'S) LANCERS, 1864 . . . . .	336
ITALIAN CAVALRY . . . . .	337
POPE PIUS VI. BLESSING OFFICERS OF THE 12TH LIGHT DRAGOONS, VATICAN, 1794 . . . . .	388
REGIMENTAL MEDALS . . . . .	389
GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT, G.C.B. . . . .	423
CHINESE WARFARE, 1860 . . . . .	426
SIR HOPE GRANT WATCHING THE BOMBARDMENT OF TAKU FORT . . . . .	427
PRINCE RUPERT . . . . .	454
SPANISH HUSSAR . . . . .	498
13TH LIGHT DRAGOONS, 1841 . . . . .	499
BRITISH CAVALRY TUNIC BUTTONS . . . . .	542
HUNT BUTTONS OF THE BRITISH CAVALRY . . . . .	543

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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JANUARY 1910

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## *'THE EDITORSHIP'*

THE last number concluded the fourth volume which has been produced since the Journal's initiation. During the four years of its existence it has embodied in its pages all kinds of information of general use and interest to the Cavalry Service.

With this number a new term of editorship commences, a course which enables new views and ideas to be laid before the readers. During the period throughout which Colonel W. H. Birkbeck has held the office of Editor the Journal has flourished and made great strides in a forward direction; both to him and to his Staff at the Cavalry School and to Lieutenant Bertrand Stewart of the West Kent Yeomanry, who have done much to assist him, are due the thanks of the readers.

The Journal, while remaining under the general control of General Sir John French, the Inspector-General of the Forces, and Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell, will for the present be edited by Major-General the Honourable J. H. G. Byng, recently Brigade Commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

It is hoped that Officers will not relax their energy in contributing articles, sketches and photographs; in the past they have been submitted in numbers from all quarters, and many have been of the greatest value; in fact the object of the Journal is to create an interchange of ideas, and it is by the transmission to the Editor of articles such as have appeared in the past that this object can be achieved.

With regard to the Sporting Notes, the editor of this department would be glad to receive from Regiments, both at home and abroad, more details of their doings in this direction, and Colonial Regiments are appealed to at the same time.

The thanks of the readers are due to all those who have assisted and furthered the advance of the Journal by contributing to its pages, and it is hoped that the number of these benefactors will not diminish during the coming year.

ARTHUR LEETHAM (*Managing Editor*).

VOL. V.—NO. 17.

B



*GENERAL SIR BANASTRE TARLETON, BT., G.C.B.**'Swift, vigilant, and bold'*

By COLONEL H. W. PEARSE, D.S.O.

THERE never was a time when the history of the American War of Independence aroused much interest in the minds of Englishmen. From the skirmish at Lexington, in April 1775, which began the war, to the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown in October 1781, which ended it, the contest was thoroughly unpopular in England. The reverses to British arms, though inevitable in a long war carried on with insufficient means, sorely wounded the national pride, and little satisfaction was derived from occasional successes, gallantly though they might have been achieved, which had been won at the cost of men of kindred blood. The surrenders at Saratoga and Yorktown caused profound humiliation, while the capture of Charleston, the victories of Camden and Guildford, and, indeed, many others, though exploits highly honourable to the troops engaged, were little regarded at the time, and have long since been forgotten.

Nevertheless there were, during the long struggle, many episodes of enterprise and endurance creditable both to our officers and our soldiers; valuable lessons in bush and hill fighting acquired in North America proved valuable in other parts of the world; and many well-deserved military reputations date from this unhappy war. Of the three arms the Cavalry was least employed and had the least chances of distinction, yet few officers earned a higher reputation in the American War than did the subject of this sketch; a circumstance which a brief narrative of his truly remarkable exploits may serve to explain.

Banastre Tarleton was born August 21, 1754, the son of a Liverpool merchant. In early life he was educated for the Bar, but, being attracted to the profession of arms, he bought, at the age of twenty, a cornetcy in the King's Dragoon Guards. His commanding officer was Colonel Sloper, a veteran of the Seven Years' War who had been the principal witness against Lord George Sackville at his court-martial.

Tarleton served nearly two years in England, and rapidly became a highly efficient officer. Ambitious of distinction, he volunteered for service in America, and sailed for that country in December 1777. Tarleton's first experience of active service was an unpleasant one, for he was present at General Clinton's reverse before Charleston in June 1776. Three months later, however, he took part in the re-capture of New York, by Sir William Howe. The tidings of this achievement, by the way, were spoken of by Charles James Fox as 'terrible news,' an early demonstration of what is now called the pro-Boer spirit. Tarleton served also in the severe action of White Plains, in October of the same year, and on December 13 distinguished himself when in command of the advanced guard of the patrol under Colonel Harcourt, which made a successful dash and captured the American General, Charles Lee, who was reconnoitring. This was the first of many similar exploits.

Early in 1777 Tarleton was selected for the appointment of Brigade-Major of Cavalry, and in this capacity served under Sir William Howe at the action of Brandywine, and at the capture of Philadelphia. So far Howe's operations had been generally successful, but the surrender, after most determined efforts, of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga (October 1777), and the declaration of war by France, completely turned the scale. Howe received no adequate support from England and adopted a policy of inaction. Tarleton, therefore, had no special chance of distinction during the winter of 1777; but the mounted troops were constantly engaged, and when, on the resignation of Sir William Howe, in the following April, the officers of the Army gave a farewell entertainment in his honour and Tarleton appeared among the knights in armour who figured therein, with the motto 'Swift, vigilant and bold' emblazoned on his banner, it was recognised that the words were appropriate, if not modest. The young soldier had justified his selection for the staff; he was soon to show his fitness for command.

A local corps had recently been raised at Philadelphia, which was named 'The Caledonian Volunteers.' Its first commander was Captain Sutherland, who was presently succeeded by Lord Cathcart. On the removal of the latter by promotion, his place was taken by Tarleton. The Volunteers were now reconstituted and re-named, becoming a mixed corps of Cavalry and Infantry under the title, soon to be widely known, of 'The British Legion.' A small party of the 17th Light Dragoons was permanently attached to the corps as a training establishment for the mounted men, and in addition a troop of the same regiment was usually

attached for duty, serving under its own officers. Tarleton, on receiving command of the Legion, was granted the local rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was at the same time gazetted senior captain of the 79th Foot (Royal Liverpool Volunteers), a regiment raised in his native town. The promotions bore date January 8, 1778, Tarleton being still little over twenty-three years of age.

General Clinton, on taking over command from Sir William Howe, found it necessary to concentrate his strength, and therefore executed, in the month of June, a difficult retreat by land from Philadelphia to New York, during which Tarleton commanded the rear-guard. Clinton being then condemned for a time to inaction, Tarleton devoted all his energy to the training of the 'British Legion' on a system all his own. He and his men, while retaining the sword, adopted the carbine also; they soon became finished backwoodsmen, proof against fatigue, and able, as they soon showed, to outwit and out-fight the Americans at their own game of partisan warfare. Both the Cavalry and Infantry of the Legion were trained for fighting purposes only, ceremonial being entirely discarded. For his services at this period, and during the previous retreat to New York, Tarleton was gazetted a major in the Army in August 1779. The campaign of this year closed with the triumphant defence of Savannah against a powerful combined French and American army. An assault having been repulsed, with heavy loss to the French troops, they were re-embarked on their fleet and sailed to the West Indies. Negotiations for peace, however, came to nothing, and Sir Henry Clinton decided on a vigorous campaign in the Southern Colonies in the year 1780, and it was in the operations that followed that Tarleton established his reputation as a leader of Cavalry.

Sailing from New York in December 1779, with 7600 men, Clinton arrived before Charleston early in the following April. The sea passage had been long delayed by stormy weather, and the two mounted corps, Simcoe's 'Rangers' and Tarleton's 'Legion,' lost nearly all their horses. Clinton lost no time in opening a regular siege of the town, which was strongly fortified and garrisoned, and despatched a column to the north to cut off the communications of Charleston with its source of supply. Tarleton's Legion and a corps of Infantry marksmen, commanded by Major Ferguson, 70th Regiment, formed part of this column. Ferguson was to the Infantry in America what Tarleton was to the Cavalry, and on April 12, 1780, the two fell suddenly by night upon an American force of three Cavalry regiments in a strong position, some thirty miles

from Charleston. The surprise was complete, and the Americans were dispersed, losing all their stores and ammunition, 400 horses and 100 prisoners. By this success Tarleton remounted his Cavalry, and also was provided with horses for part of the Infantry of the Legion, thereby greatly increasing its mobility. On May 6, after another march of thirty miles, he again defeated the Americans, who were advancing to re-capture their lost position, and the investment of Charleston was thus completed. Three days later it surrendered with a loss to the Americans of over 6000 prisoners. This was one of the most decisive triumphs of our arms during the War of Independence, and no small share of the credit was allotted to Tarleton.

General Clinton now returned to New York and left the operations in the Southern Colonies in charge of Lord Cornwallis, an active and vigorous soldier from whom Tarleton received full support and a free hand. Cornwallis, without delay, began operations in the interior of Carolina, advancing in three columns to sweep the country. Receiving information of the position of a detachment under Colonel Burford, which had retired on hearing of the fall of Charleston, he sent Tarleton in pursuit with 240 of his own Dragoons and Mounted Infantry, and forty of the 17th Light Dragoons, with one gun. Tarleton made an extraordinary hot-weather march to a district on the borders of North and South Carolina, then called 'the Waxhaws,' covering 105 miles in fifty-four hours. On arriving within twenty miles of Burford's force Tarleton sent forward an officer and summoned Burford to surrender, but the latter continued his retreat. Finally Tarleton came up and, dividing his small force, attacked the Americans on both flanks, and in the centre. The American Infantry, imitating British methods, held their fire, but too long, and were broken in an instant. Over one hundred of them were killed, and 200, with two guns, were captured. For this exploit Tarleton was highly commended in despatches.

Lord Cornwallis now proceeded to base his operations on Camden, a town on the navigable river Santee, where in the month of August he found himself threatened by a largely superior force under General Gates, the officer to whom Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga. Lord Cornwallis had less than 2000 men, and Gates had perhaps 6000, but of inferior quality. By an unusual coincidence the two forces advanced simultaneously to the attack and met on the march. After a short but severe struggle, on August 16, the skill of Cornwallis and the superior discipline of his force prevailed, and the Americans broke and fled.



Tarleton, who commanded the Cavalry, got round and charged the Americans from the rear, an achievement which was the turning-point of the action, and subsequently made a most effective pursuit of twenty-two miles, his vigour and capacity being again highly praised by Cornwallis.

On the following day, Tarleton, with 350 men, moving with great secrecy and rapidity, marched northward to attack a force of 1000 men under General Sumpter, which had been intended as a reinforcement to Gates's army. Owing to the heat and to overwork only 180 of Tarleton's men were still with him when at three in the afternoon of August 18 he surprised Sumpter's column in its bivouac, and destroyed it as a fighting force. In his despatch of December 3, 1780, Lord Cornwallis wrote of this affair: 'It is not easy for Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton to add to the reputation he has acquired in this province, but the defeating 1000 men, posted on very strong ground and occupying log-houses, by 100 Cavalry and 80 Infantry, without the assistance of any Artillery, is a proof of that spirit and those talents which must render essential service to his country.'

In January 1781 Tarleton sustained his first reverse. He was then at the head of about 1000 men, and had been despatched by Lord Cornwallis, who was operating in North Carolina, to attack a force of nearly equal strength, under Colonel Morgan, an adept in backwood fighting. The action took place in an open tract known as 'the Cowpens,' and owing to the misconduct of some of Tarleton's troops resulted in a severe defeat with heavy loss. On this occasion Tarleton's bold tactics failed, though they were designed and executed with his usual skill and spirit. Fortune was against him, but it was generally admitted that the disaster which befell was brought about by no fault of his, and Lord Cornwallis, a generous commander, at once affirmed the fact. Tarleton himself showed his usual desperate gallantry in his attempts to restore the fortune of the day, and he was bravely supported by his officers and by the troop of the 17th Light Dragoons; but the irregulars of the Legion failed him in the hour of adversity.

In the successful action at Guildford, in North Carolina, the last victory of Cornwallis (March 15, 1781), Tarleton commanded the Cavalry, again highly distinguished himself, and was very severely wounded, losing half his right hand. The victory of Guildford, gallantly won and dearly bought, had no lasting effect, and Lord Cornwallis was eventually compelled to take up the hopeless position of Yorktown and Gloucester.

Tarleton commanded the latter post, and continued his bold services and gave his bold counsel to the end, which came in the surrender of Cornwallis on October 19, 1781.

With this disaster Tarleton's active career came to an end. He had been promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army for his services at Guildford; in five years of incessant active service in the field he had earned a high and deserved reputation as a Cavalry leader; and he was still only twenty-seven years old. Instead, however, of pursuing his career he turned to politics and pleasure, sitting for many years in the House of Commons as member for Liverpool, and becoming a prominent figure in the world of fashion. He attained the rank of General, and died in 1833, having been created a Baronet and having received the Grand Cross of the Bath.

Tarleton was a remarkable soldier with an instinctive talent for war. He achieved his successes, usually at very small cost, by the secrecy of his operations, the high standard of training of his officers and men, and by his own skill and daring in action. He fought with the object of inflicting every possible loss and injury on his enemy, and he has been accused of undue harshness, and even of cruelty. American writers have gone so far as to describe him as 'a devil incarnate,' but the same writers call Lord Cornwallis, an exceptionally humane soldier, 'a relentless savage.' Such unmeasured language loses all effect, and leaves no stain on the persons attacked.

## SPANISH OPERATIONS AT MELILLA

(TO NOVEMBER 1, 1909)

By CAPTAIN F. D. FARQUHAR, D.S.O., *Coldstream Guards, General Staff*

### SPANISH OPERATIONS IN THE RIFF

#### *Previous History*

THE beginning of Spanish rule in North Africa may be said to coincide with the decline of the power of the Moors in Spain. In 1492 the Spaniards took Granada from the Moors, and in the succeeding years they fitted out expeditions against Marocco. In 1496 Melilla was captured by the Spaniards, and they took Velez de la Gomera in 1564, Ceuta in 1580, and Alhucemas in 1673. These latter places lie to the west of Melilla, the distances being—Ceuta 150 miles, Velez de la Gomera 90 miles, and Alhucemas 46 miles.

A period of continual strife followed between the Spaniards and the Riffians until in 1767 a treaty was signed between the Emperor of Marocco and the King of Spain. It is interesting to note that in 1808 England occupied Ceuta under pretext of protecting it from attack by the French. She, however, evacuated it almost immediately owing to the protests of the King of Spain.

In 1810 the Sultan offered to buy back all the Spanish possessions in North Africa for the not very dazzling sum of 20,000*l.*; the Cortes consented, but the deal never came off as England refused her consent. The French invaded Algeria in 1830, which turned the eyes of Europe once more towards the north coast of Africa, and in 1848 the Spaniards took possession of the Zafarin Islands, 30 miles east of Melilla; these islands give a certain amount of protection from the gales and heavy seas outside, and there is a good anchorage between the islands and the mainland. The population of the largest of the islands consisted in 1906 of one unhappy Spanish corporal and four men, representatives of the entirely simple life.

In 1859 the Spaniards, under General Prim, really exerted themselves, defeated the Moors at Wad Ras, and marched to Tetuan.



MELILLA.  
The Old Town.



FORT  
CAMELOS.

Spanish  
Operations  
at  
Melilla.



MELILLA.  
The Anchorage.



MELILLA.  
General View.





PA VIA  
HUSSARS.



BREAST-WORKS AT NADOR.



PA VIA  
HUSSARS.

## Spanish Operations at Mehilla.



OBSERVATION LADDERS.  
Made from railway lines.



THE DE LA REINA  
LANCERS AT NADOR.

This is the only occasion during all these centuries of intercourse that the Spaniards have really mastered the Riffians.

In 1893 there was a recrudescence of trouble, but although the Spaniards put 25,000 men into the field, they achieved little success.

#### THE RIFFIANS AND THEIR COUNTRY

The Riff (which in Arabic means 'edge') is the name given to the region along the north coast of Africa, roughly from Melilla to Tetuan. It is curious to think that this country (part of which is not thirty miles from Gibraltar) has never been conquered within the memory of men, and is to this day practically unknown and unexplored.

In this small patch on the map exist some thirty independent tribes. The majority of them belong to the Berber family, the aborigines of Morocco. They are of light complexion, fanatical, fierce and warlike, and are indifferent to religious matters: in some respects they bear a strong resemblance to the Pathans on the Indian frontier, though they are probably less formidable fighters, as they are not, as a rule, good shots. As a matter of fact, the Riff proper does not extend east of the Mar Chica, and the Quebdana tribesmen are not pure-bred Riffians, but have a considerable strain of Arab blood.

#### MELILLA

Melilla is situated only 40 miles from the French frontier. It consists of a town with ancient fortifications on a rocky peninsula, which juts out into the sea for nearly 500 yards. It is connected with the mainland by an isthmus about 100 yards long and 80 yards broad. The port consists of two quays, alongside which only vessels of from 5 to 8 feet draught can lie; in the roadstead  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 miles to the east, on the other hand, there are depths of from 18 to 25 fathoms. A mole is now in process of construction, but the roadstead is so open to all north-east winds that the harbour is never likely to be completely satisfactory.

Beyond the isthmus is the modern suburb, 'El poligono,' which consists of good two-storied houses and is comparatively clean.

The civilian population in ordinary times is about 4000.

The total trade in 1906 amounted to about 500,000*l.*, the imports from Spain being represented by only 60,000*l.*

The water supply is bad.

The Spanish territory is traced at a distance of about 3600 yards from the town, with a neutral zone about 600 yards broad beyond it.

It is defended by nine masonry forts ; they have no ditches, and they would not be tenable against modern artillery, but they may be considered as impregnable against riflemen, being well sited with a good field of fire. Their armament, though not of the latest pattern, is quite adequate against the Riffians.

There are no fortifications on the sea side.

The usual garrison consists of 6000 men, including two Infantry regiments, one squadron, one disciplinary brigade, and batteries of Field and Mountain Artillery.

#### THE COUNTRY

The most noticeable feature of the country west of the town is Mount Gurugu (3225 feet high) and the mountains of Cape Tres Forcas (1200 feet). Between these two points the country is extremely difficult, ploughed out with nullahs and ravines, a regular sniper's paradise. Following the railway along the sea-coast the going is fairly good until the Mar Chica is reached. Continuing along the road surveyed for the railway, a difficult pass has to be negotiated between Atalayon and the continuation of the Gurugu range. The direct route from Nador to Zeluan is again through mountainous country, while north-west of Zeluan lies the difficult tangled mass of the Beni-bu-ifror Mountains, where the Spanish mines are.

East and north-east of Zeluan the country is far flatter and easier.

A good deal of the district is very fertile, vegetation extending nearly to the top of Mount Gurugu, the chief products being corn, barley, sweet potatoes and vegetables.

The climate is mild and healthy on the whole, the hot air from the desert being intercepted by the Atlas range. Rain falls from October to February, at times very heavily. There is a certain amount of malaria, notably in the marshy ground on the banks of the river Oro, immediately south of Melilla.

Inside the Spanish territory good metalled roads exist, elsewhere the so-called roads are only tracks : motor cars and even motor lorries have managed to get to Zeluan *via* Nador, but, generally speaking, pack transport only can be used.

#### ORIGIN OF THE WAR


Some years ago it was discovered that minerals (chiefly iron ore) existed in the Beni-bu-ifror Mountains. A company, called the North







# SPANISH OPERATIONS AT MELILLA





African Company, was brought out to work them. This company was founded by a Frenchman, Monsieur Massenet, and was largely financed by French capital ; it obtained a concession from the Moorish Pretender, Bu Hamara. A survey of the railway was made and completed to the Second Caseta.

Another company, called the Spanish Mining Company, was subsequently formed, backed by a Spanish group of financiers. This company also obtained a concession from the Pretender, and was building its railway, which ran parallel to the other, when the war broke out.

At the time he gave the concessions the Pretender was supreme in the Riff, and the then Sultan of Morocco, Abd-el-Aziz, is believed to have made no protest. The present Sultan, Mulai Hafid, on coming to the throne, sent word to the Spaniards that Bu Hamara had no right to make concessions, and that they had no right to work the mines.

After the Sultan's message, the Moors round Melilla became somewhat truculent. During last spring the Spaniards made various military promenades through undoubted Moorish territory, thinking apparently that this would have a soothing effect. Things went from bad to worse, and on July 9 the Moors attacked a working party on the railway near the Second Caseta, killing four Spanish navvies.

#### THE SPANISH ARMY (GENERAL)

Before going any further it will be as well to take a glance at the forces of the two combatants. The Spanish Army has a peace strength of about 72,000 men, which, according to Spanish war establishments, could be expanded in war to 290,000 men without including the second reserve. It is organised in fourteen Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division.

Service is by way of being compulsory, but a large number of men are excused for various reasons ; men can, for instance, buy exemption from service for 60*l*. Recruits join in their twenty-second year, and are by way of serving with the colours for three years and in the reserve for another nine. As a matter of fact, a soldier only spends from one year to two and a half years with the colours, and is then sent home on unlimited leave, so that there are always a number of men who are nominally doing their colour service who are away, but can be called up if occasion demands it.

This army of 300,000 men looks very well on paper : in case of a real

national danger, such as the invasion of Spain by some foreign nation, it would no doubt be possible to recall all reservists to the colours to defend their country. But that is a very different thing from dislocating the whole commerce of the country by recalling the reservists and sending them off on what many Spaniards considered a 'capitalists' war' in Melilla. It must be remembered, too, that Spain used always to be in financial difficulties while she possessed Cuba and the Philippines: those two dependencies hung like millstones round her neck, and absorbed all her surplus cash. Since she lost Cuba, her financial affairs have shown a great and consistent recovery; many thoughtful Spaniards therefore regarded this adventure at Melilla as establishing a second Cuba on the coast of Africa, which would again involve the country in a financial quagmire.

How, then, was an expeditionary force to be organised? The first reinforcements were sent from Barcelona, and consisted of the peace cadres filled up with ordinary reservists. This step had two effects:

1. It interfered with commerce and caused great dissatisfaction in Barcelona, and Barcelona is the most unpatriotic place in Spain.
2. It weakened the garrison in that city.

Its result was the serious outbreak in Barcelona in July, which caused considerable loss of life and made it necessary to proclaim martial law throughout the whole of Spain.

The authorities then recognised that in future it would be more politic to send only the men doing their colour service (including those on unlimited leave) to the war. Subsequent reinforcements consisted in most cases of peace cadres filled up with drafts from other regiments, which of course meant that many of the men were strangers to each other and to their officers.

It should be remembered that with the exception of the 6000 men garrisoned at Melilla, the Spanish troops had no knowledge of the country or of the method of fighting there.

#### THE RIFFIANS

It is extremely difficult to arrive at any accurate estimate of the number of the Riffians. Such a force is necessarily rather a fluid quantity. Among warlike people of that description a number of reinforcements will arrive for a time in order to have a little diversion and to obtain a little loot, but they will go home when they are bored, or hungry, or out of ammunition.

There is no central authority to keep them in the field.

Again, their great mobility and their knack of appearing at several points in rapid succession, not to mention the large number of camp followers who accompany them even into battle, make the numbers of fighting men look larger than they really are. Some Spanish newspapers said that as many as 40,000 men were in the field, though it would be quite impossible to feed so large a force from local resources.

Judging from the estimate of impartial British war correspondents of considerable experience, it seems possible that on one or two occasions as many as 15,000 or even 20,000 Moors may have been under arms; the average, however, is much less than that, and probably has not exceeded 4000 to 5000, while not more than 3000 have probably ever appeared on any one battlefield. It is interesting to note that the Spaniards had concentrated 46,000 men at Melilla in October.

As regards armament, the Riffians had no artillery; as to rifles, they had a considerable quantity—probably more than 1500—Mausers, the remainder being Remingtons, Martinis, &c. Bu Hamara is reported to have collected a considerable quantity of ammunition when he was in the Riff, and some of the leading Kaid's probably had stores of their own; beyond this they have been nearly entirely dependent on what could be smuggled across from Spain or what could be taken from the enemy. A certain number of cartridges have been recharged by them with slugs, hammered telegraph wire, rusty nails and other surprise packets of that sort, but they have too much regard for their rifles to do this on a large scale.

The Riffians have the advantage not only of intimate knowledge of the country, but also of fighting in defence of their homes; and, in addition, they have considerable contempt as well as dislike for the Spaniards. A certain number of the Chiefs are mounted, but they have no real Cavalry or Mounted Infantry. The nucleus of their force is composed of the Guelaya group of tribes, of which the Beni-bu-ifror are the most formidable.

#### OPERATIONS

The campaign up to November 1 can be divided into various phases.

PHASE I.—July 9–27. The period of the Spanish reverses.

PHASE II.—July 28–August 24, when the Spaniards were collecting reinforcements and provisions.

PHASE III.—August 25–September 19. During this time the

Spaniards had given up the idea of taking Gurugu frontally and moved round to the south of the Mar Chica.

PHASE IV.—September 20-30, the fighting phase.

PHASE V.—September 30-November 1. This was a period of complete inactivity.

#### PHASE I

When the four Spanish navvies were killed on the railway line, near Sidi Musa on July 9, General Marina had only the 6400 men of the Melilla garrison available. He acted with vigour and promptitude; he immediately sent out two companies to pursue the aggressors, and speedily followed in person, bringing one squadron, six Infantry companies, the disciplinary brigade of 200 men, one field and one mountain battery. With this force he chased the Moors from ridge to ridge, eventually halting on the heights with the simple name of Jebel Sidi Ahmet el Hadj, with his left on the Atalayon hill which is about 300 feet high, and his right bent back to Sidi Musa. The Spanish casualties were six killed and twenty-seven wounded. The Spanish entrenched themselves in this position and prepared to hang on there. As can be seen, this is not an ideal place for an entrenched line which is to be held for some period. Gurugu completely commands the line and enfilades it, while the position of the Gurugu range in rear of the right of the line makes that mountain a suitable point of concentration for a force acting against the Spanish convoys and lines of communication; a successful attack on the second Caseta would cut the Spaniards in two, in which case the advanced troops, with no means of getting food and ammunition, would be in a precarious condition.

However, the line was occupied and is still occupied.

The Spanish Government had foreseen the possibility of trouble in Melilla, and held in readiness three brigades of 'Cazadores,' or light Infantry, at Barcelona, Madrid, and Algeciras.

Each brigade was about 6000 strong, and included twelve mountain guns. The Barcelona brigade was despatched at once and disembarked at Melilla between July 17 and 20. And it arrived none too soon. A Moorish force attacked Sidi Musa and Atalayon in the afternoon of the 18th, and the action continued till 3 A.M. the following day, the Spanish having forty casualties. Though the Spanish were finally successful, the Moors actually forced their way at one time inside the Spanish entrenchments.

After this action the Madrid brigade of Cazadores was despatched to Melilla ; most of them had arrived by July 23 and 24, so that General Marina had about 16,000 men available on those dates.

On July 20 another night attack was made on Sidi Musa and the Second Caseta, which the Spanish only repulsed after suffering 102 casualties.

Heavy sniping continued, but the Moors made no further attack until the 23rd ; on that date they crept up under cover of night and attacked at dawn, taking advantage of a fog ; the first attack was against Atalayon, and when that had developed, they launched their main attack against Sidi Musa. The fighting lasted for over twenty hours, and was real ' hammer and tongs ' at certain moments.

The Spanish had a casualty list of fifty-five killed and 261 wounded, and had to relinquish some of their advanced positions.

The *morale* of the troops appears to have suffered somewhat, which was hardly to be wondered at : the original Melilla garrison were worn out with incessant fighting and outpost duty ; the Barcelona brigade was full of reservists who were almost mutinous at being sent to Melilla ; and, in addition to this, all the Spanish troops found themselves engaged in a class of fighting quite unforeseen by their drill books, and they were pushed into the firing line the moment they set foot on shore, before they had even recovered from the pangs of sea-sickness.

After the above actions the Algeciras brigade was sent to Melilla, arriving there between the 29th and the 31st. On July 27 occurred the most costly action of the war. It was discovered at dawn that the Moors had pulled up about 200 yards of railway between the first and second stations, about three miles from the Hippodrome. A convoy and working party were sent out to repair the line under the escort of the Madrid brigade under General Pintos. This brigade protected the front and right flank of the convoy, which accomplished its work and retired to Melilla. The Moors, who up to this time had been firing chiefly at the convoy, now turned their attention to the escort. General Pintos began to lose men ; at about 4.30 P.M. he suddenly launched an attack, apparently with the intention of capturing the whole of Mount Gurugu. The Moors, who were in excellent positions, concealed behind boulders and rocks, steadily picked off the officers. The Spaniards were ignorant of the ground, and began to advance up a ravine called the Wolf's Gorge, which was a blind alley with high unscaleable sides. The brigade was soon in difficulties, units got separated and split up ; General



Pintos and two commanding officers were killed ; the Spaniards in rear fired upon their comrades in front thinking they were Moors. General Marina, who was in Melilla when the attack began, brought out all his Artillery and covered the retirement with a tremendous bombardment. The brigade dribbled back ; its losses have not yet been officially published, but it appears practically certain that they exceeded 1200, many of them caused by Spanish bullets—a heavy proportion of casualties, considering that only about 4500 men were engaged.

General Pintos appears to have acted without orders, for it is unlikely that General Marina, a most conscientious man, would have been in Melilla when so important an attack was taking place ; it is also unlikely for him to have ordered an attack by one isolated brigade as late as 4.30 P.M.

So ends the first phase, in which the Spanish casualties amounted to over 2000 out of a total force of about 16,000.

The causes for their non-success appear to be :—

1. The want of war training among both officers and men.
2. Ignorance of the ground and the method of fighting suitable to the ground.
3. The rash initiative of General Pintos.

## PHASE II

During this period the Spaniards dug themselves in while their reinforcements disembarked and settled down.

The following group of four redoubts was made and garrisoned by a brigade (nominal strength 6000 men) :—

Redoubt No. I.	at the Second Caseta	.	.	Garrison	1000
„	No. II. at Sidi Musa	.	.	„	700
„	No. III. at Sidi Ahmet El Hadj	.	.	„	1200
„	No. IV. at Atalayon Hill	.	.	„	800

The redoubts were well sited and well built, consisting of stone sangars, crowned with sandbags and usually recessed and provided with head-cover.

In addition to the Infantry garrison, some mountain guns were allotted to each fort. Two blockhouses were made between the Second Caseta and the permanent defences ; and the intervals in the permanent defences were strengthened by shelter trenches and wire entanglement.

The fighting was confined to raids by the Riffs, usually made by

night, on the railway and the redoubts ; though the Spaniards suffered casualties—forty men being killed and wounded on the night of August 2, for example—the general situation remained unchanged.

The expeditionary force was reorganised as follows :—

1. 1st Division (8000 strong), under General Orozco, consisted of two Infantry brigades, one Cavalry regiment, thirty-eight batteries of Q.-F. field guns. This division was chiefly composed of the Madrid garrison, and was in a higher state of efficiency than the rest of the army.

2. The *Light Division* (12,000 strong), under General Tovar, consisted of twelve rifle battalions and twenty-four mountain guns.

3. Army troops about 7000 strong, consisting of one mixed brigade, balloon section, searchlights, railway section, &c.

4. The Melilla garrison (reduced to about 5000 men). The total amounting to 32,000 men, 1200 of whom were Cavalry.

### PHASE III

Now, when the curtain is about to ring up on the real commencement of the campaign it may be instructive to consider the alternatives open to a commander placed at Melilla with 32,000 men. It certainly seems that our experience—a pretty wide one—in small wars has shown us that the most ingenious strategical combinations are in this sort of warfare often inferior to a straight heavy blow. The difficulty sometimes is to induce the enemy to fight ; this, however, certainly does not seem to have been the difficulty at Melilla.

The mere occupation of ground does not in itself constitute a victory ; sooner or later the nettle must be firmly grasped, which fact the Spaniards did not appear to realise.

Would it not have been sound either (1) to have moved across the Guelaya peninsula (which is only six miles broad opposite Melilla) and to have attacked Gurugu from the north, or preferably (2) to have moved round south of the Mar Chica and, with Zeluan as a centre, to have had a regular ' drive ' to the north ?

Rightly or wrongly, General Marina decided to move round the Mar Chica, but this step was not followed by any decisive action.

The Mar Chica is sixteen miles long and has an average width of five miles. The portion north of Atalayon is shallow, the southern portion is deeper. The lagoon must at one time have been joined to the sea, but the channels are now practically closed ; as a consequence so

much water has been lost by evaporation that the lagoon is nearly 8 feet lower than the sea ; as soon as a canal could be cut, therefore, the level of the lagoon would rise, and it would become sufficiently deep to allow small gunboats to use it.

On August 25 a column consisting of one regiment, one squadron, and one battery, under General Aguilera, moved fifteen miles along the narrow spit of land between the Mar Chica and the sea to La Restinga, where a supply depôt was formed ; on the following day Aguilera moved to Sok-el-Arbaa, where he established an entrenched camp. This camp was only sixteen miles from Zeluan, the most important city in the neighbourhood and the former headquarters of the Pretender, also a place of strategical importance, as it commands the plain from the Muluya to the River Quert, which turns Gurugu. Aguilera was to some extent 'en l'air,' as he was separated from the rest of the Spanish army by the whole length of the Mar Chica. Efforts were accordingly made to establish an armed flotilla on the Mar Chica, both for tactical co-operation and to assist in the transport of supplies.

Several efforts had been made both to reopen the northern channel from the Mar Chica to the sea and to cut a new channel at La Restinga. The width of the isthmus is 150 yards in the former place and 500 yards in the latter ; although three dredgers were sent out from Spain each capable of excavating 300 cubic metres per hour, neither channel was open for the passage of gunboats up to the middle of November.

However, one launch (armed with a Nordenfeldt gun) and several lighters were got over the isthmus on rollers in time to be of some assistance to Aguilera.

On August 31 Aguilera was attacked, but in the open, flat country the Spanish Artillery gave a far better account of themselves than they had in the mountains. The Moors retired, losing, according to the Spaniards, thirty-five killed, the Spanish only having one man wounded.

On September 4 Aguilera made a reconnaissance along the Mar Chica. The Moors at first hoisted white flags and professed the most pacific intentions. As soon as the reconnaissance moved back, however, these white flags became the rallying points for a counter-attack, and the rearguard had some difficulty in reaching camp.

On September 6 Aguilera, whose force now amounted to two squadrons, four battalions, one field and one mountain battery, advanced on Lehdara. The advance was in two columns and worked admirably. One column moved along the Mar Chica, turned the left flank of the Moors

opposing it, and drove them east into the arms of column No. 2. The Spanish casualties were seventeen, those of the Moors were estimated at 250. Though this may have been an exaggeration, it was a good sweep-up and perhaps the best bit of work in the campaign.

On September 7 the rest of the 1st Division arrived at Sok-el-Arbaa. On the 9th the division moved five miles inland to Zoco-el-Jemis, where it remained until the 20th.

In the meantime Colonel Larrea, with two battalions, one squadron, one mountain battery, and 400 friendly natives, had been carrying out a series of military patrols near Cabo de Agua. On August 27 he moved to Tasaguin; on September 6 he moved down the Muluya (which, by the way, is the French frontier at this point). He met with small opposition, and on September 7 the local tribes gave in their submission, surrendered some arms, and paid a fine of 200*l*.

These successes, coupled with the severe punitive measures adopted by Aguilera, who destroyed the crops, gardens, and houses in the districts where he encountered opposition, seem really to have brought about the pacification of the Quebdana.

Between September 9 and 13 a third division of about 11,000, under General Sotomayor, was despatched from Spain, bringing the effective total of the expeditionary force to 43,000 men.

#### PHASE IV

General Marina's plans now began to develop. His first object was to occupy the whole breadth of the Guelaya Peninsula (about six miles broad) from Melilla to the sea on the other side, thus cutting the Moors in two.

The Light Division under General Tovar moved in two columns each of one squadron, one Infantry brigade, and three mountain batteries under Brigadiers Morales and Alfau respectively.

The Army Troops Brigade kept up connection with Melilla.

Morales reached Taxdirt and Alfau reached Jatel (each about four miles from Melilla). Alfau's left flank was subsequently attacked by 2000 Moors; this attack was beaten off, but on the Moors being reinforced by 2000 riflemen and 1500 mounted men (according to the Spanish estimate) the attack was resumed with resolution. Fighting continued till 6 P.M., one Spanish squadron of the Alfonso XIII. regiment bringing off three successful charges. The Spanish casualties were

nineteen killed and one hundred wounded. Those of the Moors were said to amount to 700; they, at any rate, probably lost nearly as many men as the Spaniards.

On September 22, Sok-el-Had, the chief centre of the Beni-Sicar, was occupied by General Sotomayor direct from Melilla, in co-operation with Tovar's division: Spanish losses, seven wounded. On September 24, four Chiefs and 2000 Moors surrendered at Sok-el-Had.

On September 20, Orozco moved to the Aograz wells. On the 25th he moved out in two columns, moving first towards Zeluan, which caused the Moors to concentrate in its defence. He then wheeled to his right on Tauima, which he took at 11 A.M. Leaving a battalion and a battery there as a flank guard, he marched on Nador. This position had been fortified against an attack from the Melilla direction, but Orozco's movement took it completely in reverse. It was shelled from Atalayon and Sidi-Hamed, as well as by Orozco, and was captured at a cost of five casualties, and was razed to the ground. Orozco moved as a flying column without transport, picking up supplies by water at Tauima.

The next day Tovar's division (which had been moved across from Taxdirt) joined Orozco, raising the force at Nador to nearly 20,000 men. On the 27th this large army marched to Zeluan, which was occupied practically without opposition.

On the 28th a night attack was made on Sotomayor at Sok-el-Had, which showed that the Moors were keeping their spirits up. On the 29th sixteen companies under General Real occupied the summit of the redoubtable Mount Gurugu; though their advance was practically unopposed, and their retreat a trifle hasty, this occupation was carried out with a good deal of flag flying, martial music, and the pomp and circumstance of glorious war, a little detracted from by occasional excursions and alarums on the part of the Riff snipers. The actual summit of the ridge was found to be untenable, and a position had to be taken up on the lower slopes.

The occupation of Gurugu was greeted with immense enthusiasm in Spain, where everyone, including the Government, appeared to think the campaign at an end.

But alas! for the most fickle of all fortunes, the fortune of war; on the very next day these aspirations were dashed to the ground.

General Tovar advanced to make a reconnaissance in force with three brigades, under Generals Alfau, Morales, and Diaz Vicarios, in the direction of Sok-el-Jemis, north of Zeluan. The column, which started

at 7 A.M., encountered the enemy about 9, and found them in force (estimated by the Spaniards at 7000 men). By 10 A.M. all three brigades were deployed, Vicarios being on the left ; by 2.30 P.M. nearly the whole force was in the firing line ; the Moors began to lap round the Spanish right and gained a rocky eminence from which they opened a useful enfilade fire. The force retired in échelon from the right ; unfortunately at this moment the ammunition of the artillery failed, and for the next three-quarters of an hour the guns were useless. The Moors, encouraged by the retirement and the sudden cessation of artillery fire, put in a determined attack, and in the next hour caused eighty casualties in three companies. The Spanish troops behaved uncommonly pluckily under these trying circumstances, and the retirement was carried out without panic or disorder. The casualties were heavy, amounting to forty-one killed and 248 wounded, but those of the Moors were also undoubtedly numerous.

This concludes the fourth phase.

The heavy fighting on the 30th caused the despatch from Spain of another Infantry Brigade, under General Carbo, and a Cavalry Brigade, under Prince Carlos de Bourbon. The Cavalry at Melilla were formed into a division of two brigades under General Huertas. This grouping of the Cavalry seemed to promise a speedy resumption of the offensive, and the general opinion was that a concentric advance would be made on the Beni-bu-ifror position from Zeluan, Nador, and Sok-el-Had, the Cavalry Division being used to cut off the retreat of any fugitives who attempted to get away by the valley of the Quert. Nothing, however, happened, and Tovar remained at Zeluan, Orozco at Nador, and Sotomayor at Sok-el-Had ; the rainy season began in the middle of October, which of course made the movement of transport more difficult, and caused dysentery and enteric among the troops, whose ideas of camp sanitation appear to date from the siege of Troy.

No mention has yet been made of the fighting at Alhucemas and Peñon de Velez de la Gomera.

Alhucemas is a rock in a bay of the same name, 1400 yards from the shore ; it is only 165 yards long and 75 yards broad. It has a garrison of about 200 men and a couple of coast defence batteries, one of which is of a very old type.

Velez de la Gomera is another rock off the coast of Africa, and is only 100 yards from the mainland ; it is 420 yards long and 120 yards

broad. It has one ancient battery of Krupp guns and a garrison of 150 men.

Nothing definite or decisive has occurred in either of these places. The Moors have done a good deal of 'sniping' with rifles; the Spaniards have 'sniped' with their aged coast defence guns, and the results are naturally small.

It may be said that the Spaniards have practically been in the position of beleaguered garrisons; since the so-called fighting in these two places does not affect affairs at Melilla, perhaps we may leave them at that.

### ORGANISATION

#### *Divisional*

The ordinary Spanish division consists of :—

Two Infantry brigades of two Line regiments (each of three battalions).

One Cavalry regiment of four squadrons.

One Artillery regiment (of eight batteries, divided into three brigades).

One company of Army Service Corps.

One section Army Medical Brigade.

At the commencement of the campaign the Spaniards were not organised in divisions, but in what were called Mixed Brigades.

When the divisional organisation was adopted it differed in several important particulars from the normal one.

First of all, as regards the Light Division (about 12,000 strong), under General Tovar. This was composed of two Mixed Brigades each of six battalions of Light Infantry (Cazadores), one squadron, three mountain batteries, one Sapper and one Field Telegraph Company, one company A.S.C., and one Mounted Ambulance.

The Infantry of each Mixed Brigade was again subdivided into two demi-brigades each of three battalions.

Two other Divisions about 8000 strong were formed under Generals Orozco and Sotomayor; these differed as regards organisation both from the normal Spanish division and from Tovar's Light Division. A new name was coined for them, and they were called the first and second Organic Divisions. They differed from the normal division in the following particulars.

Each Infantry regiment contained two battalions of 800 men each,

instead of three battalions of 1000 men each, so that the divisions contained 6400 Infantry instead of 12,000.

The Artillery numbered three batteries instead of eight.

The Cavalry consisted of two squadrons instead of one regiment of four squadrons.

One company of Sappers and, in one case, a divisional telegraph company was added.

So that the normal divisional organisation was completely discarded.

### *Brigade*

The 3rd Mixed Brigade (constituted in a similar way to the two Mixed Brigades in the Light Division) was allotted to the Army Troops.

It may be noted that the ordinary peace strength of a Spanish battalion is 300 ; in order to complete battalions to a strength of 800 men it was necessary not only to recall all men on unlimited leave, but also to draft men from other battalions in Spain.

So that the general organisation must be described as ' patchwork.'

### *Cavalry*

The Cavalry were at first organised in one brigade ; subsequently in one division of two brigades each of two 4-squadron regiments. Except that the division had no Horse Artillery its organisation was identical with the normal organisation of Spain's one Cavalry division.

The Cavalry division at Melilla appears never to have existed as a separate unit, except on paper, so that its organisation is not of much importance.

### *Infantry*

As regards the Infantry, the following are the principal points noticed.

## THE ADVANCE

The usual formation on the march was in column of fours, a Cavalry screen in front and a line of Infantry skirmishers on the flanks and in front of the column ; this formation suited the country, but would have been improved on if the Cavalry had gone farther forward. An attack was conducted by a line of skirmishers advancing by sections or squads with a portion of the force in reserve, the advance being made in Indian file the men in rear doubling into line on the order to halt and building up a firing line of about one man per yard. It is claimed that this Indian



file advance gave the enemy a smaller target to aim at, but it entailed a great deal of useless fatigue on the men.

#### COVER

After the first few fights the Spanish soldier learnt to take full advantage of cover ; he, however, retained his fondness for the kneeling and even the standing position ; when excited he will stand up and blaze away, and the officers at such times have little control over their men.

#### MUSKETRY

It must be remembered that many men have only fired on miniature ranges when they finish their colour service. At the longer ranges there was a certain amount of volley firing by sections, but the officers were unable to point out clearly or the men to understand the position of the target, in addition to which the ranges given were so inaccurate as to destroy the value of such shooting. No system of judging distance had been taught, and the consequent waste of ammunition was enormous ; on one occasion men opened fire at 3000 yards merely because a mountain battery was firing at that range. Rapid fire is unsuited to men so little trained as the Spanish.

#### SCOUTING

A certain number of marksmen were told off in each company as scouts, but Infantry scouting did not exist except in so far as a number of men wandering aimlessly about in front of their battalion may be said to be carrying out this important duty.

#### RETREAT

Retreats were conducted in an indifferent manner, because it is only with well-disciplined troops that a retreat can be conducted satisfactorily with enemies like the Riffians. The officers, knowing their men, insisted on the companies or sections moving in close order in two ranks at a walk. The casualties were naturally heavy, but it is impossible in the present state of the Army to do otherwise. The covering fire was good as regards volume, but direction was sadly lacking. The great use of a strong counter-attack was not appreciated, it usually came too late, and the troops involved in it went too far. The difficult problem of bringing in the wounded was well performed during a retreat, involving as it did the loss of two rifles to the firing line for each man carried out of action.

## MARCHING POWER

The men marched excellently, and when one considers that the country is all stones, sand, and thorns, the distances they covered carrying their forty-pound kit seem wonderful. Practically no men fell out on the march.

## EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING

The men carried blanket and knapsack, containing change of clothing and a pair of boots, in addition to bayonet, water-bottle, Mauser rifle, and 150 rounds of ammunition.

The uniform consists of a blue-and-white cotton shirt, much inferior to our khaki, with an English helmet. The Mauser rifle is an excellent weapon, and the knapsack is perhaps an improvement on ours.

## TRENCHES

The Spaniards were slow in making trenches; the shelter trench was not automatically thrown up when a position was occupied. As regards siting, they were too much inclined to cling to the crest.

The barbed wire entanglements, which were usually about twenty feet broad, were too high, and it was possible to crawl under them; the posts were not strong enough, and could be pulled down.

## ORGANISATION OF THE COMPANY

The company of 200 men is a self-supporting unit having its own transport of six mules: one for officers, one for water, one for entrenching tools, the remaining three carrying the men's rations and 3000 rounds of ammunition. Each company is commanded by a captain, and each section (of which there are three) by a subaltern. The corporals, who are really first-class privates, do most of the N.C.O. work, the sergeants, of whom there are two per section, being indifferent N.C.O.s. They have the power of hitting the private soldiers, though they are certainly said not to abuse this privilege.

The method of rationing the men is this: Each captain is allowed 10*d.* per man every day, out of which the man must receive 1½*d.*, the remaining 8½*d.* being spent on the men's food. The money is drawn in bulk by the captain of the company.

The meals consist of a stew of meat or fish, with rice or vegetables cooked in oil, at 9.30 A.M. and 6 P.M., with, in addition, bad coffee at 5 A.M., and a sufficient quantity of bread or biscuit. Special arrangements are

never made to feed the men before a march or an action. On September 30 one regiment was for ten hours without food of any kind, having started on only a cup of weak coffee. Men are supposed to carry three days' rations if necessary ; but this is not always done.

### *The Officers*

The regimental officers are good fellows and brave to a fault : they have a good deal of theoretical knowledge, but do not seem to realise when purely theoretical knowledge must go to the wall, and are perhaps too much bound by text-book maxims.

For example, on one occasion when attacking a hill, which was only held by about half a dozen Moors, one company was extended 3000 yards from the enemy and advanced by alternate rushes for half an hour before coming under fire : so that the men were tired, hot, out of breath, and dispirited before the action had begun, the only reason being that this particular form of attack had been ' laid down.'

### *Men*

The material is excellent, but during the twelve months or so that Spanish Infantry soldiers are trained it is impossible to discipline them properly. For instance, it was found impossible to prevent the men bartering ammunition for fruit. A Moor who was short of ammunition had only to walk into Melilla with a bunch of bananas and he could return with a new supply of cartridges. Though the Spanish soldier is inclined to be lazy, he is strong, enduring, plucky when well led, and, above all, cheerful.

### *Machine Guns*

Maxim and Hotchkiss machine guns were used, one section of two guns being allotted to each brigade.

The barrel of the Hotchkiss had to be unscrewed to be cooled, and several jams occurred from over-heating.

The guns were sometimes used in the firing line ; sometimes they were employed in long-range fire from a flank position.

The waste of ammunition was considerable.

## CAVALRY

### *Armament and Equipment*

The Cavalry trooper, though a smallish man, rides about nineteen stone when fully equipped. The saddle is of a heavy type, the bit a sensible Pelham.

He is armed with a Mauser carbine and sword. Three troops per squadron of the Lancer regiments carry the lance. The sword is of a new pattern, straight, well-balanced, with a roomy grip. Unfortunately, on the only occasion that the Cavalry used them, fourteen swords broke out of seventy, chiefly in withdrawing the weapon after thrusting.

#### *Reconnaissances*

The Cavalry were not sent nearly far enough, and the best value was not got out of them; no attempt was made to brush aside small sniping parties, so that the Cavalry advance was very easily 'held up.'

#### *Shock Action*

On only one occasion did the Cavalry use shock action, when three troops of the Alfonso XIII. Regiment charged on September 20 to relieve an Infantry regiment which was hard pressed. The charge was successful, but seven men were killed and eleven wounded out of seventy.

Many good opportunities of cutting off small bodies of Infantry were not utilised.

#### *Dismounted Action*

The Spaniards recognise the effectiveness of dismounted action, and used it with effect on September 30.

#### *Horses and Horsemastership*

Cavalry horses ranged from 15·3 to 16 hands; 15 per cent. are crossed with blood stock, and they are distinctly useful animals, with lots of substance and very active. The horsemastership was good on the whole, though there were a certain number of sore backs, due chiefly to loss of condition.

The riding can only be described as rather indifferent.

#### ARTILLERY

Organised in 4-gun batteries.

#### *Armament*

Field gun, 75 mm. Q.F. Schneider Canet: a very good gun. These guns only arrived at Melilla with the 1st Division—that is to say, after the disastrous period which terminated with General Pintos' *débâcle*. Its effect was immediately apparent. Range, 5000 yards; very effective up to 4000 yards.

St. Chamond 2·9 inch Q.F.: inferior to the Schneider.

*Mountain Gun*

70 mm. Krupp of old pattern, which is certainly not more than an accelerated firer : some of these guns are said to have fired 10,000 rounds in Cuba, so their accuracy is naturally a variable quantity.

There were also a number of guns of position (chiefly 9 cm. Krupps) in the forts.

*Ammunition*

Only shrapnel was carried.

The allowance of ammunition was 250 rounds per gun, carried in the ammunition wagons, of which there are twelve per battery.

Shells were refilled at Melilla.

*Prematures*

These were frequent with both field and mountain guns. Fourteen occurred on September 4, for instance, one of which is said to have caused eighteen casualties.

*Horses*

On the whole the Artillery was well horsed with a compact cobby French horse of the Percheron breed.

## INTERCOMMUNICATION

At the end of July the posts at Sidi Ahmet el Hadj were connected with Melilla and with each other by telegraph and telephone. There was no telephone organisation for Infantry brigades or Artillery batteries. Signalling was in the hands of the Engineers—there were no battery or battalion signallers ; lamp, flag, and helio were used : the system worked well. Orders are said never to have been sent by any other channel except by galloper.

On the Moorish side signal fires were used, and a rough code was made use of.

Some pre-arranged places of concentration were arranged between the tribes : one signal fire was lighted near the place of concentration ; if the neighbouring tribes were coming to assist they lighted two fires, if they could not come they lighted three.

## BALLOONS

The Spanish had two captive balloons : one spherical, one boat-shaped. The boat-shaped balloon proved of considerable value both for

locating the Moors and more particularly for 'observing' artillery fire, which was done up to a range of 4500 yards. A special reconnoitring officer went in the balloon in addition to the R.E. officer. The maximum range of vision from the balloon was eleven miles.

### MEDICAL

#### *System of Collecting Wounded*

There were three stretchers per company and six mules per battalion under the battalion medical officer. The collecting station was under regimental arrangement. The dressing station was under the brigade-surgeon, who has a special organisation for the purpose. Hospital trains were requisitioned as required, but there were no special ambulance carriages. Motor ambulances containing eight beds seemed to work well.

### FINANCE

The war up to December 31, 1909, will have cost Spain about 2½ millions. The cost of the war during October is said to have amounted to 37,000*l.* a day.

### LINE OF COMMUNICATION

The first point that strikes one about the lines of communication is their shortness, the farthest point, Zeluan, being only about eighteen miles from Melilla, for about five miles of which a railway was available. This is a very small distance compared, let us say, to our lines of communication in Somaliland, which were more than 200 miles long, the whole of which distance had to be traversed by pack transport.

The detailed organisation of the lines of communication is not yet known: there certainly was no General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, and the working of them appears to have been done partly by the Commandant at Melilla town, partly by the Headquarters Staff.

### RAILWAYS

The Spanish line (1 metre 10 centimetre gauge) was completed during the operations from the pier at Melilla to the disused canal on the Mar Chica. Four engines and thirty bogey trucks were available for use on this line, which had a good depôt at the Hippodrome. The French line (1 metre gauge) was completed for about 4½ miles. Three engines and eighteen trucks of various sorts were available. This line also had a base at the Hippodrome.

## PIERS

On the Mar Chica piers were made at the disused canal, at La Restinga, and at Nador.

At Melilla there was a good pier on the east side of the town which connected with the railway. In addition to this there was about 100 yards of wharfage in the harbour. Practically everything had to be landed by lighter. Two tugs and ten lighters were normally available for this purpose. Sometimes ships' boats were used in addition.

## TRANSPORT

As regards transport, pack mules and camels had been landed by the end of September. There were 300 camels, with a probable load of 320 to 400 lb. The load of a mule was 220 lb.

The mules were splendid animals, well bred and compact, averaging about 14'2. One man led each mule. The camels were of a weakly type.

There were a limited number of four-wheeled wagons, and, in addition, four motor lorries of Spanish make, which carried four to six tons. These worked well and managed to get as far as Zeluan.

## SPANISH WAYS

The following examples show that dilatoriness is still a national Spanish characteristic :

1. General Primo de Rivera, a former War Minister, has stated that the probability of a war in Melilla was foreseen nearly a year before the outbreak of hostilities. Nevertheless nothing was done to improve the disembarkation facilities or the water supply at Melilla. As to the organisation of an Intelligence Department, nothing appears to have been done, and even in November this most important department was still practically a minus quantity. General Pintos' disaster is a good example of the Spanish ignorance of the country. That General, it will be remembered, led his brigade into a ravine that proved to be a death-trap, the brigade losing nearly one-third of its strength. This ravine is a remarkable one, and correspondents who have visited it since the disaster unite in saying that it was madness for troops to enter it without securing their flanks. Yet it is only three and a-half miles from Melilla town, which has been in the possession of the Spaniards for over 400 years !

As regards ignorance of the climate, the expeditionary force which landed in July were unprovided with helmets ; on the other hand, when

the rains began in October the troops had by that time got helmets, but they had no warm clothing and but one cotton suit apiece.

It may also be mentioned that the maps issued were very inaccurate and without scales.

2. A railway expert calculated that it would be possible, with the rolling stock available, to run a maximum number of fifteen trains per day on the railway. The Spanish despatched about two trains per day. They advanced literally at a foot's pace to railhead, usually at the same hour every day, and took a long time to unload. Naturally the Riffians were not slow to realise this, and they always made them run the gauntlet on the return journey. This arrangement thus achieved a minimum of output at railhead with a maximum of casualties.

3. When a Spanish railhead depot was made at railhead it was made *across* the railway, so that any subsequent prolongation of the line was made extremely difficult.

4. At a time when it was most desirable to push stores forward with the greatest despatch, two regiments of Cavalry were kept at the front in addition to the divisional Cavalry. Such a quantity of horsemen were not used for any tactical purpose, and the horses naturally ate a large quantity of forage every day, all of which had to be brought from the base by pack transport. Had the Cavalry remained near Melilla, the animals carrying all this Cavalry forage could have been used for moving stores, and the advance would have begun sooner.

#### CONCLUSIONS

One cannot expect to find any very novel strategical or tactical lessons from the study of the Melilla campaign. But the campaign is none the less interesting, particularly so to English soldiers, so many of whom are constantly taking part in some small war or other in some portion of the Empire. Without undue self-exaltation, I think we may fairly say that the Spaniards cannot teach us much about mountain fighting; one or two points are worth attention, but most of the conclusions to be drawn appear to show that the principles held in this country are sound.

As regards the good points to be noticed, one must place first and foremost the great gallantry and courage of the Spanish officers and men. As regards the latter, their conduct really appears to have been admirable, when one considers that the war was undoubtedly unpopular in Spain.

Unfortunately, though courage is a high military virtue, if it is



unassisted by knowledge it merely leads to the violent and speedy demise of its possessor.

2. The mobilisation arrangements and the despatch of troops to the seat of war seem to have worked without a hitch.

A British Cavalry officer who witnessed the detrainment and embarkation of the Pavia Hussars at Malaga speaks of it as 'one of the most orderly and best-arranged things I ever saw.' Each squadron had its horses and men detrained, watered, saddled up, and ready to march off one hour after the arrival of the train, with no fuss or disorder.

The British Consul at Algeciras says, 'To me, who have seen troops embarked at Gibraltar for Egypt and South Africa, the work done here seems little short of marvellous.'

3. The system of decentralising the battalion organisation, so that a company could be detached at a moment's notice as a self-supporting unit with its own transport, seems excellent. This is, of course, easier with a company of 200 men with pack transport than in England—in fact, on the Indian frontier I am told even a section can be so detached if necessary—still, it must be counted to the credit of the Spaniards to have adopted so convenient an organisation.

4. It was also a practical idea to make the men wear sandals instead of boots, which may partly account for the good marching and for the small number of footsore men.

As regards other points :—

1. The unrest in Spain at the commencement of hostilities gives us additional evidence—if indeed any is needed—that in these days of national armies if a war is to be energetically conducted the people must be in favour of it as well as the Government. No doubt, with a well-disciplined nation the troops will go—even to an unpopular war—without disturbances, but they will lack the requisite spirit: if the nation regards the war with apathy, the army will never act with energy.

2. Once more the principle is emphasised that it is by fighting, and fighting only, that the Oriental is beaten. 'Manœuvring the enemy out of his position,' 'placing oneself between the enemy and his base,' 'gaining victories without a shot being fired'—all these phrases are merely the jargon of the despatch writer; a campaign conducted on those lines may end in a patched-up peace, but never in real submission.

3. 'Manmastership.' We hear a good deal about horsemastership. In this campaign it appears to have been 'manmastership' that was lacking. Out of the eight battalions with Orozco at Nador in October,

seven were detached to garrison forts, escort convoys, do fatigues, &c., only one remained with headquarters ; on a shot or two being fired at night, the whole camp usually stood to arms and remained in the trenches till daylight. To mention one or two more points : men were allowed to sing and chatter all night and were naturally disinclined to move in the morning ; again, meals were cooked at certain hours fixed in peace time, no alteration of these hours was made on days of battle, when the troops usually remained unfed all day. Under these conditions it was naturally impossible to get the best out of the men.

4. The Infantry fighting shows the danger of blindly applying a number of so-called 'rules' on the battlefield. Owing to the short period during which the Spanish soldiers are trained, the officers spend nearly all their time on the parade ground, and it is possible that this may have led them to think that 'the attack' was a parade movement, which must always be executed in the same way, whatever the country or the enemy.

5. The Spaniards appeared to have over-rated the fighting power of the Riffians and to have allotted far too large a proportion of their men to purely protective duties ; they allotted battalions to hold lines that should have been held by companies, and brigades to a front more suitable for a battalion, and, as a result, the forces available for offensive movement were so weakened as to be practically impotent.

The method of protecting convoys certainly seems open to criticism.

Large escorts were employed, a convoy usually being escorted by one or even two battalions in addition to two squadrons and one battery. At various well-known points the Riffians usually had snipers ; day after day these escorts formed into regular 'attack' formation and drove off the snipers, and day after day did they suffer losses when the time came to retire.

A system of permanent pickets on these hills would have caused less fatigue to the men and fewer losses.

As regards the conduct of small wars, the Melilla campaign may be said on the whole to confirm the soundness of the principles held in the British Army. As regards the light thrown on the Spanish Army, it is clear that the traditional gallantry of the Spaniard is as remarkable to-day as ever it was, but in spite of this, and in spite of the other military virtues existent in the army, there appears to be a lack of driving power and adaptability which is accountable for the dragging on of what would otherwise have been but an insignificant campaign.

*CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON*

By LIEUT.-COLONEL G. DE S. BARROW

NAPOLEON is generally looked upon as being the great exemplifier of the use of Cavalry in modern times.

It will be as well to begin by directing one's attention to certain main points connected with Napoleon's use of his Cavalry, which will be evident in the following brief study of some of his campaigns which we are about to make. They are :—

*a.* He realised the necessity of dividing up his Cavalry, so that the duties of protection and exploration might be performed by two distinct bodies.

*b.* At the same time he was not bound by any hard-and-fast rules as regards this division. Sometimes he reinforced his Independent Cavalry at the expense of his Army Corps Cavalry, and sometimes he did the opposite and reduced the Independent Cavalry in order to give more of this arm to the Army Corps Commanders.

*c.* That portion which he designed for strategic purposes he kept in his own hand and dealt with directly.

*d.* He used his Cavalry in masses. He himself said 'The most abundant means, if scattered, can produce no result. With Artillery, Infantry, *Cavalry*, and throughout the entire military system this rule is invariable.'

*e.* He used the Cavalry everywhere, and was not too much affected by considerations of ground.

*f.* He never sent his Independent Cavalry out on vague missions. He was always perfectly definite in his orders as to where it was to go and what it was to do.

*g.* Recognising that it is the combination of the three arms which alone produces lasting results, he frequently supported his Cavalry with mixed bodies of troops, but never so as to interfere with the mobility of the former.

These points are very important to bear in mind. In the first place, a large amount of modern Cavalry literature is the work of French and

German writers who write with the idea of a war between their two countries perpetually before them, and there is a danger of our forming the conclusion that there is only one way of employing the Cavalry—viz. as it would probably be employed in the circumstances of that particular war. Whereas it is evident that Napoleon had no hide-bound system, but in the employment of his Cavalry, as elsewhere, he apportioned it and directed it in accordance with the requirements of each special situation.

In the second place, the above points support to a large extent the teaching contained in chap. vii. of our 'Cavalry Training Manual,' as we shall see as we go along.

Everyone is familiar with the Ulm campaign. I will only go into it sufficiently to bring out the chief points concerning the Cavalry.

The Grand Army of 1805 was composed of seven Army Corps and the Reserve Cavalry.

To each of the Army Corps was attached a division or a brigade of Light Cavalry.

The Cavalry Reserve comprised at the commencement :

Two divisions of Heavy Cavalry.

Four divisions of Dragoons.

Each division had a Horse Battery.


The strength of this body of horsemen at the end of September was about 20,000 men, or equal to five French Cavalry divisions of the present day.

From the moment that the army crossed the Rhine up to that when it reached the Danube the Light Cavalry preceded the Army Corps by one or two days' march. It acted as 'Protective Cavalry.'

Meanwhile the Reserve Cavalry is charged with a special mission.

Crossing the Rhine at Strasbourg on September 25 with three divisions of Dragoons, Murat establishes himself at Offenburg, Wilstedt, and Ettenheim, supported by Hautpoul's division of Cuirassiers and Oudinot's Grenadiers.

He pushes reconnaissances into the Black Forest by the valleys of the Rensch and the Kinzig, in order to attract on this side the enemy's attention. At the same time his Cavalry covers the concentration of troops at Strasbourg, who are destined to join Ney at Stuttgart and form the pivot of the army in its great converging movement. 'You



ULM CAMPAIGN, 1805.

are going to flank,' writes the Emperor to Murat; 'you are going to flank the whole of my march, which is a delicate one, in that it is an oblique march to the Danube. It is necessary, therefore, in case the enemy takes the offensive that I am warned in time to act accordingly and not have to do what suits the enemy.'

Here we have a very clear enunciation of the idea in Napoleon's mind that the Cavalry is to preserve for him his liberty of action; and not less clear and direct are the orders he issues to ensure this result. In execution of these orders the Reserve Cavalry, after having deceived Mack by its demonstrations in the Black Forest, draws closer to the right wing of the army in the direction of Stuttgart. Ney's corps, marching twenty-four hours in rear of the Cavalry, is placed under the orders of Murat, who thus commands a flank guard of 30,000 men. Marching in advance and on the outer flank of this wing during the movement towards the Danube, it crosses that river on October 7, carries the bridge over the Lech at Rain, reconnoitres and surrounds an advanced Austrian detachment at Wertingen, and then marches on Ulm by Burgau, supported by Oudinot's Grenadiers and the 4th Corps.

It must be noted that after leaving Stuttgart, and again after the passage of the Danube, the Reserve Cavalry is reinforced successively by two brigades of Light Cavalry taken from Lannes' corps. This is because the Light Cavalry is better suited for reconnaissance work than the Heavy, and it is desirable to save the Heavy divisions of the Reserve Cavalry for possible work on the battlefield.

After having taken part in the operations which led to the capitulation of Ulm, Murat is launched in pursuit of the Archduke Ferdinand's Cavalry and the corps of General Werneck which have succeeded in escaping. He has under his orders three divisions of Dragoons and the Chasseurs of the Guard, and is again supported by Oudinot's Grenadiers and Dupont's division.

On October 18 he catches up Werneck, who capitulates; on the 20th, near Nuremberg, he completely disperses the enemy's Cavalry. In four days he has covered about 120 miles, taken 12,000 prisoners, 120 guns, and 11 colours. Napoleon's letters to Murat at this period are interesting. He writes on October 17, 1805:—

'I have just received your letter from Hausen. I congratulate you on the success you have obtained. But do not rest; pursue the enemy at the point of the sword and cut all his communications. . . . I am greatly impatient to get news of you, to know positively where the head

of the hostile column is, and if it has intercepted anything at Nordlingen. All this news is of the greatest importance to me, and I send General Mouton on purpose to know before midnight on what I can count, because that information must regulate my movements.'

And again on October 18 :—

'I have just received the news of your march. Oudinot's division has set out before daybreak, and will be by this evening at Heidenheim, as well as the rest of Nansouty's division. Marshal Lannes will command both of them. . . . Beaumont's division is on the march. You have therefore enough Cavalry to do the enemy a lot of harm. I shall await here all day to-morrow news from you. Pursue without ceasing. Take the enemy's 500 artillery waggons, and see that my communications are completely established.'

These letters are examples (1) of Napoleon's eagerness for information and (2) of the manner in which he urges on the pursuit.

When, after the capitulation of Ulm, the army marches on Vienna, Murat is pushed on in advance in order to get into contact with the Russian army. The Cavalry is followed by the bridging equipment and immediately supported by Infantry in order to ensure its ability to cross the river when necessary. Its rôle now is to give the Emperor time to concentrate for battle. It occupies successively Muhldorf on the Inn, and the points of passage of the Salza, the Traun, the Enns, and the Ipps.

On November 5 Murat throws the rear-guard of Bagration back on the defile of Amstetten ; on the 7th he reaches Mölk ; on the 8th he is in contact with the Allies deployed behind the Trasen. The main body of the army is two days' march behind. It is now that he commits the fault of marching on Vienna, which he occupies on the 13th. Meanwhile the Russians recross the Danube at Krems and defeat Gazan's Division, which is isolated on the left bank at Durrenstein, on October 11. If Murat had hung on to the Allies, as he should have done, they would not have been free to accomplish this operation. Napoleon writes to Murat concerning this : 'My cousin, I cannot approve of your action, it is that of an idiot ; you have thought of nothing but the glory of entering Vienna.'

But soon the pursuit recommences. On November 13 Murat crosses the Danube at Vienna. Covering his right flank with a brigade on the road to Brunn, he pushes reconnaissances along that to Krems and on all the roads to the east of the Znaim road, along which he himself

goes with the bulk of his force; in this way he explores on a front of thirty miles all the country between the Vienna-Brunn and the Stockerau-Krems road. On the 14th contact is regained with the Russian rear-guard, which falls back on Hollabrun.

We have seen during the course of this magnificent campaign an illustration of every one of the points I have enumerated as being characteristic of Napoleon's employment of Cavalry.

*a.* It was divided into two portions: the Light Cavalry brigades attached to the corps for 'protective and covering purposes'; the Heavy Cavalry, six divisions, retained for 'independent purposes.'

*b.* When the circumstances required it, two brigades of the Protective Cavalry were taken to strengthen the Reserve Cavalry.

*c.* The Independent or Reserve Cavalry was kept by Napoleon directly under his own orders.

*d.* The Cavalry was massed. Murat never had at any time throughout the campaign less than three divisions concentrated under his command.

*e.* The Cavalry Reserve was first pushed into the Black Forest, a country which no one would select as being suitable for Cavalry.

*f.* The tasks given to the Reserve Cavalry were definite ones.

*g.* The Reserve Cavalry was supported by Infantry, by the Grenadier battalions of Oudinot, by the division of Dupont, and by others.

And how varied were the duties which this Reserve Cavalry performed.

(i) It acted as a screen to cover the concentration of troops at Strasbourg.

(ii) It deceived the enemy by its operations in the Black Forest.

(iii) It performed the duties of a flank guard.

(iv) It assisted in the final movements for the isolation of Ulm.

(v) It carried out a pursuit which destroyed the remnants of Mack's forces.

(vi) It pushed forward to gain touch with the enemy.

(vii) Throughout it procured for Napoleon his liberty of action.

And in what manner do the lessons of this campaign support the teaching contained in 'Cavalry Training,' chap. vii? A few quotations from the latter will show.

'The Cavalry with an army is divided according to the nature of the duties required of it into:—

'*a. Independent or Strategical Cavalry*, for strategical exploration under the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief.



' *b. Protective Cavalry*, for the provision of the first line of security.

' *c. Divisional Cavalry*.'

'Circumstances may require the reinforcement of the Strategical Cavalry by the Protective Cavalry, or *vice versâ*.' . . . 'The Commander-in-Chief, in order to gain full value from the arm, must clearly determine what he requires of his Cavalry, and accordingly group units in a suitable manner.'

'The Commander of the Independent Cavalry will receive from the Commander-in-Chief full instructions as to the mission he is to fulfil.'

' . . . Whereas the protection of an Army requires a wide extension of front and subsequent subdivision of force, the strategic reconnaissance demands an almost contrary disposition, viz. concentration of force.'

For the campaign of 1806 the Grand Army retained nearly the same organisation as in the preceding year. To every corps was attached a brigade or division of Light Cavalry; but the Cavalry Reserve was made stronger from the start by two brigades of Light Cavalry, i.e. it was composed of:—

Two divisions of Heavy Cavalry,

Four divisions of Dragoons,


Two brigades of Light Cavalry (Milhaud and Lasalle).

Its strength was about 25,000 sabres (28,000 total).

During the march of the Army in three columns by the roads Coburg-Saalfeld, Kronach-Schleiz, and Bayreuth-Hof, the Light Cavalry moved in advance of the central column, and acted as little else than Protective Cavalry. The remainder of the Cavalry Reserve at the commencement marched between the 1st and 3rd Corps.

The question might naturally be asked why it was kept back on this occasion when only the year before it had been employed in such a very different manner, as we have just seen. Some writers, generally German ones, attribute it to the fear the French (Cavalry) had of the Prussian superiority in this arm; superiority of training, horses and manœuvring power; and in support of their assertions they bring forward certain orders issued to the French Cavalry about not exposing themselves too much. On the other hand, Bonnal says that the Reserve Cavalry was kept in rear in order not to betray the presence of the French columns to the Prussians. I cannot help thinking that if the Cavalry had been kept in rear during the Ulm campaign Bonnal would have made the same excuse for it.

It seems to me that probably the real reason was this—Napoleon was not the man to use his Cavalry simply for the sake of using it. As I said before, he did not tie himself down to any rule as to its employment. And in this case it did not fit in with his plans to send out his Cavalry



until a definite object presented itself which justified the inevitable risks which the Cavalry would run in the pursuit of that object. And doubtless there *was* an underlying feeling that in an encounter with the Prussian Cavalry at the outset the latter might draw 'first blood,' a thing he was very careful to avoid happening to him.


But later on, after the passage of the Thuringianwald, the Cavalry moves rapidly to the line of the Saale, whence it sends out reconnaissances as far as Leipzig. As an example of what these reconnaissances did I may mention two which on the 12th covered 50 miles and entered Leipzig, although that town was occupied by two Prussian battalions and a regiment of Cavalry, and returned the next day to Weissenfels, 40 miles, without having unsaddled.

It was after the battle of Jena that the Cavalry under Murat carried out one of the most famous pursuits in history. Murat reached the town of Weimar upon the heels of the fugitives, and captured there 15,000 Prussians and 200 guns. The next day, closely followed by Ney's Infantry, he reached Erfurth, and here 14,000 more prisoners and 20 guns and immense military stores fell into his hands. He next turned towards Magdeburg, whither it was discovered that the larger portion of the Prussian forces were retreating, and on his way he broke up numerous formed bodies of the enemy and made many more prisoners.

From Magdeburg Murat went to Spandau, which surrendered on his summons the same day that Davoust entered Berlin. Prince Hohenlohe with a portion of the Prussian Army which still held together, having been headed off from Berlin, took the road *via* Zeydenich for Stettin. Murat, never resting, pushed on after him relentlessly, caught him up at Zeydenich and inflicted on him a loss of 1000 men, and next day enveloped and captured the Prussian Gendarmes of the Guard.

Hohenlohe was now cut off from the direct road to Stettin. He tried therefore to get round by a more circuitous route, but Murat marched his horsemen all night across country from one road on to the other, intercepted him, and attacked him again on the morning of the 28th, near Prentzlow. Lannes' Infantry, which had also marched all night, co-operating with Murat, compelled Hohenlohe to surrender with 16,000 Infantry, six regiments of Cavalry, 64 guns, and 45 standards. On the next day, the 29th, a portion of Murat's Cavalry (a brigade of Hussars) under Lasalle marched on Stettin, and this fortress, containing 160 guns and a garrison of 6000, surrendered, on the second summons, without firing a shot, to a brigade of Hussars. Such was the moral effect of this sudden appearance of French Horse!

Murat now turned westwards in pursuit of Blücher, who was retiring on Lubeck. On October 30, 4000 Prussians were captured at Anklam. On November 1 Blücher's rear-guard was defeated at Nossentin and lost 500 prisoners. On November 4 Blücher was again beaten at Wismar.



On the 5th Lubeck was taken ; and Blücher was finally compelled to surrender at Ratkau on the 7th with 4000 Infantry, 3700 Cavalry and 40 guns. This wonderful pursuit now finished, 'for want of any more enemy to fight,' as Murat wrote to the Emperor. Five hundred miles had been traversed in 24 days, or an average of 21 miles a day continuously, with many combats and the capture of two fortresses. There is a saying that 'He who fights and runs away lives to fight another day.' There is an exception to this rule. An army which fights another commanded by a Napoleon, and possessing a Cavalry with leaders such as the French possessed at that time, may run away as much as it likes, but it will very soon cease to live.

I must pass over the years 1807, 1808, and 1809, for though they contain much of interest as regards the employment of the French Cavalry, I want to leave the space to say a few words concerning the 1812 campaign. It contains certain lessons which have not been brought out by those we have already dealt with.

In 1812 Napoleon's Cavalry mustered 95,000 sabres. Ten out of the eleven army corps had each a division of Light Cavalry, the remaining corps had a brigade. This left 224 squadrons for independent work, and these were grouped into four corps, under (1) Nansouty, (2) Montbrun, (3) Grouchy, and (4) Latour-Maubourg.

When the French forces first advanced the Emperor was in reality at the head of three armies. The main army under his own immediate orders was preceded by the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of Murat ; the army of Prince Eugene was preceded by the 3rd Cavalry Corps, and that of Jerome by the 4th.

These masses of Cavalry carried out the exploration service in front of their respective armies. Murat followed up Barclay de Tolly, covered the concentration of the army corps destined for the attack of the entrenched camp at Drissa, and afterwards resumed the pursuit on Vitepsk.

Meanwhile the 3rd Corps (Cavalry) cleared the way for Davoust's march on Minsk in order to turn Bagration, whilst Jerome, covered by the 4th Cavalry Corps, attacked him in front. Bagration, however, having escaped by a rapid withdrawal on Bobrinsk, was pursued by the 4th Corps (Cavalry), whilst the 3rd Corps was directed on Orcha, in order to link up with the Emperor, and moved on Mohilew, preceded by its Light Cavalry.

Murat, now at the head of the first three Cavalry Corps, cleared the way to Smolensk. Then during the march on Moscow he had the genera

direction of the three masses of Cavalry which covered the three armies—the 1st and 2nd Corps in front of the centre column, Grouchy in front of the left, and Latour-Maubourg in front of the right.

But this great force of Cavalry, which numbered at the outset 95,000 sabres, was now reduced to 20,000, and by the time it reached Moscow the instrument had almost ceased to exist ; it could only then count some 5000 effective sabres.

The length, rapidity, and continuity of the marches, the losses in battle, the wretched state of the roads, the difficulty of feeding such enormous masses of Cavalry marching concentrated in a poor country, the necessity therefore of feeding the horses with a quantity of green forage—these were some of the causes which contributed to this extraordinary attenuation ; but there were others even more instructive to us, viz. the overloading of the horses, partly the result of gorgeous uniforms and love of finery, and bad horse management, the existence in the ranks of a large proportion of young horses and horses only partially trained as troop horses, and a total inability to take the Cossacks at their true worth and deal with them accordingly.

The fact is there was very little true discipline in the army which marched into Russia. Love of glory and personal interest predominated. There were many old veterans in the ranks and many seasoned and war-trained officers, no doubt, but there was also a very large proportion of men and horses which the Emperor's constant war demands had allowed no time for proper training. This is more serious as regards Cavalry than Infantry, for, apart from other things, you cannot teach a man to be a good rider and a good horsemaster in a day, no more than you can give a horse the balance and the proper development of loins and back muscles, and the collected action which are so essential if he is not to break down under the prolonged exertions peculiar to Cavalry work in the field. So the instrument—the combination of man and horse—being faulty, not all the Emperor's influence, nor the leadership of Murat and the other brilliant Cavalry officers under him, nor the *morale* engendered by years of almost uninterrupted success were of any avail to preserve it. And so, for reasons entirely apart from those of the battlefield, this splendid force of Cavalry, which according to a French eye-witness 'shone in gold and steel, flashing in the rays of a June sun along the banks of the Niemen, and full of ardour and élan,' ceased practically to exist before Moscow was ever reached.

In spite of his great difficulty in raising fresh Cavalry after 1812,

we find Napoleon still maintaining the independent force in his own hands, at the expense, if necessary, of the Corps Cavalry. In 1813 most of the army corps only had one brigade where formerly they had a division; three army corps had none at all. But now his Cavalry Corps, of which he had five, only numbered about 4500 sabres each, or the strength of a division, and the instrument lost amidst the snows of Russia could never be replaced. After Lutzen, after Bautzen, after Dresden, the Emperor was unable either to complete or to exploit his victories—firstly, because he had not sufficient Cavalry; secondly, because he did not dare to use up what he had. In one of his bulletins (May 23, 1813) we read, ‘The Emperor keeps his Cavalry in reserve until it becomes sufficiently strong numerically; he wishes to save it.’ And speaking of his inability to pursue, he cries out, ‘For want of Cavalry the battles are without any result’; words full of significance, uttered as they were by the great soldier and towards the end of a career of unparalleled experience in war.

We have later examples of the same thing, though from other causes, in the battles of Liao Yang and Mukden, where, it is generally recognised, the Russian reverses might have been turned into irrevocable defeats had the Japanese possessed a Cavalry force proportionate to the strength of their other arms.

## THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY ON THE YALU IN THE SPRING OF 1904 \*

By BARON V. ESEBEK, *Captain Austrian Cavalry—9th Uhlan Regiment*

APPEARANCES are against us! The large 'manœuvres du centre' in France show that Army B, which was much the weakest in Cavalry (General Millet had but two corps Cavalry brigades), prevented the two independent Cavalry divisions and the two corps Cavalry brigades under General Tremenau from gaining an insight behind the line. This fact, which of course is not very flattering to our arm, causes 'La France Militaire' to point to the analogy of this to the situation on the Yalu in May 1904. As such a comparison may easily cause the casual reader to conclude that to-day Cavalry is unable, with the means at hand, to pierce the hostile Infantry screen, I may be allowed to discuss anew this epoch of that campaign—so often written about—which diminished, for the first time, the lustre of the Russian Cossacks and which, in the opinion of many, threw a cloud on the future of our arm.

What splendid opportunities offered themselves to an energetic Cavalry leader during the Japanese advance! That not a single raid or coup was undertaken, or even attempted, by Mischtschenko's eleven Cossack squadrons against the bridges which the Japanese of necessity had to throw, against the widely separated magazines, against the supply depots, is the more inexplicable when it is considered that Kuroki's nine squadrons were widely dispersed and bound down by special duties. But we should also not forget that the Russian Cavalry was hastily organised into larger units and consisted in the main of *reserves*, and we should not regard it as a model for modern Cavalry.

The eastern detachment of the Manchurian Army on the Yalu had at its disposal more than twenty-two sotnias, equally divided on both wings. Of those on the right wing General Mischtschenko had already, on February 17, crossed the river with the Transbaikalian Cossack brigade in order to reconnoitre towards Antju. The battery attached to his command could not keep up, on account of the bad roads, and had to be sent back to the north bank. Kasan was reached by patrols on February 24, and on the 27th touch was gained with the Japanese

\* Translated from the *Austrian Cavalry Journal*, and reprinted from the *Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association*.



advanced troops. On February 28 an engagement ensued, lasting an hour and a half, between six *dismounted* sotnias and four dismounted Japanese squadrons, which the Russians broke off on the approach of the Japanese Infantry. Without at all being forced thereto, Mischtschenko thereupon retreated and voluntarily abandoned the south bank of the river on April 3. It is undoubtedly true that the intention of the Russian general headquarters to engage only in a delaying action on the Yalu, and Kuropatkin's anxiety about his line of retreat, which cropped out in all his orders, had a great influence on Mischtschenko's action ; but neither the one nor the other ought to have influenced him sufficiently to forget his duties as a Cavalry leader and to abandon the touch he had gained with the opponent. On April 2 the first hostile patrols reached the Yalu ; on the 4th—that is, one day after the Russian Cavalry brigade had crossed back over the river—the Japanese advance guard Cavalry appeared there ; on the 8th, the advanced Infantry troops ; and on the 14th, notwithstanding the unusual high water, the entire 12th Division was concentrated there. Of all these events the Russians received information only through Korean spies ; for after the Russian Cavalry had retreated and taken up its bridges the obstacle in front of the Russian position became of great advantage to the Japanese ; the Yalu becoming a mask for the Japanese, so to speak. With the Japanese concentration south of the Yalu once completed, the Russian near reconnaissance naturally had to come to an end. Reconnoitring detachments sent thereafter across the river encountered the enemy everywhere. The entire Russian Cavalry should have tried its very best, then, without regard to its own lines of retreat, to get around the flank of the opponent and operate against his communications to the rear. Even if in doing this it would have lost some of its fighting power, the results achieved would have been of far more value than the mere defensive operation with which Mischtschenko's brigade had to content itself behind the river. The excuse has been made that Mischtschenko's squadrons found no important Cavalry opponent, but only Infantry, and that the terrain precluded movements of Cavalry—even that of single troopers—off the mountain roads. I believe the true reason is a different one : in the work of a high-ranking Russian Cavalry officer concerning the employment of Cavalry in this war I found an explanation as follows : ' On account of the very inferior horses, which are small and better suited to draft than Cavalry horses, the Transbaikalian Cossacks ought to be called *Mounted Infantry* pure and simple.' Cavalry which regards its most noble arm as a mere means to carry its fire power

to the vicinity of the enemy, which does not regard the horse as its *main arm*, may possibly be able to perform good service in a defensive screen, but will never be the *eye* of the army. It appears strange that in the very few encounters between the opposing reconnoitring parties, both parties dismounted as a rule and resorted to the carbine.

It would, however, be wrong if we were to look on this as a maxim for our future conduct. The character of the Korean mountain country precluded enveloping movements; but in open terrain the Cavalryman who dismounts to fight on foot gives all advantage to a quick and energetic mounted opponent. As many of our officers are inclined to believe that in time to come we shall be but Mounted Infantry, basing their belief on experiences in Eastern Asia, it seems to me of value to point out explicitly that the Russian near reconnaissance from the Yalu position was invariably a failure, in spite of the fact that a mounted detachment of 140 rifles was attached to each Siberian rifle regiment. This gave for tactical reconnaissance eight such commands, which ought to have been sufficient to perform all the tasks of divisional Cavalry had they not lacked the essentials of Cavalrymen. The well-mounted, well-drilled Cavalryman will always and at all times be the best organ for reconnaissance, as is proved by the failure of the Russian reserves and Cossacks, and is further proved by the work of the mounted rifle detachments; but give these same Cavalrymen blooded horses, drill and educate them properly, and inspire them with confidence in the superiority of lance and sabre, and see the difference.

That the mounted rifles and reserve Cossacks were very deficient in the essentials of good Cavalrymen can be seen in more than one of Kuropatkin's orders by reading between the lines. In a telegram sent to the commander of the East detachment, for instance, Kuropatkin says: 'The passive observation may lead to disastrous catastrophes.' Considering events on the Yalu, we may say that the value to the defender of an obstacle in front is very questionable when the obstacle serves only to interrupt contact with the enemy and screens the latter's intentions.

After the middle of April there was a Russian reconnoitring detachment on the left bank of the Yalu, and on May 1 it had reached Antju, being consequently lost to the army for reconnaissance during the battle on the Yalu. This was a flying column formed of one squadron and two mounted rifle detachments, under Lieut.-Colonel Madritow, which had crossed the Yalu on April 15 on boats and had sent out patrols from Tschosau. It is true that these patrols gained touch with Kuroki's

right wing, but were unable to learn anything of value, all their reports being based on information received from Chinese spies. When Colonel Madritow saw himself endangered on the 26th by the Japanese advance he abandoned his very favourable post ; instead of debouching to the north-east and so remaining on the hostile flank, he went south around the Japanese right wing to operate against the hostile line of communications. Thereby his detachment voluntarily abandoned the exceedingly important observation of the flank and could find out nothing concerning the Japanese preparations for crossing the river and the measures taken for the advanced stages of the battle on May 1.

The Russian Cavalry of the left wing—two regiments under Colonel Truchin—had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to send patrols across the Yalu and take up connection with Colonel Madritow's patrols. This was done on April 25. On April 24 Colonel Truchin reported that hostile detachments had crossed the river at different points without his patrols being able to ascertain their strength, or even the branch of the service to which they belonged. Colonel Truchin had orders to fall back if stronger detachments crossed the river, to cover the route of retreat Kuan-Diansan. In place of doing so he fell back on the 28th on the left wing of the Russian Army, so that the line of retreat mentioned was entirely unprotected. When the Cavalry advanced towards that line the next day it reported that the enemy was already entrenching in the mountains of Husan between the Yalu and the Liao, and it was also seen that mountain Artillery had been placed in position on the north bank of the Yalu. In spite of this Lieut.-General Sassulitsch, commanding the Eastern detachment, was still of the opinion on the morning of May 1 that the main Japanese attack was to be looked for from the south—from Witju—and it should certainly have been expected of the Cavalry of the left wing to perceive and report in time the enveloping movement of the 12th Japanese Division. The report sent by the East detachment to general headquarters on April 30, full of uncertainty of the situation, was judged in no unmistakable terms by Kuropatkin. His reply to General Sassulitsch is given verbatim here on account of the lessons it contains : ' The main requirement for the success of our operations is exact ascertainment of the enemy's strength and position. From reports received so far I do not see that the observation duty is being properly carried out—a duty which should not cease, day or night, to ascertain movements of and measures taken by the enemy. Certain definite points should be selected for observation and assigned to specially suitable officers. Close touch with the enemy

is of paramount importance. According to your report Colonel Truchin's two Cavalry regiments are performing but little in this direction. Transmit this opinion of mine to both Cavalry regimental commanders. I further want you to have full knowledge of everything happening at the different—necessarily separated—parts of the Eastern detachment, and to see that connection is kept up. In the case of Colonel Truchin I miss the endeavour and ability to keep up this connection.'

The failure of the Russian reconnaissance and the scant reports sent in by the Cossack patrols teach us to attach the highest value to the education of our mounted messengers and patrol leaders: we see here that the inborn abilities of the Cossack, which serve him well as horseman and rifleman, are offset by his lack of intelligence; and we see also that no matter how good the natural material is, it will be found wanting in tasks set in war unless properly trained and improved in time of peace.

On April 24 the technical preparations for forcing the Yalu crossing had been finished. On the 25th Japanese torpedo boats and gunboats had entered the mouth of the Yalu, silenced the batteries on the north bank there, and facilitated the entrance of vessels loaded with bridging material. During the night of April 25 and 26 Infantry crossed on pontoons to the islands, in which operation, on the Kurito Island, a Russian mounted rifle detachment was surprised and lost all of its horses. On the morning of the 26th Kuroki's army was separated from the Russian position only by the western arm of the Yalu, but withal the Russian headquarters was still in ignorance of the enemy's intentions and disposition of forces, although the latter had already commenced to throw bridges at Witju. On the evening of the 27th General Sassulitsch still believed that but small hostile observation detachments had crossed the Yalu. A reconnaissance of the terrain between the Yalu and Liao was set for the night of April 27 and 28; this terrain was in the hands of the Japanese advanced troops on the 28th. To ascertain how far these had advanced on the right bank a high-ranking General Staff officer was sent with one battalion, two mounted rifle detachments, and two guns into the hills of Husan across the Eiho. This detachment drove back an outpost company of the Japanese Guard Division and succeeded—though fired on by a battery which had gone into position north of Witju—in entrenching itself on the Tiger hill and holding its position there until the morning of the 30th. A second reconnaissance, sent out the same day, of one battalion and two guns was resultless, for Russian headquarters was still in ignorance of the enveloping movement commenced by the Japanese

12th Division. To keep this movement concealed as long as possible the Japanese batteries accompanying the 12th Division, which made excellent utilisation of artificial cover, did not open fire until the Russian batteries had betrayed their position. They opened fire about 10 A.M., April 30, and within an hour and a half the Russian batteries were silenced and the Japanese batteries kept the Russian position under fire until 5 P.M. Now General Sassulitsch could no longer be in doubt that Kuroki was doing more than a simple demonstration. During the night of April 30 to May 1 it had been ascertained that the Japanese Guard Division and the 2nd Division were crossing the river, and this fact was reported to the commander of the Eastern detachment. There could now be no doubt that a general attack would take place on May 1. We need not go extensively into the course of that battle, in which the Cavalry on both sides played but waiting rôles: it has been portrayed by more fluent writers than myself.

Kuroki had ordered the attack to start at 8 A.M.; shortly after 9 A.M. the Russian position was in the hands of the Japanese; the defenders evacuated the position when the Japanese got to within 400 metres of it; only at a very few places did the bayonet come into use. The artillery of the Japanese Guard Division immediately unlimbered in the position evacuated by the Russians. During the retreat the lack of connection and communication in the Russian position was fatal—the separate defensive groups retiring without mutual support. In this manner a battery of the left wing, retreating without Infantry protection, came under Japanese Infantry fire at 600 yards range and lost all of its horses and guns; another battery became stuck in a narrow defile and fell into the enemy's hands—clear proof that there had been no reconnaissance in rear of the position. Separate Russian battalions, seeking a defensive position without any connection with other troops, saw themselves continually outflanked by the Japanese Infantry. This, then, was the time for the Cavalry to save their honour, if it could not save the fate of the day. But the twenty-two sotnias of the Eastern Division were eighty kilometres away from the battlefield. Only late in the afternoon was Mischtschenko's brigade called up from Dagushan to Piamyn. Granted that the terrain, and possibly also that the character of the Transbaikalian Cossacks, did not allow proper and correct utilisation of the Cavalry on the battlefield, the *carbines* of these twenty-two sotnias, if concentrated in *one* position, could have developed a fire power sufficient to protect the retreat and materially lessen the losses of the exhausted battalions which had fired away their ammunition. Placing the Cossack brigade

behind the *right* wing caused the premature retreat of that brigade behind the stream, for the *wrong* disposition of this force was the result of inefficient and incomplete reconnaissance.

The catastrophe would have been complete had not the Japanese stayed in the captured position with their 2nd and Guard Divisions until 1 P.M. ; the 12th Division only remained at the heels of the retreating Russian left wing and struck its line of retreat in the flank.

Only at 1 P.M. the 2nd and Guard Divisions took up the pursuit. About 3 P.M. they encountered serious resistance at Harmattan, where the 11th Rifle Regiment had taken up a position. Towards 5 P.M. the remnants of the Siberian battalions reached the line of communications, where the rear-guard was taken over by the 10th Rifle Regiment, which had been called up from Antung. After dark a rest was ordered for two hours, and then the march continued unmolested to Foenhuantschan.

Although the Russian Cossacks were far away, the 9th Japanese Squadron did nothing to molest the retreat of the demoralised Russian Infantry. This shows clearly that the Japanese Cavalry was nothing more than Mounted Infantry. What a pity that an arm of such high moral quality was deficient in the best of all soldierly virtues—namely, the ardent desire to take the offensive and the love of the sabre! However, we ought not to blame the Japanese Cavalry too much, for their horses were entirely too small and weak. Only on May 3 the Japanese Cavalry of the First Army advanced on Piamyn, the main body of the army, which had spent the night of May 1 to 2 on the battlefield, following its Cavalry on May 4. By that time the Russian Eastern detachment had gained the mountain passes on the road to Liaoyang in its rear and was in safety. By May 11 the First Japanese Army was concentrated at Foenhuantschan and remained there till June 23.

So much for history. Now a few words concerning our personal views. If we, on account of our military education and the achievements of our sires, feel justified in criticising an unfortunate army, we should not do so without giving that unfortunate army full credit for fulfilling its duty and willingness to sacrifice itself. Both these attributes were inherent to the Russian *soldier*. We can be honestly jealous of those who had a chance to receive the reward of their peace training in front of the enemy. It is true, there is no reason for our being pessimistic ; that our 'Africans' have lately proved to the world. However, the events of a century ago, which the year 1907 brought to our remembrance, caution us not to throw aside in disdain the catastrophes of the Manchurian Army, but to draw therefrom lessons applicable to our situation.

The battle on the Yalu, which was the overture in the East Asiatic drama, already showed the line of action ever recurring in the course of the campaign—the defensive. The disadvantage of that—when opposed to an energetic attacker—increased on the Yalu by the Russian reconnaissance Cavalry recrossing the stream prematurely and leaving the Commander-in-Chief in the dark as to the measures taken by the attacker. This led to a wrong disposition of his forces behind the defensive sector, which became disastrous in the absence of all connection within the position. To justify the Cavalry to some extent we will state that General Sassulitsch's orders from general headquarters were 'not to engage in an unequal battle if ever possible, but to hold the position.' Had Mischtschenko's Cavalry remained far to the front to the last minute, it undoubtedly would have succeeded in learning the enemy's dispositions ; and General Sassulitsch thereby might have been able either to evacuate the position in good time and in good order or to call up sufficient additional troops to hold it. Madritow's detachment, which was the only body of troops on the left bank of the Yalu when the Japanese advance troops arrived there, was too weak to assure support to its patrols, and was forced to retire.

It is possible, and very probable, that a future European war will assume the shape of *position battles*. If so, the possibility decreases for our arm to interfere frontally. With the concentration of enormous armies behind a fortified position, however, critical moments will become more numerous, caused by difficulty of replenishment of ammunition, bringing up supplies, &c. And there, then, lies the field of activity for strong bodies of Cavalry—divisions and corps—to cut the extensive hostile communications to the rear, the most vital spot of a modern army.

One thing we must not forget : neither on the Yalu nor later in the course of the Russo-Japanese War has either Cavalry entered the original domain of Cavalry, the pursuit ! The Russians had no opportunity for that, the Japanese lacked the material, for this requires a Cavalry which not only can shoot well, but which also can ride and fight well.

How clearly the Japanese perceived the truth of this is established by the fact that the Japanese Government did send, during the war, a high official to Europe to study the remount system there, and commenced, immediately after the war, to increase their Cavalry by eight regiments. Therefore we should not allow the apparent negative lessons of the East Asiatic campaign to rob us of our faith in our arm nor to abridge the fundamental rule of our noble arm : 'Only a Cavalry which is self-confident will achieve great things.'

'ARRACAN,'  
'SOBRAON,'  
'PUNJAB,'  
'EGYPT, 1882,'  
'TEL-EL-KEBIR.'



1809


THE 2nd LANCERS.  
(GARDNER'S HORSE.)



1909.

THE  
'CAVALRY JOURNAL'  
HEARTILY  
CONGRATULATES  
THE REGIMENT ON  
THE CELEBRATION  
OF ITS CENTENARY.  
THE TWO ILLUSTRATIONS HERE  
REPRODUCED ARE  
TAKEN FROM THE  
EXCELLENT  
PROGRAMME OF  
FESTIVITIES COMPILED IN HONOUR  
OF THE OCCASION.





THE WEST KENT (Q.O.) YEOMANRY.  
1832.

# A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF THE EGYPTIAN CAVALRY DURING THE ATBARA AND OMDURMAN CAMPAIGNS

[FROM AN UNPUBLISHED DIARY OF AN OFFICER]

## PART I.—ATBARA CAMPAIGN

### CHAPTER I

#### MINOR RECONNAISSANCES BEFORE THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA

THE advance of Mahmud to Metemma and the possibility of his taking the offensive, led to a concentration of the Egyptian Cavalry being effected between Berber and the Atbara. By the beginning of March 1898, eight squadrons were available for action in this part of the theatre of war, leaving only two for duty on the Korti reach of the Nile.

On March 3 the British Brigade, under General Gatacre, passed through Berber, and, covered by the 5th Squadron (Major Le Gallais), advanced southwards to Essellem,\* where Maxwell's Brigade with the 6th Squadron (Bimbashi Ratib) was already cantoned.

At this time the most reliable reports placed the Dervish army then in the field at a little over 11,000 men, made up as follows :

	Rifles	Cavalry	Spearmen
Mahmud .. .. .	4,000	2,000	3,000
Osman Digna .. ..	80	300	2,000

Total, 11,380 of all arms with about half a dozen field guns.

Although there seemed no real prospect of active operations taking place on the line of the Atbara, and although the history of Dervish tactics in the past scarcely justified the idea of their acting offensively, still the fact of a large hostile force being within four average days' march of the Atbara, made Colonel Broadwood wish to reconnoitre personally the Atbara river line with the object of considering its tactical value in any possible offensive or defensive operations.

\* See map on page 76.


Accordingly *early on March 7* he set out from Essellem, taking the 6th Squadron, and Captain Haig (7th Hussars)—the latter eventually acted as his chief Staff officer during the coming Atbara Campaign. Dakhila Camp, now known as Atbara Fort, was reached before noon, and the detachment halted there for the night. In the course of the evening, two deserters from the enemy were brought in, and stated that Osman Digna was at Shendy, that Mahmud's force was ten to twelve miles further south, and that a Cavalry post, numbering some thirty odd men, had been pushed northwards, to a point about forty-five miles south of the Atbara.

On the *morning of March 8* the march was resumed. Major Mahon (8th Hussars), commanding three squadrons already encamped at Dakhila, now joined the reconnoitring detachment, together with a company of the Camel Corps, under Captain King. The march from Dakhila lay up the right bank of the Atbara, past Ras el Hudi, the latter a locality which later became well known to the whole of the Anglo-Egyptian Army, but which at this time merely represented the name of a district where grass was more plentiful and jungle less dense than was usually the case on the Atbara. Abadar, about twenty-two miles from Dakhila, was reached by noon. Here a small stone enclosure had been erected by friendly Arabs, on rising ground, about 300 yards from the river, as a protection against Dervish raiders; and an easy path leading down the river bank, which elsewhere was very steep, commended this spot as a suitable camping-place. The detachment was therefore halted, and a system of protection arranged for the night. Finding no practical ford at this place, however, Colonel Broadwood, accompanied by the two other British officers and a troop of Cavalry as escort, proceeded to reconnoitre further up stream. A crossing-place was found about a mile from the camp, where the water at the deepest part only reached the horses' bellies; the water was very clear, with numerous fish visible. The left bank was found to be more thickly covered with trees and jungle than the right, and a dense growth, extending for about a mile and a half in breadth, had to be traversed before the open desert was reached. The latter was hard and stony, with a slight but gradual rise from the river for about three miles; then seemingly interminable undulations, and an utter barrenness, stretched out to south, east, and west, as far as the eye could reach.

No fresh signs of the enemy were seen, though numerous remains of recent salt workings were found in the valley. It was from this district

that the bulk of the salt used in Omdurman was obtained before the capture of Berber.

*Next morning, March 9,* the Cavalry, lightly equipped, marched at 5 A.M., while Captain King with his company of Camel Corps remained at



Abadar to guard the camp. The plain of Umdabia, some eight miles from Abadar Fort, was first reconnoitred. Here a large number of salt workings were passed and a village of *tokuls*, which, judging by the *angereeb*s (beds) and water-pots strewing the ground, had been abandoned by its Dervish occupants in some haste. The river bank was fringed

with palms, beneath which clustered many ruined houses, with here and there patches of ground which had once been tilled, but which were now overgrown with thorns.

A good ford was found at Umdabia village, the water only reaching the horses' knees. The squadron crossed at this point, and, passing through a belt of jungle a mile or more in width, moved out into the desert and turned up stream for two or three miles, keeping about a mile distant from the scrub. Three small patrols were sent out, but no signs of an enemy were found. It was then decided to recross the river, but the left bank was found to be very steep and about twenty feet above the river bed, and it was only after some difficulty that eventually a point was found where horses could slide down one by one. On reaching the right bank again patrols under the British officers pushed out across an alluvial plain to Mutrus. Here very thick scrub was encountered, and as this was the limit of the zone which Colonel Broadwood had permission to reconnoitre, the detachment returned to Abadar, moving this time by the desert. Next morning the return march commenced. The Camel Corps company followed the direct road to Dakhila, but Colonel Broadwood and the Cavalry, after passing Hudi, moved north-west across the desert by a track which led to Darmali, whence Essellem was reached about 11 o'clock, the distance being about twenty-four miles.

The information gained during this reconnaissance proved invaluable a few weeks later, when Mahmud's army left the Nile Valley and took up a position near Nakheila, two or three miles beyond the zone reconnoitred by Colonel Broadwood's patrol. The only available map of this district had been compiled in the autumn of 1897, during the march of a small column under General Hunter along the track of the old telegraph line to Abaluk. This map proved, however, to be most inaccurate, partly because the route followed by the reconnoitrer passed, in many places, several miles from the river, and partly because the only instrument used in its compilation was a Cavalry sketching case, the distances being judged by 'estimated pace of horse, camel, or Infantry marching by day and night.' Information as to the nature of the river banks and fords was conspicuous by its absence.

Without elucidation such a map could have been of small use to officers, either for the planning or for the execution of military operations.

The next few days were spent in waiting for the situation to develop. On Sunday, March 13, it was reported that the 'officers on the gunboats

near Shendy had seen the Dervish army advancing ; and a deserter stated that yesterday (Saturday) Osman Digna had advanced fifteen miles north of Shendy, followed by Mahmud.\* Many were the speculations as to what line of action would be adopted. But officers were not kept in doubt very long, for *on Monday, the 14th*, three more squadrons, with a machine-gun section and headquarters of the Egyptian Cavalry,\* marched from Berber to Kunur, whither the Sirdar and Headquarters Staff also moved next day.

*On Wednesday, the 16th*, the Cavalry at Kunur, now joined by the two squadrons from Essellem, were ordered to cross the Atbara and reconnoitre southwards, with the object of getting touch with the enemy and discovering his intentions, leaving only one squadron for outpost and divisional duties. Leaving Kunur, the column proceeded south to a point about two miles east of Dakhila, where Major Mahon's three squadrons joined it. Here a friendly Arab reported that 'the advanced guard of the Dervishes had reached Hudi ford,' but it was impossible to gather from this man in what strength the enemy had appeared—anything from a handful of men up to 3000.

However, the march was continued up the right bank of the Atbara to abreast of Hudi ford without any of the enemy being seen. The column was then halted on the high ground to allow of the river valley being carefully searched, but the only hostile traces were the tracks of three unshod ponies which were pronounced to be those of Dervishes. Patrols, supported by a squadron, were then pushed across the river, and when all was reported clear, the column watered and fed by detachments. The river was then crossed, and about noon the march was continued towards Ed Damer on the Nile, which was reached at about 2.30 P.M. This place had formerly been a very flourishing township, and the chief centre of learning in the Sudan. Now, however, all the houses were in ruins. After a halt of half an hour, the return march was commenced under the protection of one squadron as rear-guard, and it was 7 P.M. before Kunur was reached again.

The day was a long and tiring one for the horses ; indeed, the majority of them had covered not less than forty-five miles—those which had been out on patrol duty had covered many more—a considerable distance in the climate of the Sudan. Possibly the casual critic may consider such a reconnaissance, carried out as this was with a whole brigade, before contact with the enemy had been gained, and at the beginning of a

\* See footnote on page 67.

campaign, when it cannot be foreseen what calls may have to be made upon the Cavalry, a mere waste of horseflesh. A few patrols, it might be argued, or at most a squadron, would have discovered just as much, and the horses would have been spared much fatigue. There is no gainsaying such an argument, but unfortunately war is not made by machines, but by human beings of flesh and blood and nerves.

In criticising these operations it must be remembered that the Egyptian Cavalry had never as yet met any large force of Dervish horsemen, nor indeed had it ever been allowed to proceed to any distance in front of its own Infantry. Consequently, at the commencement of the Atbara campaign, the Dervish horsemen were viewed with considerable respect, and even officers spoke with undisguised apprehension of the uncertainty as to what might happen were Mahmud's 2000 odd cavaliers to swoop down upon the Egyptian squadrons. Colonel Broadwood, therefore, realised the importance of as far as possible meeting the Dervishes in superior numbers, and of risking no check at the outset. What mattered the loss of a few horses from fatigue if those that remained carried riders who had gained confidence in themselves? On the other hand, consider the effect on the *morale* of the whole Cavalry, and its probable behaviour throughout the rest of the campaign, if at the commencement its patrols and perhaps a reconnoitring squadron had been worsted in the first contact with the enemy! In this connection a comparison may be made with the situation of the French Cavalry at the commencement of the Jena campaign in 1806. They were confronted by the Prussian Cavalry, whose very name at that time was symbolical of success, and the glamour of whose past victories under Seidlitz and Zeithen was still a factor to be reckoned with. At any rate, no less a leader than Napoleon took this moral factor into his calculations, and directed Murat not to risk the smallest check. With this object the latter was to make all patrols and detachments considerably stronger than those which the enemy were in the habit of sending out, and he was ordered to keep his force concentrated.

*Next morning, Thursday, March 17*, was spent by the Cavalry (except two troops on outpost duty) in camp at Kunur. But the rest was of short duration, for at 1.30 P.M. an order came to start at once for the Atbara, in order to discover whether Mahmud's army had reached Umdabia or vicinity. This order was in consequence of spies having reported that his force had left the Nile.

By 3 P.M. the Cavalry Brigade was in movement, consisting on this

occasion of eight squadrons, a battery of Horse Artillery, and a maxim gun section.

A patrol under a British officer reconnoitred Hudi ford and vicinity; but there were still no signs of the enemy, and the force eventually bivouacked at a clearing in the Hudi bend of the river about seven miles from Dakhila, and some six miles down stream of the Hudi ford. The river at this point was unfordable and protected the camp satisfactorily from the south. The night passed without any alarms.

*Next morning, Friday, 18th*, two reconnaissances were sent out, each consisting of a squadron with two British officers.

Major Mahon, with one squadron, proceeded to Ed Damer and reconnoitred a few miles to the south of it, but found no traces of the enemy. The other squadron was commanded by Major Le Gallais, and left the bivouac about 4.45 A.M., reaching Hudi ford about 7 A.M. Here a small observation post was left, and the march was continued to Abadar, which was reached about 9 A.M. Leaving the main body of the squadron near the fort, the two British officers (Major Le Gallais and Captain Haig), accompanied by a small patrol of picked men and horses, proceeded to Umdabia, crossed the river near the village, and then advanced in a south-westerly direction for about two miles to some high ground from which a good view could be obtained across the desert. Nothing was to be seen of Mahmud's host, so the patrol returned *via* Abadar to Hudi bivouac, which was reached at 2.30 P.M. The distance covered by this patrol was estimated at about forty-three miles.

The brigade, having finished its supplies, had to return to Kunur. It marched at 3.15 P.M. and reached camp about 5 P.M., the distance being estimated at ten miles.

The Cavalry had now had four fairly long days, so, except for two troops on outpost duty and a British officer's patrol to Ed Damer, Saturday was observed as a day of rest. The patrol sent to Ed Damer (under Captain Peyton, 15th Hussars) was fired upon by a small party of the enemy.

There was no doubt by this time that part of the Dervish host was within fourteen miles of the Atbara, but it was uncertain what Mahmud's designs might be. Would he consider himself strong enough to attack Atbara Fort?—it is rarely possible to fathom the workings of the mind of a savage. Rumour, however, attributed to him the design of leaving the Nile, where the gunboats hindered his people free access to the water, and establishing himself somewhere near Umdabia on the Atbara,



whence he could threaten Berber and the Anglo-Egyptian communications. Whatever plan the Dervish leader might adopt, the Anglo-Egyptian army would probably be in a better position to checkmate him from a camp on the Atbara itself than from its then position at Kunur on the Nile. If, for instance, Mahmud attacked the detachment at Dakhila, the Sirdar's force, if camped at Hudi clearing, could ford the Atbara and then, sweeping down the left bank, drive the Dervishes into the gunboats on the Nile. Or, again, if Mahmud elected to threaten Berber from Umdabia, a march of half a dozen miles would place the Anglo-Egyptians on his flank.

Accordingly, it was decided to transfer the Anglo-Egyptian force to a camp on the Atbara, and *early on Sunday morning, March 20*, two patrols under British officers, supported by a squadron, reconnoitred to Hudi and four miles south of the river. The report that all was clear was received at Kunur at 11.30 A.M., and the main body then started for Hudi clearing. The day being comparatively cool, owing to a slight dust storm obscuring the sun, the Infantry came along at a fair pace, and the leading brigade reached Hudi clearing before 3 P.M. This was the first day that the whole force had marched united, and some delay occurred in getting the troops into their bivouac for the night. Indeed, the sun had set before the Cavalry were shown the space allotted to them, and then it was found that there was no room inside the *zereba* for them, so they bivouacked outside on the flank. The information gained during the day from patrols pushed southwards from Dakhila showed that the enemy had not continued his movement northwards *via* Ed Damer. Yet the bulk of the Dervish army had left the Nile! Where had it gone? East of the Nile being desert, 10,000 men could not spend many days there. They must, therefore, have passed onwards to the Atbara, and the question now to decide was to what part of the Atbara had they gone?

*On Monday, March 21*, the Cavalry were sent out to find the answer to this question, but their sphere of action was limited and they were ordered not to proceed farther than the thick bush near Mutrus. Accordingly at 5 A.M. the Cavalry Brigade, consisting of eight squadrons, and the Horse Artillery battery, but without the machine guns, started and proceeded to Abadar. From here two reconnaissances were sent out, each consisting, as before, of a squadron with two British officers. Major Mahon and Prince Francis of Teck crossed and moved up the left bank of the river, while Major Le Gallais and Captain Haig reconnoitred the

right bank. The party on the left bank found no traces of the enemy, but Major Le Gallais' party, on reaching the vicinity of Mutrus (the limit of the zone ordered to be searched) saw, about a couple of miles farther on, but only for an instant, a single Dervish scout. As the party approached the Dervish galloped off up stream. After examining the ground near where the Dervish horseman had been standing, the patrol returned to the squadron, which had been left as a rallying point on the high ground overlooking Umdabia plain. The squadron then retired along the outskirts of the scrub to Abadar, while the patrol, with the British officers, fell back along the river bank. Occasional halts were made to see if the enemy was following, but the numerous palms and thick undergrowth prevented any movement in the valley being detected. Abadar was reached about 1.30 P.M., the result of the reconnaissance was reported, and the squadron proceeded to water and feed. Now, the desert near the Atbara is very stony, and under the midday sun the stones become so hot as to render it necessary to sit down with caution, even with thick breeches on; one can therefore imagine with what relief the horses, tired and thirsty after nine hours' work, plunged into the clear waters of the Atbara and drank their fill. The Sudan summer had already begun, and at about 2 P.M., the hottest time of the day, the scene about Abadar Fort was, as might be expected, one of repose. Captain Baring's squadron was disposed in a cordon of outposts, whilst Captain Persse's squadron stood saddled up, the men themselves lying on the ground, but ready to mount in a moment should support be required. The remainder of the force was resting in full enjoyment of the midday halt, with that feeling of security and carelessness which a good system of protection and a midday meal produce.

Suddenly some shouting and a few shots were heard near the river, and then across the open space in front of where the squadrons were halted came a stream of Egyptian and Dervish horsemen. One of the latter actually reached the place where the commander of the outposts was hastily mounting, but was shot by an Egyptian trumpeter before he could do any harm. The *capssa* (alarm) next sounded, and Persse's squadron galloped forward to drive back the intruders. Very few minutes elapsed before all the squadrons were mounted and a general advance was made. The thick nature of the scrub, however, prevented a clear view of the situation being obtained or any estimate being formed of the strength of the enemy. All that was known was that the picket on the river bank had been surprised, and that several of its number

had been shot and speared by the Dervishes. The enemy, however, had retired, and only a few stragglers could be seen moving off. Persse was therefore ordered to advance, to press them back and clear the scrub.

This was at a place rather more than a mile up stream of Abadar Fort. Here the soil is alluvial and of that kind known as 'cotton,' with numerous cracks and holes. On the edge of the desert the scrub is thin, but as the ground falls towards the river the soil becomes richer and the thorn bushes gradually thicker until within about 500 yards of the bank all movement is restricted to paths. Persse's men advanced with a dash across the open ground, broken though it was, killing or driving before them a few of the enemy. But as they entered the thicker scrub more of the enemy appeared—to the number of 200 or 300—and assailed the squadron in flank and rear when hampered in the difficult ground. The position was indeed a trying one for any troops. The Egyptians fought bravely, but they were taken at a disadvantage and lost severely before they could be extricated from the thicket. Eight men were killed, eight others were wounded (of whom two died of their wounds), and thirteen horses were killed or missing.

The want of some maxim guns was severely felt at this juncture; their moral effect on the enemy was always considerable, and at a time like the present a few shots fired into the scrub would probably have driven the enemy off and saved thereby the loss of men and horses. In all other expeditions subsequent to this the Cavalry were invariably accompanied by some maxims.

The brigade pursued as far as the thick bush about Mutrus, into which the Horse Artillery fired a few shots, but with what result could not be seen. The enemy, however, declined to be drawn into an engagement, and as it was now almost dark the Egyptian force fell back, followed only by a few of the enemy's scouts.

The return march was slow, partly owing to the darkness, but chiefly owing to the number of wounded men. These were placed upon the limbers of the guns, for no ambulances accompanied the brigade. The question of how to transport wounded men is at all times a difficult one for Cavalry, but especially so in savage warfare. Still, in country where guns can accompany Cavalry it would seem possible for some type of light ambulance to go also, and the latter, by relieving the force of the severely wounded, would certainly increase its mobility instead of lessening it. Fortunately the enemy was not at this time in a position to attack in force, for his Cavalry, it appeared, was much done up after

its march across the desert from the Nile. But those acquainted with Dervish methods of warfare, and the avidity with which they swoop down upon a retiring foe, will acknowledge that the danger was a real one, and that the Cavalry on this evening, with tired horses and hampered with wounded, was in no enviable position. The difficulty of the situation was increased by the uncertainty as to the position of the camp. It was known before the reconnaissance set out that the whole force was to change camp during the day to a position somewhat nearer Abadar. But, as in many places the river bends three or four miles away from the old telegraph road along which the brigade retired, it was quite possible to miss the camp in the darkness.

However, thanks to the reconnaissance already narrated above, Colonel Broadwood knew the river and its bends, but it was past 11 P.M. before camp was reached. It took some time then to find an entrance into the *zereba*, and to thread the way in single file past sleeping forms to some spot where the squadrons could picket; for the ground had not been cleared yet, and the bivouac resembled nothing so little as the pretty plan supplied in all regulations for encampments! The work of allotting ground to squadrons and picketing horses, dark though it was, did not take long, for the Egyptian Cavalry had already had much experience in camping, and officers and men knew what was required of them. But even when bivouac is reached much remains for the Cavalry soldier to do. He has to care for his mount before anything else, and unless the troop horse is well looked after, especially when work is so continuous as it was in this campaign, the most efficient Cavalry in the world will disappear like snow before the sun. To ensure that horses are carefully watered and provided with grass and barley by men thoroughly tired after twenty-four hours of fighting and marching, requires from all ranks a personal interest in their work. To water about 1000 horses on the night in question was a lengthy operation. A single track, and that only fit for horses in single file, led through the jungle to the river bank and descended very abruptly twenty feet down to the river bed. Grass, again, is not an article of store in the Sudan, but has to be cut. Men were to be seen busy at this on the banks and on the ground between the bivouac and the river, shortly after the squadrons arrived and before they got their own food. Others drew barley for the horses and rations for the men, and distributed supplies. It would be easy to enlarge upon the difficulties met with in this bivouac. Many were unavoidable, but

some might have been lessened, perhaps, by a little more foresight on the part of the Headquarters Staff. We must remember, however, that this was the first time that so large an Egyptian force had taken the field accompanied by so many squadrons, and also that Mahmud's advance had come rather in the nature of a surprise. In any case the Egyptian soldier is brought up to do with few material comforts, and readily dispenses with what to other troops are absolute necessities. Indeed, there seems some doubt whether any European Cavalry could have done the work which the Egyptian horsemen were called upon to do in the Sudan, and even our Indian Cavalry, with their numerous grass cutters, ponies, and followers, would have found it hard to subsist in like circumstances.

Notwithstanding the late hour at which the squadrons settled down, one paraded before daylight *on the 22nd March* for outpost duty, and marched at 5 A.M., with a battalion of Infantry, for Abadar.

About two hours after their departure volley firing was heard, and the remainder of the Cavalry Brigade with the Horse Artillery battery and the two maxim guns (so much needed the day before) turned out at once and marched to Abadar. As the brigade drew near, the enemy, about a hundred mounted men, withdrew, leaving several of their horses dead or wounded behind them; they also suffered some casualties in men, but these they carried off with them. Their retreat was so rapid and they gained such a considerable start that the brigade only followed them about five or six miles. This was sufficiently far to secure the camp from alarm that evening, and also to enable the dead in yesterday's skirmish to be buried unmolested.

Having satisfied himself that the enemy had really retreated, Colonel Broadwood halted the brigade on rising ground and sent Captain Persse's squadron to search the scrub in the vicinity of where the charge had taken place. The dead Egyptians were found just as they had been left on the previous night; the Dervishes had not touched them, nor had they yet removed their own dead.

This duty over, the brigade returned to camp at Hudi just before sunset.

Now, up to this period of the campaign the organisation of the Egyptian Cavalry had remained practically unaltered. That is to say, the highest unit, both tactical and administrative, was the squadron. Consequently, Colonel Broadwood commanded eight squadrons, or ten separate units in the field, for the Camel Corps company and the Horse Artillery battery daily worked under his orders.

This was felt at the outset rather a cumbrous organisation, and the squadrons were accordingly grouped into twos or threes, each group under a British officer, to suit the exigencies of each day's operation. But as soon as the squadrons returned to camp they reverted again to a position of independence, and the rosters for duties, and orders in matters of detail, necessarily became complicated when so many separate commands were concerned. To obviate these difficulties, Colonel Broadwood now decided to divide his force into two regiments each of four squadrons. He thus commanded, instead of ten as formerly, four units in the field—namely, two Cavalry regiments, one battery of Horse Artillery with the maxims, and one company of the Camel Corps.<sup>1</sup>

During the time that the Anglo-Egyptian force was camped at Hudi each regiment took it in turn to detail a detachment (usually two squadrons) for outpost duty at Abadar on alternate days, and in addition sent out the following patrols from camp thrice daily: (a) an officer (Egyptian) and four men across to the left bank of the river, to reconnoitre for a distance of two miles up and two miles down stream, and

<sup>1</sup> The following is a list of the Cavalry Brigade Staff and commanders of the several units :—

*Brigadier.*

Lt.-Col. R. G. Broadwood (12th Lancers).

*Personal Staff.*

The Marquis of Tullibardine (Royal Horse Guards).  
Sergt.-Major Blake (17th Lancers).

*Brigade Staff.*

Captain D. Haig (7th Hussars), Chief Staff Officer.  
Abdul Maqeed Effendie Raafat, Assistant Staff Officer.  
Captain H. E. Hill Smith, A.M.C.  
Captain T. E. W. Lewis, A.V.D.

*1st Regiment, under Major P. W. Le Gallais (8th Hussars).*

1st Squadron	. . . . .	Captain W. H. Persse (2nd Dragoon Guards).
4th    "	. . . . .	Captain Honble. E. Baring (10th Hussars).
5th    "	. . . . .	(Major Le Gallais).
6th    "	. . . . .	Bimbashi Ratib.

*2nd Regiment, under Major B. T. Mahon (8th Hussars).*

7th Squadron	. . . . .	Bimbashi Hussein Effendie Shereef.
8th    "	. . . . .	Captain W. E. Peyton (15th Hussars).
9th    "	. . . . .	Captain H.S.H. Prince Francis of Teck (Royal Dragoons).
10th   "	. . . . .	Sagh Shahata Effendie Kamil.

*Battery Horse Artillery, including*

Maxim section . . . . .	Major Young, R.A.
Company Camel Corps . . . . .	Captain A. J. King, Royal Lancashire Regiment.

a similar distance towards the desert ; and (b) three men under a N.C.O. in a N.E. direction from camp out into the desert for about six miles.

All horses were watered and fed daily in time to enable the brigade to march at 5 A.M. in case of necessity. As soon as reports had been received from the patrols, which left camp immediately before daylight (4.15 A.M.), parties from each squadron went out to cut grass inside the limits watched by the outpost squadrons. These parties were sent mounted and fully equipped, so that they could join the brigade at once in the event of it turning out. At this time of year there was a good supply of grass along the river bank, and as the main body of the outposts was at Abadar, about five miles from camp, there was ample protected ground from which to supply all wants in respect of green forage.

In case of alarm by day, the orders were that horses should be saddled at once, but at night the men were to stand to their horses, special precautions being taken to secure private animals.

*On Wednesday, March 23, Colonel Lewis' Infantry Brigade, accompanied by one squadron under H.S.H. Prince Francis of Teck, marched at 4.30 A.M. to Abadar.*

Some days had elapsed since reliable information had come in regarding the movements of Mahmud's army. The skirmish of March 21 showed that a considerable force of his Cavalry had already reached the Atbara, so it was generally expected that the foot soldiers, riflemen and spearmen, might appear any day in the vicinity of our camp. It was more difficult now for spies to get in and out of the Dervish lines without being detected, so, many of these, to judge by the information they produced, had recourse to imagination. They asserted that Mahmud had actually reached Umdabia on the day following the Cavalry skirmish, and was encamped in the thorns there. This seemed scarcely possible, for patrols from the outpost Cavalry had daily overlooked the Umdabia plain without detecting the presence of any enemy. Still, thick scrub existed a few miles up stream of Umdabia village, and it was thought possible that the enemy might, if encamped in this jungle, have defied detection. To search this jungle if Mahmud was really in it was a hazardous and possibly a costly task for a small body of Cavalry such as Colonel Broadwood had under his command. However, it was not yet known whether the ground on the left bank might not be favourable for getting an insight into the enemy's supposed position, and it was suggested that if the enemy had really reached the

Atbara, the tracks made by his marching columns would be visible in the desert. Possibly, too, a view of some parties watering in the river might be obtained. At any rate, Colonel Broadwood determined to try this method of reconnaissance first, and ordered a patrol under a British officer to cross at Abadar and proceed up stream.

Captain Haig, the Staff officer of the brigade, was entrusted with this duty. He left camp at about 10 A.M. accompanied by a *sheikh* of the Bishareen and another Arab, the two latter riding ponies recently captured from the Dervishes. At Abadar an Egyptian officer and three men of Prince Francis of Teck's squadron joined the party, and the Dervish ponies, which suffered much from want of shoes on the stony ground, were exchanged for two good troop horses.

To cover the advance and retreat of the reconnoitring party Colonel Lewis sent Captain H. G. Majendie (Rifle Brigade), with two companies of Egyptian Infantry, to cross the river and hold the farther approach to the ford. As soon as the latter were posted, and a suitable line of retreat for the patrol arranged by the two British officers, the reconnoitring party started. It marched at a smart trot, moving up stream and in the open desert, about a mile from the edge of the scrub. Halts were made every quarter of an hour or less, wherever the ground rose and afforded a view of the river bank or of the desert. No sign of the enemy was seen in the desert, and Umdabia and its clump of high trees, though examined by a powerful telescope, revealed no signs of life. After one and a half hour's march in this fashion a small cluster of half a dozen mud and straw huts called Menawi was reached without incident. Menawi stands on a stony spur about forty feet above the river, and some 500 or 600 yards from it, the intervening distance being covered with scrub. The patrol was directed upon this point because here the belt of scrub which everywhere borders the river bank was narrower, and, the river taking a bend, a view could be obtained up the reach concealed by the Mutrus scrub, in which the enemy was supposed to be encamped. So that if the statements of the spies as to the enemy's position were correct, some parties of so large an army would be likely to be visible from this point. A small party had certainly recently visited Menawi, for the ashes of a fire were still hot, and they had ridden horses. Hence there was no doubt that there were Dervishes about ; but the question was, had Mahmud's main body reached this part of the Atbara, or were there only a few bodies of horsemen here ? To get a view of the actual river bed it was necessary to move down



to the bank, for scrub and palm trees hid the water from an observer on the rising ground on which Menawi stands. Accordingly, after posting the Egyptian officer and the three men to keep a lookout in different directions, Captain Haig went with the two Arab *sheikhs* down a track which evidently led towards the river. After following it a short distance, about two or three hundred yards, some fresh tracks of horses were found, and suddenly a couple of Dervish horsemen were seen making off up stream. There was now no time to be lost if a repetition of March 21 was to be avoided. So the party hurried on to the river bank, where a good view for a couple of miles up stream was obtained. Next, moving down stream a short distance, the Umdabia reach was searched carefully with glasses. There was not the smallest sign of an enemy moving about, nor of tracks of a large force having crossed ; it was therefore clear that the reports of the spies were incorrect, and that Mahmud's army, if on the Atbara at all, was encamped up stream of the bend in the river near Menawi, and not in the Mutrus scrub.

Having satisfied himself on this point Captain Haig returned through the scrub to the desert, and, recalling the Egyptian officer and party, fell back to a point almost opposite Umdabia. The latter village and plain were examined from this, and also from two other places, but without detecting any sign of the enemy.

Abadar ford was reached about five o'clock, and the patrol and covering party then withdrew unmolested to camp.

The ' fog of war ' still hung heavily around the Dervish leader and obscured the movements of his army. The reconnaissance, while, on the one hand, it cleared up the situation as far as Mutrus, seemed to cast the country beyond into deeper shadow, and caused extravagant speculation as to what the enemy might be doing.

Undoubtedly Mahmud's army had left the Nile for some place on the Atbara, for had not the officers in the gunboats and reliable spies reported seeing the host upon the march ? The place supposed to have been selected by Mahmud for his camp was Umdabia, but it was now clear that he had not gone there, but to some place higher up stream. Why had he done this ? Were the Atbara Fort and the Anglo-Egyptian army no longer his objective ? And, if not, was he about to strike at Berber and the communications between the army and rail-head ? This seemed likely, for Berber, with the exception of a few companies of Egyptian Infantry at the *nuzl* (supply depôt), three miles from the town, was without any garrison, and many of the most influential

of the inhabitants were still favourable to Dervish rule. In fact, bearing in mind the time which had elapsed since the enemy was seen on the march from the Nile, it was difficult to find any other reason for the non-appearance of Mahmud's Infantry. The latter should have reached the Atbara on the 20th or 21st. It was now the 24th, and the skirmish with the Dervish Cavalry had taken place on the 21st. Possibly the Dervish Cavalry had been sent out to occupy our attention while the main portion of their army crossed unmolested somewhere further up stream.

So likely did this method of reasoning seem that Colonel Broadwood left camp before 5 A.M. on *Thursday, March 24*, with four squadrons, for Abadar. From here patrols were sent out, including one similar to that of the previous day, with the same Arab *sheikhs*, and under the same British officer. This latter patrol marched in a N.E. direction for about ten miles and crossed the desert tracks which lead from Berber towards El Hilgi on the Atbara. No signs of an enemy having moved towards Berber were found, but there were a few fresh marks of camels going in the opposite direction, towards the Atbara.

It was clear, then, that the enemy had not moved across the desert to Berber, but that his camp must be somewhere on the Atbara, up stream of the Mutrus scrub; and it seemed probable that Mahmud would shortly continue his forward movement, taking the offensive. The British force was accordingly kept in a position of readiness, protected by a mixed outpost force at Abadar, the strength of the latter being generally one battalion of Infantry and two squadrons. Small mounted patrols of the enemy were constantly seen, and a few deserters were occasionally captured, but no clue was obtained as to where exactly Mahmud's army was encamped. The constant state of readiness which the military situation called for on the part of the Cavalry, the long hours of waiting in the sun, and frequent patrolling under the eyes of an active and savage foe were most trying on men and horses. The number of British squadron officers was only six (including Major Le Gallais, who also commanded one of the regiments), and as no squadron went on duty or any important reconnoitring patrol without a British officer, the latter were on duty almost daily.

By *Sunday, March 27*, six days had elapsed since contact with the enemy's horsemen had been obtained, yet the position of the enemy's camp, or *Dem* as it was called, had not been discovered. This lack of information cannot be attributed to inefficiency or want of keenness on the part of the Egyptian Cavalry, but rather to the belief at

headquarters that Mahmud might at any moment take the offensive. Consequently a somewhat passive *rôle* was at first prescribed, and any reconnaissances sent out were directed to move within a more or less restricted area—that is to say, to a distance of about a couple of infantry marches from the camp at Hudi. As time wore on, however, and Mahmud did not appear, the desire for further intelligence increased, till on this Sunday a more extended reconnaissance than usual was sent out. A detachment, consisting of one squadron (Prince Francis of Teck) and the Camel Corps company, the whole again under the command of Captain Haig, was ordered to cross the river close to the camp and reconnoitre towards Menawi. After crossing the river and passing through the belt of scrub the Camel Corps, under Captain King, was halted on some rising ground as a support to cover a possible retreat, the spot selected being about two miles distant from the river bank, and affording a good view. The squadron then continued in a S.E. direction, and after marching for an hour at a trot and walk, reached a point about two miles west of Umdabia. Here the squadron remained in readiness to advance or retreat as circumstances required, whilst Captain Haig, with a patrol consisting of the Bishareen *sheikh*, an Egyptian officer, and three men, continued his march southwards. At Menawi tracks of the enemy's horsemen were visible, but there were no signs of the enemy in force in the river bed. Captain Haig therefore decided to proceed further southwards, and sent back for the squadron to advance and take post at Menawi—there to serve as an advanced rallying-point for the patrol to make for if pursued by a superior enemy. The patrol was then led up stream along the outskirts of the scrub and over some very rough and stony ground.

The desert as it approaches the river in this part becomes undulating and broken into ridges, making it possible, by taking advantage of the crests, to explore a certain distance ahead with glasses before actually committing the patrol to a further advance. The latter advanced from ridge to ridge, and when halted each member had instructions to watch in a definite direction to guard against surprise. After proceeding cautiously in this way for rather more than an hour, two vedettes of the enemy were seen about half a mile off, near the place called Et oz El Hallag on the official map.\* The approach of the Cavalry patrol had, however, been detected, and the Dervish scouts at once made off towards the river through very thick scrub. An examination of the ground

\* Not reproduced.

where they had stood showed that not more than two had been there. A few minutes after the Dervishes had disappeared smoke from a lighted dom-palm rose high in the still atmosphere in a N.E. direction from where the patrol then was, and apparently on the farther (or right) bank of the river. These palms were lighted as signals to warn those who were scattered along the river resting, watering, or grazing their horses, and they seemed to be lighted both when a hostile detachment was approaching and when it began to retire.

The direction taken by the Dervish vedettes in their retirement led into such thick scrub that the officer commanding the patrol, after following a short distance, came to the conclusion that no large force of the enemy could have passed through. He then returned to the open desert in the hopes of there finding signs of Mahmud's army. A few tracks of men, of camels, of horses, and of donkeys were found, but not enough to indicate that a force of 10,000 people had passed towards the river, though the tracks might be those of a party on the flank of the main column. Two hours had elapsed since the patrol left the squadron near Menawi, and as the Dervishes were probably already on the move in consequence of the alarm signal, the commander of the reconnaissance decided to withdraw. On the way back six Dervish Infantry were taken coming from the direction of the Nile, who stated that they had been to Shendy to get grain, and that Mahmud's force was on the Atbara not far from where they were captured.

The reconnoitring detachment reached camp without incident. The Dervishes did, however, follow it up, for the post of friendly Arabs on the left bank of the river was attacked in the evening with the loss of three men, including the son of a *sheikh*.

## CHAPTER II

### FIRST RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE OF THE 'DEM' (MARCH 30)

THE result of the reconnaissance of March 27 seemed to show that a mixed force of Dervishes had reached the Atbara above the Mutrus bend of the river, but neither its exact position, its composition, nor its numbers had been discovered.

The small reconnaissances so far sent out had found generally that the width and density of the scrub on the left exceeded that on the right bank of the river, consequently a strong reconnaissance pushed judiciously

up the latter seemed to offer the best chance of solving the problems involved.

Accordingly, *on Monday, March 28*, Colonel Broadwood received permission to carry out a reconnaissance in this direction with the whole of the Cavalry, supported by an Infantry Brigade pushed forward beyond Abadar.

The supply arrangements for the Cavalry were as follows :—

(a) *On man and horse*.—Each man carried  $1\frac{1}{2}$  day's biscuit ration, the  $\frac{1}{2}$  representing the unused portion of his previous day's ration.

4 lb. of barley was carried in the corn sack behind the saddle.

(b) *On squadron camels* (3 per squadron, usually used for squadron kit, cooking pots, Egyptian officer's baggage, &c., which were not required on this expedition) :—

	700 lb. barley
	100 „ biscuit
	<hr/>
Total .	800

(c) *On Camel Corps company camels*.—4,000 lb. barley (*i.e.* 500 lbs. per squadron).

Thus taking the strength of each squadron at 100 horses, two days' barley ration, or 16 lb. per horse was carried.

In addition to the biscuit carried as above, six extra camels were taken, carrying one day's dry ration for the men and *suffaria* cooking pots (*i.e.* light ones for use on detached duty).

One private camel per British officer was also taken.

*On Tuesday, March 29*, two squadrons marched at daylight as usual for outpost duty near Abadar. The remainder of the brigade, with the Camel Corps, Horse Artillery battery, and two maxim sections, followed at 2.30 P.M. The transport camels and mules carrying ammunition (one per troop), marched with the Camel Corps, which thus acted as a sort of first line supply column to the Cavalry Brigade.

The outpost Cavalry having reported all quiet in their front, detachments from squadrons had been allowed to fall out during the march to Abadar in order to cut grass. As the brigade neared Abadar, however, sounds of firing were heard, and a report came in stating that the enemy was advancing in force. The foraging parties were at once called in and the brigade advanced in a concentrated formation and at a brisk pace to support the outpost Cavalry. It eventually turned out that the enemy numbered only some twenty-five to thirty horsemen, and had probably

come forward to discover the cause of the dust raised by the Cavalry Brigade during the march. There was no just cause for alarm, but the evil of unnecessary alarms was brought home to all. The brigade had been attracted beyond the outpost line, so that instead of settling down quietly and comfortably in bivouac before sunset, it was dark before the squadrons reached Abadar. Colonel Maxwell's Brigade had already made a *zereba* of thorns, but his Staff officer, having scant knowledge of the space required by a Cavalry Brigade, had left so little room for the squadrons that it was a matter of some difficulty to fit them into it, especially in the darkness. It was about 9 P.M. before all were settled, leaving not many hours for rest.


*At 2 a.m. the next morning* squadrons began to water, the men got a hot meal, and by 5 A.M. the brigade was on the march. One feed per horse was carried on the saddle, but all kit and the remainder of the forage was left at Abadar, protected by Maxwell's Brigade. A troop of Cavalry was also left to furnish patrols to reconnoitre across the Atbara as well as six or seven miles in a north-easterly direction from the bivouac.

General Hunter accompanied the Cavalry Brigade. The track along the old telegraph line was followed, which passes close to Abadar, but, leaving the Umdabia bend of the river far to the right, then runs straight to a point about three miles east of the Mutrus scrub, whence it runs almost parallel with the Nakheila reach of the river for some miles.

During the march, which was carried out at the rate of about six miles an hour, a few Dervish scouts were seen, but the latter rapidly fell back as the brigade advanced. At about seven o'clock attention was attracted to a large cloud of dust which rose over the trees near the river away to the right front, and from which two smaller dust clouds were seen to break away, one moving up and the other down stream, and both then disappearing. The brigade was directed towards the large dust cloud, and soon patrols reported that this was caused by a stir in the Dervish camp.\* However, no opposition was encountered, and the brigade next reached a point about 1000 yards N.E. of the camp, where the Horse Artillery battery came into action and fired ten common shell and nineteen shrapnel into it. It was difficult to observe the effect, as the *Dem* lay in a hollow and half of it was hidden in trees and bushes, but the enemy seemed to take no notice of the firing. During the bombardment a patrol under Major Mahon, reconnoitring on the up-stream side of the camp, reached a small hill about 400 yards to the south-east

\* See map on page 89.

of it over which a white dusty track rose ; from here he got a good view right into the enemy's position. About the same time General Hunter, accompanied by Colonel Broadwood and the latter's Staff officer, went towards the enemy's other flank, and also reached a point some 300 or



400 yards distant from the zereba and on rising ground above it. To their front appeared some dozen yards of stockade work, made of palm trees protecting an old-fashioned gun, and it was possible to see into and along the trench. The latter appeared to be some three or four feet deep and to be filled with men crouching down. The 'fire discipline' of the

Dervishes was certainly excellent, for although this little group of officers stood for some five minutes examining the position not a single shot was fired at them. Few European troops would have resisted so tempting an opportunity, and why the Dervishes sat so close it is difficult to conjecture. Possibly they hoped by a show of weakness to draw the Egyptian force further forward, and then, having lured their enemy to close quarters, to fall upon him with cold steel and overthrow him by weight of numbers. This form of tactics is much favoured by the Dervishes, and has succeeded more than once—notably, at the battle of Omdurman, when the 21st Lancers were drawn into making their desperate charge. On this occasion, however, to reconnoitre was Colonel Broadwood's only object. Thanks to the passive attitude assumed by the enemy, their position had been closely examined from front and flank without striking a blow, until, indeed, there was little left to be learnt about the *Dem*.

Accordingly, as soon as the position had been thoroughly reconnoitred, the retirement commenced. The enemy did not follow, except with a few patrols. Abadar was reached without incident, and the whole force withdrew to camp at Hudi without having suffered a single casualty, and with the satisfaction of knowing that, thanks to their efforts, the whole situation had been cleared up.

Camp rumour, based possibly on reports from spies, exaggerated the strength of the enemy's defences to such an extent that opinion at army headquarters was said to be opposed to any assumption of the offensive. In justice to the Cavalry it must be pointed out that this view was not based on their reports. On the contrary, owing to the persistency of the rumour, Colonel Broadwood and Major Mahon sought an interview with the Sirdar in order to impress upon him what they had seen with their own eyes, so that he might not be dissuaded from attacking without delay.

For the next two days, *Thursday, March 31, and Friday, April 1*, the Cavalry were confined to outpost and patrol duties. Their work, however, had been so continuous up to date that their camp had not been cleared and lacked many of the comforts which the Infantry had been able to provide for themselves. This General Hunter noticed, and thoughtfully detailed a couple of battalions to assist in making shelters and in clearing the ground, thereby adding much to the comfort of men and horses when in camp.

*On Saturday, April 2*, an attempt was made to reconnoitre the enemy's



position from the left bank, with a view to selecting a place of action for the Cavalry during and after the expected battle.

The reconnoitring force consisted of a wing of Major Mahon's regiment (viz. 9th squadron, Prince Francis of Teck, and 10th squadron under an Egyptian officer) and the Camel Corps company. Colonel Broadwood commanded the force, and a young *Battaheen* Arab, who had marched from the Nile with Mahmud's army and then deserted, was mounted on a troop horse and taken to act as guide.

Crossing the river close to camp shortly after 5 A.M., the force marched direct to Menawi. Here the Camel Corps took up a position on rising ground, while the rest of the force continued the march five or six miles further up stream. On the way some Dervish foot soldiers were captured, who stated that they were returning from the Nile, whither they had gone for food. The young *Battaheen* now stated that the force was drawing near to the route taken by Mahmud's army during its march from the Nile, for he recognised the tree which had been taken as the point of direction, and that the *Dem* must therefore lie a mile or more away on the right bank of the river. Accordingly a small patrol was sent forward under Major Mahon, consisting of the *Battaheen* Arab boy, Captain Haig, and an Egyptian officer. About 2000 yards or more beyond the place where the squadrons had halted, the rocky nature of the ground changed to a sandy plain, across which numerous tracks were plainly distinguished, all converging towards the conspicuous tree referred to above. It seemed impossible to estimate what size of a force had passed—most of the tracks were no wider than those made by a flock of sheep on a hill-side, but so thick and close were the footprints that the sand had become hard like a metalled road. The distance between these well-defined tracks varied from two or three yards up to 500, while interspersed were other tracks of stray individuals, and marks of camels, horses, and donkeys. March discipline had obviously been somewhat neglected, and 'go as you please' must have been the order of the day. The tracks certainly covered a breadth of over 2000 yards—possibly more, for the patrol did not reach the extreme limit of the tracks. When the patrol had gone about two miles from where the squadrons were halted, and was working towards the river bank, Major Mahon suddenly descried five mounted Dervishes between his patrol and the main body. So intent were they in their observations of the latter that apparently they had not seen the patrol, and their backs were towards it. It was impossible to tell how many more of the enemy were in the vicinity; the

scrub was thick, and according to the *Battaheen* extended as far beyond the conspicuous tree as the patrol was from it—over a mile, or say two and a half miles in all. It was therefore considered unwise to try and work back to the squadrons by passing between the Dervish scouts and the river. Indeed, there was now no great object in getting to the river bank, for the *Battaheen* Arab boy described its nature, and amongst other details stated that there was no difficulty in crossing the river-bed near the *Dem*, because there was no continuous stream, but only pools of water. The return of the patrol along the desert side seemed by no means a simple matter, since the Dervish scouts were well placed for interrupting it. It was possible, too, that other Dervish horsemen might be at hand (so close was the patrol to their camp), who would readily join in a chase where numbers would be in their favour. Accordingly, Major Mahon, having satisfied himself as to the most suitable points of crossing the river and noted the difficulty of passing the thick jungle on the left bank, decided to 'defer no time : delays have dangerous ends.' Taking advantage of rising ground and bushes to conceal the movement, he led his party westwards towards the desert, and then, making a sweep northwards at a sharp pace, rejoined the main body in safety.

The return march was marked by no incident worthy of record. The heat, however, was great, and the horses suffered so considerably that two died from the effects of the sun in the desert, and several others were only brought back with difficulty to camp. Incidents such as these illustrate the conditions under which the Cavalry carried out their reconnoitring duties during this campaign.

For the rest of the force Saturday was a quiet day. Two squadrons marched about noon, with Colonel Lewis' Egyptian Brigade, to Abadar, and remained there to cover the advance of the whole force the next day, for it had been decided that the army should move camp closer to that of Mahmud. Colonel Broadwood issued his orders for the march at 2 P.M. For the Cavalry the following camel transport was allowed :—

9 camels per squadron . . . . .	72
1 camel per headquarters of regiment . . . . .	2
3 for Cavalry Brigade Staff . . . . .	3
3 spare . . . . .	3
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>80 camels</b>

One and a half pound of biscuit was carried by each man in his haversack, 7 lb. of barley was carried in the corn sack on the saddle, and 5 lb.

per horse by the Camel Corps. The squadron camels were loaded with a few cooking pots and as much barley and rations as they could carry, and all supplies remaining on hand were placed in the *nuzl* (commissariat store) at 4.30 P.M. Arrangements were made to form a sick horse dépôt at Dakhila (Atbara Fort) to which place all sick horses were despatched at 4.30 P.M.

No general order was issued for the march of the whole force, merely a verbal one to the effect that the march would begin about five o'clock in the morning. The desert is a large place, and there was no fear of columns crossing or delaying one another, consequently many orders which would be indispensable to set even a small force in movement in an enclosed country could be dispensed with. Colonel Broadwood accordingly started as soon as it was light, about 5 A.M., and striking out into the desert moved upon the left flank of the column.

It was uncertain how long the force would have to wait at Abadar, so the new camp was marked out with great care under General Hunter's directions. Wide roads were cut, ample ground was cleared, and the force camped in a more regular formation than had hitherto been possible.

### CHAPTER III

#### SECOND RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE OF THE DERVISH 'DEM' (APRIL 5)

CAVALRY Brigade Orders issued *at 5 p.m. on Monday, April 4*, though brief were sufficient to cause a slight stir, for they raised the expectations of all, and indicated that the time of decisive action was approaching. They were as follows :—

Abadar, 4. iv. '98, 5 P.M.

1. The brigade will parade for reconnaissance at 5.10 A.M. to-morrow.
2. One led horse per squadron to be taken; these to march with the Horse Artillery battery.

Next morning the brigade moved off at the hour named, accompanied by two Infantry battalions. The latter had instructions to march to Umdabia, so the route taken by the column lay considerably to the right of the old telegraph track, and as it thus followed the bend of the river the distance covered was greater than on the former reconnaissance of the *Dem*. General Hunter commanded the whole force sent out, and Colonel Broadwood the Cavalry Brigade. The object of reconnoitring the enemy's camp a second time seems to have been due to a desire to make sure of the character of the enemy's defences and to enable the

Infantry Brigadiers to make a personal reconnaissance of the position which they would probably have to attack, and of the best line of approach to it. Unfortunately, both General Gatacre, commanding the British Brigade, and Colonel Macdonald were unwell, while Colonel Lewis was in charge of the camp and outposts, so that three of the four Brigadiers were absent. Colonel Maxwell, however, was present, and many other officers, Staff and regimental, also joined the column for one reason or another. Some were bored with so many weeks of idleness in camp and wished for exercise; others attended with the object of seeing some fun or of displaying their skill as trained observers—what an opportunity seemed to present itself for putting into practice lessons learnt in peace time, the ‘sketch of a position’ in the very presence of the enemy himself! For, be it known, at the time the Cavalry Brigade started few doubted but that the enemy would remain inactive as on the previous occasion, absolutely inviting zealous officers to come and report upon his *Dem*.

It was about 8.30 A.M. that the *Dem* was first sighted. As before, much dust was hanging over it, and, as the brigade drew near, two columns of dust were observed moving away, one up and the other down stream. Approaching closer, so as to command the right flank\* of the enemy’s position, two columns, each of 300 or 400 Dervish horsemen, were next seen moving eastward from the enemy’s right, some up a hollow from the river and others on the spur adjoining the hollow. The Egyptian horse artillery guns were unlimbered, and after a few rounds had been fired, the Dervish horsemen withdrew out of sight. The Brigade then advanced to a point nearer the *Dem*, where the guns again opened fire upon the enemy, who by now had moved nearer to the river, and drove them still further into the bush, so that only a few groups remained here and there. The right flank of the enemy’s camp was thus uncovered and could be reconnoitred without danger of interference from up stream.

Reconnoitring officers, and others anxious to have a look at the *Dem*, accordingly moved out and viewed the right of the enemy’s position, covered by the main body of brigade. About this time some explosions were heard in the *Dem* at intervals of a few minutes, and smoke was seen in the entrenchment. Next a large round shot passed over the heads of Colonel Broadwood and his staff, and ricocheted in the sand

\* The *Dem* is assumed to be facing north, so that right means the east face and left the west.

about fifty yards beyond where they were standing. The gun had been well aimed, but thanks to its high trajectory the projectile did no harm.

After the right of the enemy's camp had been thoroughly examined, General Hunter directed Colonel Broadwood to move towards the enemy's left, and take up a position which would enable that flank of the enemy's *zereba* to be similarly examined.

The guns and maxims, accompanied by one squadron, with Le Gallais' two squadrons in their left flank, moved off first; Mahon with his three squadrons having to wait until he could take his place in rear, whilst Baring, with two squadrons, trotted in from the eastwards to cover the right flank.

When the guns moved off a slight breeze was blowing from the head of the column, causing the thick fine dust which immediately rose in clouds effectually to obscure everything for some distance in its rear—only those who have seen a dust storm in the Sudan will realise fully what an impenetrable veil can be formed by the dust of the desert once it is stirred up. Colonel Broadwood having issued his instructions, sent his staff officer to acquaint Captain Baring with the orders, and then moved off himself on the left front of the guns, in order to indicate in which direction he wished the brigade to proceed. The guns had scarcely retired 400 or 500 yards when the Dervish horsemen, evidently watching for this opportunity, galloped forward at top speed from the scrub and assailed the left rear of Major Le Gallais' squadron. The dust prevented those at the head of the column from seeing what was about to occur in rear, and Colonel Broadwood first learnt of the impending attack from his Staff officer, who saw the approaching Dervishes when returning from giving the Brigadier's orders to Captain Baring. Major Le Gallais, being farther towards the left flank of the column, had also seen the danger. Without waiting for superior orders, he wheeled his two squadrons into line, and throwing forward his right somewhat so as to meet the enemy, charged resolutely upon the Dervishes. Colonel Broadwood and his Staff joined in the charge. The enemy did not attempt to meet it as a body. Being in loose order, many of them passed round the flanks of Le Gallais' men, or turned about and fled, so that only a few of their numbers were ridden down. After advancing about 500 yards the squadrons reformed, and a few troops were dismounted and fired volleys. Colonel Broadwood then realising that this charge had left the flank of the guns uncovered, directed his Staff officer to detail another squadron to take Le Gallais' place. The latter's determined onset had caused the

Dervish horsemen in the vicinity of the charge to halt, but when Captain Haig, passing round the left flank of Le Gallais' line, rode back to execute the Brigadier's order, he saw parties of the enemy moving forward up the depression already mentioned, and likely soon to outflank and envelop Le Gallais' left.

Major Mahon had not yet followed the guns with his squadrons, and his squadrons were placed ready to attack or to continue the retirement according as circumstances might require. He had seen the movement executed by Le Gallais' men, but owing to the dust could not make out exactly what was happening; on Captain Haig's appearance, however, a few words soon made clear the difficult situation in which Le Gallais' squadrons were.

Directing two of his squadrons to move so as to protect the left flank of the guns in accordance with the Brigadier's order, Mahon, without a moment's hesitation, led his remaining two squadrons forward to support Le Gallais' left. All fears about the safety of his own left flank were in the meantime allayed by an assurance that the Staff officer would at once summon Baring and his squadrons to act as third line. Captain Baring quickly grasped the situation, and acted with the same promptitude as the other leaders. Meanwhile, the guns and maxims continued the movement towards the rear, in accordance with the original orders, but circumstances reduced the number of squadrons in their immediate vicinity to two—one on either flank.

Mahon's advance proved most opportune, for the Dervishes now hesitated in their movement to outflank Le Gallais' left.

At this juncture, whether by luck or by design it is hard to say, a fresh body of horsemen, equally numerous as the one already engaged, came pouring forth on the flank of the cavalry from the down-stream side of the *Dem*. And with them a motley mass of riflemen and spearmen, rushing forward from the *Dem* as if to an assured victory. Regardless of the safety of their friends, individual riflemen would halt to fire and then rush forward again, causing several casualties from rifle bullets among the squadrons. Captain Persse (Queen's Bays) was wounded severely about this time in the forearm while directing the firing of his men.

To extricate troops once engaged is always a difficult and costly operation; but when these troops are not only engaged in front, but are also outflanked on both sides by a mobile enemy like the Dervishes, and are encumbered, too, with wounded, it will be realised in what a hazardous

position the Cavalry had become involved. The Dervishes had moved with surprising rapidity, and the effect of their outflanking move soon told on the morale of the Egyptians. A squadron or more of the latter began to withdraw to the rear faster than is ever advisable for a mounted force to retire during an action. Fortunately their horses were tired, and some British officers riding larger and stronger animals were able to head them. A more moderate pace was assumed, and then, having halted, some men dismounted with carbines, and firing a few steady volleys caused some of the Dervishes in this quarter of the field to check their pursuit. But the mass of Dervish Infantry was still coming closer every moment; their fire was also improving, and the enveloping movements of their horsemen were becoming more pronounced. Something would have to be done quickly to delay their advance if the Cavalry Brigade was to be extricated from disaster. It seemed impossible now for the squadrons to retire without getting involved in a running fight with Dervish horsemen, whose ranks were already thickening perceptibly, evidently in readiness to pounce upon the backs of the Egyptians the moment the latter wheeled about. This moment could not long be delayed, for the squadrons already confronted fully treble their own numbers.

Now, no Cavalry in the world could retire from such a situation without losing for a short space, at any rate, its tactical unity. It was essential, therefore, that some pivot be provided on which the squadrons could rally and reform, and in the open desert the horse battery and the maxims alone could supply this need. These, however, were by this time about a mile distant from the bulk of the squadrons, and being in ignorance of the sudden onslaught made upon the Cavalry owing to the thick dust which followed their trail, were continuing to march in the direction indicated in the original order. The Brigadier, indeed, sent to recall them, but in the dust and turmoil the messenger went astray. Captain Haig, however, realising that time was all-important, galloped after the guns and stopped them on his own responsibility. In a few words the situation was explained, and the gunners promptly decided to come into action, a slight rise in the desert being agreed upon as a suitable position. Captain Haig then returned to the Brigadier with the information that the guns would be ready to open fire as soon as the Cavalry had cleared their front, and the squadrons were accordingly ordered to rally on the right of the guns.

The movement was executed rapidly, the Dervishes still vigorously

following up the rear. The maxims, however, were ready, and as soon as their field of fire was clear, they opened a hot fire on the enemy. This timely action saved the brigade. All risk of a general stampede was now at an end, but much skill was still necessary in order to withdraw the brigade without serious loss. Colonel Broadwood now showed considerable ability in handling his units, and his orders were well executed by his subordinates. Regiments supported by guns and maxims retired in succession. A portion of the brigade always maintained a front towards that direction in which the enemy was for the moment most threatening, and by means of dismounted fire prevented a close pursuit of the rest of the brigade. This alternate action and retirement continued for fully an hour, until the trees about the *Dem* appeared merely a haze upon the horizon. The Dervish infantry slackened their pursuit soon after the maxims opened fire for the first time, but the horsemen were more tenacious and galloped rapidly forward each time a body of Egyptians began to retire, only halting when the fire of the maxims and squadrons beyond began to tell upon their ranks.

It was past 5 P.M. before Abadar was reached. The Sirdar met the Cavalry and congratulated them on their fortitude, and well might he do so, for never before had the Egyptian Cavalry alone confronted so numerous an enemy. Indeed, the situation for a time had been so critical and the bearing of the Egyptian squadrons as a whole so steady, that any army might well be proud to include them amongst its numbers.

The absence of fussiness on the part of the Brigadier and the manner in which he trusted subordinate commanders and abstained from embarrassing them with detailed orders was no less conspicuous than the quickness with which those subordinates grasped the situation and acted on their own initiative. The readiness also with which the gunners co-operated with their comrades of the Cavalry when in difficulty, and the effective combination of shock and fire action, were also points worthy of remark this day. It was many years since so large a force of Cavalry led by British officers had met so numerous, so determined, and so skilful an enemy, and if at times the result of the day seemed doubtful, all the more credit is due to the pluck and determination of the Cavalry commander and his officers, who by their fearless bearing inspired confidence in their men and thus extricated them from an awkward situation.



It is open to question whether the higher authorities were wise in sending the brigade out to execute a reconnaissance in exactly the same manner as only five days previously. No attempt was made to take the enemy by surprise; on the contrary, the Brigade marched round the Umdabia bend of the river, so that instead of appearing suddenly in the early morning, it arrived later than on the first occasion. An enemy would indeed be despicable who would allow his position twice to be reconnoitred by a mass of horsemen without making some attempt to prevent it.

The losses suffered by the Cavalry Brigade on this day were as follows:—

	Men	Horses
Missing or dead . . . . .	8	18
Wounded . . . . .	28	13
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total casualties . . . . .	36	31

Much difficulty was experienced in withdrawing the wounded men. The Brigade was provided with no ambulance of any kind, so the worst cases were placed on the limbers of the guns and the others were made to ride.

No mercy was shown by the Dervishes to those who fell into their hands. A party of men from one of Major Le Gallais' squadrons bravely galloped out to bring in one of their comrades who had fallen, but arrived only in time to see him despatched by the enemy. A corporal of the 9th squadron who had received a spear wound in the shoulder and had his horse killed nearly shared a similar fate, for he was knocked down in the dust and ridden over by his own squadron during its retirement. Fortunately, however, he was seen by Captain Haig, who succeeded in carrying him back to the guns.

The information gained this day confirmed the report of the former cavalry reconnaissance—namely, that the *Dem* could be stormed without much difficulty. Orders were accordingly issued by the Sirdar for the force to march next morning to Umdabia.

On Wednesday, April 6, the Cavalry Brigade started about 5 A.M. and protected the front and left flank of the infantry during its march to the new camp. The wounded were left at Abadar.

After reaching Umdabia, General Hunter with a Sudanese battalion and one squadron (the 6th) proceeded to Mutrus to select a suitable place where the infantry might halt and water on the way to attack the

*Dem.* Small parties of the enemy were seen, but the object was effected without molestation.

The heat on this day was very great, and four men of the Black Battalion were knocked over with sunstroke.

## CHAPTER IV

### BATTLE OF THE ATBARA

*Thursday, April 7*, was a busy day in camp.

At 10 A.M. the following brigade orders were issued, and show exactly what was done :—

#### CAVALRY BRIGADE ORDERS BY KAIMAKAN BROADWOOD, BEY.

Umdabia, 7. iv. '98, 10 A.M.

1. (a) The Brigade (without transport) will parade at 2 A.M. to-morrow, clear of the bush east of camp, facing south; the 1st Regiment on the right; maxims in rear of 2nd Regiment.

(b) One led horse per squadron to accompany the Brigade; these will march with the maxims, until the Camel Corps joins the Brigade.

2. Rations are to be drawn as usual to-day, and the following amount of food and forage will be carried :—

(a) Each man  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lb. biscuits.

(b) Each horse 7 lb. corn.

(c) 5 lbs. per horse carried by the Camel Corps.

3. All ammunition mules, lame horses, and baggage to be left in camp at a point which will be notified later.

4. The remaining portion of food and forage to be packed ready to be placed on camels to follow the Brigade if necessary, and left near the Brigade transport.

5. Horses to be watered and fed and men to have a hot meal before starting.

B/O  
D. HAIG,  
C.S.O. Cavalry Brigade.

To O.C. 1st Regiment.

To O.C. 2nd Regiment.

To O.C. Maxims.

The Infantry left camp about 6 P.M. and marched to Mutrus, but it was 1.30 A.M. on the 8th before the squadrons paraded and marched independently by a road which had been cleared through the scrub to the place of assembly mentioned in brigade orders.

The march began shortly after 2 A.M. on a bearing E.S.E. The brigade was formed in square with the guns in the centre, as on many previous occasions. The following table shows the rate of advance :—

- 2.15 A.M. to 2.30 A.M.—15 minutes' trot=2 miles.  
Halt for 10 minutes.
- 2.40 A.M. to 2.50 A.M.—10 minutes' trot=1 mile.  
Track of infantry hit off.  
Direction changed to N.E.
- 2.50 A.M. to 3.5 A.M.—15 minutes' trot=2 miles.  
Infantry column caught up.
- 3.5 A.M. to 3.20 A.M.—15 minutes' trot=2 miles.


The Cavalry now passed along the left flank of the Infantry column, and at 3.20 the tracks first found by the Cavalry Brigade on March 30 were crossed. Here turning S.E. the whole force formed in the direction of these tracks towards the *Dem*. By 3.40 A.M. the Cavalry was formed on the left of the army, and a halt was then made till 5.10 A.M. The distance to the *Dem* from this point seemed to be about three to four miles.

At 5.10 the march was resumed and at 6.10 A.M. the Artillery commenced firing on the enemy's position. During this firing the Cavalry Brigade (less the horse battery which had joined the mass of the Artillery) acted on the left of the attack, where it was confronted by the mass of the Dervish horsemen. By 7.30 A.M. the artillery preparation was over and a general advance was made by the infantry. The Cavalry conformed to this movement, and supported by maxim fire drove their mounted opponents back into the river bed, the latter being actually reached about 8 A.M. at a point about two miles above the *Dem*. The line of the river had been assigned as a limit to the Cavalry, so its further action was for the time being restricted to firing a few volleys at fugitives crossing the bed of the river which, except for pools here and there, was quite dry.

About 9.15 A.M. permission was received to cross the river. The banks of the river were very steep, but the Arab horses slid down the one and scrambled up the other with extraordinary agility and little time was lost in the passage. On the left bank, however, the jungle was so thick that to advance on a broader front than half sections, or sometimes single file, was impossible.

Colonel Broadwood led the advance in person. After proceeding about two miles and finding the jungle as dense as ever, he decided to return and get on the track by which the bulk of the enemy had retired.

Having reached the river bed an order from the Sirdar was received to pursue up the right bank of the river, but as the Cavalry Brigade had held complete possession of this before the retreat of the enemy commenced, it seemed that the order must have been given under a misapprehension of the situation. Colonel Broadwood therefore, being little more than a mile from the *Dem*, galloped forward to see the Sirdar and received permission to pursue up the left bank. At 12.40 the pursuit on the left bank recommenced along the tracks left by the fugitives. As already stated when dealing with the reconnaissances on this bank, the thick belt of scrub extends to a width of some three miles. This



favoured the enemy greatly in his retreat and enabled him to disperse and vanish with almost dramatic suddenness into the bush. Numerous small parties, however, were captured, many of the prisoners being wounded. No tracks were found to indicate that the enemy had retired in any sort of formed body; on the contrary everything pointed to the supposition that a general *sauve qui peut* had taken place.

The pursuit was carried on until nearly 5 P.M. The Brigade then returned past the *Dem*, to Umdabia, reaching the latter place at about 9 P.M.

The return march commenced at 3.30 p.m. next day, Saturday,

*April 9.* The Brigade halted that night at Abadar, and continuing the march early on Sunday, five squadrons reached Kunur by 10.30 A.M., while the remaining three squadrons went to Dakhila (Atbara Fort) under the command of Major Mahon.

Starting from Kunur at 6 a.m. on *Monday, April 11*, the five squadrons and headquarters of the Cavalry reached Berber *nuzl* by 10 A.M., and settled down in the same village they had occupied before Mahmud's advance.

The reception of the Cavalry—the first portion of the Anglo-Egyptian army to arrive after the Atbara fight—by the inhabitants of Berber, was of a curiously mixed character. Many of the supporters of the Khalifa's cause had scarcely yet realised the truth of the reports that a large Dervish army, under one of the ablest Emirs, had practically been wiped out, and these stood looking on in silent bewilderment as the Cavalry wended its way through the dusty streets. Others of the inhabitants, chiefly women, raised piercing shrieks of joy and evidently were genuinely glad at the return of the victorious horsemen.

*(To be continued.)*

## THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE HORSE ARTILLERY WITH THE CAVALRY DIVISION

THE Cavalry divisional training, 1909, marked a great improvement in the co-operation of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, thanks to the sound principles on which the divisional training was based, and the skill of the Horse Artillery commander in giving effect to the wishes of his chief.

The true rôle of the Horse Artillery, viz. the support of the Cavalry in their decisive attacks at all hazards, even at the risk of losing their guns, appears to have been well grasped, though the actual timing of the moment when this support should be given was not always right. Herein lies the great difficulty. If fire is opened too soon the hostile Cavalry can decline the fight, or manœuvre so as to draw our Cavalry across the line of fire and mask the guns, while if it be too late, the attack takes place without the support of the guns, whose fire would be at once masked. I am inclined, however, to believe that the difficulty, possibly, appears greater at peace manœuvres than it would be on service, and that if once two bodies of Cavalry were approaching each other in open country with a view to attack it would be very hard for one of them to make a strategic movement to the flank or rear under the fire of quick-firing guns without their *morale* suffering, to say nothing of the actual loss suffered by that portion which had come under fire.

The chief point to bear in mind is not to be too late; an error in being a little too soon in opening fire being far more excusable and likely to cause less harm to the plans of the divisional commander than being a moment too late.

As regards procedure, brigades or batteries should occupy successive positions of readiness, and even when batteries have been brought into action it is generally advisable to keep some portion limbered up and in hand to meet an unforeseen move, until the real Cavalry fight has begun.

It is laid down in 'Cavalry Training' that under normal circumstances no special escort should be necessary for the guns, and I think this point requires emphasis. The best security for the Artillery lies in the

success of the Cavalry, and Horse Artillery brigade and battery commanders should be very chary of asking the Cavalry to fritter away their strength in providing escorts when every horse and man is wanted for the attack. During the training machine guns were frequently detailed for this duty, and there can be no doubt that given careful training in fire tactics they could be most usefully employed for this purpose, and also for denying fire positions to the hostile guns.

The question of arming the Horse Artillery man is one that requires consideration. Personally I should like to see the sword restored to the N.C.O.s and gunners. History tells us that occasions have arisen, both in India and on the Continent, when Horse Artillery batteries have had to burst their way through hostile masses, and there is no reason why this should not occur again in the future.

As regards organisation there were certain points brought to notice which it may be hoped will be altered in future years.

1. The weakness of the R.H.A. brigades. They were both organised in batteries of only four guns each. Now, in order to prevent fire being masked, to bring a converging fire on the hostile Cavalry and to watch for counter attacks it is often advisable that the guns should be dispersed, and the missing sections from each battery were often sorely missed. It is absolutely necessary that in future each battery should have its six guns.

2. One of the brigades detailed for the divisional training was not one that would form part of the division on mobilisation. It would seem only natural that both the brigades which would join the division on service should train with it in peace.

3. The want of an organised staff was much felt. In this connection it would seem only sound that a brigadier-general or colonel should be appointed to the command of the Artillery of the division for a term of years instead of for a few weeks as at present. He might also be responsible for the training of all the R.H.A. batteries in the United Kingdom, and be commandant of an R.H.A. practice camp. Such an appointment could not fail to bring about the best results, and would be well worth the money spent on it.

4. It is highly desirable that the establishment of the R.H.A. brigade allotted to the division should be raised by thirty-six horses per battery in order to provide them with first line wagons. The question of ammunition supply was neglected this year, but it is one that becomes of increasing importance with the development of the quick-firing gun.

There is a further point that merits consideration, and that is whether it would not be advisable to attach another battery R.H.A. armed with light howitzers to the Cavalry division.

It may be said that the *rôle* of Cavalry would be to turn positions where they were checked, but there is no doubt that the want of some such weapon militated against the success of Mischenko's raid on the Japanese line of communication.

Moreover, after six years of almost continued war in the beginning of last century, it was deemed advisable for the Waterloo campaign to mobilise each battery R.H.A. with one howitzer, and one battery was armed entirely with them.

It might also be urged that such a battery would detract from the mobility of the Cavalry division, but there is no reason why, under normal conditions, it should not march with the ammunition columns, where, if wanted, it would be all ready at the disposal of the divisional commander.





*[We are indebted to Mr. HARRY PAYNE for the above illustration, which will also be utilised for the front page of cover of the four numbers of the present volume.]*



# TACTICAL FORMATIONS


## FORMATION FOR APPROACH MARCH.



### Cavalry in column of brigade masses.


In this formation the whole Division is concentrated as closely as possible. It is suitable for concealing the Division in an undulation of the ground and for moving along hollows such as are met with on Salisbury Plain, Wantage Downs, &c. But in open ground the formation is too vulnerable. It is also too concentrated for rapid deployment for the fight.

# FORMATION FOR APPROACH MARCH.




This formation is suitable for an advance prior to attacking. In front is a group for the main attack with its supports. Lastly a reserve is provided to guard against the unforeseen. It is separated from the attacking line, but within reach of it.

# FORMATION FOR APPROACH MARCH.




Force disposed in greater depth. Suitable for feeling the enemy and for reconnoitring, without committing the force to an attack against one's will. In front is a first line for manœuvring purposes, with artillery, which is of especial value in a reconnaissance. The Brigades for the main attack are held back, and a Brigade is retained as reserve.

# FORMATION FOR APPROACH MARCH.




Force disposed in greater breadth. Brigades at deploying interval, one being the brigade of direction. Artillery may march with any of the columns. This formation is suitable for crossing ground interspersed with copses and home-steads; forming short defiles, it lends itself to an enveloping attack. Brigadiers must act more on their own initiative than in the previous formations, and the Division is less under the direct control of the Divisional Commander than when disposed in greater depth. A change of front, too, is less easily carried out than in either of the previous formations.


**BRIGADE WITH GUNS PASSING DEFILE.**




# BRIGADE WITH GUNS PASSING DEFILE WITH CONCENTRIC ATTACK.



# FOUR BRIGADES AND GUNS CROSSING BY TWO PASSAGES.




**BRIGADE DEPLOYING FROM TRIPLE COLUMN.**






OBLIQUE DEPLOYMENT FROM DOUBLE COLUMN.

ENEMY →



# RETIREMENT THROUGH DEFILE WHEN PURSUED BY ENEMY, WITH A VIEW TO ATTACKING ENEMY AS HE DEBOUCHES.



The 1st Brigade moves to a flank position under cover, ready to attack enemy in flank as he emerges from the defile, and forms to meet the 2nd Brigade.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Revue de Cavalerie*.—The number for August opens with a very striking appreciation of the work done for the Cavalry of France by the lately-deceased General de Galliffet ; it is written by the well-known Cavalry commander, General Geslin de Bourgogne, who, less fortunate than the comrade whose labours he so ably describes and so generously extols, has been prematurely retired from the active service of his country while still in full possession of the will and the power to do good work for her. The manœuvres of 1908 are already ancient history, but 'Un Cavalier aux Manœuvres d'Armée' contributes a long paper on the results therein apparent of the present-day system of Cavalry training. If we understand his argument aright, he complains that in the constant straining after great strategical results, the means necessary to attain these ends are not sufficiently studied ; that the intellectual side of Cavalry training has been glorified at the expense of the physical ; that in the search for the Cavalry commanders of the future the clever strategical or tactical theorist is in danger of being preferred before the real Cavalry leader who knows the possibilities and limitations of his arm and how to attain the one and when and how to strain the other.

Under the title of 'Contradictions' the correspondence which commenced with an article in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* on 'La Cavalerie du Service de deux Ans' is continued. The present article is in the main a fiery onslaught upon the exaggerated ideas of the value of the dismounted attack, by which the present writer contends that a hostile Cavalry may be defeated but never overwhelmed. This number contains the orders issued by General Tréneau for the Cavalry manœuvres carried out this year in France by the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions.

In the September number Colonel de Sérévillè has an article on the principles of regimental training ; it is of value mainly to his own Army, since it is based upon purely local conditions connected with the time of year at which recruits join and remounts are handed over. The writer contradicts the statement so often put forward in the French Military Press that the introduction of the two-year period of Colour-service has been the ruin of the French Cavalry ; he holds that owing to the increasingly large number of re-engagements and of enlistments for long periods there is a sufficiency of junior non-commissioned officers not only to provide the 'old soldier' element upon which the young recruits can model themselves, but also the trained men to break in the remounts. Here follow two alternative proposals for the better organisation of the French Cavalry : these suggestions start from the standpoint that the *brigades de corps* be abolished, and that the existing regiments of horse be grouped in Cavalry Divisions and Divisional Cavalry. Under Pro-

posals 1 the regiments are taken as they exist at the present moment, but some alterations of garrisons—which need not here be gone into—are required. Two squadrons are allotted to each Infantry Division as Divisional Cavalry, so that for the ordinary Army Corps one Cavalry regiment of four squadrons will provide the Divisional Cavalry—a *six* squadron regiment providing that for each of the Army Corps at Besançon and Chalons, which are organised in three divisions. It is proposed that five regiments should form a Cavalry Division composed of two brigades (one Light and one of Dragoons or Lancers) each of two regiments, with a fifth or odd regiment drawn from the Cuirassiers; this is to be attached for administrative purposes to one of the two brigades, but to remain at the disposal of the divisional commander. In justification of this novel organisation it is urged that a division of three brigades has been found awkward in manœuvre, and that if in one of two brigades a reserve is held back—which is usually done—one brigade becomes at once much weaker than the other. The regiment of Cuirassiers will fall naturally into the position of this reserve. Proposal No. 2 is based not so much on the numbers of regiments and squadrons as on the actual strength in men of the whole Cavalry of the French Army. The Divisional Cavalry is to be organised as in Proposal 1, but whereas the Divisional Cavalry squadron will number but 121 of all ranks, in the regiments forming the Cavalry Divisions each squadron will have a strength of 161. It is, however, proposed that each regiment of a Cavalry division should be composed of three squadrons only, and that the division should be made up as follows: a brigade of three Light Cavalry regiments, a brigade of three regiments of Dragoons or Lancers, a regiment of Cuirassiers—thus *seven* regiments in all—and two machine-gun detachments. It will be observed that under Proposal 1 there would be twelve Cavalry Divisions in France each of five regiments; under Proposal 2 there would be nine such divisions each of seven regiments. (N.B.—In the above the Algerian corps is not here considered.) This number closes with the first part of a paper, interesting but somewhat highly technical, the object of which is to prove that, under certain conditions, the remount might be brought to maturity at least a year earlier than at present, and that breeders, being relieved of the necessity of keeping remounts until they have reached the age at which they are now purchased by Government remount agents, would be enabled to raise such stock at a price mutually more remunerative to buyer and seller.

The November number opens with an *étude sur Sedan* which promises to be interesting, as the work of the Cavalry is to be specially dealt with, and the battle is to be generally reconstructed by the light of present knowledge and with the assistance of modern developments. The translation of Bernhardi's 'Cavalry in Future Wars' is concluded in this issue. Lieut. Goubaux discusses the organisation of cyclist detachments in other armies, and suggests an organisation suitable for his own. He proposes that the tactical unit should be the battalion of three companies with motor transport; that for each Cavalry Division and for each Army Corps there should be one cyclist battalion, or a total of twenty-six battalions altogether; and that these should be raised by transforming into cyclist Infantry thirteen of the four-company battalions of *chasseurs-à-pied*. The cyclists for the *services de l'arrière* he leaves to the initiative of voluntary wheelmen. He considers it of the first importance

that each Cavalry Division should have a call upon the services of a cyclist battalion ; one reason is, of course, to make up in some degree for the numerical inferiority of the French as compared with the German horsemen, but his other reason for their employment shows a curious divergence from the views expressed and reiterated in both the British and the German Cavalry regulations. Lieut. Goubaux, who is not, however, a Cavalry officer, states that Cavalry will only act dismounted on the *defensive*, and he proposes in this connection that the cyclist Infantry shall provide the element of offence in the fire fight, while the Cavalry form the *élément de manœuvre*. The paper on the more rapid maturing of the remount is continued, the writer laying much stress upon the need for quickening the growth of the *frame* of the animal by the administration of certain phosphates, as to the proper assimilation of which, however, the writer admits there has always been considerable difference of opinion.

*Militär-Wochenblatt.*—In the issue dated October 9, Colonel von Chelius, commander of the Hussars of the Guard, writes on 'Strengthened Cavalry Brigades.' He points out that in the manœuvres of 1908 and 1909 of the Guard Corps, trial was made of brigades of Cavalry which, made up to an increased strength, were used as independent bodies. In 1908 brigades were formed of three Cavalry regiments with a section of Horse Artillery, a machine-gun detachment and a pioneer detachment—which last the writer considers superfluous. In 1909 the ordinary Cavalry brigade was given a section of Horse Artillery and a machine-gun detachment. The writer is of the opinion that the ideal composition for such a brigade is three Cavalry regiments, with Artillery and machine guns as above, and holds that while a force thus constituted is practically half a Cavalry Division, it is in reality superior to the larger body by reason of its increased mobility. In the number of November 2 Rittmeister von Lücken has a short paper on the benefit which may be derived by Cavalry officers in general from practising for and taking part in show-jumping. In the 4th November number there are some comments on the conditions for the annual long-distance ride, open to German officers of all arms, for the prize given by the Emperor. It is suggested as fairer to all if it were laid down that only troop-horses should be ridden belonging to the regiment of the competitor ; thus the officer of small means would have an equal chance with his richer comrade, while the observance of such a regulation would encourage a higher standard of training and horse-study generally among mounted units. It is further suggested that the course to be taken should not be confined to the roads, but that cross-country riding should form at any rate a small portion of the test ; and finally that every year a prize should be given, rather than that the winner should have to defend his title to a challenge trophy.

In a paper of the 11th November on the necessity for increased instruction in the Cavalry, extraordinary stress is laid upon the vital importance of imparting a knowledge of history, and particularly of *regimental* history, among all ranks. In view of the complaint one finds everywhere in the German service papers on the increasing amount that has to be taught to the modern Cavalryman and the short time there is in which to impart it, this insistence that regimental

history should under no circumstances be neglected seems rather significant. An article on 'Nahaufklärung' in the issue of December 4 is of importance as drawing attention to the increasing disposition to recognise the difficulty of the work which in the future will lie before the Cavalry Division and also the Divisional Cavalry—a difficulty which some modern German military writers try to meet by suggesting the augmentation of the independent Cavalry bodies on the one hand, and on the other by insisting upon the co-operation of all arms in the work of the Divisional Cavalry. For this latter end the author of the paper under review proposes the permanent organisation in each Infantry brigade of a certain small establishment of mounted Infantrymen, who are not only to set free the Divisional Cavalry from orderly duties, despatch riding, &c., but are even to relieve them from part of their reconnaissance work, being for this purpose trained with Cavalry to a certain degree of efficiency.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte.*—The October number contains two articles reminiscent of the work of the Cavalry in the campaigns of 1859 and 1866. Major-General Buxbaum follows with a paper entitled 'What Fashion Decrees,' and appears to hold the opinion that, because it is considered the fashion to do so in the present day, the employment of Cavalry is too much confined to dismounted work, and that commanders of this arm are far too prone to use the carbine or rifle in place of the sword, no matter what the prevailing conditions of the moment may be. An article on 'Raids' by Count Schwerin is both a reply to and a continuation of a paper of the same nature contributed to the April number by Major Kerchnawe, and the author considers that in the future it will be quite out of the question for any Continental Power to employ any portion of its Cavalry force in the execution of mere raids, which, if successful, have no more than a purely temporary moral effect and exercise no permanent influence upon the result of a campaign or even of an action. It is very greatly to be preferred, he urges, that Cavalry bodies should be kept in hand for their legitimate rôle of timely intervention in the battle, following upon the necessary preliminary 'Aufklärung,' and ending in a relentless pursuit when victory is assured. Then follows a paper upon the training of Austrian remounts, from which it seems that the writer admits that there is little fault to be found with the existing regulations on the subject, but rather with the manner in which they are applied or even ignored. Dr. Maday writes on 'The Psychology of the Horse,' and Lieutenant Weise on the technical means at the disposal of modern armies for the conveyance of information. There is then an abridged translation of the lecture delivered on July 6, 1906, by Brigadier-General Rimington on 'The Spirit of Cavalry under Napoleon,' and published in the October number of that year of the 'Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.'

Full half of the November issue is occupied with a detailed account, by Colonel von Unger of the General Staff, of the work of the German Cavalry Divisions in the Imperial Manœuvres of 1909. These were chiefly remarkable for the formation and employment of a Cavalry Corps, and Colonel von Unger combats the opinion which seems to have been freely expressed that such an organisation is awkward to handle and slow in movement. He admits that

this may be the case if such a corps is looked upon and manœuvred as a single unit ; it should, however, he declares, rather be considered and employed as two Cavalry Divisions placed under one command in order that together they may effect a purpose special to both. This is rather a record than a study, but the account is very full and probably accurate, and is, moreover, illustrated by two good sketches and an excellent map. 'A Regimental Officer' contributes a paper on the much-debated subject of Divisional Cavalry, and complains that under the present system in the Austrian Army, whereby a small body of Cavalry under a N.C.O. is attached for duty to every Infantry brigade to perform the duties of Divisional Cavalry, neither the Cavalry nor the Infantry learn anything of value. He suggests that Cavalry should only be apportioned to Infantry at the more important manœuvres and then in the numbers laid down in the field-service manuals ; that the Infantry brigades should be given an increased number of wheelmen for despatch riding and orderly duties ; and that a certain number of mounted Infantrymen should be organised for such duties as now absorb a large proportion of the men of the Divisional Cavalry squadrons. He opines that even when relieved of these duties the effectives are still too few, and he then arrives at a suggestion, made, curiously enough, in a recent issue of the *Revue de Cavalerie*, that the number of squadrons in a regiment of Divisional Cavalry should be less than those in a regiment forming part of the Cavalry Division. The writer, however, strongly advocates the increasing of the number of squadrons allotted as Divisional Cavalry to an Infantry Division from three to four.

*Spectateur Militaire*.—There is comparatively little of Cavalry interest in the numbers of this fortnightly under review ; but running through them is a proposal for army organisation, and in regard to Cavalry it is suggested that the regiments should be organised on the basis of *cavalerie d'armée*—a title which the writer prefers to that of 'independent Cavalry'—Corps Cavalry and Divisional Cavalry. In France he would have certain regiments allotted to divisions, others grouped in brigades of two or three regiments and attached to Army Corps, and squadrons of Divisional Cavalry attached to Infantry Divisions. All regiments of French Cavalry have at present five squadrons, of which four only are mobilisable and the fifth is a dépôt squadron ; it is proposed that the dépôt squadron should be abolished. The squadrons throughout are approximately of the same strength in men and horses. The *cavalerie d'armée* would be composed of fourteen regiments of Cuirassiers, sixteen of Dragoons or Lancers, and ten of Light Cavalry, and would be grouped in brigades composing ten Cavalry Divisions. The Corps Cavalry should, it is suggested, form twenty brigades composed of twenty regiments of Dragoons and twenty-three of Hussars. The military organisation in France allows for forty-three Infantry Divisions, *i.e.*, two Divisions for each of seventeen of the Army Corps, and three Divisions each for the remaining three Army Corps, and it is proposed to allot one squadron only to each Division. There will thus be as many squadrons of Divisional Cavalry as there are regiments of Corps Cavalry. The suggestion offered is that each divisional squadron should be attached for instruction, administration and discipline to a corps regiment as a supernumerary squadron, but be held at the disposal of the Divisional

commander under whose orders it would pass on mobilisation, such squadrons to be regarded as special units belonging for all time to their Infantry Divisions. In strength of men and horses these squadrons will be no different from those of other squadrons.

In the number dated November 1 there is the commencement of a paper describing the operations covering Belfort engaged in by General Lecourbe against the left wing of the Allied Army advancing on Paris after Waterloo. These operations have been rather overlooked in the turmoil of events during which they occurred, but they are worthy of study and cause one to wonder whether Waterloo might have had a different ending had Napoleon, as he apparently had at one time some idea of doing, given Grouchy's command to Lecourbe. The writer of this study points out that during the Hundred Days the *commandements de couverture* were all bestowed upon local men—Lecourbe, commanding the Corps de Jura, came from Ruffey in the Jura; Suchet, commanding the Army of the Alps, came from Lyons; Rapp, commanding the Army of the Rhine, was an Alsatian; while Gérard, commanding the Moselle Army, was a Lorrainer. Lecourbe was certainly not well supplied with Cavalry; he had a so-called division of two brigades, but one of these contained but one regiment and the whole division only numbered 863 men.

‘The German View of the Employment of Cavalry.’ By Alsoran.

H.I.M. The Kaiser, Supreme War Lord of the German Armies, comes of a warrior race, and has been trained as a soldier from his youth up; his opinions, therefore, not only carry professional weight, but ensure that continuity of policy so essential to the successful organisation and training of a vast army.

Himself a believer in the effective action of masses of horsemen even on the battlefield, as demonstrated yearly at his Imperial Manœuvres, he permits no tinkering with his horsemen, no reduction in their numbers or training, and no substitution for them of any less perfect brand of mounted troops.

Though many German writers do not agree as to the value of Cavalry as a tactical weapon on the actual field of battle, none gainsay its strategic importance; it can never be too strong or too highly trained for its strategic mission, and therefore diminution of its numbers is unthinkable. Though, as General von Bernhardt puts it, the power of modern fire-arms makes the action of Cavalry in the battlefield more difficult, there are other factors which increase its importance and open to it a far wider field of action.

The enormous size of modern armies makes any change of plan, once it is launched, well-nigh impossible, while the vital importance of communications, railways, and telegraphs is intensified.

Exact and timely strategic reconnaissance and enterprises by Cavalry against an enemy's communications thus gain in importance, while hardly less indispensable is the screening and protection of their own main columns.

To discover and to cover, though they may be more difficult, are now more important than ever.

General von Kleist sums up the strategic rôle of Cavalry in one word—*Reconnaissance*; it may have other missions, such as raids and the destruction of railways, but the key-note is reconnaissance—reconnaissance, which alone



confirms by actual evidence the hearsay information gained from other sources, spies, prisoners, newspapers, &c.

The fundamental idea of German strategy and tactics is a resolute offensive imposing their will on the adversary and forcing him to conform to their line of operations, and to give it this power of initiative the supreme command relies upon its Cavalry masses launched far in front of the armies to seek and maintain contact with the enemy's main columns after sweeping away, if necessary, the hostile Cavalry and bursting through any screen opposed to them.

Of such paramount importance is this strategic action, that it is little to be wondered at that the German Cavalry is the constant object of the Kaiser's personal attention and is stinted neither in numbers, equipment, nor in opportunities of practising its *rôle* on an adequate scale.

'To weaken the Cavalry arm,' wrote General von Kleist, 'and by economies thus effected to strengthen the Artillery and Infantry, is to clip the eagle's wings in the hope of growing more formidable claws.'

'Armies of Artillery and Infantry can put up a prolonged passive resistance, but they can never make their superiority felt at the decisive point ; they can stop an enemy, but they can never win decisive victories.'

Both in England and in France the Cavalry are divided into three distinct lines :—

	<i>France.</i>	<i>England.</i>	
1. Strategic Reconnaissance.	Cavalry Divisions.	The Cavalry Division.	Cavalry of the Commander-in-Chief.
2. First line of security	Corps Cavalry Brigades.	Mounted Brigades. Protective Cavalry.	Cavalry of the Army or Corps Army Commander.
3. Immediate security.	Cavalry squadron, forming part of each Division, for use with advanced, flank, and rear guards of all arms.	Two companies M.I., forming part of each Division, for use with advanced, flank, and rear guards of all arms.	Cavalry of the Division Commander.

The Germans only have two lines :—

The Cavalry Divisions.  
The Divisional Cavalry.

But though no third line is clearly prescribed, there is sufficient indication in their Field Service Regulations of 1908 that the Divisional Cavalry will be divided into bodies of Protective Cavalry, as well as squadrons for the immediate service of the Divisions.

'In certain circumstances,' says the Field Service Regulations, 'it may be advantageous to concentrate the Cavalry of the two Divisions of an Army Corps, but at least one squadron must be left with each Division.'

Opinions of German writers differ as to the number of squadrons required for Divisional service—General von Bernhardt considers two squadrons, aided by cyclist despatch riders, enough ; others think a regiment of four squadrons none too much, and would add a squadron of Mounted Rifles for orderly duty and despatch riding ; while at Imperial Manœuvres the number of Divisional squadrons varies from one to four.

The Japanese, taught on German lines, give a regiment of three squadrons to

each Division, but in Manchuria frequently took away all but one to swell their independent Cavalry Brigades.

Again, in dealing with reconnaissances, the Field Service Regulations clearly indicate the use of a distinctly protective line of Cavalry.

'Extended Reconnaissance belongs to the Cavalry Divisions ; ranging far in front of the Army they contribute the essential means of clearing up the situation and locating the enemy.'

'Reconnaissance by the Divisional Cavalry is carried out on similar principles, but within narrower limits; its constant duty is the protection of the other arms against surprise.'

Here we have in other words the difference between the duties of Strategic and Protective Cavalry laid down in our own Cavalry Training and this is amplified as follows :—

'The object of Reconnaissance is to fix the presence, the dispositions, and the strength of the enemy.'

'The object of Protection is both to check a determined attack, and to prevent the enemy from observing our own dispositions.'

'Reconnaissance and Protection require different methods ; protective detachments are tied to the troops they cover, but the movements of reconnoitring patrols depend upon the enemy alone.'

'Good Reconnaissance of itself ensures safety, and, on the other hand, protective detachments can also gain information.'

'Reconnaissance and Protection are the complement of each other and cannot be separated.'

'If to one body of troops both *rôles* are assigned at the same time, the commander would do well to detail for each separate units.'

But German Regulations do not end here, for though reconnaissance is, they say, essentially a Cavalry duty, still circumstances may make it impossible for them to carry it out, and the work must be completed by other arms ; and, as the operations progress from stage to stage, the service of reconnaissance *on the front* passes more and more into the hands of other arms.

On the battlefield Cavalry will find their sphere on the flanks and rear of the enemy, fixing his flanks, the position of his reserves, and reporting the arrival of reinforcements ; they must also look to any wide intervals in the enemy's line, and fill similar gaps in their own.

Reconnaissance is thus divided into three parts, distinct but liable to overlap :—

(a) Strategic reconnaissance by the Cavalry Divisions.

(b) Protective reconnaissance by the Divisional Cavalry.

(c) Tactical reconnaissance by all arms—Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, and Aeronauts.

The strategic reconnaissance must be so arranged that there are no omissions and no duplication of work, and this indicates, though it does not distinctly prescribe, the massing under one command of several Cavalry Divisions or Corps of Cavalry.

The actual instrument of reconnaissance is the officer's patrol, of which the strength may be as much as a complete troop, accompanied by an officer of the General Staff or another arm, independent of anything but its object, and the necessity of getting back the information in time to be of use.

Supporting the patrols are contact squadrons, the patrols being usually extra to, and not found by, the squadrons, which cannot afford officers when so acting. These squadrons form reservoirs of information and ensure its rapid transmission to head-quarters by every available means.

Behind the contact squadron move the Cavalry masses, advancing from feature to feature on information received, marching possibly in several columns, but always with the power of rapid concentration, and usually in communication with supreme head-quarters by wireless telegraph.

On the information gained by this strategic reconnaissance the armies are set in motion, and as they approach each other their protective Cavalry comes up with the strategic Cavalry.

Detailed information now becomes of increasing importance ; the points reached by the heads and tails of the marching columns and the exact strength and order of march, certainly of those on the flank, must all be definitely ascertained.

As the battle draws near the enemy's tactical dispositions must be determined as accurately as possible, and so the third phase, tactical reconnaissance by all arms, is entered upon.

Protective reconnaissance is said to be essentially the duty of the Divisional Cavalry (presumably massed for the purpose into Brigades) ; when there is no strategic Cavalry in front, distant reconnaissance is added to its work, but the presence of strategic Cavalry never absolves it from its protective duty.

Protective Cavalry patrols are seldom supported by contact squadrons, though their attitude is an aggressive one, to close with and drive away or capture any hostile patrols they meet ; the main body is never to go so far from the Army it protects as to make its absence from the battlefield impossible.

There is still another use to which these Regulations indicate the possibility of devoting considerable bodies of Cavalry, *i.e.* to form a screen, which may be either offensive or defensive.

In an *Offensive* screen a mass of Cavalry is assembled to hold the enemy at a distance, with strong patrols and cyclist groups pushed out along all the roads, to attack and drive back hostile patrols within their outpost line. A *Defensive* screen is most effective when resting on some natural feature, which limits the hostile reconnaissance to a few lines of advance. The roads can then be barred by dismounted Cavalry and machine-guns, reinforced by cyclists and even by Infantry, with patrols in front and concentrated bodies of Cavalry in rear ready to assist any threatened point.

And thus is indicated another strategic mission of Cavalry, *i.e.* to form an impenetrable screen to mystify and mislead or to conceal some strategic combination.

So much for the German view of the employment of Cavalry as set forth in the Field Service Regulations ; they are careful to indicate only, without laying down definite prescriptions.

When we come to study German Cavalry writers, we find much more decidedly offensive views, the clearest being those of General von Bernhadi, whose 'Cavalry in Future Wars' finds a place in every officer's library.

'He who attempts to carry out reconnaissance or protection will fail in both *as long as the opposing Cavalry is in being.*'

Reconnaissance demands concentration to sweep away the hostile Cavalry

and burst through the opposing screen; protection entails wide dispersion along the whole front of possible attack and the flanks as well; the requirements of both services are thus essentially opposed to one another.

From the above it is evident that German writers contemplate the massing of very large bodies of Cavalry under one command, a return to the methods of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.

Though the Regulations mention nothing larger than a Division of six regiments in three Brigades, with two Batteries of R.H.A., von Kleist is of opinion that it is quite possible for one commander to lead two Divisions as one Corps, and Bernhardi would concentrate even several such Corps under one command for some special strategic object.

If, as both history and the annual Imperial Manœuvres show, a Corps of Cavalry of forty-eight squadrons and two Brigades of Horse Artillery can be handled on the actual battlefield, how much more is the combined action of such masses feasible in some strategic operation, where the essential condition is merely that the action of the two Divisions working separately though in unison, each under its own commander, should be directed to a common end.

Thus General von Bernhardi's ideal of the united action of vast concentrations of Cavalry goes far beyond mere success in the Cavalry combat, and he would use them to crush by weight of numbers and the power of their rifles, machine-guns, and artillery all opposition to the attainment of any special strategic object which the supreme command may give them.

In the great decisions of modern war the weight even of a Brigade of Cavalry is insignificant, and there is no limit to the number that may effectively be brought to bear.

Thus Germany expects great things of her magnificent Cavalry, and it is the special care of the Supreme War Lord that not only shall its mounting, its equipment, and its training be as perfect as possible, but that the special moral attributes of its gallant and dashing young officers shall be preserved and fostered by every means possible.

The author desires to acknowledge the assistance he has received in compiling these notes from the perusal of Major Niessel's admirable work, '*Tendances Actuelles de la Cavalerie Allemande.*'

'Historical Records of the Denbighshire Hussars.' By Colonel L. E. S. Parry, D.S.O., and Engineer-Lieutenant B. F. M. Freeman, R.N. (Wrexham: Woodall, Minshall, Thomas & Co.)

A well-written and well-illustrated record of the regiment from the year 1795 up to 1906. The task of compilation was handicapped by the fact that no order books previous to the year 1838 exist, nor are the old papers of the Lord-Lieutenant's Office to be found.

Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, who was the first Colonel of the regiment, raised the ancient British Fencibles or North Wales Fencible Cavalry, which proceeded to Ireland in 1798, and a regiment of Provisional Militia, which, in company with a detachment of the Denbighshire Militia, he took to France in 1814. Many of the men of these two regiments subsequently joined the Denbighshire Yeomanry, but beyond this there is no connection between this regiment of Yeomanry and the ancient British Fencibles.

**PROBLEM No. 9**

By the Author of 'Bonnie Bertie, or the Blue-eyed Bombardier.'



'Top hole, my boy!' were the exact words used by the old Colonel when Lieutenant Sherlock Crighton of the Royal Slashers returned after so successfully carrying out the little affair of 'The Three Bridges.' \*

Unofficial—certainly; slangy—perhaps, but terse, to the point, and of a nature to touch a young officer's heart was the old soldier's expression. What he wrote in his despatches we do not know; but he could not have described his Lieutenant's action more aptly in two whole sheets of foolscap—less quarter margin.

We all know now of the results of Crighton's exploit; how, by blowing up two girder bridges in the nick of time, he had delayed the enemy's concentration in the north and so rendered 'yeoman service'—though he was a Regular—to our arms at a most critical moment in the campaign. The best account of the incident was given in the CAVALRY JOURNAL, † but many of the daily papers had for once got hold of the right end of the stick, and were at the time full of scare headlines: 'Bravo, Crighton!' 'Slim Subaltern of Slashers

\* See Vol. I. No. 2 of the 'Cavalry Journal,' April 1906.

† See the 'Cavalry Journal,' Vol. I. No. 4, October 1906.

Scores,' and portraits of many other people appeared over the name of our hero. But Sherlock was neither spoilt nor affected by this adulation. He saw no papers. What, however, he felt more than anything else was the grip of his Colonel's hand when they met, and sweeter, far sweeter than the unheard plaudits of the multitude was his chief's word, 'Top hole!'

The campaign wore on, and for a short period our bright boy rested on his laurels. We must not be taken too literally here, for there is never any rest for a 'hero at the front,' least of all for a thrusting Cornet of Horse. No; his work had been varied and arduous enough, but he had not been entrusted with any similar destructive expeditions. All the same, Sherlie had thought much on the subject of demolition, and his head was filled with the advisability of blowing up girder in preference to brick bridges, and he was always trying to recall cases in previous wars exemplifying the far-reaching effects of destructive Cavalry raids. At the 'little camp fire' it was now always Sherlie who held the floor. He would discuss 'the immense powers conferred upon the individual *quâ* individual by the introduction of the high explosive,' and would enlarge upon how one man, well organised and co-ordinated, and equipped with knowledge and material, could upset a whole army. He discoursed of booms, flanges, webs, bracing and other technical matters, but always ended up with the formula: 'All I say is, "Put me among the girders."' This was final. He was now the acknowledged expert of the 'little camp fire,' and when he said 'Gallop for the girder!' the matter was settled.

It must not be supposed, however, that Crighton had become a prig. By no means: his hair was neither curly enough nor sufficiently well oiled for him ever to become that. Besides, as we have said, he was a 'clean-limbed' youngster. Formerly full of *joie-de-vivre*, he was now full of the unholy joy of destruction, for, like the small boy who has thrown his first stone at a window, his mind was opened up to a vista of possibilities.

Now in Sherlie's own squadron there was a still younger officer who absolutely hung upon Sherlie's words and worshipped him as *Il Maestro*.\* This subaltern's name was Augustus Gagpincher (first-cousin to Alf. of the same surname). All his comrade's sayings and maxims had sunk deep into Gussie's receptive and still plastic mind. In fact, he had annexed most of them as his own. Mind you, Gussie was no slouch. Much water had flowed beneath London and other bridges since the day when he defined 'A hasty demolition' as being '*one which was carried out with instantaneous fuse.*'

One evening, when Sherlock happened to be away on 'special service,' it chanced that the occasion arose for a party to go out and destroy a temporary railway bridge across a river some miles away. The original bridge had been blown up by 'the foe,' and had been hastily restored by our Engineers. The fortune of war now necessitated that this improvised structure should in its turn be cut. This contingency had been foreseen, but by some oversight the destruction of this special bridge had been omitted, and the Colonel received an urgent order to have this carried out as quickly as possible in order to forestall the enemy. In the 'star's' absence the duty naturally fell to Lieutenant Gagpincher, and it was with a swelling bosom (his head

\* This is Italian. It means the 'star' or 'spot' performer.

had swollen already) that the gallant lad received the parting instructions of his commanding officer, who, not knowing what an excellent understudy Sherlie possessed, rather regretted that officer's absence.

'Know how to do it, my boy?' were his final words.

'Gallop for the girder, sir,' was Gussie's prompt but unoriginal reply as he clicked his heels, saluted, and turned on his toes. 'Yuss, I don't fink,' he added, quoting the family motto *sotto voce*.<sup>\*</sup> Happy at heart he strode away; happy, because this was his chance; strode, because he was clean-limbed.

It was the work of but a few brief minutes for the little band of twenty men under the grizzled Sergeant Barlasch to collect, get mounted, and prick o'er the plain. With cheerful hearts the devoted band topped the rise, for 'someone had blundered,' and they had found more explosive in camp than ought to have been there. As a matter of fact this amounted to—

32 slabs of wet gun-cotton (15 oz.).

12 1-oz. dry primers.

12 No. 8 detonators with fuse attached.

1 box of 'Vesuvians.'

String, nails, and a hammer were also available.


The party struck across country and after two hours reached the railway. Following this they arrived at the river and the bridge in about two hours more. It had rained steadily during the whole journey, but just as Gussie caught his first view of the doomed structure old Sol dispersed the clouds. Though the wet bridge glistening in the sunlight was indeed a glorious sight, Gussie was more puzzled than dazzled by what he saw. By the time that he had felt his 'Vesuvians' to see if they were dry, and had appreciated the situation sufficiently to acquire as much information as is conveyed in the drawings (marked X and attached to these proceedings), he received a message from the trusty Barlasch, who was covering his front with a few men, that the enemy were in force about a mile and a half away and were approaching rapidly.

Gussie had to act promptly. He did! He—no—I leave that to you.

P.S.—Gussie was not quite so well-groomed as Crighton; but he was cleaner-limbed.


<sup>\*</sup> More Italian. It means 'with the clutch out.'

# PROBLEM NO. 9



ALL TIMBER, HARD WOOD. PILE LEGS DRIVEN INTO BED.

PROBLEM  
NO. IX.





# Problem No. IX.

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Open to Subaltern Officers of the Mounted Branches of the Regular, Territorial and Colonial Forces at home and abroad.

All Solutions should be as short as possible, and be attached to this page with the name, rank and address of the sender, and forwarded to

THE EDITOR,

'Cavalry Journal,'

Royal United Service Institution,

Whitehall,

London, S.W.,

not later than May 14, 1910.

A Prize of a 'Cavalry' Watch will be awarded to the Officer whose solutions are considered to be the best.

The Editor's decision will be final.

*From*

*Name* .....

*Rank* ..... *Regiment* .....

*Address* .....



Helmet of the Inniskilling Dragoons (showing results of a sword cut) worn by Lieut.-Colonel H. D. White, who commanded the Regiment at the Battle of Balaclava, October 25th, 1854. Colonel White was the first man into action in the Heavy Cavalry Charge; he afterwards became General Sir H. D. White, K.C.B., and held the following appointments: Assistant Adjutant General for Cavalry, Brigadier of the Cavalry Brigade in Ireland, Brigadier of the Aldershot Cavalry Brigade, and Inspector General of Cavalry.

Helmet of the 15th Light Dragoons (now the 15th King's Hussars) of the pattern worn *circa* 1765. The illustration is taken from an actual helmet recently presented to the Royal United Service Museum by Major-General P. H. Sandilands. Beneath the standards on either side of the plate are the words 'At Emsdorf.' It was at the Battle of Emsdorf, in 1760, that the 15th, when serving under the Prince of Brunswick, so distinguished themselves; in fact the victory was almost entirely due to the gallant part played by the Regiment, which lost in the action two officers, two sergeants, seventy-one rank and file, and one hundred and sixteen horses killed, in addition to other casualties. For its brave conduct on the occasion the Regiment was permitted under royal authority to bear the word 'Emsdorf' on its guidons and appointments.



TWO HISTORIC HELMETS.




"On Guard"  
Hampton Court

## NOTES

THE following has been received from Captain H. D. W. Lloyd (The Cameronians) which may be of use to some of our readers, both for making rapid sketches in the field and ascertaining the time it will take to march from point to point.

The figures to the right of the vertical line give the number of hours, and those to the left the number of minutes marched. The rate of marching in miles per hour is shown on the right of the scale.

The scale is constructed by drawing two parallel lines ; the distance marched in an hour at the lowest rate of marching is marked off on the top line, and at



the fastest rate on the bottom line, viz., two and five miles per hour, if working on foot. Intermediate lines are drawn at equal distances apart to show half-hour changes of rate. To the left of the vertical a distance equal to one hour's march is marked off on the top and bottom lines and divided into twelve equal divisions ; these are joined up to show the distance marched in intervals of five minutes. The scale can be drawn to suit any map, but is most useful for small scale maps. It is best to draw it on tracing cloth, which is strong and allows distances to be read off the map without the aid of compasses.

## INDIA A SEA POWER

### ITS DEFENCE—NAVAL AND MILITARY

GENERAL SIR E. F. CHAPMAN, K.C.B., sends the following :—

In an Imperial sense the naval defence of India must be grouped with that of Australasia and South Africa, the guarding of these units of Empire against a possible attack from the Pacific necessitating the easy concentration of a

considerable naval force in the Indian Ocean, with naval squadrons covering Australia and the Cape.

We need to create a naval base to the east of Suez, and to accept a standard of naval strength to be maintained in Eastern seas that shall not be affected by political complications in Europe ; for in time of war we cannot depend on being able to forward reinforcements of men or war material to India by the Suez Canal, nor can ships be sent by that route to strengthen our fleets in Oriental waters.

In the event of war Great Britain should, until after a naval victory in home or Atlantic waters, be relieved of anxiety as to her distant possessions. South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India must be made inter-dependent for protection and reinforcement, and able to resist attack for a considerable period after war has broken out. They must be made independent and inter-dependent, and the Navy that protects them must have a separate base.


The question of the mobilisation of the Army in India also needs reconsideration, in order to provide for the despatch of a force of 10,000 men, fully equipped, to the assistance of any of the countries already named, and to hold a force in readiness to support naval action in the Pacific ; while in each of the other Imperial units Imperial Forces should have for their considered objective the reinforcement of India, and should be familiarised with the question of its defence.

Before all things, it seems to be of the highest importance that any committee that considers questions relating to the defence of India should be given a naval as well as military character, and that naval officers of standing should serve upon it.

### COMBINED 'HOBBLE' AND 'COW COLLAR.'

SUGGESTED BY MAJOR C. R. GAUNT, 4TH DRAGOON GUARDS.

ANYONE who served in South Africa during the late war—or, for the matter of that, anyone who has been present at Cavalry Manœuvres—must often have seen a tired Dragoon stretched on the ground, holding the reins in his hand,



while his hungry horse tried to collect a little something to fill an aching void, only to be reprovèd with a job in the mouth when he had got to the end of his tether and endeavoured to grab a succulent mouthful just out of reach.

All horses require quantity as well as quality, and this especially applies to English Cavalry and gun horses, Waler and Hungarian ; whereas an Arab, Indian country-bred or South African can do with


less bulk. But none are the worse for having it, and the horse in his natural state is grazing most hours out of the twenty-four.

We have in the Drill Book a plan for hobbling and for knee-haltering,

both excellent in their way, but with drawbacks. It is easy enough to teach men how to do it, but take them away from it for a few months and the results are not satisfactory; their knots slip and you get chafes, or the horse gets free; and even horses properly knee-haltered can go at a fair pace. Some of those who were in Ladysmith on October 27, 1899, may remember how a number of Boer ponies, saddled, and many of them knee-haltered, stampeded into the outpost at Limit Hill. Onescallywag, at any rate, won't forget it; for he tried to 'pinch' one of them, and got a cut over the head from one of the outpost that pretty-well scalped him.


Now the Boer and South African farmer generally learn knee-haltering from their childhood, and are always at it; while with our men it is taught, and, I fear, often forgotten. And we must remember that in the event of war our ranks are largely filled with Reservists, who have necessarily been away from this sort of detail for months—and possibly years.

The stockman in Australia carries on the D of his saddle a pair of hobbles, and the writer, who has had some small experience of stock-riding, suggests



that the hobbles might be used in our Cavalry to perform the double function of 'cow collar' and hobble.

Weight is, of course, always a grave consideration; but hobbles such as I suggest could be made to weigh 1 lb. 8 oz. or less, while the Service head-collar weighs 2 lb. So there is an actual saving in weight if, as I propose, the head-collar is eliminated altogether, giving a half-moon Pelham bit with sewn head-piece, and sewn or stud reins. This is a bit that for all-round utility and every kind of mouth is hard to beat.



It is well known that some horses can always get out of a head-collar, whereas a 'cow collar' will defeat them.

It is not claimed that this article of furniture will look smart, or be in any way suitable for His Majesty's escort or the G.O.C.'s orderly; but on Salisbury Plain or the veldt of the Transvaal it will give the poor old 'hairy' many pleasant and profitable moments which are otherwise wasted.

## A VISIT TO WEST POINT

BY CAPTAIN C. W. W. McLEAN, R.F.A.

FOUNDED in 1802, and added to in later years, West Point Academy is the Sandhurst of the United States. Two hours' journey from New York, it is delightfully situated on a high plateau overlooking the Hudson. The wooded hills make a fitting background to the grey stone buildings, and the view of the river as it rounds the Point and flows on through a wild and heavily wooded country is delightful.

The number of cadets is 400, and these are divided into four classes, the junior class being called 'goats.' To enter they must pass a competitive examination, be not less than seventeen nor more than twenty-two, and physically fit, the old custom of each Congressman nominating three men being held in abeyance. For four years they remain in the Academy. Long leave is unheard of except the two weeks at Christmas, and their holiday consists of from June till August under canvas, when there is no study and all time is devoted to drills and exercises. From the time the cadet enters the Academy until he is turned out a second lieutenant he is provided for by the Government.

Fine upstanding fellows they look in their smart grey uniforms, well turned out and well drilled. They are provided with two uniforms—undress and full dress. The undress is grey, bound with broad black braid, no pockets, and hooked up the front; trousers of grey with broad black stripes, and a grey peaked cap.

The full dress is cut square at the waist and has short tails, hooked at the throat, with grey cord across the front, finished off with a double row of brass buttons.

The grey shako is higher than in undress, with a sponge-like plume and brass plaque. White gloves complete the uniform.

The cadets are divided into companies, each commanded by cadet lieutenants having under them sergeants and corporals, and woe betide the man who has a dirty room or a speck of dirt on parade. His name is posted on the order board for office next morning, and his punishment is pack drill on the hard, hard square. The long low dormitory buildings form two sides of the square, in front is the old pillared guard-room, on the left the class-rooms, and high up the hill on the right the new chapel. Each room holds two cadets—one end partitioned off for the beds, the other is used as living room and study. They are bare and plain—two deal tables, two hard chairs, a locker, fireplace, and arm rack is the only furniture on a hard wood floor, the whole painted a dull khaki.

The cadet has little time for recreation, excepting Sunday and a half-holiday Saturday. His time is fully occupied. Breakfast 7.55; class from 9 to 12.30; lunch 12.45; orders 1.15; class 2 to 4; drill 4.30 to 5.30; supper 6; preparation 7 to 9. The whole Point is given up to the Academy. Beyond the dormitories is the parade ground, bordered on the left by the officers' cottages, pretty little wooden bungalows each with its own garden and lawn; on the right flows the Hudson. Starting from the end of the Point we made a circuit of the buildings and grounds, passed the four-gun battery of disappearing guns on

the Point, the old fort, relic of the Civil War, until we reached Memorial Hall, used as a club-house for dances, &c., the walls covered with tablets in memory of old cadets who had fallen in battle. Next was the old chapel, too small now to be used, and which is to be moved to the cemetery. The officers' mess or club is a long, low grey stone building of two storeys, with large, airy rooms, beautifully finished in dark woods, containing reading, mess, card, and billiard rooms. The single officers' quarters come next, very comfortable and well furnished with electric light and every luxury. Turning, then, to the left, opposite the dormitories are the offices and museum. The museum has an excellent collection of gun models, rifles, and old arms, also one room of captured colours—two, I regret to say, British. The dining hall looked beautifully clean—a long room containing about sixty tables, the floor of white tiles, the walls heavy with portraits of old commandants. But the kitchens were a marvel of ingenuity. Every labour-saving device imaginable was employed, all run by electricity—potato-peelers, bread-making machines, steam cookers, refrigerator plant, lifts, and all spotlessly clean.

From the buildings themselves we moved further down the hill to the Artillery and Cavalry barracks. A battery of Artillery is kept for the training of the cadets, as well as some 400 horses and a mule train. The horses can be taken out at any time and polo is encouraged. The captain of the battery was most kind and took infinite trouble in showing me everything. I was astonished at the excellence of the barracks and stables, and the men live like kings in what appears to be a first-class hotel.

The gun park was open at both sides. The gun—a quick-firing one—resembles ours, but looks lighter and not able to stand the same amount of knocking about. The trail is longer, with spade attachment at the end. Tools are carried in the trail; the two seats for the layer and range-setter are on the brake arms. The firing mechanism is on the right, the gun being fired by the range-setter. The panorama sight is used and the old Scott's sight. The buffer is underneath the gun, the recoil being taken by springs and oil, with a gauge to mark the distance of recoil on the side. The breech is closed by two interrupted screw threads. There are two seats in front of the shields, and the bottom of the shield lets down from the front. In the seats are carried two shrapnel, being got at by an opening in the shield by the gun numbers. The limber looked light. The gun is kept on the limber hook by a spring-ring attachment, which occasionally allows the gun to unlimber when passing over rough ground. The limber-box is fitted with brass compartments for the shell, the door letting down as a shield. Strange to say, no spare parts are carried in limber or wagon. I was much taken with the battery commander's cart, a light, one-horse vehicle, carrying all the battery commander's appliances on the march. There is also the farrier and collar-maker's wagon and store cart. The stables were large and airy, floor of tiles finished in light wood with iron fittings, and a nice roomy loose box at the end of each line. There were two lines of stalls in the centre, the horses facing each other, wooden bales dividing the stalls, then a single line against both walls. The water is in troughs outside, and in each manger was a patent stoneware salt-holder containing compressed table-salt. The horses are small and stuffy-looking, typical Artillery horses, though some look light in the bone. Unfortunately no attention is paid to their



tails and manes, which almost sweep the ground. Their allowance of corn is twelve pounds per day; hay, sixteen pounds. They stick to the old neck collar. It is of steel sheeting, adjustable at the neck. The surface is smooth, but there was little give and take in the steel. Yet I was told they have few galls. The off horses carry saddles, and all the horses cruppers.

The barrack rooms were spotless—large and airy, with rubber matting down the centre, spring iron bedsteads, steel lockers for each man, and electric light. A bright reading-room and large dining-hall, with perfectly white deal tables, looking out on to a broad verandah completed the upper storey. In the basement were the large tiled bath-rooms and shower-baths, also the store-room, in which is kept a trunk for each man, provided by the Government, furnace, &c.

I had no time to see the Cavalry barracks, and was hastily driven to the ferry to catch my train for New York. So ended my instructive and delightful day, made so by the kindness and hospitality of the officers at West Point, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude.

### FOREIGN

*Austria.*—During the manœuvres of last autumn there was a very serious stampede of Cavalry horses, belonging to a regiment of Dragoons, caused by the rays of a searchlight having been suddenly flashed in their faces while they were picketed out at night. From this circumstance an officer of Engineers has been induced to offer the following suggestion in a Service paper. He proposes that steps should now be taken to use the searchlight as a weapon of offence; that a searchlight detachment should be attached to each Cavalry division; and that the light should be carried on a motor-waggon using a powerful siren. The waggon is also to carry a machine-gun. The author of this suggestion anticipates great results from the combined effects upon picketed horses of hostile Cavalry of searchlight and siren by night, or of machine-gun and siren upon Cavalry in the field during daylight.

It has been definitely decided to paint all gun-carriages and waggons an invisible olive-green, with lettering in black.

*France.*—The military authorities were recently offered, and have accepted, 100 Argentine remounts. These have been distributed for trial and report among some of the Dragoon regiments quartered in the northern commands.

The existing Cavalry Drill Book dates from the year 1899, but underwent revision in 1904. It is recognised that the introduction of the two-year period of army service and the most recent developments in the employment of Cavalry render a further revision necessary; but before proceeding therewith the War Minister has called by circular for an expression of views, in regard to the modern employment of the mounted arm, from the leading regimental officers and commanders, and reports are to reach him early this spring.

*Germany.*—From returns lately published it appears that in the seventeen army corps furnished by Prussia and Wurtemberg, there were, during the year 1908, 98,998 horses, of which rather more than 42 per cent. were treated during the year for different diseases. In the last ten years cases of sickness

or accident among horses necessitating treatment have shown a considerable increase—from 38·74 per cent. in 1898 to 42·82 per cent. in 1908. The Cavalry regiments of the Guard provide by far the largest percentage of sick horses.

It has now been decided in the interests of invisibility on service that white horses are no longer to be ridden in the Cavalry, and they are for the future, in fact, proscribed, except for the waggons of the foot Artillery and Army Service Corps.

The Cavalry hitherto armed with the carbine, Model 98, has now been re-armed or is in process of re-armament with a new weapon, firing the S. bullet, as used in the infantry rifle, and provided with a bayonet. The following are some comparisons between the new carbine and the weapon now withdrawn :—

	Old	New
Weight of carbine . . . . .	7·231 lb.	7·937 lb.
Length . . . . .	3·116 ft.	3·629 ft.
Weight of cartridge . . . . .	429·019 grs.	366·559 grs.
Range . . . . .	1,200 m.	2,000 m.

From remarks in the German Press it seems that no little importance is attached to the fact that in future, in the colour of the uniform and in similarity of head-dress, Cavalry will, when dismounted, be practically unrecognisable from infantry.

In regard to the employment during last year's manoeuvres of a Cavalry corps, it is complained that, even under so eminent a leader as General von Kleist, the results obtained were not altogether satisfactory. It is urged that the tactical value of so large a Cavalry body is in inverse proportion to its size, and that the mere gain in effectives is more than set off by decrease in mobility.

*Italy.*—The five new Cavalry regiments, numbered 25th to 29th, lately added to the Italian army, are to be stationed at Bologna, Vercelli, Brescia, Florence, and Noba, the more senior regiments formerly garrisoning these places being transferred to Rome, Treviso, Ferrara, Pordenone, and Palmanova. The majority of these places are either in close proximity to or not inconveniently distant from the Austro-Italian frontier.

*Japan.*—During the recent war in Manchuria the Japanese had frequently reason to regret their weakness in Cavalry and the absence of any horse artillery batteries to accompany and support the few horsemen they possessed. It is now rumoured that the arsenal at Osaka is carrying out experiments with a view to diminishing the weight of the present field-gun, and that the resulting weapon may possibly shortly be issued for trial with Cavalry.

#### SUBSCRIPTIONS.

Subscriptions for the current year are now due, and should be forwarded to the

Managing Editor,  
'Cavalry Journal,'  
Royal United Service Institution,  
Whitehall, S.W.

## SPORTING NOTES

## RACING

MISERABLE weather, with rain falling incessantly, prevailed on the first day of the Aldershot races. The sport, however, was good, and it was pleasant to see Mr. D. McCalmont ride two winners. In a field of fourteen runners, he won the November Hurdle Handicap on his horse N.B., and supplemented this by winning the Camp Steeplechase of three miles on his horse Vinegar Hill.

Splendid weather favoured the second day's racing, when Mr. McCalmont again distinguished himself. After getting a very ugly-looking fall in the Pavilion Handicap Steeplechase, the winner of which was ridden by Mr. P. Roberts, he pluckily rode his horse, Johnstown Lad, to victory in the Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase, with Mr. R. Ashton's Dorion (owner) second, and Capt. R. C. de Crespigny's Alert III (Capt. C. de Crespigny) third. The Open Hunters' Hurdle Race was won by Mr. A. Fitzgerald's Cherub, his owner riding a good race and starting 20 to 1.

The Royal Military College Point-to-Point Races took place at Hawthorn Hill, by kind permission of the Garth Hunt. The Light-Weight Race was won by Mr. W. Callander's Tomtit (owner), and the Heavy-Weight Race by Mr. E. Gilbey's The Mighty Atom (owner). There were eight starters for the Light and thirteen starters for the Heavy Weights.

The German gentlemen riders can again record in the past season very gratifying further progress. About *three thousand* gentlemen, *for the most part officers*, won open races. Lieut. von Raven (9th Uhlans) heads the list of a new German record with 63 wins in 156 races. Lieut. Braune (15th Uhlans), the champion of the year before, comes next with 53 wins in 143 races. Then come Lieut. Graf Bethusy Huc (1st Guard Uhlans) with 25 wins, Lieut. Graf Holck (3rd Guard Uhlans) with 24 wins, Lieut. von Mitzlaff (3rd Guard Uhlans) with 22 wins out of 56 mounts; Lieut. von Mossner (23rd Dragoons), Lieut. Schloeditz, Dr. Fr. Riese, and Lieut. Görne (7th Hussars) with 18 wins each; Herr W. Dobel and Lieut. A. Newmann (4th Lancers) with 17 wins each; Lieut. von Keller with 16 wins; Lieut. Arnswald (1st Dragoons) with 14 wins; Lieut. Lors (15th Uhlans), Lieut. von Sydow (3rd Hussars), Lieut. von Hohberg (3rd Hussars), Lieut. Lahusen (13th Dragoons) with 13 wins each; Lieut. Treviranus, Lieut. Fürst R. Wreve, and Lieut. P. Barthels with 12 wins each; Lieut. Freiherr von Wangenheim (13th Lancers), Lieut. Mann, Lieut. von Egan Krieger (1st Hussars), Lieut. Eggeling (15th Uhlans), Lieut. C. von Esbeck Platen, Herr W. Schulz, and Herr O. von Lössel with 11 wins each; Herr C. Lücke, Lieut. F. von Zobellitz, Lieut. de Osa, Lieut. Plainböck, and Lieut. Graf Spreiti with 10 wins each, &c., &c. Two gentlemen who were only in the saddle twelve times each won six races.

In 1907 we called attention to the decadence in our soldier-riders, pointing out that steeplechasing is a sport that requires coolness, nerve, quick decision, and, above all, absolute fitness—qualities so essential to Cavalry officers. In Germany, France, and other foreign countries the authorities hold that steeplechasing is a school for Cavalry officers, and encourage it in every way.

In 1883 and 1884 it was an English gentleman, Mr. W. H. Moore, who headed the list of gentlemen riders in Germany, but since then the number of German amateurs, chiefly officers, has steadily increased; while the English amateurs, chiefly officers, have steadily decreased. If an international amateur race-riding competition, on the flat or across country, could be held, Englishmen would discover that they were no more successful than at the first jumping competition at Olympia.

During the past flat-racing season under Jockey Club rules there were only twelve amateur riders, some of whom only rode once, and two only were soldiers. Our racing authorities are now taking steps to amend this, both on the flat and across country, by encouraging amateurs and opening more races to them; and we trust that our military authorities will do the same.

### NEW YORK HORSE SHOW

The twenty-fifth National Horse Show, held at Madison Square Gardens last November, quite eclipsed all previous shows.

The exhibition of roadsters, saddle horses, light, middle and heavy-weight hunters; single and double harness horses, jumpers, draught horses, chargers, and ponies was a magnificent one. The arena is larger than that at the Agricultural Hall, London, and the surroundings can comfortably accommodate 10,000 persons.

The credit of this great show is due principally to Mr. Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, who has brought experience, as much as wealth, to bear upon the project. Horsemen from all over the States and Canada gave him genuine support, and it is pleasant to record that Major the Hon. J. Beresford, D.S.O. (7th Hussars), and a party of British officers crossed over to America to compete; that they received a great ovation, and were extremely successful. Major Beresford won the special event for chargers open to all nations (nineteen entries). Lieut. P. G. Yorke (Riding Establishment, R.A.) and Lieut. T. Sebag Montefiore (103rd Battery, R.F.A.) won with their entries, Biddy and Taffy. Lieut. T. G. Hetherington (18th Hussars), on Unity, and Lieut. Yorke, on Biddy, captured the broad jumping contest, being first and second respectively. Lieut. C. T. Walwyn (R.F.A.) was second in the riding and jumping competition. These were fine performances, considering that their horses had not been one week on land after a trying voyage across the Atlantic. Unfortunately, Lieut. Sebag Montefiore sustained a broken ankle, owing to a most sporting wager. Following a discussion in the club-room after the show had closed, he undertook to ride a pony barebacked without a bridle over the jumps. With merely a halter, he succeeded admirably, but passing out of the ring to the stables the pony slipped on the boards, and fell heavily on his foot, breaking his ankle.

## POLO

The Hurlingham Polo Committee held a meeting to consider what steps should be taken to organise a team to go to the United States next season to attempt to get back the America International Polo Cup, and decided not to send a challenge to America to compete for the Cup next year. This has aroused a great deal of criticism in the papers, but it is understood that one of the principal reasons for the decision was that the present was not a good time for getting together and trying a suitable stud of ponies. The Committee further considered that an inadequately organised visit with an inevitable beating would be a great set-back in our attempt to regain the Cup, and that it would be a long time before a guarantee fund could again be raised to send a team across the Atlantic.

Six names have been removed from the Hurlingham Recent Form List—viz. Mr. Morris Nickalls, Mr. C. O'Hara, Mr. A. Rawlinson, Mr. Percy O'Reilly, Mr. A. Rotherham, and Major Neil Haig, who is in India; while two names have been added—viz. Mr. Isaac Bell and Colonel Chunda Sing.

Mr. Isaac Bell is of American birth, and was for several years Master of the Galway 'Blazers,' and is now the Kilkenny M.F.H.

Colonel Chunda Sing is a fine Indian player who during the past season assisted the Count de Madre's 'Tigers.' Originally in the 16th Bengal Cavalry, he is now a Colonel in the Patiala army, and proposes bringing over a native Patiala team to play in this country.

At the invitation of the Burlingame Club (near San Francisco), California, Mr. F. A. Gill (late 3rd Dragoon Guards) is taking an English team out to play in all the leading tournaments there next spring.

Besides Mr. Gill (3), the team will consist of Mr. F. B. Hurndall (1), Mr. B. A. P. Schreiner (2), and Major H. R. Lee (back), all of the 20th Hussars. Most of the Americans playing here for the International Cup are also going, so there will be some fine polo. We wish Mr. Gill's team good luck, and trust that their visit may lead to an all-England team going out another year to compete for the Cup.

The final of the Inter-Regimental Tournament at Hurlingham is fixed for Saturday, July 9, 1910, which is a week later than usual.

The Polo season at Cannes this year again promises to be a popular and successful one. It commences on January 17, and all information concerning hire of ponies, &c., can be obtained from the manager, Capt. E. D. Miller, Spring Hill, Rugby.

The Hurlingham Committee, having reconsidered their decision not to challenge America for the International Polo Cup, now announce that they will send a provisional challenge to the American Polo Association, informing them that a formal challenge will be sent after the Champion Cup on June 25, if a suitable team of players and ponies can be got together for that purpose. Hurlingham have previously suggested to the American Polo Association that in future challenges for the Cup should be issued before December 31 of the preceding year.

## POLO ABROAD

The Poona Open Tournament secured an entry of six good teams—viz. 6th Dragoons, 13th Hussars, 26th P.W.O. Light Cavalry, 33rd Q.O. Light Cavalry, Penguins, and Government House. The final between the Inniskilling Dragoons and 26th Light Cavalry was a magnificent game. At the call of time the score was three all, so extra time was played with widened goal-posts. Play for a brief space was in the Cavalry end, but Faunce relieved the pressure, and the Cavalry were soon pressing the Dragoons. A stout defence was encountered, and the ball went out wide. For the Dragoons, Bowen ran the ball across, and Ritson, with a lengthy hit, scored the winning goal for the Inniskillings.

The match was witnessed by a large gathering, including General Sir Pertarb Sing, the donor of the Cup; the Maharajah of Jodhpur, and the Gaekwar of Baroda. After the game, speeches were made by General Sir Pertarb Sing and General Swan, and Mrs. Swan presented the Cup.

Teams: 6th Dragoons—Capt. C. R. Terrot (1), Mr. G. le R. Burnham (2), Capt. R. G. Ritson (3), and Mr. E. C. Bowen (back). 26th Light Cavalry—Major M. H. Henderson (1), Mr. H. C. Chaytor (2), Capt. E. L. Popham (3), Major R. de L. Faunce (back).

The final of the Bareilly Tournament between the Royal Artillery and 17th Cavalry was won by the former by three goals to one.

The Secunderabad Junior Tournament drew seven teams. The final was between the 33rd Light Cavalry and the 29th Lancers. The Lancers were rather unlucky and the Cavalry won a fairly easy victory by four goals to one.

Teams: 33rd Light Cavalry—Lieut. G. Edward Collins, Lieut. M. H. Beattie (Wiltshire Regiment), Lieut. P. K. Wise, Lieut.-Col. J. M. Edwards, D.S.O. (back). 29th Lancers—Capt. G. Marchant, Risaldar Mahomed Hussein, Capt. H. Meynell, Capt. H. J. Willes (back).

The final of the Meerut Autumn Tournament was between the 12th and 17th Lancers, the former winning a good game by five goals to two.

Teams: 12th Lancers—Mr. Wyndham Quinn, Capt. T. R. Badger, Mr. Nicholas, and Capt. Truman (back). 17th Lancers—Mr. L. S. Platt, Capt. T. Melville, Mr. H. Nutting, and Capt. G. Thompson (back).

## BOXING

## ROYAL NAVY AND ARMY CHAMPIONSHIPS

Started in 1892 with less than a score of entries, these Championships secured last year a record entry of 216, whereas this year a fresh record of 237 was created, the increase being chiefly in the officers' classes. This speaks to the popularity of boxing in both branches of the Services. The contests took place, as usual, in the spacious gymnasium at Aldershot, which was crowded from morning till night during the three long days' competition. The big tournament was admirably carried out by Colonel Rolt, who received

much assistance from Captain Trueman and Lieut. J. Betts (Master-at-Arms) ; and at the close General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien presented the prizes, and congratulated the men on their pluck and skill. The chief officials were : Referees, Colonel G. M. Fox and Commander P. Royds ; judges, Major E. Wray, Lieut. F. S. Byrne, Captain R. B. Campbell, and Lieut. H. Boyd-Rochfort ; timekeeper, Colonel H. Goldfrap ; M.C., Captain C. F. H. Trueman. Results :—

*Warrant Officers, Petty Officers, N.C.O.s, and men*

Feather Weights (9 stone and under).—Final : Corporal R. Darley (holder), Royal West Kent Regiment, beat Private J. Miller, 1st Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. Darley hooked the left on the neck, and Miller went down and out in the first half-minute.

Light Weights (10 stone and under).—Final : Corporal A. Baker, Royal West Kent Regiment (holder), beat P.O. Dunn, H.M.S. *Tenedos*, after a close fight.

Middle Weights (11 stone 4 lb. and under).—Final : Private Harris, 2nd Coldstream Guards, beat Private McEnroy, 1st Irish Guards.

Heavy Weights (catch weights).—Final : Gunner Hewitt, R.M.A. (holder), beat P.O. Jeffreys, H.M.S. *Victory*, very easily.

*Officers*

Feather Weights.—Final : Captain R. C. Williams, R.F.A., beat Lieut. G. Wildman-Lushington, R.M.A., after a good fight. Williams was the most skilful boxer, but Lushington made a plucky stand.

Light Weights.—Final : Captain R. V. Cowey, R.A.M.C., beat Lieut. P. F. Newcombe, R.N. In this bout Newcombe (holder) had the best of it, but, hitting below the belt, was disqualified.

Middle Weights.—Final : Captain Lindsay, Rifle Brigade, beat Lieut. McCarthy O'Leary, 1st Irish Fusiliers.

Heavy Weights.—Final : Lieut. A. M. Read, 7th Haryana Lancers, beat Lieut. G. M. Ellison, 2nd Lincoln Regiment (holder). Read was at a great disadvantage as regards height, weight, and reach, but, plodding along to the end, stayed best and just won.

The 3rd Dragoon Guards gave another splendid tournament at Aldershot under the capable management of Captain W. Sykes. It was well attended, and at the conclusion that good sportsman Major-General Grierson distributed the prizes. Results :—

Six-round Contests.—Corporal Miles, 3rd Dragoon Guards, beat Private Emery, Royal Irish Fusiliers ; Private Carling, Grenadier Guards, beat Dans Haugh, Marylebone ; Private Boyce, 7th Hussars, beat Sergeant Warr, The Buffs ; Private Miller, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, beat Private Leach, Royal Irish Regiment.

Ten-round Contests.—Petty Officer Dunne, H.M.S. *Tenedos*, beat Private Corbett, 3rd Dragoon Guards ; Private Voyles, Irish Guards, beat A. Bennett, London ; Petty Officer Jefferys, H.M.S. *Victory*, beat Private O'Connor, late 6th Dragoons.

The 20th Hussars, under the presidency of Major-General W. Pitcairn Campbell, C.B., gave a big tournament at the Curragh. Results :—

Novices' Feather Weights.—Final : Private Wakworth, 20th Hussars.

Novices' Light Weights.—Final : Private Teale, Essex Regiment.

Amateur Heavy Weight Championship of Ireland.—Lieut. M. P. Leahy, R.A.M.C. (holder), beat Lieut. Reid, Bengal Lancers.

Five-round Amateur Contest.—Lieut. Reid, Bengal Lancers (amateur heavy-weight champion of India), beat Mr. Hofferma, Dublin University, in the fourth round.

Six-round Contest.—Private Leahy beat D. Anderson.

The six- and ten-round contests produced some fine exhibitions of boxing.

## FOOTBALL

### CAVALRY CUP—ASSOCIATION

The results of the first round were :—

#### ENGLAND

21st Lancers (Canterbury) beat 7th Hussars (Aldershot), 4—0.

19th Hussars (Aldershot) beat Royal Scots Greys (Tidworth), 3—1.

3rd Dragoon Guards (Aldershot) beat 4th Dragoon Guards (Brighton), 5—3.

2nd Life Guards beat 11th Hussars, 2—1.

Queen's Bays (Hounslow) beat 1st Life Guards (Windsor), 4—1.

11th Hussars (Shorncliffe) drew with 2nd Life Guards (London), 2—2.

#### IRELAND

20th Hussars (Curragh) beat 18th Hussars (Curragh), 2—1.

Byes: 5th Dragoon Guards (Dublin), Royal Horse Guards (London), 16th Lancers (Norwich), 5th Lancers (York), 4th Hussars (Colchester).

The results of the second round are :—

19th Hussars beat Royal Horse Guards (4—0).

3rd Dragoon Guards beat 2nd Life Guards (5—1).

21st Lancers beat 2nd Dragoon Guards (4—1).

5th Lancers beat 16th Lancers (4—1).

20th Hussars beat 5th Dragoon Guards (4—2).

Bye : 4th Hussars.

### ARMY FOOTBALL—ASSOCIATION

In the first round the 3rd Dragoon Guards and 19th Hussars won their ties against the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers and 2nd Royal Irish Regiment respectively.



The 21st Lancers accomplished a good performance at Whitstable by defeating the local team by five goals to nil in the Kent Football Association Amateur Cup Competition.

#### ARMY FOOTBALL—RUGBY

For the Army Rugby Cup the Royal Scots Greys won their tie in the first round, and have drawn the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment in the second round.

The Rugby match Cambridge University *v.* the Army was played at Cambridge. It was a fine game of good football, and resulted in a draw, each side having scored thirteen points—viz. Cambridge, three goals (one penalty) ; Army, two goals and one try.

The Rugby match Cambridge University *v.* the United Services resulted in an easy win for the Services by eleven points to three. The game was played in torrents of rain with the ground a quagmire.

The International Trial Oxford and Cambridge (Past and Present) *v.* Navy and Army was played at Twickenham before about 2000 spectators and ended in the complete rout of the Services as the Universities scored four goals and three tries to nil. The Services were represented by ten naval and five military officers.

In the final of the Calcutta Tournament (Rugby) the 1st West Riding Regiment beat the Calcutta Club after a tie. This is the fourth year in succession that the West Riding have won the trophy.

#### HOCKEY

The Army Hockey Tournament received no less than forty-six entries. The preliminary rounds are now being played off, and the final rounds are to commence February 1.

#### ATHLETICS

The South African Athletic Meeting held at Roberts Heights, Pretoria, was remarkable for the fine performances of Sapper Churchill, R.E., who won the half-mile in 2 min. 1½ sec., the 100 yards in 10½ sec., the 220 yards in 22½ sec., and the 440 yards in 53 sec. Lieut. Laird, 2nd South Staffordshire Regiment, won the 120 yards in 17½ sec. The 2nd Welsh Regiment won the Aggregate Cup, and Sapper Churchill the Methuen Cup. At the conclusion General Lord Methuen presented the prizes.

#### POLO IN INDIA

In the final round of the Lahore Tournament the 10th Hussars were victorious, beating the 12th Lancers by ten goals to two.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RECEIVED



**COLONEL SIR AUGUSTUS S. FRAZER, K.C.B.**  
(Royal Horse Artillery).

1776-1835.

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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APRIL 1910

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*COLONEL SIR AUGUSTUS S. FRAZER, K.C.B., F.R.S.,<sup>1</sup>  
ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY*

By COLONEL R. HOLDEN MACKENZIE

AUGUSTUS SIMON FRAZER was the son of Lieut.-Colonel Andrew Frazer, Royal Engineers, and of Charlotte, daughter of Stillingfleet Durnford, Esq., of the Ordnance Office. He was born on September 5, 1776, at Dunkirk, where his father was employed at the time on the demolition of the works of that fortress. He received his early education at the High School of Edinburgh, where he was the contemporary of, amongst others, Lord Brougham. He is described as being then a lively boy, fond of boyish sports, clever, and, for his years, a good scholar. On August 16, 1790, at the age of thirteen, he entered the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, as a gentleman cadet.

On September 18, 1793, he was gazetted a second lieutenant in the Royal Artillery, and three months later joined the Army in Flanders commanded by H.R.H. the Duke of York. In January 1794 he was promoted to first lieutenant, and was attached with two field guns to the 3rd Foot Guards, with which regiment he served until the return of the Army to England in May 1795.

The battalion-gun system, universally condemned by officers of the Royal Artillery, was extensively practised during that campaign.

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution by permission of the Council.

Occasionally the guns were brigaded, but, as a rule, they were attached in pairs to the infantry battalions, and placed in charge of an artillery officer.<sup>52</sup> One waggon accompanied each pair of guns, and the detachment consisted of one subaltern, two non-commissioned officers, eight gunners, three drivers, and nine horses.

During that period he was present at the affair of Mouveaux, the battle of Cateau-Cambrésis, the affairs of the 10th, 17th, 18th, and 22nd May near Tournay, that of Boxtel, and the recapture of Fort St. André.

In May 1795 Lieutenant Frazer was appointed to the Royal Horse Artillery, and on July 16, 1799, received the rank of captain-lieutenant. In August he embarked with a troop of Horse Artillery for North Holland, to take part in the expedition under the Duke of York. He was present in several engagements, including the battles of Bergen, Egmont, and Alkmaar. He appears to have been for a time again employed with the battalion-guns, for on one occasion they are spoken of as being brigaded into a battery under his command.

On September 12, 1803, Frazer received the rank of captain, and was appointed to the command of G Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, with which, in March 1807, he embarked for South America, to take part in General Whitelocke's disastrous expedition to Buenos Ayres. He arrived at Monte Video on June 2, and assumed the command of the Artillery, which he retained until the active operations were over. Whatever may be said of General Whitelocke's conduct of the operations, Captain Frazer was distinguished—as afterwards in more glorious scenes—for his professional knowledge, his personal activity, his consideration for those under his command, and for the zeal and gallantry with which he played his part in the campaign. The Artillery was very little engaged, but his arrangements for its transport and service were admirable and exhaustive. He was most minute in his arrangements. He wrote the orders with his own hand, and, knowing the nature of the country which the men would have to traverse, after embarkation he issued the most detailed instructions, before leaving Monte Video, as to dress, diet, horses, &c. In fact everything which ingenuity could devise to lighten the difficulties of the operation was thought of by Captain Frazer. When the opportunity occurred, the Artillery behaved with great gallantry and intelligence, exerting themselves to the admiration of the whole Army, and Frazer was very favourably mentioned in General Whitelocke's despatches:—'I cannot

sufficiently bring to notice the uncommon exertions of Captain Frazer, commanding the Royal Artillery, the fertility of whose mind, zeal, and animation in all cases left difficulties behind.' His kindness of heart and consideration for those under his command are shown in his official letters of the period, in which he invariably mentions the services of deserving officers and non-commissioned officers. In his last letter he implored that he and his troop might be attached to any portion of the Army which might be on active service. He seemed eager to drown the recollection of failure in the excitement of successes under some able leader. As this memoir will show, he was not disappointed.

It was not for some time, however, that he was afforded the opportunity of showing, under a worthy commander, those high qualities of soldiership which marked him as one of the most brilliant and accomplished officers of an age fruitful in soldierly character. On June 4, 1811, he received the brevet rank of major, and, in November 1812, joined the Duke of Wellington's Army in the Peninsula, having made a temporary exchange of troops with Major R. Bull, who was under the necessity of returning to England from severe illness. He had not been many months with I Troop before he received a more important command, that of the Royal Horse Artillery in the Peninsular Army; and in this capacity he served on the staff for the remainder of the war. He was present in May and June 1813 at the affair outside Salamanca, that of Osma, and the siege of Burgos. On June 21 he was at the battle of Vittoria. Sir Alexander Dickson, commanding the Artillery, in a private letter to General Sir John Macleod, particularising some of the officers who had specially distinguished themselves in the battle, wrote: 'I cannot close this letter without mentioning the valuable assistance my friend Frazer afforded me during the whole business. I may truly say he flew from one troop to another, accompanying them into action and attending to their supply, or looking out for roads for them to move. You, who know Frazer so well, can easily anticipate what he would be on such an occasion.' Frazer, who had his horse wounded in the battle, was rewarded with a brevet lieutenant-colonelcy.

He had a narrow escape during the action. Observing some squadrons of Cavalry near to our guns, he rode forward to ascertain who they were, and was surprised to find himself alone among the enemy. Fortunately he was not noticed, and he at once rode back and brought up Gardiner's troop of Horse Artillery, which quickly caused the French to shift their quarters. When bringing up his troop along a narrow road, with the

guns almost at a gallop, he saw a wounded French officer lying in the centre of the road. Another minute and the heavy weight of the guns would have crushed the sufferer into the earth as they passed over him : but Frazer threw himself from his horse, dragged the Frenchman to the bank which skirted the road, and, remounting with the same rapidity, had barely time to escape the death from which he had generously saved his enemy. Providing him with some brandy, and leaving him in charge of a bombardier, Frazer afterwards sent a surgeon to attend the wounded officer, who turned out to be General Sarrut, who had been dreadfully wounded with case-shot. He expressed his deep gratitude to Frazer, and died shortly afterwards.

His next service was at the blockade of Pampeluna, after which he was engaged at the siege of San Sebastian, a graphic account of which appears in his correspondence. During the first siege he was in charge of the two breaching batteries, and his services were particularly brought to the notice of Lord Wellington by Sir Thomas Graham. During the second siege he was in command of the right attack, the fire from the guns of which was very destructive. The English Artillery played a very distinguished part in the siege and capture of San Sebastian. The fire was remarkable for its vigour and accuracy, and elicited the surprise and admiration of all who witnessed it. Sir Alexander Dickson says it was ' kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example.' Sir Thomas Graham, in his different reports, bears ample testimony to it. In his report of July 27, 1813, after the unsuccessful attack, he says : ' The conduct throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery and Engineers never was exceeded in indefatigable zeal, activity, and gallantry. I beg to mention particularly to your Lordship, Lieut.-Colonels Dickson, Frazer, and May, and Major Webber-Smith.'

Lord Wellington's forward movement into France on October 7, 1813, by crossing the river Bidassoa, is considered one of his ablest movements. Lieut.-Colonel Frazer was most energetic in his services on the occasion. On November 10 was fought the battle of the Nivelle, which resulted in the enemy's extended position being carried at every point, from St. Jean de Luz to the front of the Puerto de Maia, and in the capture of fifty-one French pieces of ordnance and 1500 prisoners. Lieut.-Colonel Frazer was one of the field officers in charge of the Artillery on the right in support of the attack on the redoubts, which did essential service, and was acknowledged to have been skilfully handled. The conduct of the

Artillery during the battle excited the favourable comment of all, including Lord Wellington. Sir Alex. Dickson, in a private letter, spoke highly of Lieut.-Colonel Frazer's services. He was again prominent in the battles fought with Soult on the river Nive from December 9 to 13. He says, in his private letters, that he was fortunate in seeing much of the fighting on these occasions, and in receiving handsome acknowledgments of the services of his gunners and guns.

The movements in the spring of 1814 were important and on a considerable scale. In February, Lord Wellington's designs included the passage of the Adour near its mouth—a feat deemed impossible by Soult—which was effected on February 23. Lieut.-Colonel Frazer was present in the operations, as also in the investment by Sir John Hope of the city of Bayonne. On the night of February 27, Hope attacked the village of St. Étienne, drove the French out of it, and captured some prisoners. There was very little call for the British Artillery, the principal work being done by General Himiber and his German Brigade. He applied for some of the British Artillery to bring off a French field-piece which was standing behind a traverse in the road between the enemy and his own troops, but they could not be spared, and Colonel Frazer volunteered to lead a party of the Germans for that purpose. Frazer ran forward, turned the gun round, and the Germans brought it in. Several of them lost their lives, and Frazer received a musket ball in his shoulder.

On April 10, Wellington obtained a decisive victory over Soult near Toulouse, on which occasion Frazer's services were acknowledged by Sir Alexander Dickson. Hostilities then ceasing, Lieut.-Colonel Frazer returned to England, receiving for his services the Peninsular gold cross, with one clasp for Vittoria, San Sebastian, Nivelle, Nive, and Toulouse, and the distinction of a Knight Commander of the Bath. Soon after his arrival in England he was appointed to command the Royal Artillery in the Eastern District; and on December 20, 1814, was appointed to a regimental lieutenant-colonelcy in the Royal Artillery.

On the outbreak of hostilities in 1815, Sir Augustus Frazer was re-appointed by the Duke of Wellington to the command of the British Horse Artillery, and to be attached to Headquarters. He left England on April 16 and joined the Allied Army a few days later. He was present at the battle of Quatre Bras on June 16, but the Horse Artillery did not come up until after the fight. In the retreat of the 17th, the troops of Horse Artillery accompanied their Cavalry brigades. They frequently



came into action, and did good service in checking the advance of the French Cavalry. In the great victory of June 18 the Horse Artillery performed distinguished service, and their coolness and quiet steadiness were proverbial. An instance occurred during the day, which showed the foresight for which Frazer was ever remarkable. When the French succeeded in forcing their way into the wood of Hougomont, and Wellington saw the necessity of immediately dislodging them, he spoke to Frazer on the subject, and was surprised that the latter had already seen the importance of the position and had ordered up Major Bull's howitzers. The troop came up handsomely ; their very appearance encouraged the remainder of the division, then lying down to be sheltered from the fire. The Duke said : ' Colonel Frazer, you are about to do a deliberate thing ; can you depend upon the force of your howitzers ? Part of the wood is held by our troops, part by the enemy ' ; and his Grace calmly explained what Frazer already knew. Sir Augustus Frazer answered that he could perfectly depend upon the troop ; and, after speaking to Major Bull and his officers, and seeing that they, too, perfectly understood their orders, the troop commenced its fire, and in ten minutes the enemy was driven from the wood. This service, which, considering the proximity of the allied troops in the wood, was of a very delicate nature, was executed with admirable skill, and attended with the desired effect.

Frazer had some narrow escapes. He was rolled over by a round of case-shot which wounded his mare in several places, a ball grazed his right arm above the elbow, and his second charger was shot in the neck. A lively narrative of the events of the Waterloo campaign, together with the march to Paris, and the surrender and occupation of that capital, is to be found in the interesting letters addressed by him to his wife and others.

To his firm self-reliance and decision was due the fortunate circumstance that the British Horse Artillery was not overpowered by weight of metal, as it was outnumbered, at Waterloo. He prevailed on the Duke of Wellington, somewhat against his Grace's predilections (for he knew little of Artillery details or tactics), to permit him, almost on the eve of battle, to substitute 9-pounders for 6-pounders with many of the troops, and to arm one troop wholly with howitzers. To this exchange may justly be ascribed much of the success of that memorable day, in the far heavier loss which the case-shot of the 9-pounders, stationed in front of the British line, inflicted upon the enemy advancing to the attack, and in the consequent saving of life to the allied troops by whom the attack

was repulsed. 'Had the troops continued with light guns,' Frazer writes, 'I do not hesitate to say the day had been lost.' Another instance of his firmness of character is exhibited in the speedy way in which he made the Prussians, two days after Waterloo, surrender all the French guns which had been captured by the British, but which they had annexed and 'regularly parked with Prussian sentries.' Sir Augustus Frazer was awarded the Waterloo medal, and his services were specially mentioned by Major-General Sir G. A. Wood, who commanded the Artillery at Waterloo.

Whilst serving with the army of occupation, Frazer was selected by the Duke of Wellington for the delicate duty of arranging with the French commissioners ; to examine and report 'in the most exact and most expeditious manner the actual condition of the various fortresses of France, and to settle when they should be formally given over to the allies.' On the return of the Army to England he was appointed to the command of the Horse Artillery at headquarters, Woolwich, which he retained until promoted to a regimental colonelcy on July 29, 1825. On May 30, 1828, he was appointed Director of the Royal Laboratory, Woolwich, and was holding that appointment when his death occurred there on June 11, 1835, at the age of fifty-eight.

Sir Augustus Frazer is considered one of the most distinguished officers which the Royal Horse Artillery has produced, and he won for himself and his branch of the Service a high reputation. In personal appearance he was strikingly handsome, while his interesting letters stamp him as a thorough soldier, a perfect gentleman, a delightful companion, and a modest and unassuming man. He was a staunch friend, possessing a kind heart and one that could feel for others' woes.

*FURTHER LETTERS ON CAVALRY*

Not by PRINCE KRAFT

THESE letters passed between two friends, 'Tom,' in the Infantry, and 'Jack,' in the Cavalry, and are published, as they may be of interest to officers of all arms.

September 30, 1909.

MY DEAR JACK,—Many thanks for your letter. The Cavalry question perplexes me very much. I am afraid you will class me with other 'insufficiently read soldiers'; but I must risk that.

I unfortunately saw little of the Cavalry training. I saw one day in the enclosed country round here, and three on Salisbury Plain; but from conversations with some of your fellows, I gathered that what I saw is regarded as the probable action of Cavalry in the next great war.

Please don't think me critical; I am merely trying to form an opinion. (A) What struck me was, that on Salisbury Plain the element of chance is largely eliminated, because, apart from the fact that the ground offers no hidden obstacles, such as wire fences and sunk roads, (B) the commanders know that they have nothing to think of except shock-action; because they know that their opponents will not lay traps for them, and endeavour to defeat them with a combination of fire and shock-action.

(C) Some Cavalry officers appear to think that the great Cavalry fight will take place within ten days of the commencement of war, (D) and that in a month's time the Cavalry on either side will be of little use.

(E) Are we so certain of the superiority of our Cavalry that we mean to risk all in this great Cavalry duel? (F) The Artillery duel is dead, because it was not in keeping with the co-operation of the three arms.

(G) What I mean is, can we not evolve a system of tactics which will be less drastic in its results, but which will preserve our Cavalry for use in battle, and which may also enable them to hold their own against superior numbers?

I fully realise the importance of shock-action, but it always seems to

me that the man who judiciously combines it with fire-action has a pull over the man who uses it alone.

Yours ever,  
TOM.

October 1.

MY DEAR TOM,—Yours to hand, and having a little spare time, I will employ my leisure in discussing this somewhat important subject.

I have read your letter with interest. One wants independent thought, and on the subject of Cavalry it really is a positive *concession* if officers generally will give it even a moment's thought.

I am going to answer your letter methodically, taking each point you mention in turn ; and in order that you may understand what I refer to, I am returning you your own letter with the references duly lettered.

To begin with, I don't know what exactly you did see ; but I don't think you were right in drawing such deductions as that the Cavalry had nothing to think of but shock-action, or that the Cavalry duel was in any way an end in itself. Cavalry Training is very clear and distinct about this (see section 145, Cavalry Training). However, I will refer to these points later.

*Paragraph A.*—If the ground of Salisbury Plain offers few obstacles, it is a very fair likeness of most of the country from the Ural River in the east to Bay of Biscay in the west, and from the Channel and North Sea in the north to Spain, Mediterranean, and Italy in the south.

The Cavalry also never moved without special officers out, *in advance* of the main body, in order to reconnoitre for obstacles and, if necessary, to see to their being cleared away when that was possible. (See C. T., s. 149 (II).) And in the case of any general action it is the duty of the General Staff of the Army and of the Cavalry Division to carefully reconnoitre the ground in the vicinity, foresee as far as possible where ground admits of the employment of Cavalry, and prepare for its deployment and attack by removing wire fences and making gaps where possible and where required. (See General Haig's June Staff Ride Report. Problem VI. p. 28, and Problem VIII. pp. 32, 33.)

When we moved to Lambourn, wire had been removed previously by arrangements with owners. Some critics, whose business seems to be to make criticisms without further consideration, said ' Absurd ! How unpractical ! ' But in peace, curiously enough, one has to consider the owner, and can only take down what *he* allows ; and one must

leave him some pens for his stock. In war, however, Cavalry would probably not bother to consult owners, and wire would be cut indiscriminately!

*Paragraph B.*—Why do you say commanders had nothing to think of but shock-action? And why should that, even if it was the case, eliminate the element of chance? In employing shock-action you can lay, and you can tumble into, a trap as easily as you can with fire-action. As a matter of fact, when half Divisions were manœuvring against each other the element of chance was as much to the fore as in any other field day—say, Infantry Brigade *versus* Infantry Brigade.

And also fire-action was employed constantly where the ground gave dismounted men any support, such as Shrewton Folly; and quick-firing guns and machine guns (two per regiment) also provide strong fire-action, under which Cavalry masses might suddenly come.

Finally, in the advance of the Cavalry, the lesson was rubbed in by General Haig, and was *usually* applied, of advancing from *cover to cover*, by 'successive bounds,' and the Cavalry masses were not brought into the open to reach each successive cover until the one in advance had at least been scouted, and very often occupied in some force. So that the Cavalry masses should not have fallen into 'traps,' even if such had been laid for them. They were always surrounded with a sufficient cordon of combat and security patrols. I should have thought onlookers could have seen this principle all the way through. If they did not, in the words of the Scripture, 'they have eyes, but they see not.'

This principle of successive bounds you must know as well as I do, for we never acted on any other during the two and a half years we fought together in South Africa. Only *once* I withdrew my scouts before making 'a bound' forward in order to effect a surprise, and then fell among 1200 Boers with disastrous results.

And though there was a combination of shock and fire-action that day by the Boers, it was their *shock*-action which *decisively* ended the combat in their favour in ten minutes, with a minimum loss to themselves and a maximum to ourselves. It was their body of 600 to 800 horse who galloped out to our right flank, turned about, and galloped *over us* in five minutes that finished the affair. These two lessons ought to be nearly as clear in your mind as in mine.

*Paragraph C.*—I dare say Cavalry officers are right in thinking that a 'great Cavalry fight' will take place within ten days; but they are

certainly not right in thinking that it is going to be '*the*' Cavalry fight. There may be many others.

*Paragraph D.*—And as for their idea that in a month's time the Cavalry on both sides will be of little use, it only shows how lamentably they have neglected to read military history. There is *only one sure* foundation for military theories, and that is history ; for there you get *facts*, which are the only sure foundation of any theory. Why should Cavalry nowadays be used up in a month, when Cromwell's, Frederick's, Napoleon's, the Americans' fought for years, and were as efficient at the end (Napoleon's up to 1812) as at the beginning ?

*Paragraph E.*—There is nothing certain in war—except *one* thing, and that is, that if you are not prepared to take risks, if the leaders are not strongly animated with a resolute spirit, you will *inevitably* be defeated. War is a *horrible, dangerous, and most uncertain* business, and therefore, if you are not prepared to accept the risks, you had better not engage in it. I might answer this query by another. Are we so certain of the superiority of *our Army* that we mean to risk it in a battle ? It is only the idiot who fights unless he thinks he has a chance of winning (unless he is gaining time for some one else).

Such an argument as this is, I am sorry to say, based on a misconception of the question—of the *spirit* in which war should be conducted. Why should we not risk our Cavalry as much as anyone else would risk theirs ? Why is our Cavalry *more* precious to us than their Cavalry is to others ? Why should not the Cavalry be expended as much as the other arms in gaining the end of all war—i.e. decisive victory ? If you *dare* not put out all your strength and all your means, you enter the contest with one arm bound behind you. Shakespeare, I think, said, and truly :

He fears his fate too much,  
Or his deserts are small,  
Who dares not put it to the touch,  
To win or lose it all.

Von Schmidt said, and *also truly* : ' Cavalry are much too expensive an arm to be allowed to do nothing.' But I do not wish here to support the necessity of the Cavalry duel, as you will see later, but only to stamp on the argument based on such a spirit as the one you suggest ; for in it lies the certain germs of inaction, uselessness, pusillanimity, miserable irresolution, and final defeat. If you train *any body* with such ideas (Cavalry or anyone), you will *ruin* them as soldiers.

But *revenons à nos moutons*. Where in the Cavalry manœuvres did you see the idea that we are *seeking* a Cavalry duel? If you did see it, it must have been the result of an excited imagination. During the manœuvres there may have been many Cavalry fights, as well as the engagements of *all* arms; but when any troops go to manœuvres, they go in order to practise leaders, as much as the time will allow of, in handling troops *in a fight*. That is all.

There is no *seeking* a Cavalry duel in General Haig's training, nor in the Cavalry Training either. One *may* fight the enemy's Cavalry if they oppose us *in our mission at the moment*. Do you propose actually teaching Cavalry to avoid fighting?

But again, please ask yourself, and tell me where you find it in history, where *anything* was ever obtained in war (if the enemy opposed you) without first paying in the currency in which negotiations are carried on in war—i.e. by fighting and blood?

Please read what General Haig said at some length on this subject in his March Staff Ride (p. 20). Is the doctrine of *seeking* the Cavalry duel inculcated there?

*Paragraph F.*—There is no Cavalry duel, no Cavalry battle. 'There is only one battle—that of the three arms.' And it is *on the battlefield*, in *close co-operation* with the other arms, that the real tactical employment of Cavalry is sought for by our Cavalry Training, as much as by all students of military history. Also see p. 23, June Cavalry Staff Ride, and Problems V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. therein, and the days at actual manœuvres of the Cavalry Division devoted to practising (a) attack on Artillery, (b) on Infantry, in which the close co-operation of all the other arms was the *essential* feature of the scheme in both cases.

It is most unjust to say that the Cavalry do not study close co-operation with the other arms, when, if you glance through the report of the June Staff Ride, you will see that six tactical problems out of the ten studied deal with the co-operation of all three arms in battle.

If, in our endeavour to assist in the total destruction of the enemy's *main* force (i.e. of *his* Infantry), we are opposed by his Cavalry, are we not to fight and try to defeat his Cavalry, merely because if we do the newspaper and other critics will say, 'Oh, there is your Cavalry duel'? Are we to stand idly by?

The Artillery 'duel' was an absurdity, *as understood* in our Army previous to the South African war (for proof of which see 'Two Recent

Wars,' recently translated from the French by the War Office), because it was a duel in which the *Infantry* did *not* co-operate, and of which they were the idle spectators. But now, are not our Artillery ever to fire at the hostile guns to try and silence them because of a fear of entering on an Artillery duel? The idea is absurd.

The question simply is this, that the Cavalry fight is *merely a means* to an end. You seem to think that the Cavalry teaching at the manœuvres (why, I do not know) was, that the Cavalry fight was *an end in itself*. It is *not*.

In the domain of strategy, Cavalry may fight Cavalry in order to gain a passage for obtaining information. In the domain of tactics, Cavalry may fight Cavalry in order to free itself from an obstruction to *its attack on other arms* (in co-operation with its own forces).

In war, he who runs away does not usually live to *fight* another day, but merely to run away again. Beware how you foster such pernicious ideas. The matter is not badly put by Chalot (p. 80 and p. 141): 'One may ask oneself what would have happened if the German Cavalry in 1870 had found before it a Cavalry acting in the same way? *Certainly a big fight*, the weakest falling back on their supports; then the beaten side, after several combats, forced back on the Infantry advance guards, followed by the victor. . . .

'In the combats of Cavalry, moral force and bravery are more important factors than in the other arms, which can be crushed at a distance by fire. Victory certainly will not always go with numbers, but often to courage and energy. For this reason Cavalry should never despair (except in England!). If the crushing superiority of the enemy forces it to be prudent, a grand *rôle* still remains which will demand from it the greatest activity and mobility. It must then seek and resolutely attack the hostile detachments and patrols, falling on all fractions of the advanced troops to which it can provide superior force, no longer seeking the hostile main forces, but a partisan war added to its system of exploration, disappearing as soon as sufficiently strong forces of the enemy's Cavalry are heard of,' &c., &c.

*Paragraph G.*—You cannot evolve 'a system of tactics' which aims at final success, and at the same time makes *a rule of avoiding a decision*. You will simply fail; you will be beaten ignominiously from the field by a more *resolute* enemy who does *seek a decision*. I do not imply that every time you meet the enemy you must fight, regardless of circumstances. If you are in inferior numbers (certainly to a great degree),



the quicker you 'git' the better. 'Nobody but an idiot fights when he is certain to be beaten.'

But *why*, in Heaven's name, do you think from your observation (or anyone else's) at the Cavalry manœuvres that the English Cavalry are being taught to attack in a headlong way the enemy's Cavalry, regardless of numbers or any other circumstances? If Cavalry generals meet superior numbers, they must fall back; but if they meet equal numbers, or even inferior numbers, are they to fall back? Is this the system which you wish taught?

Moral cowardice in a leader is much easier taught than courage and resolution. You will meet with few difficulties in your task, and I may congratulate you beforehand on the complete success of your teaching.

When our Cavalry comes to fight that of an enemy, the tactics (which must never amount to a *system*) must suit the ground, the force on both sides as far as is known, fire- and shock-action each playing its part, the objects our Commander has in view, backed up (I still have some *faint* hopes of) by a sound tactical training and by a firm, resolute determination that if he once enters on a fight with a view of *seeking a decision*, that view will not be lightly given up, and that, in order to make that decision a success, *every* energy and *every* man will, *if necessary*, be *freely* expended.

In fact, reading your letter again, I come to the conclusion that, though we may both seek the same ends, that you did not think the teaching at the Cavalry manœuvres did so; and that you gathered from these manœuvres some erroneous ideas which were never, for one moment, put forward in them by the General-in-Command.

One more point, which is often overlooked by Infantry officers—you must remember that in training Cavalry the *mechanical* side is nearly as important as the intellectual. I mean, that in handling Cavalry it is *not* sufficient to produce a good plan and give the necessary orders. But these orders have to be carried out with *accuracy*. For instance, if you tell a Cavalry Brigade to make a flank attack, that Brigade has (1) to gallop in column without losing distance; (2) to wheel into line simultaneously and in good order; (3) to wheel into line at the exact place and moment, so as to bring the line facing the direction as nearly as possible in which it must finally advance on the objective; (4) to maintain calmness, discipline, order, cohesion in their line of gallop, so that the blow is delivered by a *compact body*.

All this requires *much* practice, and therefore the attack against

'Flags,' who move according to orders is a necessary practice in order to give leaders the chance of judging the pace and the time, and in order to get large bodies to move together at a fast pace without confusion, without excitement, without disorder. Later on, free manoeuvre against a 'Flag' or other enemy is permissible; but *not* at first.

But *why* and *how* did you and others draw some of the deductions you seem to have done?

Midnight.

Yours ever,

JACK.

P.S.—*Re Paragraph E again.*—This fear of 'risking the Cavalry' in a fight is based on the same false ideas as those which flourished in the eighteenth century about soldiers generally. They were then considered too precious to be risked, as every soldier represented so much money. Therefore war was conducted by skirmishes and manoeuvres. And Cavalry brought up and handled on such ideas will meet exactly the same well-deserved fate as met the eighteenth-century soldier when he met Napoleon, a leader *resolute* to fight and determined to make that fight *decisive*.

The next step, I suppose, in the military education of the British Army will be to say that our Infantry are too few and too precious to be risked in an attack. You will then take up a 'strong defensive position'—and clear out of that as soon as the enemy advances to the attack!

In fact, it seems to me that the present set of officers have not taken Napoleon, Moltke, Lee, Jackson, and Grant as their models, who all placed the *spirit* far higher than the form. Are your models for rapidity and resolute attacks our leadership in South Africa? 'To relieve Ladysmith will cost 3000 casualties. Is it worth it?' Is the same irresolute spirit still rife?

Read your history, and you will find that no Cavalry were destroyed by loss in battle; and in South Africa less than anywhere. They have been *morally* destroyed and useless when they have been inspired by a spirit of *irresolution* and opposed by a more vigorous, better-disciplined, and more resolute foe. But the losses in battle of *successful* Cavalry have never ruined them. Cavalry is usually ruined by ignorance, bad handling, and *feeble* leadership.

Our Cavalry in South Africa was handicapped (out of several causes) because our Staff allowed almost 50 per cent. of trained Cavalry

soldiers to loaf in depots or march on foot with the waggons, while horses were taken to mount perfectly untrained Infantry soldiers, at the same time sapping and draining Infantry battalions, 'the backbone of the Army' in battle.

Once you begin to fear loss, you have sown the seeds of irretrievable ruin, in the Cavalry as well as in any other arm.

October 4.

MY DEAR JACK,—Very many thanks for writing at such length in answer to what my bearer would have called 'his pore letter.'

A.—You ask what I saw. I am afraid it was very little.

1. An attack by a Cavalry Brigade in the ordinary close country of England.

2. August 31.—Half division against half division.

3. September 1.—Division against marked enemy.

4. September 2.—Field firing.

B.—You laugh at us onlookers 'having eyes and seeing not,' but as there were so many of us we were very properly told not to get in the way, and particularly not to be in front, hence we followed in rear; small wonder, therefore, if we did not see the Scouts, or know exactly what was going on, and that we came to the conclusion that the meeting between the opposing Cavalrys on August 31 was a chance affair. I see now from your letter that we were quite wrong, and that it was a carefully planned arrangement, *after* the opposing Cavalry had been located by Scouts.

You ask why I say that Cavalry commanders have nothing to think of except shock-action.

There is an impression—an entirely wrong one I now know after reading your letter—that the Cavalry officer who dismounts his men and resorts to fire-action, is looked upon with great displeasure in high places.

This, I admit, is a wrong impression, but there must be *something* in it as it is an impression gathered by officers who were attached to Cavalry longer than I was, and whose business it was to seek for information. I don't mean to say that there is anything in this accusation (for want of a better word) against the higher leaders, but that some Cavalry officers have got this impression.

D.—You ask me why the absence of fire-action should eliminate the element of chance.

I said 'largely eliminate,' not eliminate, and I maintain that if a man

only has to look out for another charging him, he is in a better position than the one who may also be shot at the same time.

But I have already admitted that I was wrong in supposing that our commanders only have shock-action to fear at manœuvres.

E.—I saw and appreciated the successive bounds; it is a plan I very soon found out for myself, and made use of with my section in advanced guard work in South Africa.

F.—You do me an injustice—which, however, you atone for later by saying that you and I are agreed—when you say I do not want to risk the Cavalry. No one who witnessed our wretched attempts in South Africa to win battles without losing casualties could for a moment doubt that *that* system was wrong, any more than anyone who has been charged can have any doubts as to the effect of shock-action.

I would risk Cavalry, certainly, if I really thought the result worth it, but my anxiety was to keep the Cavalry for co-operation with the other arms on the battle-field.

G.—Our Cavalry are likely to be in inferior numbers in the theatre of operations, hence I did not wish to see them wasted; I wished that their system of tactics would enable them to avoid destruction till the great decision. You laugh at my idea of a system of tactics for such a case, yet you yourself enunciate the very system that I had in mind. You speak of the inferior Cavalry, 'disappearing as soon as sufficiently strong forces of the enemy's Cavalry are heard of,' &c.

Can this be done with shock-action alone? You don't mention it, but surely this is a case for fire-action, for Cavalry Training says that fire-action is the only action which can be broken off at will.

Whilst on this subject of fire-action, do you think that our Cavalry understand the real meaning of rifle-fire like you do? Do you think they realise its effect? I have heard so many cases of Cavalry quite ignoring rifle-fire that I think they cannot do so.

They have not all had experience, and I am sure that after the war you had a great respect for rifle-fire.

H.—It is curious your quoting page 20 of the March Staff Ride against me.

I read that page just after my last letter to you, and was so struck with it and so thoroughly in accord with it, that I have recommended all my friends to read it too. In fact I nearly wrote off at once to tell you I had read it. You realise, I think, that my views on Cavalry are not too far removed from your own, but you rightly conjecture that I had

doubts as to whether the practice was equal to the preaching, and you ask me where we have got these ideas from.

I do not care to quote people without their leave, but I don't think there is any harm in quoting Harry, as I know you would not think he had given an opinion without having thought the matter out.

He says that on the last day of manœuvres a Cavalry Brigade came up behind the Infantry in Shrivenham, on the Blue side, when their obvious position was on the flank, that being there they obstructed their own Infantry in their retirement, and that it was evident that they could not have put themselves in communication with the Staff of the Infantry with which they were supposed to be acting in concert.

Also, rumour has it, that on that same day the Cavalry of both sides were told to go and have a battle on Lambourn Downs ; but of course this is mere rumour.

I.—Of course I don't mean to imply that we must not try to silence the enemy's guns, on occasions, as the Japanese did at the Yalu ; neither do I wish to see our Cavalry failing to attack the enemy at any time when they are convinced that the result will be of use to our side or that they will win, but I should like all Cavalry officers to study and practise page 20 of the March Staff Ride, which I think should be added to Cavalry Training.

J.—I must confess to having overlooked the mechanical side.

The fact of the mere drill of battle fighting having to be taught, and the fact of the skeleton enemy having to be used for that purpose, I now see.

This fact alone removes many of my difficulties, and I can only hope, I think with you, that the training of our Cavalry will now progress so rapidly that we may soon see the removal of this kind of military clay-pigeon trap !

Yours ever,

TOM.

October 5.

MY DEAR TOM,—Many thanks for yours. Let me continue our discussion. As a broad, general statement, and having no *particular* reference to your letters or to you in particular, I am convinced that there is a *strong* current of hostility to Cavalry throughout the whole Army, and more especially when Cavalry claim to be of any use mounted. This was very evident during this year's training season, and any attempt to employ Cavalry mounted was *always publicly* and *officially* condemned,

and privately sneered at, as a mere loud display of 'Cavalry spirit' (a hateful term, for the spirit of enterprise, of resolute attack and of determination to *conquer*—or die—should be equally present throughout all *arms* and all *ranks*). That the Infantry charged was supposed to be under the fire of quick-firing guns, was in the open, unsheltered from shrapnel, under the fire of our own Infantry, and was in inferior numbers, was never considered.

A great deal of the criticism levelled at Cavalry has been for some years and still is *distinctly hostile*. Fair criticism is one thing, and is good and useful, but hostile criticism, especially when based on ignorance, not only leads to bad feeling, to loss of confidence and aloofness between the arms, but it positively leads to vicious principles being laid down.

And the torrents of adverse criticism that have been poured on the Cavalry have often been *hostile* and based on superficial knowledge, not only of what the Cavalry actually did, but even of the principles on which they should be trained.

And even in your first letter—unintentionally I know—some of your remarks come under this head. For instance, you said, or implied—(1) the encouragement of the Cavalry duel, as a sort of 'Be all and end all' for the Cavalry; (2) that the Cavalry moved regardless of cover and insufficiently 'protected'; (3) that dismounted action is tabooed. And none of these criticisms were justified. We are, and we ought to be, a Band of Brothers, all working for *one thing only*,—i.e. the decisive defeat of the enemy—and this feeling of hostility (which we are quite aware of) is a deuced bad thing for the Army. However, enough of this subject.

Now, once more to the Cavalry duel question.

This is the difficulty which faces you: If you will not (because you *dare* not, or for any other reason) send forward your Cavalry masses into contact with the enemy, you run two grave risks—(1) you will not get sufficient information to enable you to act with decision, for history tells you that neither *spies* nor *small patrols ever* provided sufficient information of themselves; (2) you will lower the *morale* of your Cavalry, for you make them take up a defensive, and in fact, almost a defeated, attitude. And in lowering the Cavalry *morale*, you lower that of your whole Army.

On the other hand, if you send them boldly forward, you may run the risk of their defeat and its consequent disadvantages.

Now the only solution that I think is sound is that the handling of

this Cavalry *by its commander* must depend on circumstances. I think it should go forward, and in order to have all chances of victory on its side, and to be ready for events, I think that it should be concentrated. Whether it fights decisively, or merely delaying actions, must be left to the judgment of the man on the spot—*i.e.* the Cavalry commander—and to the circumstances of the moment.

You *cannot* make *sure* that your Cavalry will not be defeated, except by avoiding fighting altogether, and if you set that up as a principle, you run far greater risks than you otherwise would, for it is *the fighter* who always wins *in the end*.

You cannot make a *certainty* of anything in war (except defeat, if you wish it!), and you cannot eliminate the *personal* element. You *cannot* evolve a system of tactics that will make you *safe*, for war is essentially unsafe. You can only train men and leaders to have (1) stout hearts; (2) sound principles; (3) sound judgment on the spot.

A great deal of your argument here is based on the statement that 'our Cavalry are likely to be in inferior numbers.' Firstly,—why? Are we going to fight on the Continent single-handed? Secondly, let us wait till we enter on the campaign and see what the actual circumstances are. When we know the circumstances, we must handle *all* our troops to suit them, but do not let us *lay* down a 'system of tactics' as a hard and fast *rule* beforehand—more especially a *defensive* one.

Let the Cavalry, certainly, like everyone else, be taught to conduct a retreat if necessary.

And also remember that inferiority of numbers on the whole theatre has often been compensated for by boldness, by energy, by acting on sound principles, and by providing *local* superiority at the point of shock.

So, even if we are in inferior numbers, we may still carry out our *rôle*, if we act boldly and skilfully and on sound principles, but never if we voluntarily retire from the contest.

The next important point in your last letter is where you express your 'anxiety to keep the Cavalry for co-operation with the other arms *on the battle-field*'—(my italics).

Now this desire is in accordance with all the teaching on the Continent, and is based on the most careful study of campaigns and battles. But it is quite a new idea among English officers, and I can assure you this idea has not progressed very far.

In South Africa it was *entirely* absent one might safely assert. There

Cavalry were almost invariably employed in ' wide flanking movements.' They were in consequence never present and ready to act in close co-operation *with the Infantry* at the *point of attack*, and they never did any real good employed in this isolated fashion, but, on the contrary, either sat down and did nothing or they got themselves into difficulties (as at Talana and Graspan).

If you want a more lengthy discussion on this point, read an article in the CAVALRY JOURNAL (April, 1908), ' Cavalry on the Battle-field,' by Eques, and especially note and study the references to our official history of South Africa.

But IF you want this *co-operation* on the field, you must stamp out this spirit of hostility to the mounted attack, and Cavalry must be more sympathetically dealt with, and, in fact, leaders (often Infantry officers) must *demand* such attacks from their Cavalry. But (1) the opportunity must be *prepared* by the other arms, for Cavalry never have successfully attacked intact Infantry ; (2) losses up to a certain point must be faced. Barely fifty years ago a certain regiment lost 57 N.C.O.s and men KILLED in a successful charge on Infantry, and the important point to note is that that number is *more* than my regiment lost in the *whole* of the South African war, where we lost 40 odd killed in action, fighting from January, 1900, to the end. So it was not the deadliness of modern fire that stopped shock-action in South Africa, but the SPIRIT of the training, of our officers, Infantry and Cavalry. We had been *trained* not to charge, and that it was impossible, for years before the war.

Alvensleben, talking of Bredow's charge, well expresses what we (the British Cavalry) had also been reduced to. He said, ' It was not a sacrifice, but quite a legitimate operation, but our Cavalry had " *lost the habit* " of making such attacks.'

And if this same regiment had been prepared to suffer *anything* like the loss that it stood up to fifty years before (without losing its efficiency), is it to be doubted that such attacks would have been successful in South Africa ?

But our leaders had not (and I think, still have not) the knowledge of how to employ the Cavalry *and the determination to do so*.

It may be asserted (and, in fact, it was once stated officially) that our Cavalry *were* trained to shock-action before South Africa, and could not apply this method of action. But I can assure you that this was *not* the case. We were certainly *drilled* for shock-action, and well drilled too (the mechanical side of Cavalry Training which I referred to in my



last), but we were *not* taught *tactically* how to make use of our opportunities, when to make use of them, how to make use of the ground to cover and conceal us, nor were we inspired by the resolute spirit necessary, as for years we had been systematically ruled out of action by every umpire when acting against Infantry.

And we all know the result. Is it one of 'the lessons of South Africa' that we are again to use our Cavalry in the way they were used there?

In fact, my dear fellow, if you *study* the operations in South Africa, in order to learn, NOT how things were done, which is the common idea of 'study,' but in order to learn how things *might*, and *ought*, to have been done, one great fact will strike you. Not one single case can be found in which our Cavalry galloped at the Boers and were repulsed; every single time that they did so the attack was completely successful and the losses comparatively small—*i.e.* Elandslaagte, Klip Drift, Sand River, the 12th Lancers at Diamond Hill, and many smaller affairs.

To quote Hœing, our study of many wars, and especially of South Africa, has been conducted in such a manner that 'many things have now grown to be maxims, not because they were rightly done, but because such and such a man did them.'

And again, look at the Russians, trained to consider dismounted action as the only real one for Cavalry. *How* completely they failed!

And now to turn to your criticisms on the dismounted action of Cavalry. Firstly, you say you were present on August 20, when a Cavalry Brigade was operating through enclosed country. If you saw that day, surely it alone should prove the falseness of the criticism that our Cavalry will not, and cannot, fight on foot.

I *know* anyhow that the work of the officers and men of one regiment there, fighting dismounted through all that ground, was excellent. And I am also convinced that the Cavalry can use their rifle as well, or better than, the Infantry (see the result of the Aldershot Rifle Meeting), and that they can fight quite well on foot—WHEN the ground and the circumstances demand it.

As to the impression that the Cavalry Officer who dismounts his men is looked upon with great displeasure in high places, I am quite ready to admit the charge, up to a *certain* point. I myself *very often* express *great displeasure* when I see officers doing it; but I do so because they very often dismount in situations which are hopelessly bad, tactically.

To such pernicious and absurd lengths has this so-called lesson (*sic*!) of South Africa been carried, that our Cavalry officers will now throw

themselves off their horses at once on seeing, or even *hearing* of, an enemy.

And when off, they remain glued to the ground for hours. If this is what some of our critics wish to see, I can only trust that they will continue to be disappointed.

I will give you two examples. (I.) A sergeant (of my regiment, too !) in command of a troop advanced up the open slopes of Crog Hill (near Lambourne) with two scouts eighty yards or so in front of him ! When these two scouts topped the crest, they came, to their mutual surprise, on four men of the enemy, also dismounted *in the open* ! But our scouts fled back to the troop, and its leader, ruined by the false teachings of South Africa, at once threw himself and his troop off their horses and flat on their stomachs, within eighty yards of the top !

Could anything be worse or more *damnable* ? He (the troop leader) could not possibly have been in a worse position. If the enemy were in any force he was certain to be 'scuppered,' lying down the hill in the open, at a distance of eighty yards. If the enemy were not in force, he had lost his head and behaved like a coward.

There were only three sound courses—(1) Attack direct, mounted ; (2) Gallop away to a flank, and come up on the ridge further away, and so turn the enemy, and see what they were ; if only a few men, destroy them by riding them down ; (3) Gallop back to the nearest cover.

(II.) A whole brigade was retiring at a walk across the open valley from Weathercock Hill to Knighton Down. They were, for the moment, out of action ; but a hostile regiment came up the valley, not knowing they were out of action. The regiment arrived, unseen, covered by a small rise, within 500 yards of the flank of the retiring brigade. They immediately dismounted *in the open*, and opened fire. Nothing could have been worse. The retiring brigade would have had only to wheel into line and gallop straight at them. The regiment would have been destroyed. It could never have stopped the flanks of the brigade, *even* if it had blown a hole in the centre.

*But*—there was a wood and a farm quite close. If the regiment had wanted to use fire, these two points ought to have been seized, and a squadron kept mounted in reserve. The hostile brigade could not charge a wood or a farm.

So much for the result of *indiscriminate* dismounted teaching. And it has struck deep root, and I can only warn you that you will see its effects to your cost when we come to war again, unless a better and sounder set of ideas come into vogue soon.

But these ideas must come from the *whole Army*, not from the Cavalry alone. No amount of the teaching can weigh against the newspaper correspondent and the insufficiently informed and hostile critic from the other arms.

The question comes down to this, that Cavalry should usually use dismounted action—(1) when small parties come on large hostile bodies, and *when* they are at a sufficiently long range that they have time to mount and be off if the enemy gallops at them in superior numbers; (2) when 'tactical points'—such as woods, farms, &c.—are there to be occupied and the situation demands it; (3) when the ground is rough and enclosed. But, in *most other* cases, the employment of dismounted action is bad, though you cannot lay down rules.

It may be argued from these examples that more training is wanted in dismounted work, but, *on the contrary*, more training is required in how and when *not* to dismount.

I have *never* heard or seen a single *sound* criticism of the occasions when Cavalry should or should *not* dismount by officers of the other arms. All they endeavour to inculcate is indiscriminate dismounted action everywhere and anywhere. And the result of this sort of training and criticism is that the sound judgment of Cavalry officers on the matter has been almost destroyed.

It is a great deal worse in war if the Cavalry take to throwing themselves indiscriminately off their horses, in unsuitable tactical situations and ground, than if they galloped resolutely at everything they saw! For the latter action anyhow, whatever its material results, must always carry with it the enormous moral advantage of the offensive, *à outrance*.

I daresay our Cavalry do often overlook the real meaning of rifle fire—and possibly ignore it. But, my dear fellow, so do young Infantry officers, and with less excuse—MUCH less excuse. For the horse moves a great deal faster than the man on foot. And also, owing to the slowness of Infantry movements, umpires have time (1) to consider the situation, and (2) to halt the Infantry or order them back.

But if a Cavalry squadron suddenly starts galloping, the umpire can hardly make up his mind as to how much fire it is exposed to before the squadron has gone beyond recall. This question of umpiring is *far* more difficult for Cavalry than Infantry.

It is also very hard at manœuvres to realise (in fact often *impossible*) what fire is aimed at you, and this leads to many absurdities. But do you *really* think the absurdities are more frequent in the Cavalry than among the other arms? Because I do not. I have seen Infantry attacks,

carried through in half an hour, when in war they would have taken six hours, and I have seen, within the last few months, two battalions standing in column of route (smoking their pipes too, and quite indifferent !) in a road within 600 yards of an enemy entrenched, because they had no room to deploy. In fact, if I followed Infantry at manœuvres, in the same hostile spirit that some Infantry officers follow Cavalry, I could produce for you a fine list of absurdities.

Nor do I say that the actual handling of the Cavalry by the officers, senior or junior, was perfect. It was full of mistakes, and always will be to a certain extent, human nature being what it is. But I do say that the principles put forward were sound. And *that* is the first business of an officer training any body of troops. There are some poor Cavalry officers. But I know some rather poor Infantry officers !

But we *want* to progress—we are trying—and we are working on sound lines, and I think, imperfect as we may be, our young fellows are just as conversant with correct principles as the young fellows in the Infantry. Do not you think so ?

I do not quite see the point of Harry's statement in regard to the subject under discussion (*viz.* the Cavalry training), of a brigade of Blue Cavalry on the last day of Army manœuvres, coming up behind the Infantry, instead of being on the flank, unless it is to prove how far behind the precept the actual practice is. That, however, is quite possible, but it does not apply to the Cavalry only.

Again, is the mention of the fact (for it was a fact) that the Cavalry were sent up to Lambourn Downs to have a battle, meant to throw ridicule on Cavalry Training and ideas ? Because, if it is, it is not only grossly unjust, but it is a fair example of the line that criticism takes. Who *ordered* the Cavalry to go through this absurd show ? Why was it ordered ? Had the Cavalry or any of its leaders anything to do with it ? And did not the Cavalry think it as ridiculous as anyone else ? It was merely done to give our politicians and foreign spectators a small 'spectacle.'

Now turning to the last remark in your letter, that in reference to the necessity of practising the mechanical side of Cavalry action ; though you say you now see this necessity, I am afraid your hope ' that the progress in training may be so rapid that we may soon see the removal of this kind of military clay-pigeon trap ' shows how completely you fail to grasp how Cavalry should be trained, in order to ensure (1) the smooth movement of any body of horse ; (2) the correct *execution* of a manœuvre, of a plan, once it is decided on ; (3) the quietness of the horses in the

ranks, the *steadiness* and *discipline* of the men, so that the squadrons will deliver a 'compact' shock, be still in hand and easily rallied when in disorder.

Now, to achieve this, nothing is so useful as a Flag enemy, who is moving. It is easy enough, or fairly easy, to wheel into line against nothing, with no particular direction, but it is quite a different thing to so lead your column, and so time your wheel that when you make it you move on and strike your object, and that a moving one, in a compact body, and without *disorder* (which is always the sure attendant of *indiscipline*).

And every year there are young horses, young soldiers, and young officers, in our squadrons, who require careful training in this, and the Flag enemy, for the squadron, for the regiment, for the brigade and Division, provides the best way of practising them.

When you begin fencing you do not begin with loose play. You are first taught certain attacks and certain parries. Next your instructor tells you that he will leave himself open to a certain attack and you are to try it, or he will make a certain attack and you are to use a certain parry. Finally, when you have attained a certain facility and accuracy in handling your weapon, you are allowed to use your will, and loose play begins. So exactly with Cavalry.

The Flag enemy on September 1 fulfilled this object. A certain form of attack was to be practised. To the ordinary onlooker, who was only looking for a spectacular battle and who had no conception of these principles and of the necessities of Cavalry training, the show was totally misunderstood and may have appeared unrealistic.

So far, therefore, from the Flag enemy disappearing, it is to be greatly hoped by all who understand training Cavalry, that attacks against it will be practised annually, and that its use will be much extended by squadrons, regiments and brigades. In fact, the I.G.F., in his annual report, issues particular orders in regard to the use of the Flag enemy.

Nothing could show better how necessary it is to practise these attacks than the fact that this attack when it was made by eighteen squadrons in line was badly done—the ranks were in disorder, the men out of hand, and the pace too fast.

You could not have selected a worse simile for your argument or a better one for mine than the clay-pigeon trap. For it fulfils a most useful purpose in training anyone to shoot, nor does accuracy in shooting ever become so certain that its use can be dispensed with. Every year, about July, many great shooting men go down to the grounds near

London and fire away hundreds of cartridges at clay-pigeons, merely that the hand and eye may work together in August after the grouse.

Yours ever,

JACK.

October 19.

MY DEAR JACK,—Very many thanks for again writing to me. I quite agree with you that there is a certain amount of hostile criticism of Cavalry ; this is, of course, due partly to jealousy and also to ignorance and some narrow-mindedness on the part of a large number of Infantry officers ; but you must confess that a good deal of hostile criticism during the Cavalry manœuvres came from young Cavalry officers ! At the same time I don't quite like your thinking that I went out with a view to pick holes in what Cavalry are doing. Far from it.

I had great ideas of learning from your arm what their work is.

After my first experience of your work on August 20, I wrote in my diary most enthusiastically of the way your men worked.

Then (I am merely tracing my train of thought, so to speak) came August 31. Here I was, as you know, disappointed, as it seemed to me that *for that day* all idea of fire-action, or fear of it, was laid aside. Hence all this correspondence. You have shown me that I was wrong, and that the scouts would have discovered any such trap as I suggested.

I never meant that Cavalry wished to employ shock-action as a 'sort of jaunt.' I realised all the time that whatever they did they were really trying to do it with all their might, and I realised that their heart was in their work.

I admired a good deal. I loved riding along behind the squadron, and seeing how well they rode, and how well the horses are trained, and I admired the great keenness of all ranks.

It would do most Mounted Infantry officers a world of good to see the trouble that Cavalry officers take on parade to lead their troops, and also at stables. I don't think I am a hostile critic at all, but I was seeking information, and so brought out what I, perhaps ignorantly, thought should be criticised.

I have often thought of that question of information. Now if Cavalry are really going to obtain and quickly transmit useful information, then a lot of my previous arguments fall to the ground, as the Cavalry then must try to get it even at the risk of being crippled for the big fight, and we can only then trust the Cavalry commander on the spot to both obtain information and avoid absolute defeat.

I raise this point again because I have been talking about it to X.

He says that Napoleon did not always use his Cavalry as we understand it should be used, *i.e.* as strategic Cavalry to gain information, and in support of this he points to Ulm, Jena, and Waterloo campaigns.

I don't think I ever said that our Cavalry cannot fight on foot ; in fact, on August 20, I thought they did wonderfully well, though I must own that what appealed to me most was the combination of fire and shock action along the roads. What I did say was that they did not always contemplate it, and that there was an idea abroad that it was (to use your own expression) tabooed. You have now shown me that this is not so.

The examples of fire-action you mention merely show that those concerned, especially the sergeant, were ignorant of the principles of employing fire-action. I should be furious if a Mounted Infantry sergeant did not, under like circumstances, gallop up to the crest and dismount there, or, if he knew the enemy was in overwhelming strength, make himself scarce.

Whilst on the question of fire-action I should like to draw attention to one point.

A great deal has been said by cavalrymen about the Aldershot Rifle Meeting, and in such a tone as to imply that Cavalry are now quite as good with the rifle as Infantry.

I much doubt if this is the case, any more than it was the case that Volunteers, who used often to beat Regulars at Bisley, were better in the firing line than the latter.

I think Cavalry soldiers a little bit overlook the value of fire control, without which marksmanship is useless.

It is one thing to train a picked team of intelligent men—and Cavalry *should* excel in this, having the most intelligent men—it is quite another thing to possess officers sufficiently trained to effectively control fire at unknown ranges, and over an extended front, and I don't believe that even our Infantry know how to do this as they should. The question of umpires is, of course, difficult, and I know our Infantry expose themselves when they should not, and of course Cavalry suffer (from criticism) because all their actions are so conspicuous.

I honestly think that we are quite agreed in principle, but I was merely ignorant of the way in which the principles should be applied.

I do hope all these letters have not bored you.

Yours ever,

TOM.



THE BRUNSWICK HUSSARS.


1809-1817.



*From the picture painted by Capt. H. Gilex for the late Colonel Francis Rhodes, C.B., D.S.O., 1st Royal Dragoons, and by the kind permission of Mrs. Ernest Rhodes of Batham Park.*

# **'AFTER THE ATBARA.'**

**THE CAVALRY JOURNAL—No. 14.**



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Capt. Lord E. Cecil.    Maj.-Gen. Hunter.    MAHMUD.  
 Col. F. Rhodes.    Maj. Sir H. Rawlinson.    Col. Wingate, C.B.  
 Capt. Watson, A.D.C.    Sir H. Kitchener, Sirdar.

*A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF THE EGYPTIAN  
CAVALRY DURING THE ATBARA AND OMDURMAN  
CAMPAIGNS*

[FROM AN UNPUBLISHED DIARY OF AN OFFICER]

PART II.—THE OMDURMAN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER V

SUMMER WITH THE EGYPTIAN CAVALRY AT BERBER—PASSAGE OF THE  
NILE AND MARCH TO CAMP OPPOSITE ATBARA FORT—THE MARCH TO  
WAD HAMED, AND THE GENERAL ADVANCE THENCE SOUTHWARDS.

For the Cavalry officers who remained at Berber the summer was a busy time. A few days were allowed for men and horses to rest after the fatigues of the Atbara campaign and then work began in earnest, in preparation for the final march upon Omdurman. Every morning (except on Fridays) troops and squadrons were engaged in some kind of warlike exercise from daybreak (5.30 A.M.) till about 8 A.M., when the sun became too hot for active work out-of-doors. In these exercises no uniform scheme of training was followed, after the plan of the several 'courses of squadron training' which in those days prevailed at home and in India. Instead, every squadron commander was allowed a free hand to train his men and horses as he pleased, and this system was found to work very well. The objective to be attained was clear to all—fitness to take the field again in August; and the results obtained would be apparent to everyone, for they would be judged not by the measure of approval or disapproval meted out by some inspecting officer, but by the measure of success or failure gained by the squadron in the numerous situations which would present themselves in a period of active operations against a particular enemy—the Dervishes. No partiality or favour at any rate could be imputed to the latter in judging the results! In other respects also, squadron commanders were fortunate. Squadrons were at war strength, with a full complement of men and horses, and the material of which they were composed was good. The men in the ranks were specially selected for the Cavalry, and were the pick of the Egyptian

conscripts for each year. It must be remembered, too, that conscripts are the *pick* of a nation's manhood—the men of an army raised by voluntary enlistment are not. The horses, again, were hardy, well-bred Arabs. Arms and equipment were provided on a most liberal scale. For training-ground there was the limitless desert.

Indeed, it would seem almost impossible to devise more satisfactory conditions for a Cavalry officer, keen about his profession! Compare them with those under which the squadron commander in England exists as a rule—short of men, short of horses, little or no ground for manœuvre, and unlimited regulations and restrictions. In one respect, however, officers who soldier in England have the advantage, and that is in climate. The heat at Berber was very great, the *average* day temperature in the hospital buildings for May and June 1898 being 114° F.; it reached one day 124°.

In the matter of amusements there was polo three days a week for the British officers of the garrison, and on two afternoons the officers of the Cavalry (British and Egyptian) played polo together on some of the smaller squadron horses. Polo is a valuable training for all Cavalry officers, but more especially for those brought up like the average Egyptian officer—that is to say, a stranger to equestrian pursuits. Certainly the improvement in horsemanship and manliness was in many cases so marked, that under Colonel Broadwood polo for his Egyptian officers became a standing order.

With a parade every morning, and polo or a young horse-parade in the afternoon, the summer at Berber slipped quickly away. By the first week in June the Nile began to rise, and on the 17th of that month it had risen as much as three feet. For some days after this, however, there was no change in the height of the river, and it almost seemed as if high Nile would never come.

On *July 11* the Sirdar arrived at Berber, and next day held a parade of the whole garrison. The Cavalry got a hint at this time to be ready to start in a week or ten days. The squadrons, men and horses, were already prepared to march at a few hours' notice, and the British officers now laid in supplies and hired some extra camel transport for their mess.

On *Sunday morning, July 24*, the Cavalry received an order to cross the Nile. The operation was begun about noon, and by 5 P.M. one squadron (the 4th) had almost completely crossed, but the movement was then counter-ordered, and some of the men and horses recrossed to the right bank. Next day Major Le Gallais, who was acting Com-

mandant in Colonel Broadwood's absence, held a regimental parade at 5.30 A.M., and on return from it an order was received to continue the passage of the river.

The wind was favourable, and the 7th squadron (Captain Haig) began to cross at 10 A.M. At first only one *gyassa* was available. This held seventeen horses—namely, two rows of six, and one of five horses; the latter at the stern. By 11 o'clock another boat, which held twenty horses (7 + 7 + 6), was repaired and began running, and further two small *nuggers* were obtained, which were used for the conveyance of the saddlery, one being towed astern of each *gyassa*. By 3 P.M. the whole squadron had been transported to the left bank, including 143 horses, three private camels, one donkey, and all the baggage of men and officers to be used in the forthcoming expedition.

The river was crossed at the Berber *Nuzl*, where it is fully 1,000 yards wide. Although the current was strong, the Nile being in flood, the north wind carried the boats across in an average of ten minutes from bank to bank.

On Tuesday, July 26, there was a south wind, so a steamer had to be used for towing the boats. The two small boats (*nuggers*) being no longer available, horses were embarked with saddles and arms, and consequently the *gyassas* held one horse less in each row. The work was continued till dark, when about half a squadron and some eighty sick horses and mules still remained on the right bank. Next morning the south wind was so strong that on the first trip the steamer took over two hours to reach the left bank, where it remained until the wind had moderated sufficiently to allow it to recross without risk of accident. This was about noon, and by 2 P.M. the whole of the Cavalry had crossed. The dust storm which prevailed on Tuesday and Wednesday increased the difficulty of the work, but with the exception of a few kicks and bruises, no accident of a serious nature occurred.

As soon as the camels had crossed, the baggage was loaded and sent forward. This was at 3 P.M., and the squadrons marched three-quarters of an hour later. At 6.15 P.M. the force halted for the night.

On Thursday, July 28, the march was resumed shortly before 5 A.M., and the fort opposite to Dakhila (Atbara Fort)<sup>1</sup> was reached about 10 o'clock. It was a long, tiresome march, the sun being very powerful at this season. As the river was approached a strong south wind was found to be blowing which raised a thick dust storm, and rendered the

<sup>1</sup> See map on page 165.

work of camping most disagreeable, grooming being impossible as long as it lasted.

A halt was made in the camp opposite Atbara Fort for a week, but squadron training still went on. Some squadrons were exercised in field-firing with ball ammunition, suitable ground being found about four miles from camp; targets consisted partly of figures painted on rocks and partly of canvas screens.

The eight squadrons were now organised in two regiments. The first regiment was commanded by Major Le Gallais (8th Hussars) and consisted of the following :—

First squadron, commanded by Captain Persse (Queen's Bays).

Fourth squadron, commanded by Captain the Hon. E. Baring (10th Hussars).

Fifth squadron, commanded by Major Le Gallais.

Seventh squadron, commanded by Captain D. Haig (7th Hussars).

The second regiment was under Major Mahon (8th Hussars) and comprised the following :—

Sixth squadron, commanded by *Bimbashi* Ratib.

Eighth squadron, commanded by Captain W. E. Peyton (15th Hussars).

Ninth squadron, commanded by Captain H.S.H. Prince Francis of Teck (Royal Dragoons).

Tenth squadron, commanded by *Sagh* Shahata Effendie.

On Thursday, August 4, the Cavalry marched at 5.30 A.M. from their camp opposite Atbara, with about 4,000 transport animals following in their rear. Included in the latter were the horses and mules of three Egyptian artillery batteries, whose guns had been transported by boat to Nasri Island, as well as the officers' horses, and transport animals belonging to the 1st and 2nd Egyptian Brigades (Soudanese).

For the first ten miles the road lay over an open sandy plain, but after this the country became overgrown with scrub. About 10 A.M. a halt was made for an hour opposite Gilissi Island, and horses were watered and fed. On resuming the march, the jungle became so thick that at times marching formation had to be reduced to single file, and it was seldom possible to move on a broader front than 'sections.' Two deserted villages were passed through. There was little or no wind, and a fine dust raised by the horses' feet hung heavily over the

lengthened column and rendered the march oppressive for man and horse ; added to this discomfort was a particularly hot sun.

After trekking through the bush for nine or ten miles the column headed out towards the desert, where the ground was less overgrown.

By 2 P.M. the horses, which had been marching for eight hours under trying conditions, began to show signs of fatigue. It was therefore time to find a place of rest for man and beast, but the thick bush prevented all possibility of reaching the river, and, indeed, even if the column could have reached the river bank, the water was at such a height and the banks so steep that it would have been impossible to have watered the horses. The column accordingly moved on, while officers reconnoitred for a suitable camping-ground. Eventually one was found opposite the southern end of Seilab Island, but it was 5 P.M. before horses reached the water there.

The slowness and fatigue of this march was in great measure due to the fact that the country had not been reconnoitred with a view to the advance of so large a force as that which accompanied the Egyptian Cavalry. Native guides had been provided, but although these knew the main track, which in places ran many miles from the Nile bank, they were quite ignorant of the paths across the scrub-covered ground lying between the track and the river ; nor had they any idea at what points on the bank horses could get down to the water.

*On Friday, August 5*, the march began at 4 A.M., and this became the usual hour at which the column moved off. Reveille sounded at 2.45 A.M., and each squadron paraded one hour later on the ground where its horses had been picketed. If there was no moon, squadrons closed in towards the one whose turn it was to move off first ; otherwise they stood fast and mounted when it was time to join the column. Regiments took it in turn to march at the head of the column, and similarly in each regiment squadrons changed their place daily in the order of march. The leading squadron, as a rule, found the advanced guard and flanking parties during the march, and as soon as camp was reached, found the outposts : the squadron next for duty remained saddled up in its lines, until the outpost commander reported all clear. When, however, touch with the enemy was gained, the squadron next for duty never off-saddled, but remained ready to turn out at once if required.

Almost an hour was spent on this Friday morning in getting the column out of the scrub. This difficulty over, it then debouched on to an open plain on the north side of Jebel Egedag—a rocky ridge

running at right angles to the river, and rising 300 or 400 feet above the plain. A quantity of good *halfa* grass was growing between this ridge and the river, so the squadrons halted and horses were watered and grazed for about an hour. At 10 A.M. the march was resumed, and after about two and a half hours Kutwab was reached, where the force halted for the night. The distance covered this day was about twenty miles.

*On Saturday, August 6*, the march commenced at the usual hour (4 A.M.), and the same difficulties and delay as on the previous day arose in getting from the river bank through a belt of scrub and broken ground, three or four miles wide, to the main track running southwards. Open ground near Makina was reached about 11 o'clock, and the force halted for the night.

The distance from the last camp in a straight line was probably not more than twelve miles, but the twistings, which were unavoidable in the bush or were necessary to escape bad ground, made the actual distance covered almost double as great. It had been intended that the Cavalry should reach Magawiya on this day, and that the column should be allowed a day of rest there, but the fatigue and difficulties of the road had been greater than had been anticipated, and it was now impossible to reach Magawiya before Sunday. As the column was timed to reach Metemma on the fifth day after leaving the Atbara—only five days' supplies therefore being provided—and as the Cavalry had in any case to reach Metemma on August 8, in order to cover the arrival of the Camel Corps, which was marching from Merawi along the desert route by Gakdul wells and Abu Klea,<sup>1</sup> rest for a day was impossible, although much needed by some of the horses and transport animals.


Magawiya was reached *on Sunday, August 7*, about 9 A.M. Two battalions of Egyptian Infantry were encamped here in order to cut wood for the steamers, their camp being situated in a grove of date palms, close to the river, where the shade was much appreciated after the dust and the glare of the desert.

*On Monday, August 8*, the column marched to Metemma, about sixteen miles. The troops on this occasion were spared the usual discomfort at starting of having to thread their way through the scrub in order to reach the desert track, because the Infantry had cut a road through it wide enough to march in sections.

So much has been written about Metemma and all the Dervish atrocities in its neighbourhood that a description of the place in a paper

<sup>1</sup> See map on page 57 in previous number of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

dealing merely with the work of the Cavalry would be out of place. It may be noted, however, in passing, that those who so loudly condemn the forcible methods by which the Khalifa put down the rebellion of the Jaalin tribe have forgotten the methods employed under somewhat similar circumstances even in good old England! Different nations have different standards of thought, and what in Europe would be classed as an outrageous massacre, in the Sudan would seem a mere excess of zeal.



The Camel Corps and one squadron of Egyptian Cavalry arrived at Metemma shortly after Colonel Broadwood's column. That night the British officers of the Camel Corps were entertained to dinner by the Cavalry. A party of sixteen sat down, and a merry party it was, with plenty of champagne to wash away the desert sand from throats, and loosen tongues.

*Next morning, Tuesday, August 9,* the Cavalry marched at 4 A.M. as usual. Gubat and Abu Kru were passed, and next El Hobegi, a big



deserted village some five miles from the river. Then the column struck across the desert, thereby avoiding a bend of the river, and camped for the night opposite Um Suggend Island. It was 3 P.M. when the horses reached the water. A short march had been intended, but no suitable place could be found nearer for a camping-ground, so that in the end the distance covered on this day was about twenty-eight miles.

A short march of eight miles would bring the force to a camp opposite Nasri Island, so the time of departure on *Wednesday, August 10*, was postponed an hour, this extra hour's rest being much appreciated by all.

Colonel Lewis with two Egyptian battalions was encamped on the island, and a large depôt of stores had also been formed on it. Some Dervish horsemen had raided a village in this vicinity three days previously, but although patrols were sent out six or seven miles in advance of the outposts, no signs of the enemy were found.

General Hunter with two Sudanese brigades was at this time encamped at Wad Habeshi,<sup>1</sup> which had originally been selected as the point of concentration for the expedition. The river had, however, risen so high that the camp was in imminent danger of being flooded, and the General had therefore decided to move on without delay. Accordingly the Cavalry had to continue its march without halting a day as had been intended, starting at the usual hour (4 A.M.) on *Thursday, August 11*. Shortly after starting, a disused canal was met, and by the time the column had got round this obstacle the force had described in its march a figure resembling a button-hook. Fortunately the going was good after this, and by moving at a brisk trot for an hour, the column was enabled to join the General at 7 A.M., the appointed hour. The Infantry brigades were awaiting the arrival of the Cavalry, who then assumed the lead, and after a march of twelve miles, reached the camping-ground of Wad Hamed. This had been selected by General Hunter and his staff some days previously as a suitable place for the whole expeditionary force to assemble, prior to commencing the general advance southwards.

It was expected that the Cavalry would be halted here for at least three weeks, and it was necessary, therefore, to arrange the camp with more care than was usually given to a mere night halting-place. Unfortunately for the rapid and orderly camping of the troops, those responsible for allotting ground to the several brigades and detachments were delayed through the slow progress made by their steamer against the stream, and they eventually arrived at the site for the camp two

<sup>1</sup> See map on page 168.

hours after the troops had marched on to it. The Cavalry had in the meantime been picketed, some of the squadrons actually occupying ground which General Macdonald considered belonged to his brigade. The three or four squadrons which were complained of were moved, and fresh lines were marked out by them. Even then they were not to be allowed to rest in peace, but again had to move to please someone else ! Later it was decided that insufficient space had been allotted for nine squadrons of Cavalry, and more ground was handed over for their use.

Men and horses were, however, tired after marching for eight consecutive days, so it was eventually decided that further camping arrangements should be postponed till the morrow. About 9 P.M. a terrific storm of wind, dust, and lightning passed over the camp, throwing down some tents and *tokuls* and making their occupants thoroughly uncomfortable, but only a few drops of rain fell. About midnight all was still again.

*Next morning, Friday, August 12*, the Cavalry camp was carefully marked out, and the men set to work to build themselves *tokuls*, and set up rests for the saddlery. These latter were of palm trees laid lengthwise on forked sticks, about three feet from the ground. Ample grass and beams for making *tokuls* were obtained from deserted villages in the neighbourhood. Good *halfa* grass, too, grew in abundance close to camp, so that in a few days horses began to pick up, and the men were fairly well housed.

The outpost duty for the Cavalry was light. A company of Camel Corps held a rocky ridge affording a fine view about two miles south-west of the camp, and the task of the Cavalry was limited to sending patrols thrice daily to scour the country three or four miles beyond this picquet line.

*On Saturday, August 13*, a Dervish spy was captured by one of these patrols. He was riding a camel, and apparently came upon our outposts unexpectedly. He at once slid off his camel and tried to make believe that it was a stray one from camp sent out to graze ; while allowing it to nibble the bushes, he sought to lead it away, keeping himself out of sight on the far side of the animal. The outposts had seen him, however, and a couple of patrols moved round to cut him off. As soon as he found that he had been discovered he mounted and tried to make off, but was too late, for he ran into the arms of a patrol which was returning from the front, and was captured. He then tried to make out that he wanted to desert from the Dervish army, but the circumstances of his

arrest, and the fact that he rode a good camel, all pointed to his being a scout.


On Wednesday, August 17, four squadrons and four companies of Camel Corps reconnoitred to the south side of the Shabluka Cataract,

while at the same time the Sirdar and his staff moved up the river in a gunboat. Several fortifications had been constructed to defend the Shabluka gorge, but all were found deserted. After selecting a suitable camp about twenty-two miles up stream at the south end of the Shabluka, opposite Jebel Royan, the force withdrew to camp at Wad Hamed.

On Thursday, August 18, fresh meat was issued. The men had not tasted meat since they left the camp at the Atbara, fifteen days before, and some were beginning to look somewhat fine drawn. Horses at this time received nine pounds of barley daily, no bran ration being issued. There was an abundant supply of good grass, and the horses fattened amazingly.

The time the Cavalry was waiting at Wad Hamed for the rest of the army to join was not time wasted, for parades were held daily by those squadrons not on duty.

On Saturday, August 20, Colonel Broadwood, accompanied by one squadron, went to Wadi Bishara to select a camping-ground for the force to use on the next march southwards. Camp was left about 6 A.M., and



Wadi Bishara, a deserted village, was reached about 9 o'clock. Having posted the squadron to hold some rising ground near the village, Colonel Broadwood rode on with two other British officers and a patrol to reconnoitre. The question was whether it was better to encamp actually on the river bank, or at some little distance from it and to use transport animals to fetch water to the troops. Having ridden to a point on the bank, the patrol continued its way along it down the Nile, with the intention of returning direct to Wadi Bishara. This proved to be impossible, for the river had risen so rapidly that an inlet had become filled with water and was now impassable, a state of affairs which simplified the camping question, although the return march of the patrol was somewhat lengthened. Colonel Broadwood and the squadron now returned direct to camp, but its commander (Captain Haig) returned by the river bank with orders to report on the possibility of preparing a path for towing boats up-stream. Several inlets from the Nile prevented anyone from passing along the bank except by swimming—the inlets were too deep and their bottom too soft to ford, so that a *détour* had to be made to get round each one. In many cases thick scrub and broken ground had to be passed, and sometimes a steep rocky ridge, all combining to make progress very slow. The chief obstacle to actual towing appeared to be belts of thick bushy trees, which were growing about forty or fifty yards from the dry ground, and were half submerged in water. It would be a matter of some difficulty to pass the tow-line round these if they were left standing, while to cut them down or even lop branches off them, situated as they were in the water, was a matter of time and labour. Much work was also necessary to prepare the numerous other trees which with their outspreading branches overhung the river for the greater part of the distance from Wadi Bishara to the camp at Wad Hamed, about nine miles. Yet, in spite of the many difficulties, the Egyptian Infantry succeeded in making the bank practicable for towing in the few days that remained before the general advance began.

The advance of the army from Wad Hamed began *on Wednesday, August 24*, two Sudanese and three Egyptian brigades under the command of General Hunter being the first troops to leave. Their march was covered by the 7th squadron (Captain Haig), a company of the Camel Corps (Lieutenant H. Hopkinson), and a maxim gun section. The remainder of the Egyptian Cavalry stayed for the present at Wad Hamed.

At 3 A.M. it was raining heavily, and a strong wind was blowing, quite like a raw November morning in England, but punctually at

5 A.M. the mounted troops filed out of the *zereba* and took the track towards Wadi Bishara.

There is little to relate concerning this first advance. The column halted about a mile or more south of Wadi Bishara the first night, and reached Jebel Royan camp about 8.30 A.M. on Thursday. Here a camp was prepared for the whole expeditionary force.

*On Friday, August 26*, General Hunter had ordered the squadron of cavalry, the Camel Corps company, and the maxims to escort him on a ride southwards, which he proposed to make in order to select a camp for the army. At the last moment, however, he had to proceed to Jebel Royan Island to arrange for a *depôt* for stores, hospital, &c., and Captain Haig was directed to proceed without him. The march began at 5.30 A.M. Major Gordon, R.E., commanding the gunboat *Melik*, steamed up the river in co-operation with the reconnaissance on shore, and reported where steamers and *gyassas* could reach the bank for the purpose of landing stores. Owing to the river having overflowed its bank, considerable difficulty was at times experienced in finding suitable landing places for supplies at a convenient distance from the camps. On the march out two mounted Dervishes were seen, who were evidently scouts ordered to watch the progress of the reconnoitring party, for, finding that the latter continued to advance, they lit a fire to indicate approaching danger after their custom on the Atbara, and galloped off southwards. This was the first touch gained with the enemy. A patrol followed up the enemy for a few miles, and reported seeing ten Dervish horsemen. Meantime the ground in the vicinity of the river was reconnoitred, and a suitable camping place was found about three miles in length, at a distance of about eight miles from Jebel Royan camp. Here the bank also was favourable for landing stores from the boats. The reconnaissance then returned to camp, which was reached about 3 P.M.

*On Saturday, August 27*, the main body of the Egyptian Cavalry under Colonel Broadwood arrived about noon. Wad Hamed had been left in the morning, and the distance, some twenty-two miles, was covered in about five hours, with an hour's halt *en route* for water and feed at Wadi Bishara.

Some difficulty occurred in the matter of supplying barley to the Cavalry this day. A sufficient supply had not come forward, and so *dhura* was issued instead. This was the only occasion during the campaign when the Cavalry were at all short of supplies.

The several parts of the army having again re-united at camp Jebel

Royan on this Saturday, a further move forward began the next morning. The Egyptian Cavalry marched at 5 A.M. and covered the advance of the Egyptian division to a camp near Wady el Abid. On arrival there a squadron was detailed for outpost duty on some hills about three miles further south.

In the afternoon a small party of the enemy's Cavalry came in touch with the outposts, but were driven back. The outposts withdrew at about 6 P.M., just before dark.

*On Monday, August 29*, four squadrons and the Camel Corps marched southwards to escort a party of officers detailed to select the next camping-ground, and next day the whole army marched to it. The new camp was situated about two miles north of Jebel Merreh, a steep rocky hill on the Nile bank. Rain fell heavily during the night, and it was still raining when the troops turned out. All the mounted troops preceded the army to-day for the first time, the Camel Corps, Horse Artillery battery, and nine squadrons Egyptian Cavalry being under Colonel Broadwood, while four squadrons of 21st Lancers were commanded by Colonel Martin. There was no Cavalry commander over the whole, but Colonels Martin and Broadwood received instructions separately from the Sirdar for each day's operations, and acted as they thought best in the field.

The new camp was a very confined one, and at a distance of fully two miles from the river bank.

*On Wednesday, August 31*, the mounted troops were ordered to cover the advance of the army, but not to proceed more than three miles beyond the new camp. A somewhat extravagant use of patrols and detachments had occurred on the previous day, owing doubtless to there being two commanders, so the 21st Lancers were ordered to do the scouting this day and the Egyptian Cavalry to act in their support.

The march began about 5 A.M., and as the position of the camp had prevented horses being watered before starting, Colonel Broadwood's Cavalry watered by detachments at an inlet close to the south side of Jebel Merreh at about 6 A.M. A look-out post had meantime been stationed on Jebel Merreh, from which a bird's-eye view was obtained over the plain as far as the Kerreri Hills.<sup>1</sup>

By the aid of a telescope white objects, flapping in the wind like tents or camel coverings for women, were seen on the Kerreri Hills. The intervening plain was covered with short scrub, not thick enough to prevent free movement in loose order across it, but sufficiently high

<sup>1</sup> See also map on page 178.

to obstruct the view of those marching through it, except at occasional points of rising ground. The Lancers' patrols could be seen moving forward at a rapid pace, followed by their supporting squadrons, but these, owing to the nature of the country, could not get along quite as fast as their detachments. The latter were consequently some three or four miles ahead of their supports, and in the bush between patrols and squadrons a party of a hundred or more Dervish horsemen was distinctly visible. Apparently they were watching the Lancers, who seemed to be ignorant of their proximity. Considering it probable that there might be more Dervishes in the vicinity of the Lancers than those seen from Jebel Merreh, Colonel Broadwood at once advanced with his whole force at a trot to support the British regiment. The ground was rough, and the necessity to thread the way through the bushes made the march fatiguing for the horses. However, at the sight of so many horsemen, guns, and camels the Dervishes in the scrub as well as those on the Kerreri Hills withdrew, and further support to the Lancers being unnecessary, Colonel Broadwood's command fell back to camp, now about ten miles distant in rear. One squadron and a company of Camel Corps was detailed for the protection of the camp until dark. A considerable portion of the front to be watched was covered with bush which was high enough to impede the view of a man on horseback. Standing patrols of mounted camelmen were accordingly pushed forward in this part, the additional height of the camels enabling their riders to see over the scrub, while to prevent these posts from being cut off by Dervish horsemen, picquets of Cavalry were established in their rear.

The outposts withdrew an hour before dark. Horses and men had had a long, tiring day, so it was important in view of the early hour of marching next morning to get the horses settled in camp with as little delay and friction as possible. The camp, however, was an extremely bad one for mounted troops ; it was fully two miles from water, and the tracks to the river lay over a marshy stretch of ground covered with bush. Moreover, on reaching the river, the banks were found so unsound and cut up by the feet of many transport animals, that horses had to be watered from canvas buckets. This was a slow operation, each squadron taking about an hour and a quarter, with the result that it was almost dark before watering was finished. But the difficulties of getting into camp were not over, for even when inside the *zereba* it was no easy matter to reach the ground told off to the Cavalry. Little care had been paid to keeping roads between corps and brigades open, so that much

time was spent threading the way in and out of the several lines, and more than once troops had to countermarch in order to withdraw from a *cul de sac*. Many hardships and difficulties are unavoidable on service ; those noted above, however, are not of that class, but come under the heading ' bad staff work.'

## CHAPTER VI

(I.) THE RECONNAISSANCE OF SEPTEMBER 1.—(II.) THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN.—(III.) PURSUIT OF THE KHALIFA.—(IV.) COMMENTS ON THE ACTION OF THE CAVALRY BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE BATTLE.

### (I.) THE RECONNAISSANCE OF SEPTEMBER 1

THE next day, *September 1*, a violent storm of rain and wind broke over the bivouac about 1 A.M. and lasted in a milder form till 9 o'clock. The Egyptian Cavalry marched at 5.30 A.M., and, pushing on ahead of the rest of the force, moved towards the west end of the Kerreri Hills, while the 21st Lancers, working independently, kept close to the river. The Kerreri Hills were reached at 7 o'clock. From here Omdurman was visible, some five or six miles distant, the Mahdi's tomb standing out distinctly above the rest of the town. To the west of the latter was a wide plain, across which with binoculars there appeared to be a column moving south-westwards, as if people were leaving the city. When examined through a telescope, however, the mysterious object turned out to be troops of horses grazing, while beyond, and further south, were camels, and also certain white objects similar to those observed on the Kerreri Hills the previous day—supposed to be either tents, or camel coverings in which women are accustomed to travel in the Sudan. There were no indications that a retreat was in progress, but since the objects appeared to be about four miles distant, Colonel Broadwood decided to advance closer in order to clear up the situation thoroughly. He accordingly led his command south-westwards, towards a 'round-topped hill' which lies about three and a half miles north-west of Omdurman and about four or five miles from the end of the Kerreri Hills. On the way thither the Khor Shambat was crossed. The ground about it was soft wet sand, with pools of water standing here and there, but although slightly boggy in places, the Khor in this part of its course offered no great difficulty to the passage of the Cavalry. The approach of the Cavalry had evidently been reported to



the Dervish commanders in the city, for, on ascending the round-topped hill, which was reached about noon, their whole army was seen turning out for parade scarcely three miles off. It was indeed a weird sight ! The noise, too, of war horns and drums, and the distant murmur of the vast multitude distinctly reached the ears of the astonished officers on the hill. The army was formed in groups along the front of the city, covering a line of about three miles, and as soon as each body or mob became strong enough, it commenced to advance northwards. Fully 30,000 men, extended in six or seven masses across the plain, were moving towards the Kerreri Hills before the Cavalry began to retire, and several other masses of men were still visible to the west of some *tokuls* nearer the city. Now the Anglo-Egyptian force was to camp on the Nile, south-east of the Kerreri Hills, so that the direction followed by the advancing Dervishes must bring them directly across the line of retreat of Colonel Broadwood's force, if he marched straight for camp. The distances to be covered by both seemed about equal. The Dervishes fortunately had only a few horsemen, but on the other hand their foot soldiers were advancing at a steady run. There was thus no time to be lost if the Cavalry and Camel Corps were to reach camp without a skirmish by the direct route south of the Kerreri Hills.

Colonel Broadwood began the retirement shortly after 1 o'clock. Eight squadrons of Cavalry and the Horse Artillery moved off first, five companies of Camel Corps, a maxim gun section, and the 7th squadron of Cavalry following as rearguard under Major Tudway. The latter, realising the difficult task which had been entrusted to him, urged his camels along at a fair trot, while the squadron followed at the distance of 1,000 yards or more upon his right rear. With the exception of three groups thrown out towards the enemy, the squadron was kept concentrated. Each of these groups consisted of about five or six N.C.O.'s and men, the whole three being under an Egyptian officer. They were well handled. From time to time, one or two of the more intrepid of the enemy's horsemen would gallop forward upon the groups, but either a shot from a carbine or a threatened advance would cause them to pause or fall back. Thus the retirement continued unmolested, and the boggy ground of the Khor Shambat was passed in safety. So far the only casualties had been among the horses, two being so fatigued that they were shot, after their saddlery had been removed to prevent it falling into the hands of the Dervishes. Little more than a mile separated the rearguard from the foremost line of Dervish Infantry, when suddenly, about

midway between, was seen a riderless chestnut horse, the same colour as the troop detailing the groups. A man on foot was also seen amongst some bushes running after the horse and making frantic efforts to catch it. There was no doubt from the saddlery that the horse belonged to the Egyptian Army, but it was not clear whether the man was Egyptian or Dervish. Without any hesitation, a troop was wheeled out from the squadron, and, led by the squadron commander, galloped forward towards the advancing Dervishes. As the handful of Cavalry approached, some of the Dervishes, increasing their pace, ran forward as if to meet it ; others fired their guns, and the din of drums, war horns and shouting increased tenfold. But the troop continued its course at a steady gallop, its ranks in perfect order, and advanced, heedless of the proximity of so numerous an enemy, to within a couple of hundred yards of the man whom they hoped to rescue. The main body of the Cavalry meanwhile had wheeled about, and stood halted about a couple of miles off, watching events, and ready to act if necessary. By this time the leading Dervishes had got within 200 or 300 yards of the dismounted man, and then at last all doubt vanished as to which army the latter belonged, for he now joined the Dervishes. After catching the horse, which proved to belong to the maxim gun section, the troop wheeled about and rejoined its squadron. Although it had arrived within 300 yards of the Dervishes, and under a fairly hot fire, only one horse was wounded. The steadiness and discipline of this troop, which consisted not of selected men, but of any taken haphazard from the 7th squadron, shows how reliable the Egyptian Cavalry had by this time become in the presence of an enemy.

This little episode delayed the retirement of the Cavalry and Camel Corps, with the result that the mass of the Dervishes had gained on them, and some of the Dervish horsemen, who had increased in numbers since the retirement began, were now uncomfortably near. Accordingly a trap was laid.

After the column had crossed the slight rise between the Khor Shambat depression and the Nile valley, the rearguard squadron followed, trotting quickly, but as soon as under cover three troops were dismounted, and, unseen by the enemy, deployed over a wide front behind the rising ground. Then several volleys were fired in rapid succession. These caused the foremost of the enemy to delay till more of their friends came to their aid, and also gave the impression that the position was held in force. The squadron, however, at once mounted, and quickly regained its distance from the

column, leaving merely three rear groups to show themselves on the ridge, and deceive the enemy as long as possible. These tactics were successful ; for when the column had almost reached camp, a hot fire was heard, and a numerous force of the enemy was seen advancing against the ridge, evidently thinking it was the main position of the Anglo-Egyptian Army !

The Cavalry and Camel Corps reached camp near the village of El Egeigi on the Nile about 5 P.M. The Dervishes did not follow, but halted for the night along the Khor Shambat.

In the bivouac that night it was generally understood that the Sirdar intended to bring off a fight on the morrow, for his orders directed the Army to form up at daylight in echelon of brigades from the left, preparatory to marching on Omdurman. The Egyptian Cavalry and Camel Corps were to cover this formation, and for the purpose of reconnaissance a squadron was to be on Jebel Surgham, and another on the Kerreri Hills, before dawn.

## (II.) THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN

On *Friday, September 2*, two squadrons left camp about 4 A.M. Captain Baring's went to Jebel Surgham, and Captain Peyton's to the Kerreri Hills. About an hour later Captain Haig's squadron took up a line of observation between these two hills, and the remainder of Colonel Broadwood's force, consisting of six squadrons of Cavalry, six companies Camel Corps, the Horse Artillery battery, and two maxim sections (four guns), was concentrated about half a mile west of camp. As yet there was no idea of an offensive movement on the part of the Dervishes.

About 5.45 A.M. Captain Baring reported to the Sirdar that 'the whole Dervish army was on the move northwards, and that its right flank was about two miles from the river, and would probably pass over the west shoulder of the Jebel Surgham.' It was now daylight, and Captain Baring's squadron, relieved by the British Cavalry, rejoined Colonel Broadwood, who then moved his force to the Kerreri Hills, with orders to hold them and seek to draw the enemy northwards. With the exception of the 7th squadron, which was still disposed across the dip between Jebel Surgham and the Kerreri Hills, Colonel Broadwood had the whole of his command on the latter.

The Kerreri Hills, to which reference has so frequently been made, rise to the height of about 300 feet above the plain, and consist of two main features, each about one mile long, running roughly east and west, with a dip of about 1000 yards in width between them. The east end of


these main ridges is about 1000 yards from the river, and in the intervening space there are several smaller rises or knolls. The Kerreri Hills and the spaces between them and the smaller hills are covered with rough boulders and angular stones of a volcanic nature, rendering the movement of horses and camels difficult.

The Cavalry horses and camels were in the dip between the two main ridges, whilst the dismounted men of the Camel Corps were deployed along the crest of the most southerly of the two ridges, known as Um Matragan, their right being at its most westerly point. Next to the Camel Corps, and about the centre of this southern ridge, were some dismounted Cavalry; then the Horse Artillery and four maxim guns. The remainder of the Cavalry were in the hollow behind the guns.

When narrating the events connected with the reconnaissance on September 1, allusion was made to the extensive view over the Shambat plain obtainable from the Kerreri Hills. But what a contrast that plain presented this morning! Yesterday all was silence, and some faint dots in the far distance alone indicated the existence of any Dervishes! Now, almost at our feet, a very sea of Dervishes extended across the plain, and advanced in great uneven masses like waves upon a beach. Here and there a mass of men, meeting some stony hill, would pass round it, crowding in and partly overrunning its sides much as a wave surges round a reef of rocks; and all the while a ceaseless roar arose, of many voices shouting a monotonous war cry mingled with the beating of tomtoms and the braying of war horns. The Dervish army came forward on a line roughly parallel with the lower portion of the Khor Shambat, near which they had passed the night. Their right flank just touched the western shoulder of the Jebel Surgham, and the left extended to the hill El Azrak, so that the front covered was about four miles in length. The masses towards the flanks, however, were less dense than those towards the centre; and directly in rear of the latter there appeared to be large masses in support. The west end of the Kerreri Hills was almost exactly opposite the Dervish centre, and as the position held by Colonel Broadwood's force faced south, while the direction of the Dervish advance was N.E., the former's right flank was soon turned. The four maxim guns had been detached from the Cavalry, by the Sirdar's orders, as soon as the intention of the Dervishes to take the offensive became apparent. This seriously diminished the fire power of the Cavalry Brigade, for the horse battery was armed with Krupp guns of small calibre (9 lb.) and of obsolete design, and the

troopers had only the Martini-Henry carbine. Troops, however, must do their best with whatever weapons they happen to be armed; and Colonel Broadwood's force certainly fought hard. Many of the Dervishes were hit, but instead of this checking their ardour, they pressed forward with redoubled energy.

Meantime the squadron between the Kerreri Hills and Jebel Surgham had rejoined the Cavalry Brigade, and the guns from the *zereba* had opened on the Dervishes—though with little effect, for the enemy's



right flank was two miles off, and the attack on the Ridges continued as vigorously as before. Merely the *rub* upon the Dervish right, which was about this time in the vicinity of Jebel Surgham, and which we learnt afterwards from prisoners consisted of 'Kassala boys,' was diverted towards the guns—it numbered probably a twentieth of the Dervish army. This is not to be wondered at, for the camp of the Anglo-Egyptian force was on low ground near the river, and, viewed from the Kerreri Hills, seemed so small as to be scarcely capable of containing an army large

enough to attack the city of Omdurman. Moreover, as already narrated, the ground rises from the river, and also from the Khor Shambat, and so forms a sort of low col between the Hills and the Jebel Surgham, sufficiently high to prevent the mass of the Dervish army and the troops in the *zereba* from seeing each other; there is, therefore, little doubt that, in attacking the Kerreri Hills, the Dervish leaders imagined that they were attacking the main position of their foe; and that their method of doing so was to concentrate their efforts upon the right flank of the Kerreri position, and envelop it with their vast numbers. It will be seen from the map that had this position really been held in force, the Dervish plan of attack would have been a sound one: for as soon as their riflemen gained a point west of and in prolongation of the dip between the two ridges, the most southerly ridge not only became untenable by the defenders, but also afforded cover for the continuation of the enveloping movement towards the river. This movement was practically carried out against the Cavalry and Camel Corps. As soon as it became apparent that the southern ridge could be held no longer, Colonel Broadwood retired the battery to the east end of the northern ridge—not a moment too soon, for the Dervishes had already turned the west flank of the southern one and enfiladed the dip between the two ridges. It next became a matter of some difficulty to withdraw the Camel Corps over the rocky ground, especially as the Dervishes had now crowned the heights and were pouring a hot fire down upon the camels and horses in the dip. The Cavalry squadrons retired a few hundred yards and then wheeled about at the eastern end of the dip, where they stood fronting the enemy, ready to charge if necessary to assist in extricating their comrades of the Camel Corps, while the Horse Artillery battery came into action again on the right of the Cavalry. The losses incurred at this time were severe. A direct retirement on the camp was now impracticable owing to the enemy's enveloping movement towards the river, but the Cavalry were able to retire northwards. For the Camel Corps, however, the situation was different, since the enemy on gaining the heights had brought forward his left shoulder, and a large part of his force was now advancing due east upon the Nile. Any attempt, therefore, on the part of the Camel Corps to cross this new front formed by the enemy would have meant annihilation, and their only hope lay in getting into action as soon as possible close to the river, trusting there to keep the enemy at bay until support might arrive. This was done successfully, and, in the meanwhile, Major Gordon, commanding the gunboat *Melik*, having appeared on the scene, engaged the

Dervishes, and succeeded in preventing them closing on the Camel Corps. The great numbers of Dervish dead at this point showed how fiercely the enemy struggled for their prize, and how narrowly the Camel Corps escaped disaster.

The Cavalry and Horse Artillery had remained so long in their attempt to extricate the Camel Corps, that two of the guns had to be abandoned. The Brigade then retired in succession of regiments, northwards, through the scrub, a halt being made at every convenient rise to delay the pursuer by dismounted fire. But the pursuit was not pressed for more than a couple of miles. Further away from the river, however, numerous banners were seen showing above the bush some miles north of the hill El Azrak, indicating the presence of a force ready to intercept the retreat of the army supposed to be holding the Kerreri Hills.

The flags and men seen on the Kerreri Hills soon, however, began to fall back southwards, showing that the enemy had discovered his mistake, whereupon Colonel Broadwood at once commenced to lead his command southwards again, in order to be able to co-operate with the main army in the further development of the fight. This, it seemed, could not long be delayed, for fully 30,000 men had attacked the Kerreri Hills, all keen for victory or death, and in addition there were the large supports which had been seen in rear of the Dervish centre to be considered. At any rate, in the presence of such a numerous enemy the Sirdar's march upon Omdurman could not long remain unmolested, so the return of the Cavalry was executed at a rapid pace.

It was about eight o'clock when the latter recrossed the low hills between the Kerreri Hills and the river. Between Jebel Surgham and the Nile, and extending over the plain northwards, could be seen by this time the whole Anglo-Egyptian Force, divided up into seven or eight detachments. The most northerly of these detachments—soon discovered to be Colonel Macdonald's Brigade—was furthest from the river, and was probably about midway between Jebel Surgham and the Kerreri Hills. At the time the Cavalry actually crossed the low hills this detachment was facing westwards, engaged in a desperate contest with a horde of Dervishes, whilst at the same time another horde of the enemy was being collected on the lower slope of the southern Kerreri ridge, Um Matragan. Innumerable flags were seen waving and crowding together, evidently in preparation for a combined swoop upon Macdonald's right flank.

The approach of the Cavalry caused this second body of Dervishes to

move further from the river; and about the same time Macdonald's Brigade changed front north-westwards. The Dervish rush then began and the Egyptian Cavalry and Camel Corps took post upon Macdonald's right rear. The attack was led by some eighty or more horsemen, who charged boldly forward until all were shot down, the last one not more than fifty yards from the Soudanese Infantry. Then followed mass after mass of spearmen: there was little firing on the part of the Dervishes, and that was for the most part wild, bullets passing over both the Infantry and the Cavalry who were further to the rear—indeed, as far as the latter were concerned, most felt that they were in the safest place they had been in since the battle began. But the enemy came on in such countless numbers that the thought involuntarily arose what had best be done supposing Macdonald could not hold them at bay long enough to allow the main army to countermarch and assume a fighting formation. For if Macdonald's men gave way, they would assuredly in their retirement mask the fire of their friends who were now doubling forward in support. However, luckily this situation did not come to pass, for Macdonald's Brigade repelled all the Dervish onslaughts until supported by the rest of the Army.

As soon as it became apparent that the Dervish attack had ended, the Egyptian Cavalry was launched forth across the battlefield. It advanced in two lines (one of four, the other of five squadrons), about 300 yards distance separating the lines, and intervals of 50 to 100 yards being maintained between squadrons. The direction taken was first westwards; then later Major Le Gallais' regiment, consisting of his own squadron and those of Captains Baring, Haig, and Persse, moved south-westwards, to the round-topped hill referred to in the account of the reconnaissance of September 1, about five miles distant from the scene of the main fight. On the way to this many Dervishes threw down their arms in token of surrender; many more, even though wounded, would wait for the advancing Cavalry and then fire at close range; or individual spearmen would stand boldly up and hurl their spears at a whole squadron. Under every bush capable of affording shelter from the lances of the Cavalry little groups congregated and made a last desperate stand. Such was the crowd through which the Egyptian Cavalry charged. There were many cases of treachery. Dervishes whose lives had been spared were seen, as soon as the first rank had passed on, suddenly to attack some unsuspecting trooper. It was impossible to detail sufficiently strong escorts to secure the prisoners, and several casualties occurred



amongst those engaged on this duty, notably, an Egyptian officer who was clubbed by a Dervish prisoner and had several ribs broken.

On reaching the round-topped hill Major Le Gallais' command, which preceded the rest of the Cavalry, came under the fire of a mass of Dervishes, who were about 500 yards to the south-west of the hill. They numbered many thousands, and from their good order and large supply of ammunition did not appear to have taken part in the fight. The plain, too, towards Omdurman was covered with countless Dervishes, retiring sullenly and slowly; but though defeated their behaviour showed they were in no sense routed—as the Cavalry were soon to discover. Deeming the enemy's masses too thick to justify an attack towards the city, Major Le Gallais formed his three squadrons in line and advanced at a gallop in a south-easterly direction, almost parallel with the Khor Shambat, hoping to check and cause to surrender all the fugitives that were between that *kh*or and the Kerreri Hills. These fugitives, however, were full of fight, and as the squadrons approached, they stood their ground and fired as fast as they could. The mass of Dervishes on the south-west of the round-topped hill also came on, and, owing to the new direction taken by the squadrons, this body assailed the latter upon their right flank. On their left flank were the groups of prisoners who had already surrendered, many of whom now picked up their arms again and joined in the fusilade.

The further the advance continued the stronger became the opposition. Indeed, Major Le Gallais' regiment was literally enveloped by Dervishes, who, regardless of friend or foe, fired indiscriminately. The three squadrons suffered severely both in men and horses, and the direction of their attack changed, for the mass of the enemy being greater towards the south made them gradually bring forward their right, so that they eventually headed towards Jebel Surgham. Finally they were drawn off northwards and rejoined the remainder of the Cavalry under Colonel Broadwood. This charge cost each of the squadrons about twenty horses and many wounded men.

It was now past mid-day. The Cavalry had been continuously on the move since daylight, had covered a wide tract of country, for the most part at fast paces, and many of the horses were dead beat. Accordingly, after the wounded had been dressed, Colonel Broadwood led his command to the Nile, which was reached at a point near the mouth of the Khor Shambat at about 3 P.M.

Here the Cavalry halted for about one and a half hours, till an order

arrived from the Sirdar for a move to be made towards Omdurman. It was generally understood that this advance was with a view to finding a suitable halting-place for the night ; no attention, therefore, was paid to filling water-bottles or putting some small supplies in the wallets, as would have been the case had the possibility of an immediate pursuit of the Khalifa been made known.

After marching round outside the city on the west, Colonel Broadwood halted his force on some rising ground, about a couple of miles south-west of the Mahdi's tomb. The sun was just setting, and away towards the river vast multitudes of people were seen leaving the city by the road towards the south ; men, women and children, on foot, on ponies, on donkeys, on camels, with flocks and herds and carrying off their household goods—the whole forming a most extraordinary picture. Many armed men, too, mingled with the throng, and the rattle of musketry was often heard.

### (III) THE PURSUIT OF THE KHALIFA.

About this time Slatin Pasha came out from the city to meet the Cavalry, and announced that the Khalifa had just escaped. It was already 7 P.M., but the Sirdar's orders were for the Egyptian Cavalry and Camel Corps to pursue at once, so after some minutes' delay, to procure two Kababish guides, Colonel Broadwood led his force out into the dark.

Squadrons were now greatly reduced in numbers, and all were very tired. For supplies, the men were supposed to have in their haversacks the remains of the day's biscuit ration which should last until next morning : and for the horses there was barley carried on the saddles sufficient until noon. However, it was arranged that a steamer should join the force next morning with further supplies for men and horses.

Owing to the darkness and the presence of so many armed men on the river road, the column kept inland and marched southwards towards some hills, the outline of which could be seen against the sky. The going soon became very soft, and the horses now and then floundered up to the girth in wet sand. Several rocky *khors*, too, were met, and horses and camels, thoroughly tired out, stumbled and fell on all sides, the darkness adding greatly to the confusion. About 11 P.M. Colonel Broadwood decided to go no further till the moon rose, and so drew off the column towards the desert, and halted on as dry a spot as could be found. Water-bottles were filled and horses watered at some shallow, muddy pools of water which lay around.

Then, after outposts had been posted, the men lay down to sleep beside their horses. Firing was heard all night long, and constant flashes of rifles were distinctly visible.

At 3 A.M. *on Saturday morning, September 3*, the force moved on again. Men and horses seemed refreshed with their short halt, and by the aid of a bright moon the ground was got over at a steady pace. By seven o'clock the place on the river which had been agreed upon for meeting the steamer was approached. She had already arrived, and the sight of the funnel and the thought of a good meal cheered everyone up, for no one had had much to eat since the night before the battle.

On nearing the steamer, however, it was seen that she was fully 300 yards from the bank, and no means existed of landing the stores. Horses were therefore watered and fed, and the march resumed in the hopes of finding some suitable place further up stream. The going again was very boggy and trying to the tired horses, and by two in the afternoon only some seven more miles had been covered. The steamer's flag was now visible, but a perfect morass separated the column from the river bank where she was lying. It was impossible to get to her, and the nature of the bank was the same for many miles. The question of supplies now became an urgent one, for the men had nothing left of their biscuit, and there was only one small feed for each horse. It was therefore decided to return to Omdurman. Indeed, even with supplies, there seemed little prospect of catching the Khalifa, who, according to the statements of numerous fugitives, had pushed on all night long, mounted on a swift donkey.

A halt was made till 3 P.M., and the last feed given to the horses. The column then returned to the point where the river had been struck in the morning, which was reached at sunset, and here another night was spent upon the desert.

Matters, however, were better than on the night of the battle. Fires were lighted, and Major Tudway and the officers of the Camel Corps, who always managed to carry plenty of provisions on their camels, entertained their less fortunate comrades of the Cavalry to a very satisfying repast of soup and 'army rations.'

*Next morning, Sunday, September 4*, the return march to Omdurman began at 5 A.M., but there is little of further interest to record in connection with it. The ranks of the Cavalry had been terribly thinned by the hardships of the past few days; in fact, several of the squadrons had only sufficient horses to form two weak troops. But those that remained

marched along in such good heart that the usual pace of trot and walk was kept up throughout.

The column marched by the river road. It was about 9 A.M. when the southern end of the city was reached, but the camp told off for the Cavalry was some distance to the north of Omdurman, so the whole length of the city had to be passed through. It was a most unpleasant ride. Many unburied corpses, dead donkeys, and other animals strewed the road, and produced a loathsome stench.

Camp was reached about eleven o'clock, and hunger, thirst and fatigue were soon forgotten.

#### (IV) COMMENTS ON THE ACTION OF THE EGYPTIAN CAVALRY BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE BATTLE.

There can be little doubt that the presence of the Egyptian Cavalry and camel corps on the Kerreri Hills, by misleading the Dervish army and attracting it northwards, materially aided in the result of the battle. Thanks to the Cavalry the Dervishes before they attacked Macdonald's Brigade had been on the move since daybreak, had expended much of their ammunition, and had no doubt lost confidence in their leaders, who had failed to find their foe. Moreover, the Dervish army in its attack northwards became scattered, and the blows dealt by it afterwards were delivered in piecemeal fashion, and were consequently defeated in detail. Certainly the way in which the concentric attack against Kerreri was delivered showed ability on the part of the Dervish leader who devised it, and considerable skill on the part of the subordinate commanders who in its execution handled the smaller bodies. It is unprofitable to speculate as to the possible result of a similar combined attack on the Anglo-Egyptian Force during its march to Omdurman, but it is interesting to know that some of the prisoners volunteered the opinion that 'the Dervish army would never have been defeated had its leaders not been deceived!' At any rate the action of the Cavalry *previous* to the battle is worthy of all praise.

Considering next its work *during* the attack on Macdonald's Brigade, which must be regarded as the critical phase of the battle, it has been shown that the Cavalry were at hand, ready to intervene if required. This fact reflects credit on its leader, who made every effort to reach a position from which he could act in combination with the rest of the army.

On the other hand, looking at the events and the action of the Cavalry *subsequent* to the attack on Macdonald, it can hardly be claimed that success was achieved. The fruits of victory were not gathered. Certainly many prisoners were captured—indeed, the best energies of officers, men and horses were expended, or perhaps wasted, in this work. The capture of these wretched subordinates was of secondary consideration in comparison with the capture of their leader, the Khalifa, and the question therefore arises, Why was no determined effort made to take him, alive or dead ?

There appear to be two main reasons : (a) That the numbers of the Cavalry present at the battle of Omdurman were too small for the magnitude of the task to be accomplished. It is an historical fact that Infantry and guns may, either separately or collectively, win battles, but the *mounted arm alone* (including its Horse Artillery auxiliary) can gain the fruits of victory. For this purpose every arm must be accompanied not only by a well-trained and efficient force of Cavalry, but that arm must be present in sufficient numbers. The proportion which the Cavalry in an army should bear to the strength of the other arms has always been a fairly constant quantity. Napoleon put it at one to four, others at slightly less, ' but it is generally the case in war that, if the Cavalry is allowed to fall below the usual proportion of one trooper to every six men of the other arms, the army suffers.' (' Stonewall Jackson,' by Colonel Henderson, p. 7.) The proportion of Cavalry to the other arms in the British force at Omdurman fell far short of this standard.

Not only, then, were the Cavalry relatively too few as a fraction of the army, but they were also far too few in proportion to the magnitude of the task imposed upon them—compare their thirteen squadrons, say, 1400 horsemen, with the overwhelming numbers of the Dervishes. The Khalifa's army has been estimated at from 50,000 to 70,000 men on the morning of the battle. Allow a reduction of 20,000 for casualties, and even then see what a vast multitude remained to be pursued by a mere handful of cavalry. Moreover, the Dervish is not like a European soldier. The latter, once his ' moral ' is thoroughly shaken, is apt to run ; the Dervish, on the contrary, if attacked in retreat, stands his ground, and despising death seeks to destroy as many infidels as possible. The characteristics too of the Dervish warrior are rapidity of movement and skill in using the sword : in fact they are veritable ' foot Cavalry,' and no mean enemy, even in retreat, for Cavalry to engage.

The first reason, then, for the small success achieved by the Cavalry after the fight, is that the mounted arm were not present in sufficient numbers to produce decisive results.

(b) Secondly, that the manner of their employment was defective ; for more might have been achieved even with the small force which was available. The four squadrons of 21st Lancers and the nine squadrons of Egyptian Cavalry acted entirely independently of one another—and instead of the whole force being concentrated ready to advance when the decisive phase had come, the two bodies of Cavalry were widely separated, with no unity of purpose in their action.

Moreover, if the fruits of victory are to be secured, the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still paralysed by the shock of the infantry, and it is therefore the duty of the commander of the army and his staff to organise a force for pursuit betimes. This was not done, with the result that the Egyptian Cavalry started off in a direct pursuit, and expended its force against the rear of overwhelming numbers of Dervishes who were retreating sullenly southwards. A direct pursuit is rarely a means of making success decisive—the rear of a retreating army is usually its strongest point. A pursuit on the other hand directed against the flanks and striking the line of retreat, if conducted with vigour, seldom fails in its effect.

If a force of thirteen squadrons accompanied by maxim guns had been sent forward to head off the Dervishes from the city immediately their attacks had been repulsed by Macdonald's Brigade, it is impossible to estimate what far-reaching results might have accrued. At least there would have been a possibility of capturing the Khalifa, for he did not leave the city till well on in the afternoon.

But, placed as they were, it was hardly possible for the two Cavalry commanders, Colonels Martin and Broadwood, to initiate a pursuit upon these lines. It is even questionable whether a Commander-in-chief can personally, in the course of a big battle, organise a force for pursuit without risk of neglecting matters of urgency—it is certainly, however, his duty to give the order, and then to rely upon his staff to arrange the details.

Nothing appears, however, to have been done until late in the afternoon ; result—an ineffective pursuit.

Thus the name of Omdurman must be added to the long list of battles in which the victorious army failed to pursue, and so to reap the fruits of victory.

*THE LOCAL FORCES IN THE FOUR SELF-GOVERNING  
COLONIES OF SOUTH AFRICA*

It is hardly necessary to mention that a Bill has recently been passed through both Houses of Parliament, and has received the Royal sanction, for the unification of the four self-governing colonies, viz., Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Natal and the Orange River Colony. This Bill was previously drafted in and accepted by the people of South Africa, and its consummation in May next may therefore be looked upon as an accepted fact. It differs from the similar Australian and Canadian Acts in providing for a far closer and more centralised form of government than exists in those Dominions—States' rights such as are to be found in Australia, and of which we have heard so much recently in the United States of America, will be practically non-existent in South Africa. Finally, although there is no provision for it in the Constitution, there seems no doubt but that the Union Government will control the defensive forces absolutely and completely. It is interesting, therefore, in considering the existing local forces to regard them as a basis for a future defence force and to speculate upon the steps necessary to bring them into line. Speculation on this point is all that can be attempted, for we know nothing about the future defence policy of the Union Government—and, ignorant even of the men who will form the members of that Government, cannot attempt to make any forecast based on their known personal idiosyncrasies. It is a fact, however, that the various authorities, political and military, in South Africa have been considering the question for some time past ; and that representatives of the four colonies were present at the recent Imperial Defence Conference, where, although unable to make any pledges for their respective Governments, they at least had the opportunity of learning what was being done in the other great colonies, and of hearing the suggestions and desires of the Imperial Government on the subject.

In any case it is certain that the question of defence can never become an insignificant one in South Africa, for the enormously preponderating native population forbids neglect of the military forces, and there is a very considerable proportion of South Africans who, rightly

or wrongly, are absolutely convinced that a great native rising is only a matter of time. South Africa has also an international boundary, which, like Canada's, may be counted on as a great factor in welding the people of the Colony into a homogeneous nation determined to maintain their freedom if necessary by force of arms.

	Regiments	Batteries, Squadrons, and Companies	Cyclist Sections	
<b>CAPE COLONY.</b>				Approx. total, 5,000.
<i>Permanent Force—</i>				
Staff . . . . .	—	—	—	
Cape Mounted Riflemen . . . . .	—	6	—	
<i>Volunteers—</i>				
Field Artillery . . . . .	—	—	—	
Garrison Artillery . . . . .	—	6	—	
Mounted Corps . . . . .	4	9	—	Approx. total, 3,500.
Infantry . . . . .	12	39	3	
Cape Medical Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	
Total—Cape Colony . . . . .	16	60	3	
<b>NATAL.</b>				Approximate grand total, 13,900.
<i>Permanent Staff . . . . .</i>				
Militia—	—	—	—	
Naval Volunteer Reserve . . . . .	1	2	—	
Field Artillery . . . . .	—	3	—	
Mounted Corps . . . . .	6	25	—	
Infantry . . . . .	2	12	—	
Natal Medical Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	
„ Veterinary Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	
„ Telegraph Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	
„ Service Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	
Total—Natal . . . . .	9	42	—	Approx. total, 5,400.
<b>TRANSVAAL.</b>				
<i>Permanent Staff . . . . .</i>				
Volunteers—	—	—	—	
Horse Artillery . . . . .	—	2	—	
Mounted Corps . . . . .	3	17	—	
Engineers . . . . .	1	7	—	
Infantry and Cyclists . . . . .	3	12	5	
Signallers and Telegraphists . . . . .	—	—	—	
Medical Corps . . . . .	—	—	—	
Total—Transvaal . . . . .	7	38	5	
Grand Total . . . . .	32	140	8	



Before trying to trace, as briefly as possible, the growth of the various local forces in South Africa, and outlining their present organisation, it may be convenient to mention that the existing forces in the different colonies are as follows :

In Cape Colony there are a small permanent force, Volunteers, Rifle Associations and Cadet Corps. Natal has Militia, Rifle Associations and Cadet Corps ; in the Transvaal the Volunteers form the only military force, while in the Orange River Colony there are neither Volunteers nor Militia.

In all four colonies there are Mounted Police, somewhat on the lines of the Royal Irish Constabulary. These are available for military service.

#### CAPE COLONY

The first local force mentioned in the history of the Cape was a company of Militia formed by the Dutch in 1659. Forty years later this force consisted of a company of Cavalry and two of Infantry. In addition to the Militia every burgher was liable for service, and in 1795, when we first invaded the Cape, we were opposed by 1500 men. Part of this force consisted of Hottentots, whom we afterwards took over. These Hottentots, when the Cape was handed back to the Dutch at the Peace of Amiens, returned to the service of their former masters, but transferred their allegiance once more and for the last time when we retook the Cape in 1806. The strength of this corps was then about 500 ; but it was reduced in 1827 to three companies. Meanwhile the old Burgher Law remained in force, and commandoes were raised from time to time to deal with local native troubles. For instance, during the second Kaffir War in 1846, 8500 burghers and volunteers were under arms, together with 4000 coloured auxiliaries, the regular garrison at the time numbering 4000 men.

In 1855 and 1856 various Acts were passed organising the burgher forces, sanctioning the formation of Volunteer corps, and authorising the establishment of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police.

In 1874 the local forces consisted of : Frontier Armed and Mounted Police and Volunteers (at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and in Kaffraria), making a total of 1399.

But the organisation and enrolment of these forces was by no means satisfactory, and a form of dual control existed whereby the local forces were partly under the General Officer Commanding, and partly under the

Civil Government, a system which was calculated to produce a maximum of friction and a minimum of efficiency.

In 1878 the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police became the Cape Mounted Riflemen. Yeomanry corps were formed, and various Volunteer regiments disbanded.

In both this year and in 1880 the Cape Government found itself engaged in a Basuto War, and we read of excellent work done by the now efficiently organised Cape Mounted Riflemen. In 1878 nearly 5000 men were put in the field by the Cape Government, and in 1880 nearly 6700 were engaged in operations against the Basuto.

In 1892 the Colonial Forces Act came into force. This amended and consolidated previous Acts, and it is under it that the Cape local forces are raised to-day. It authorised the formation of Volunteer corps which are liable for service wherever the colony may require them. It provided for the discipline and command of the Volunteers, and organised the Volunteer Artillery, which is similar to other Volunteer corps except that it is partially paid.

The history of the Cape forces during the South African War cannot be dealt with in this short paper, suffice it to say that early in 1901 Cape Colony had the following troops in the field :—

	All ranks
Irregular Corps . . . . .	11,629
Permanent Forces . . . . .	2,098
Volunteer Corps . . . . .	6,069
Colonial Defence Force (raised under the old burgher system for the defence of districts) . . . . .	9,264
Town Guards . . . . .	4,598
Details . . . . .	925
Total . . . . .	<hr/> 34,583

Since the war, owing to financial stress, the history of the Cape forces has been one of constant reduction and decreased expenditure. The expenditure for the year ended June 30, 1907, was about 545,402*l.* while that for the next year was 475,669*l.* At the present time the Defence Department is under the Colonial Secretary, to whom are submitted all questions of finance and important matters affecting administration by the Commandant-General.

The Commandant-General, who is also Commandant of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, has his headquarters at King William's Town, and all general work affecting the forces is under him.

These forces are enumerated in the table at the end of this paper which does not, however, include Rifle Associations and Cadets.

The Volunteer Artillery are armed with six 15-pounder B.L. guns, which are drawn by mules, and with M.L.E. rifles. The Light Horse have M.L.E. rifles, while the Mounted Infantry and Infantry have Lee-Enfields.

All transport, both for the Cape Mounted Riflemen and the Volunteers, would, in case of war, be hired locally.

Rifle Associations, which have about 1490 members, are granted a sum of 1250*l.* by Government annually. Members take the oath of allegiance and agree to serve in their own districts.

Cadets number about 5530, aged from fourteen to seventeen. They have been particularly hard hit by recent economies, and are now only given free ammunition and instruction by the Government.

The Cape Mounted Police have lately achieved some distinction by their pursuit and defeat of various Hottentot bands which came from German territory. They are responsible for an enormous area, and for many miles of arid, almost waterless, country along the Cape-German border.

#### NATAL

Natal is a much smaller colony than the Cape, and has a population of about :

95,000 Europeans,  
112,000 Native coolies,  
and 938,000 Zulus.

The local forces are raised on an entirely different basis from those in Cape Colony. There are no permanent forces, beyond a small permanent staff, and no volunteers, for in 1903 the forces were re-organised on a Militia basis. However, before considering the organisation of the Natal Militia it is necessary to trace its gradual growth and history.

The first locally raised force that we read of consisted of some volunteers, called the Natal Carabineers, who were raised in 1855 to put a stop to Bushmen incursions from the Drakensberg. This force saw service in 1856 and 1858, and again in 1861 when they guarded the frontier against Zulu incursions ; while in 1865, during the war between the Orange Free State and the Basuto Chief Moshesh, the Natal Carabineers stopped several attempted Basuto raids into the colony.

In 1874 the Natal Mounted Police, the first permanent force in the colony, were raised, and consisted of fifty Europeans. Three years later, in 1877, they were increased to 150 men liable to serve within or

without the colony, and in the same year the establishment of the Volunteers, at this time consisting of fourteen corps, nearly all mounted, was raised from 1000 to 1400.

During the Zulu war of 1878-9 Natal put about 8400 men in the field, *i.e.* 1400 Volunteers and 7000 other troops, of whom about 5000 were natives.

In 1888 all restrictions as regards numbers of Volunteers were removed.

As regards the part played by the Natal forces during the South African war, the numbers raised will, when the size and population of the Colony are borne in mind, speak for themselves.

In 1899 when the Volunteer force was called out, its strength was approximately 2070, exclusive of the Police, which fought throughout the war. In addition to the Volunteers and Police, about 7500 men were raised in the colony. In September 1900, when Natal was cleared of the Dutch, the discharge of Volunteers (with the exception of 300 men) was sanctioned, and, though in 1901, when the colony was once more invaded, a proportion of the Volunteers was again called out, the colony was, for the remainder of the war, represented by the various irregular corps that had been raised.

After the war various new corps were added to the establishment, and in 1903 the whole force was re-organised as Militia.

In 1906 occurred the native rebellion. Consequent on the murder of some of the Police, two columns were organised which operated between January and March of this year and apparently succeeded in crushing all opposition until the escape to Zululand of Bambata, a petty chief in Natal, and his combination with Sigananda, an aged Zulu chief. This led in April to the mobilisation of the whole Militia force, which operated in Zululand till June, and till the end of July in Natal immediately south of the Tugela, and eventually completely defeated the Zulus in the fights at Mome Gorge, Insuzi, and Insimba, and put an end to rebellion.

The total number mobilised, including contingents from Cape Colony and the Transvaal, was 9368.

But the Zulu problem was not finished until December 1907, when, consequent on a series of murders of loyal chiefs, the whole Militia was mobilised to effect the capture of Dinuzulu. This mobilisation was carried out with extraordinary secrecy and despatch, and resulted in arresting the Chief without opposition.

The military expenditure for the year ended June 30, 1908, exclusive of the sum spent on the police, was 68,225*l.*

The local forces in Natal as they at present exist, are constituted as follows :

By the Militia Act of 1903 a Commandant of Militia, responsible for administration and training, was appointed. The Act also authorised the creation of a militia force in which every male of European descent from eighteen to fifty years of age may be called upon to serve.

This force consists of :

(a) Permanent Militia, voluntarily recruited, which, since no financial provision has ever been made for it, does not actually exist.

(b) Active Militia, consisting of Volunteers.

(c) Militia First Reserve, consisting of all unmarried men from eighteen to thirty years of age, who are not in the Active Militia.

(d) Militia Second Reserve, consisting of all married men between eighteen and thirty years of age and all men from thirty-one to forty years of age who are not in (b).

(e) Militia Third Reserve, consisting of all men from forty-one to fifty years of age.

The active Militia must not exceed 4,000 in peace, and in the event of numbers falling below establishment, volunteers may be called for, and if the numbers are not then forthcoming the Militia may be brought up to strength by ballot.

The members of the Militia are liable to serve within or adjacent to the colony in its defence, with the exception of the Third Militia Reserve, who are only liable to serve in their military districts.

Referring once more to the table it will be seen that the force consists of twenty-five squadrons, three batteries, and fourteen companies, and is therefore mainly a mounted one, the mounted troops being, as is generally the case in South Africa, Mounted Rifles.

The officers of the Militia are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Commandant, first appointment being to the probationary rank of second lieutenant, who are not promoted until they have passed an examination in military subjects.

Finances permitting, all the Militia go to camp for ten days annually and take part in quarterly field firing practices. The men of the different arms also have to be present either at a certain number of drills or at some technical training.

The duration of the annual camp can be extended so as to allow all the Militia to attend it.

As regards musketry, the Commandant, School of Musketry, Bloemfontein, has lately drawn up a course which all South African forces have adopted.

All corps are armed with M.L.E. rifles, and units, other than Field Artillery, have Rexer and Maxim guns. Each battery of Artillery has six 15-pdr. B.L. guns, and a pompom section with two Q.F. 1-pdr. guns is included in this arm.

All corps are supplied by the Government with equipment, and there is a permanent ordnance department in charge of the reserve of arms, ammunition and equipment. Including both the equipment, &c., in reserve and on charge of units there is sufficient to equip a force 10,000 strong.

There are two armouries under the Ordnance Department.

The 1st Line Transport consists of pack horses for Mounted Rifles and of mule carts or light mule wagons for other arms.

Mounted Rifles have light mule wagons for 2nd Line Transport, and other corps have ox wagons.

This is hired or requisitioned.

The men supply their own horses, which are insured for them by Government.

The Cadet movement in Natal is particularly worthy of attention. All Government or Government-aided schools have Cadet corps or classes of instruction which must be attended by boys over eleven.

The Cadets are divided into two classes :

1. Senior Cadets from fourteen to eighteen who have left school.
2. School Cadets, consisting of all boys at the above-mentioned schools, who are over eleven years of age.

Cadet corps are under the Commandant of Militia, but are directly controlled by an officer termed the Commandant of Cadets.

Efficiency requirements are as under :—

*Seniors.*

1. Attendance at twenty-four drills of not less than an hour's duration.
2. Annual course of musketry.

*School Cadets.*

1. Thirty drills.
2. Annual course of musketry for boys over fourteen.

The Police force is divided into mounted, foot, railway and water police.

The Mounted Police consist of 850 all ranks.

They are a semi-military force, of whom about 200 men are formed into a field force ready to proceed on service at a few hours' notice.

The force is armed with M.L.M. rifles, M.L.E., M.M., or M.E. rifles or carbines.

Recruits join for a month's probation, and are then enlisted for three years.

They provide their own horses.

### TRANSVAAL

The history of the local forces in the Transvaal is, it need hardly be stated, a very short one. In 1900 the 'Rand Rifles' were formed for the defence of Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand gold mines. This was a purely volunteer corps and was disbanded on the declaration of peace. However, under the Volunteer Ordinance of 1902 Transvaal Volunteers were formed again, and the titles of the Witwatersrand Rifles and of many other corps raised in South Africa during the war of 1899-1902 were preserved in the new corps that were so created.

Although the Volunteers have, for financial reasons, been considerably reduced since 1906, they are not supplemented by any permanent force like the Cape Mounted Riflemen in Cape Colony, nor have they the powers of expansion which the Militia Act of Natal gives that colony.

On the other hand, as is also the case in Cape Colony and Natal, the local forces in the Transvaal can count on the assistance of a semi-military police force, which, in this latter colony, is remarkably efficient and highly trained.

The only active service that the Volunteers enrolled since the South African War have seen was in 1906, when a composite mounted regiment, 500 strong, and an Infantry battalion, 445 strong, were sent to assist Natal during the native rebellion.

The Volunteers are liable for service in any part of South Africa where the interests of the colony may need such service, and the force is directly under the command of the Inspector, who is responsible to the Government for its organisation, training, efficiency and inspection.

He is assisted by a permanent staff and eight non-commissioned officers and men, and by a regimental staff—nine adjutants (four of whom are volunteers), nine warrant officers and thirteen non-commissioned officers and men.

In addition to the various corps which comprise the Volunteers, reserves to all corps have recently (1909) been created.

Officers in the Transvaal Volunteers are appointed by the Governor. They have to pass an examination within twelve months of their first appointment and before promotion.

In order to render himself efficient a volunteer must perform annually the scale of drills according to his arm of the service. This scale is :—

For Artillery . . . . .	24 drills.
Mounted Volunteers . . . . .	18 „
Infantry . . . . .	12 „

Each day in camp counts as three drills, and no volunteer may be returned as efficient if he fails to attend camp or the annual inspection without special reasons.

The musketry course which a volunteer must fire in addition to the above-mentioned drills is the same as has been adopted by the other South African colonies.

The armament of the Horse Artillery consists of four 13-pdr. Q.F. and six 15-pdr. B.L. guns.

All mounted and dismounted Volunteers are armed with M.L.E. rifles and bayonets. Each man is given annually 150 rounds free, after the expenditure of which the purchase of an unlimited number of rounds per man on part payment is permitted.

Equipment is issued free by Government, but saddlery is provided under corps arrangements.

The guns and field telegraph equipment are drawn by mules hired from the Government railway, while transport is drawn from the same source, and is supplemented if necessary from private sources.

There is an Ordnance Store in Johannesburg.

Cadets were first formed in the Transvaal when a Boys' Brigade was started in 1902. These were recruited from various schools, companies being affiliated to active corps.

Later on Cadet battalions were formed, but the organisation did not prove satisfactory, and was changed in 1905 to a company basis extending all over the Transvaal.

In 1909 the Cadets were divided into :—

- (1) Senior Cadet Corps (including the 1st Cadet Battalion, Witwatersrand Rifles, and all other Senior Cadets).
- (2) School Cadet Corps (including all School Cadets).



The numbers increased from 700 in 1903 to nearly 4000 in 1908, and the movement is increasingly popular.

Each company commander is responsible to the Staff Officer for Cadets, who is in turn responsible to the Inspector, Transvaal Volunteers.

The age limit for Senior Cadets is from fourteen to twenty-one years of age, and for School Cadets from twelve to eighteen years.

The efficiency requirements are as follows :—

1. Thirty drills for a full year.

2. A musketry course.

Camps are held annually.

The Police in the Transvaal, like the Police in the other South African colonies, are a semi-military force. They are the descendants, so to speak, of the South African Constabulary who were raised during the war and of the Transvaal Town Police, which were organised for the maintenance of law and order in certain towns in the Transvaal. As at present constituted they are under the Attorney-General in the Transvaal and can be employed in any part of the world. They are controlled and commanded by a Commissioner with the rank of colonel.

Their establishment is about 2,160 Europeans and 1,200 natives. They have no reserve, but there are about 75 men at their depôt always ready to take the field, while a column 400 strong, with a battery (when the guns are purchased), could be mobilised in about seventy-two hours.

The men, who are of an excellent class with a high physical standard, are highly trained, and can shoot and ride well. They are armed with .303-inch Lee-Enfield rifles, and the force has six .303-inch Maxims, while transport and mules for the above-mentioned mobile column are always available at headquarters (Pretoria).

#### ORANGE RIVER COLONY.\*

In the O.R.C.\* there are no Volunteers or Militia, and only a very small Police force, the details and numbers of which need not be discussed.

#### *Summary.*

To sum up : it will be noticed that there is and always has been in South Africa a strong tendency to recognise the liability of every man to serve when required. We see this in the Burgher Law of the Cape and in the Militia Act of Natal, and although there are nowadays no such laws in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, there are probably

\* The name of this colony is about to be changed to Orange Free State.

half the population in the former and four-fifths in the latter colony who experienced the practical working and realised the necessity for a commando law.

This recognition will be a very valuable asset when working out a new military system for the whole of South Africa, and we may perhaps look forward to seeing another great dominion adopt the principle of compulsory service. Many would urge the desirability of universal training ; but financially speaking this must be looked on as an impracticable counsel of perfection, and it will probably be found that the most practical method of tackling the problem will be to consider how the total of the sums at present allotted by the four different colonies for their military forces can be most profitably expended in creating a South African Defence Force. Such a scheme has been worked out roughly for the Transvaal Government, and it was found that for a cost equal to that at present spent by the four colonies a force of 30,000 men, on a Militia basis and raised by compulsory enlistment, could be maintained in South Africa. Moreover, there would be a sufficient saving to allow for a considerable sum being expended annually on a military college, organised on similar lines to the Military College in Canada.

As regards the strategical problems confronting South Africa, the first and most important is the possibility of native risings. These might be isolated and without combination, or general and simultaneous. In the case of isolated tribal risings it is the opinion of most authorities that a prompt display of force will go far towards nipping rebellion in the bud. Such force, it is thought, need not be great—a column of from 250 to 400 strong would probably, in most instances, have a most salutary effect if it arrived on the spot where trouble was brewing before the natives expected it.

The reason of this is probably because either the natives have been severely punished already or because they are cowardly by nature. For instance, the Zulus, Matabele, Bechuanas and natives of South-East Cape Colony have all been defeated with heavy loss within recent or comparatively recent times, while the Swazis and the tribes of the Northern Transvaal are poor races of no fighting value.

But there is an exception to this—and a very important one. The Basutos have fought with white people on four important occasions and have never been finally and absolutely punished. Is it any wonder then that they should have a somewhat arrogant opinion of their prowess and fail to realise what they owe to the mountainous and difficult nature of their country ? Be that as it may, a single small column, however

promptly despatched, might in the case of Basutoland have a result infinitely harmful, in that it would probably cause excitement impossible to restrain among the people as a whole, and the reverse of such a column would necessitate punishment and a difficult campaign.

Basutoland, therefore, is a separate strategic problem which demands a strong force, adequately equipped with pack transport and mountain guns, while prompt action becomes of secondary, though still considerable, importance.

In the case of a general native rising it is obviously desirable that every white man should be able to use a rifle and should have an appointed position in the scheme for dealing with such a contingency.

There is a second strategical problem to be found in the proximity of German South-West Africa. The territory on both sides of the Anglo-German border is a difficult one where the water supply is a serious consideration at all times of the year, and in the dry season is so meagre as to preclude the movement of any but small and very mobile columns. Indeed, the Cape Police on the border and the mail carriers are only enabled to carry out their duties by using a few camels.

Thus it will be seen that the South African Forces must be trained to fight in all descriptions of country, which varies from the mountains of Basutoland and Natal to the deserts and karroo in the west and south-west, and from the bush veld of the Northern Transvaal and Zululand to the bare veld of the great central plateau or the forests of Cape Colony and Swaziland. Their possible enemies may be highly trained troops, ideal guerilla warriors, like the partly civilised Griquas and Hottentots, mounted mountaineers of whom most would be armed with rifles of sorts, like the Basuto, Zulu spearmen, or, perhaps, worst of all, marauding murdering bands whom it would be difficult to bring to book and to force a fight with.

It is evident that an efficient striking force, such as is found in the Cape Mounted Riflemen or the semi-military Police, must be maintained in order to strike, or, perhaps, only to show themselves at the danger point as soon as it is realised ; while in a population where the natives outnumber the white people by more than four to one it is necessary that all should be able to use their rifles and as many as possible should be efficiently trained.

Whether it is possible to apply to South Africa the system that is employed in other parts of the continent, whereby natives are trained by us to maintain peace and good order among their fellow-natives, is perhaps worth consideration and has many arguments in its favour.

## **TERRITORIAL MOUNTED BRIGADE TRAINING**

BY COLONEL THE HON. O. LUMLEY, *Commanding 2nd South Midland Mounted Brigade.*

Two years have now elapsed since the formation of the fourteen Territorial Brigades, and the majority of these have already had some experience of training as a brigade, with satisfactory results.

Now that the initial difficulties have been surmounted, and the Brigade system is becoming more firmly established and appreciated, the question arises, if not in hundreds of cases, at all events in fourteen different cases, as to what is the best course to pursue, in order that the Brigade may achieve the maximum of instructional benefit during its all too short annual training.

This article is written with a view to promoting discussion and suggestions towards this end, and with no idea of dogmatising on a subject which is still in its infancy.

### **THE NEED OF A TRAINING MANUAL**

With the circumstances and conditions of the various districts and counties differing so widely, it is difficult and possibly inadvisable to lay down hard and fast rules as to the curriculum to be followed during the annual training period.

It certainly seems desirable that there should be some approximate uniformity of programme throughout the Brigades, and that the training should proceed on well-defined lines.

The three pages at the end of 'Cavalry Training' give, it is true, a few general remarks upon the subject, but it is left to the individual to sift all the duties allotted to Cavalry from those connected with shock action.

To condense and render applicable to the few days' actual training of the Mounted Brigade the 300 pages of 'Cavalry Training' is a task which, however carefully performed by Brigadiers, Commanding Officers, or Squadron leaders, is scarcely likely to result in that uniformity of instructional training which is so highly to be desired.

## ELEVEN DAYS' TRAINING

The actual period of annual training, consisting as it now almost invariably does of fifteen days, two of which are occupied in arriving and departing, and two of which are Sundays, leaves only eleven working days available. This is presuming that the assembly takes place on a week-day; if it commenced on a Sunday, this would admit of twelve working days. That the attention of Brigadiers has been called to certain cases in which the training has been carried out on rather too advanced lines, argues no small confidence in the apparent progress made. How the work can best be apportioned throughout the eleven days depends to a great extent on the nature of the ground which is available for use, and of course on the degree of proficiency which has been attained at preliminary and recruit drills.

The work for each day of the week should be carefully mapped out beforehand, and published for the guidance of all ranks, attention in each case being drawn to the various paragraphs in the Regulations which deal with the particular exercise. Each exercise should be thoroughly explained to the men, and if possible a conference should be held on the ground both before commencing the exercise and after its conclusion.

Constant interruption of the work by talking and shouting while it is in progress does not convey half the instruction that results from a clear explanation beforehand, and a conference afterwards, pointing out mistakes, and the methods by which they can best be rectified.

In 'Training and Manœuvre Regulations' we read:—'It will generally be advisable to make the training progressive for the unit throughout the annual camp.' This progressive training is the key to efficiency, and to lighten the load of the inexperienced subaltern in charge of a troop, as well as to maintain the men's interest in the proceedings, daily progression should be carried out. That is to say, after section leaders have instructed their sections, and troop leaders their troops, for a convenient time, squadron leaders should conclude the morning's work with the instruction of the squadron as a whole. After the first few days, regiments should be taken in hand by the Commanding Officer to conclude the morning's work. Interest and variety is thus kept up throughout the day's work, and the effort of imparting instruction is sensibly diminished by being distributed on to various shoulders. During the latter half of the training, Squadron and Regimental Commanders should divide the work between them, concluding the training with one or two

days' combined schemes under the Brigadier, in which the Horse Artillery Battery, the Transport and Supply Column, and the Field Ambulance should take part.

Such schemes cannot be too short and simple, involving instructional illustration, ensuring the co-operation of the bulk of the force throughout the proceedings, rather than complicated tactical problems. As the training is restricted to so few hours, it does not do to run any risk of the scheme failing through want of clearness.

If two phases can be introduced, there is more opportunity for every man taking some share in the day's work. For instance, a scheme might have as its first phase a line of outposts, followed by a rear-guard action—or reconnoitring a position, followed by a concentration to a flank and an attack, &c., &c. It assists the rank and file to have a clearer idea of what is going on if each phase of the scheme is headed by a note of the lesson which it is intended to impart.

#### SCOUTING AND RECONNAISSANCE

Scouting and reconnaissance work is the most important and difficult duty a Yeoman has to learn. It will not end in the frequent failures to obtain reliable information if the elementary details are insisted on during instruction. These failures usually occur partly on account of absence of instructions to the scout, and partly because the scout is not trained what to look for.

A mounted scout should be trained so that he can make the best use of the ground and of his eyesight, with the object of discovering the enemy before the latter discovers him, and instructed what to do when he does meet the enemy. He should be told, before starting, the position and probable movement of the other bodies of his own force, so that he is not likely to mistake them for the enemy, what information is required, and when he is expected back.

#### CAMPING GROUNDS

The selection of suitable camping grounds, coupled with facilities for training, is not an easy task. When a single Yeomanry Regiment trains by itself in its own county, sufficient ground can usually be found which the patriotism of local landowners places at its disposal both for camping and manœuvre purposes. When, however, three or more regiments, with Horse Artillery Battery, Transport and Supply Column, and Field

Ambulance, are concentrated, the space required is as a rule out of all proportion to that which is available. This is, perhaps, not fully realised by the military authorities, whose main experience of training in England is based on the facilities enjoyed when the manœuvre act is in force.

It does not seem desirable that Brigades should train year after year on the same ground, but the number of localities in the United Kingdom where a whole Brigade can not only find convenient camping accommodation, as well as suitable training ground, certainly does not admit of frequent changes. Even presuming that camping grounds can be found to accommodate whole Brigades, it does not follow that the country round is in any way suitable for training purposes, though it may be argued that it is the actual *terrain* over which the Brigade might have to operate in case of invasion. Enclosures, game preserves, cultivation, &c., &c., so restrict the area for tactical operations, even on the smallest scale, that the work is practically confined to the roads. Thus twelve roads radiating from the camping ground are required for the squadrons alone, while road work enables very few men to be practised at a time and necessitates long periods of inaction for the majority of the men. Moreover, to ensure the maximum of instruction to the men, their attention must be maintained by a high standard of interesting variety. An intelligent Yeoman requires very different treatment from the highly-trained Regular, who is content to get through his allotted daily task with the pleasing prospect of an excellent midday meal, followed by the genial atmosphere of coffee-bar or canteen, at the worst an hour or two behind the usual time. The Yeoman is probably enjoying the one fortnight's outing which he gets in the year—is only too keen to see and learn, and the harder he is worked the better he is pleased. But the attractions of military life presented on a high road, with a prohibited game preserve on his right, new-sown fields on his left, and a restricted view to his front, do not inspire him with that interest in the elementary rudiments of the profession of arms which is so highly desirable.

Last year several mounted brigades trained on Salisbury Plain, which from many points of view is an ideal training ground, especially for convenience and space. The argument that Salisbury Plain is unlike most of the rest of England, and that it is a bad policy to teach troops and prepare them for war over a type of country in which it is very unlikely that they will have to fight, is to some extent modified by the enhanced facilities for supervision and training which exist there. After a fortnight's training on Salisbury Plain, the Yeoman has probably had

so much opportunity for digesting instruction, that he is very much better fitted to fight anywhere than he would be if he had spent his fortnight amongst the lanes and hedgerows of the Eastern or Midland Counties.

If the Mounted Brigade is to train in an enclosed country, the better plan would appear to be to camp the three regiments some miles apart from each other, which would ensure more space for working independently, and afford more opportunities for practice in reconnoitring or concentrating. When the duties allotted to a Brigade on mobilisation are detached duties, such as watching a coast line, or protecting any particular locality behind which a concentration is to take place, it is very desirable that a thorough knowledge of that district should be acquired in peace time, either by holding the annual training in the neighbourhood, or else by staff tours, week-end camps, &c., during the non-training season. A knowledge of the country, and how to make the best use of that knowledge, is the one great advantage which Territorial Troops should make sure of having over fresh-landed invaders.

#### THE RÔLE OF A MOUNTED BRIGADE

Yeomanry, as at present organised, are Mounted Rifles, and the primary duties in war of a Mounted Brigade will be to act as protective mounted troops to an Infantry Division. As such it will presumably come into contact with the enemy's Cavalry while performing screening duties, reconnaissance, scouting and observation. Its only weapon of offence (apart from its Horse Artillery Battery) being at present the rifle, fire action dismounted must be combined with all the above-mentioned duties. Hence particular attention must be devoted to fire control, indication of the target, and correct estimate of the range. In addition mobility must be constantly practised, not only when in the saddle, but also on foot, as well as during the intermediate stages of mounting and dismounting. Too much attention cannot be devoted to Yeomanry, when out of the saddle, retaining that dash which is their pride when on horseback. As Colonel Callwell so well puts it in his excellent work, 'The Tactics of Home Defence,' 'when a mounted detachment meets a hostile mounted detachment in this land of hedgerows, victory will rest with that detachment which is quickest out of the saddle and ready to fire from a position at once covered and commanding. The thing must be instantaneous—the scramble to the ground, the rush



to the knoll, the stream of bullets discharged, while the opponents are still half on and half off their horses.' The Squadron leader whose squadron is trained on these lines will be spared much anxiety when working against an enemy in an enclosed country. It must, however, be borne in mind that while it is no doubt highly desirable to possess great mobility, and to be able to move with extreme rapidity from one place to another, success on arrival can only be expected from a formed body of men. Cohesion must therefore not be sacrificed to this mobility. Thus, a squadron that wishes to gain possession of a certain position will probably succeed if it acts together, but, if the leading men reach the position some appreciable time before the last men arrive, may be defeated in detail. The same error must be carefully avoided when dismounted, and the men quickest off their horses should not advance without their leaders and comrades.

In practising dismounted action, great care should be exercised that the training does not inculcate the idea of acting defensively, and the necessity for offensive tactics, even when fighting on foot, must be impressed on all ranks. When occasion arises for occupying a locality for defence, that defence should be as active as possible, so as to retain the full advantage of mobility. To this end the Commander should employ as few men as possible at first in the dismounted line, holding the remainder in readiness to take immediate advantage of any opportunity for a successful counterstroke that the enemy may offer.

#### NIGHT WORK

It is doubtful whether much advantage is to be gained by practising night work during the short time available. It necessarily shortens the work of the day before or the day after. One night's exercise, which is very difficult to supervise, usually discloses so many faults, even amongst Regular troops, that unless it is repeated the lessons are not thoroughly learnt. There are, of course, exceptions where the nature of the ground, the effectual working of some particular scheme, or excessively hot weather, makes the advantages of night work more than compensate for the dislocation of the routine day work.

#### MOUNTED BRIGADE AUXILIARIES

The Royal Horse Artillery Territorial Battery, while devoting its energies to improving in drill and fire discipline, should not lose sight of the importance of attaining the closest co-operation with its Yeomanry

comrades. To this end constant practice is required in getting quickly into a suitable position in enclosed country, as well as rapid ranging at moving targets. A most instructive article on the training of the Horse Artillery Battery of a Mounted Brigade, by Colonel F. Wing, C.B., R.A., appeared in 'National Defence' for September 1909.

The Mounted Brigade Transport and Supply Columns should carry out all the Army Service Corps services of its brigade while in camp. It is convenient if arrangements can be made for this unit, or at all events part of it, to train for at least seventeen days. It should come out for training one day before the first day of the assembly of its Brigade, and remain out for one day after the training is over. There is plenty of routine work for the Transport and Supply Column, but they should be given an opportunity of taking part in one or two days' combined work with the remainder of the Brigade. The Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance should also take part in one or two days' combined work. The Commanding Officer of this unit should arrange his programme so as to include route marches, combined with the formation of dressing stations, collection and loading of wounded, tent-pitching, field kitchens, and, if possible, one or two exercises in searching for wounded by night.

If the Brigade is to obtain the full advantage from its combined training, it is essential that the preparatory work, such as individual training, mounted musketry and care of arms, and squadron training should be carefully attended to prior to the annual training.

*THE AIRSHIP AND FLYING-MACHINE IN WAR*

## THEIR PROBABLE INFLUENCE ON THE RÔLE OF CAVALRY

By CAPTAIN E. FF. W. LASCELLES, *3rd Dragoon Guards, Chief Instructor,  
General Instructional Staff, New Zealand Defence Forces*

THE great strides recently made, and almost daily proceeding, in practical aeronautics have powerfully affected the public mind, and much has been said and not a little has been written on the subject of the employment of the airship and flying-machine in war. Though many questions connected with the use of aerial craft for warlike purposes are likely for some time to remain in the realms of theory, there is little room to doubt that a new factor has been introduced, and that factor is one that may largely influence the issues of the wars of the future, both on sea and on land.

While there does not appear to be sufficient reason to justify the assumption that their use will cause a revolution in the methods of making war in general, any more than has the submarine boat in the making of naval war, the conquest of the air will necessitate the readjustment of some of the ideas of both soldier and sailor.

Many of the conclusions that may be arrived at at the present juncture must of necessity be somewhat conjectural, but the advancement made of late in aviation cannot fail to have raised in the minds of officers of the sea and land forces questionings as to both the immediate and ultimate bearing of practical aerial flight upon operations of war.

Though we may affect to disregard entirely the notion that the coming of the airship and aeroplane will revolutionise the methods of making war, progress almost beyond conception may possibly be achieved ere many years have passed, and it is advisable that military thought should keep abreast of developments in aeronautical science. The apparent limitations of both means of aerial locomotion as at present understood are such as to justify the dismissal as purely visionary of the idea that war in the air will supersede war on land or on sea. Drastic changes in the principles and practice of war generally as a result of the advent of

the new factor do not as yet appear conceivable within reason. It would seem that the airship and flying-machine will, for some time to come, exert such influence as they may be found to possess rather in the sphere of strategy than of tactics.


That they will be of value for strategical purposes can be readily credited from the facility they will afford for the reconnaissance of the theatre of operations; whereas the disabilities from which they at present suffer and the many questions requiring solution, with which the problem of aerial attack is closely involved, point to the fact that neither type can yet be looked upon as being in itself an actual engine of destruction and of use tactically, other than for the purpose of reconnoitring. While the matter claims the attention of all soldiers on broad and general lines, members of the different arms will be specially interested in regarding it from their own special point of view: the engineer in reference to questions of construction and manipulation; the gunner in respect of gunnery in defence against attack from the air; and those who belong to the Cavalry cannot fail to be interested in considering to what extent the *rôle* of their arm may be influenced. The writer will therefore endeavour to set forth some of the ideas that have occurred to him during consideration of the subject, which are doubtless controversial in the extreme, but to which serious attention should be directed by the cavalryman in view of probable future developments.

It is not necessary to discuss aero-dynamics or subjects of an equally technical nature, a knowledge of which is not essential to the consideration of the strategical and tactical aspects of the problem; but the powers and limitations of both types of aerial craft must be briefly touched upon in order that some guide may be gained as to the uses to which they may be put and the functions they may be expected to exercise.

Taking first the 'lighter than air' type—the airship—it has been found capable of journeying several hundreds of miles; of, when once aloft, riding through a fairly stiff wind, of rising to a height of upwards of five thousand feet, and of carrying about twenty passengers; and is navigable. So much for its powers. As to its limitations: it is of great size; requires housing in a permanent or semi-permanent structure; a gas plant for replenishing the wherewithal to ensure buoyancy; is somewhat fragile; and apparently can only be started on a flight under favourable weather conditions; and requires a large number of men to assist in both starting it on its journey and securing it on completion.

As to the flying-machine, or 'heavier than air' type, it is portable,

navigable under reasonably fair weather conditions, has attained a speed much in excess of that of the opposing type ; has remained in continuous flight for several hours, and the duration of flights is almost daily increasing ; it can be started and brought to rest with comparative ease ; its only requirement as regards replenishment is its petrol supply, which also alone appears to limit the duration of its flight. As against its advantages may be set off its failure, as yet, to reach an altitude at which it could be regarded as reasonably safe from small arm or light artillery



fire. Want of stability is also one of its weak points, and it is unable to carry more than one or two passengers in addition to the pilot.

It would appear that the airship must be operated from a base in rear of an army in the field ; that its great size will render secrecy of flight almost impossible ; that it offers a large target ; but that it is the only navigable type of aerial craft capable of carrying a sufficient weight to render the carriage of large quantities of explosives possible.

This enumeration of the characteristics of both types indicates that the sphere of the airship will be found in extended strategical reconnais-

sance, and possible attack from the air, without alighting ; that the aeroplane will be of value for both strategical and tactical reconnaissance, for carrying out enterprises against lines of communication and other highly vulnerable points, and for the carriage of despatches and the transmission of information generally. The possibility of employing either type for the purpose of transporting bodies of troops in such numbers as to directly influence any operations other than those of the most minor character appears very remote.

Therefore their use may safely be considered as confined to possible bombardment from the air ; striking at nerve centres, vital points and lines of communication ; and for purposes of reconnaissance. While in the popular imagination the fear of destruction as a result of the precipitation of high explosives from the air on to the earth beneath looms large, there are so many questions yet unsolved in regard to the possibility of accurate projection of projectiles from aerial craft, and in regard to the material effect likely to be produced, that the soldier is forced to the conclusion that for some time to come the principal use to which the new engine of war will be put is reconnaissance.

The magnitude of the forces that will take the field in future operations will be so great that it may be safely asserted that the value of strategical reconnaissance will be greater than in the wars of the past.

The execution of this work falls at present to the Cavalry, which, though the most mobile arm, is nevertheless slow of movement, being to-day no faster than in the times of Alexander or of Cæsar. Cavalry cannot be expected to cover in a day the distance the flying machine can pass in an hour.

It may be assumed, then, that the craft of the air will be of inestimable value for purposes of strategical reconnaissance. They may possibly never prove sufficiently reliable to ensure the complete supersession of Cavalry for this duty, but they will prove a most valuable auxiliary, and their range of action should ensure that the great bodies of horse in advance of an army will not require to be scattered throughout the whole of the strategical zone in the initial stages of operations, as at present, but may be concentrated and directed upon their objective with certainty and precision.

The use of the airship and flying-machine should render the location of the hostile forces a matter of certainty, and it appears that the element of chance in war will be to a great extent reduced, and that war will in consequence approximate more closely to an exact science.

It is unnecessary further to dilate upon the value of aerial craft for purposes of strategical reconnaissance.

As regards tactical reconnaissance: the flying-machine may also prove of great value, although it must, in order to acquire on the battle-field information of value, operate at such low altitudes as to render its situation one of great hazard. We may now consider the question of enterprises against an enemy's communications. The Napoleonic dictum that the secret of war lies in the communications is perhaps truer to-day than ever it was, and the modern army depends very largely upon the railway—a most vulnerable form of communication.

The effect of aerial enterprises designed to sever this form of communication can be well imagined, as can also the value of the airship and its *confrère* for striking at nerve centres, bases of supply, and other highly vulnerable points, often far in rear of the field army.

The foregoing appear to constitute very good ground upon which to base the belief that the *rôle* of the Cavalry arm will be materially influenced by the introduction of this new factor. To the horse-soldier at present falls the duty of strategical and tactical reconnaissance; to him falls the duty of conducting enterprises against the communications of an enemy, striking at vulnerable points and threatening the line of retreat of the hostile force.


Though it may be unreasonable to suppose that air craft of either type will supersede cavalry for these purposes, they should at least prove a most valuable adjunct. A vast saving in energy and in horseflesh should result, and their use will probably make their value apparent in the presence on the actual field of battle of the Cavalry in a condition of fitness for action hardly to be hoped for when men and horses have, as is now the case, to participate in the conflict when worn and jaded by the incessant and nerve-racking work of reconnaissance.

Fitness for pursuit also follows as a natural corollary. Though the preceding recital may not exhaust the statement of uses to which these new engines of war may be put, sufficient has perhaps been said to indicate that their entry into the arena has introduced problems that, while at the present moment somewhat obscure and hypothetical, may nevertheless greatly influence the results of the wars of the future, and the writer consequently feels that no apology is necessary for his temerity in appearing to rush in where beings of a superior class would perhaps fear to tread.



‘PURSUIT.’  
3rd (K.O.) LIGHT DRAGOON.  
1833.





THE 3<sup>rd</sup> (FRENCH) HUSSARS.

1815

## CAVALRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

BY CAPTAIN R. S. HAMILTON GRACE, *p.s.c. 13th Hussars.*

THE achievements of Cavalry during the Russo-Japanese war were not of that magnitude which the strength in mounted troops, possessed by at least one of the belligerents, would have led us to expect.

This fact has been seized on by the opponents of Cavalry to enunciate the formula that 'the part Cavalry play on the stage of modern war is necessarily small, owing to its inherent defects as an instrument under modern conditions.'

In the opinion of these people Cavalry must be replaced by Mounted Infantry. Yet how illogical is their argument is shown by the fact that in 1901 Colonel Picard wrote: '*La cavalerie russe est donc de toutes les cavaleries européennes, celle qui se rapproche le plus de l'idée de transformation en infanterie montée.*' The dictum of these critics being obviously false, let us inquire whether the small results attained by the Cavalry in Manchuria were not due to abnormal conditions and to the neglect of lessons expounded by great leaders.

The duties of Cavalry may be divided into :—

1. The acquisition of information.
2. The prevention of information.
3. Strategic delay.
4. Raids.
5. Battle action.

### I. ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION.

The vital necessity of information to a commander is obvious: it has been the foremost care of every great commander. Before commencing the 1815 and 1870 campaigns, Napoleon and Moltke flooded the enemy's country with spies, and these spies were backed up by Cavalry, for, once the fighting begins, the information from spies becomes uncertain. Lee's Cavalry in 1862 working in a friendly country gave him excellent information. A system of espionage organised before war, combined with Cavalry reconnaissance, is the best method of gaining information.

The Japanese followed this system, the Russians did not ; they omitted to prepare before the war and asked their Cavalry to perform impossibilities after hostilities had broken out.

Kuropatkin ascribed his failures as being largely due to the scanty and imperfect information that he received from his Cavalry.

In this matter of seeking and preventing information the war in Manchuria was somewhat abnormal.

The natural cunning of the Japanese, added to their facial resemblance with the Chinese, had enabled them to perfect before the war a system of espionage probably unrivalled in the history of war ; in consequence the duty of their Cavalry was practically confined to prevention. The Cavalry in forming their screen were not forced to go far afield and could call in the assistance of both Infantry and Artillery. Hence there could be no Cavalry fight to decide the question of liberty of reconnaissance.

The Japanese Cavalry had thus attained to a position without fighting which in a European war will not be reached without considerable losses. There were two courses open to the Russian Cavalry, either to split up into small parties and to attain their object by mobility or to remain in large masses and crash through the Japanese screen by fire action.

The Russians chose a middle course and failed. They did not mass and then break through by a determined dismounted attack, nor did they scatter and try to attain their object by mobility. They took the middle course, viz., they scattered and then tried a half-hearted dismounted attack, and were quite naturally stopped by the Japanese mixed screen. On February 27, *i.e.*, one day after the commencement of the movement, the presence of a strong Japanese force was located at Tawan. Not only this advance but the preparation for it would have been discovered had the Russian Cavalry followed the example of Stuart and acted as Cavalry instead of Mounted Infantry.

Let us suppose the Japanese had been defeated and driven back. What would have happened ?

The whole system of espionage would have been dislocated, spies would have been unable to get back, foreign agents would have been terrified, collecting stations for information would have to have been changed, and it is extremely probable that the Japanese leaders would have got very little information indeed from their spies.

If all this had happened, as might easily have been the case, how acutely would the want of a sufficient force of Cavalry have been felt—

a Cavalry that could make certain of getting the necessary and vital information, and that could hold off the enemy's Cavalry from pursuit.

For gaining information Cavalry in its proper proportion is essential as ever ; moreover it must be trained as Cavalry, otherwise it will not have the requisite mobility and dash to enable it to out-manceuvre and outflight the opposing Cavalry with whom it must sooner or later in its attempts to get information come into contact.

This *rôle* of gaining information is the most important which can fall to the lot of Cavalry, and it is one upon which the majority of our Cavalry at the outbreak of war will be employed. (The duty of preventing information being largely handed over to our Mounted Infantry.)

It is in this *rôle* and at this stage of the campaign that large bodies of hostile Cavalry are likely to be met with. The most essential function of the training of Cavalry is, therefore, to prepare it in the best way for the *rôle* of gaining information, and this training must have in view the probability of a combat against the enemy's Cavalry. If beaten in the action against the enemy's Cavalry it matters little how well our Cavalry could have performed their other duties had a chance arisen.

There are, however, times when Cavalry must rely to a very large extent on fire action, and therefore the training of Cavalry to fight on foot, rifle in hand, is extremely necessary, and should not be neglected. Our Cavalry are enlisted for seven years' colour service, while the majority of Continental nations have to train their Cavalry in three years or less. It should not, therefore, be hard to train our men to such a state of efficiency that they can equal, if not surpass, Continental Cavalry in the mounted combat, as well as being able to fight on foot.

Especially is this fire action necessary when told off to delay the enemy, as Jackson's Cavalry delayed the enemy prior to and during the battles of CrossKeys and Port Republic, and as Benedek's Cavalry might have delayed the Crown Prince from arriving at Koniggratz, and as Grouchy's Cavalry might have done before Waterloo.

Modern firearms have increased this delaying power of Cavalry. Long range and rapidity of fire make it impossible to guess the delayer's strength, and the precision of the modern rifle makes a wrong guess costly. After the battle of Wafangkou, Samsonoff and his Cavalry delayed the enemy to such an extent that they only advanced thirty-five miles in twenty-three days. At Yentai, also, the delaying power of Cavalry was well shown.

When the Japanese on exterior lines were converging on Liaoyang there were occasions when this great power could have been used.

The American Civil War showed that a boldly led Cavalry, relying on speed and secrecy, can make raids against an enemy's communications with fair safety, even when the latter has Cavalry. When, however, there is little or no hostile Cavalry the raids can be made with perfect safety, for the enemy, unable to take the offensive, is chained to the defensive, and no commander can be crushed by purely defensive action. But to be effective a raid must be undertaken with a definite object at a suitable time.

On June 12, 1862, Stuart rode round the Federals ; the main operations began on June 26. On August 23, 1862, Stuart, with 1,200 men, again rode round the Federals, covering some sixty miles in twenty-four hours ; the main operations, *e.g.*, Jackson's march, began on the 25th. On June 27, 1863, Stuart again raided, with some 1,500 men ; he did not arrive back till July 2, and was not present at Gettysberg. The first of these raids destroyed a certain amount of material and gained information, the second drew off the Federal troops at the critical moment, the third left Lee in ignorance and without Cavalry for the battle. We therefore see that a raid should be undertaken just before the battle, that the troops should return for the battle, that numbers should be limited, secrecy maintained, and trust placed in speed rather than in fighting.

From mid-December the Japanese had known of Mischenko's proposed raid and had made their preparations. On January 8, Mischenko, a gunner by trade, started. His column consisted of 10,000 men, 1,500 beasts for food, 22 guns, and some Mounted Infantry. His average march was 45 versts a day, and the next main operations did not begin till January 26. When lessons of the past are thus disregarded, lack of success must be put down to the bad workman rather than his tool.

On January 15 the Japanese despatched two patrols of 200 men each. Making a long detour, these were able to blow up a bridge 160 miles north of Mukden ; as a result the whole division of Don Cossacks and two brigades of Infantry were absent from the battle of Mukden.

Since the Russo-Japanese War the rôle of Cavalry on the battlefield is deemed by some to be past ; but before coming to so momentous a conclusion let us see whether by judicious handling the Cavalry might not have been able to reap greater results than they did.

At Waterloo and Quatre Bras it was shown that Cavalry applied frontally and without surprise against unbroken Infantry were of little

avail. The same lesson was proved in 1862, 1866, 1870. Ligny showed the effect of Cavalry against tired Infantry, Waterloo its effect in pursuit, Koniggratz its effect as an antidote to the pursuit.

The campaign of 1870 showed that these duties were still possible if the element of surprise was present, the right moment chosen, and the Cavalry well led. During the course of the American Civil War, a type of Cavalry was evolved that could charge as Cavalry, delay as Mounted Infantry, or fight on foot as Infantry. If the lessons of the past had been learnt, and the right type of Cavalry evolved, could not it have been of use on the battlefields of Manchuria, or have modern conditions eliminated it from the battlefield altogether? Could not something have been done besides merely locating the enemy's movements as the Russian Cavalry did at Wafangkow, Liaoyang and Mukden? Was there no opportunity for delaying tactics for the Russians, or would a strong Japanese Cavalry have been useless for getting information and for pursuing the enemy after Shaho, Mukden, Liaoyang, &c.?

The Japanese Cavalry failed on account of numbers. The failure of the Russian Cavalry was partly due to their leaders and want of dash, partly due to the way they were scattered without method throughout the Army. They were trained as Mounted Infantry and used as Mounted Infantry, *i.e.*, dispersed and wedged into the fronts of strongly fortified battlefields—used in the hills when the vast plains in the west lay open.

At Wafangkou the Russian Cavalry could have delayed the Japanese turning movement and taken it in flank. The fire of the Japanese Cavalry effectually broke up the Russian counter-attack.

At Liaoyang the Cavalry was scattered: Samsnoff on the right, Grekoff in rear of the centre, Rennenkampf on the left. On August 31 between 7 and 8 P.M., the attack of the last reserves of the Second and Fourth Japanese Armies on the works south of Liaoyang had failed, and after untold hardships and losses the Japanese had to fall back. Surely this was an opportunity for a Cavalry massed on the Russian right, but they were scattered, were not available, and had not the man at their head to seize the psychological moment. On August 28, Samsnoff's Cossacks, nineteen sotnias, were not enough to stop the Japanese turning movement. On August 30 Rennenkampf's Cossacks did nothing to stop the Japanese turning movement round the Russian left. September 2, Samsnoff held back Kuroki, and when Kuropatkin decided to retire, the Cossacks of Mischenko, connecting the 2nd and 4th Siberian and 17th European Corps, for two days prevented the Japanese from breaking

the line, while Rennenkampf prevented the turning movement round the left. No pursuit owing to insufficient Japanese Cavalry : result, another fight at the Shaho.

At the Shaho the Cavalry were again scattered. Grekoff, with twenty-two sotnias, on the right ; Mischenko, with sixteen sotnias, in the centre ; and Rennenkampf, with fifteen, on the left. On October 12 and 13, Mischenko stopped Kuroki's turning movement.

On October 12 Prince Kanin and his Cavalry saved the Japanese right wing from a perilous position at Ponsiho. In spite of the Cavalry having to work in the mountains, twenty-four squadrons, backed by sixteen battalions, managed to place themselves on the communications of the First Japanese Army. Had the Russian Cavalry been massed on the right it is quite open to question whether the advance of the Japanese left would have been here possible. No pursuit owing to insufficient Japanese Cavalry : result, another fight at Mukden.

At Mukden we once more find the Russian Cavalry scattered. Out of 143 sotnias, ninety-one were distributed between Alexieff, Rennenkampf and Mischenko, and the remaining fifty-two were allotted seven per Army Corps.

This dispersion, coupled with the purely defensive spirit inculcated by the Russian command and the Mounted Infantry training given to the Russian Cavalry, led, as might be expected, to a purely passive, spiritless, dismounted defensive.

A great Cavalry mass acting on the right flank, outflanking the turning movement of Nogi's army, would have had, at least, great, if not decisive, results on the future of the war.

At this battle the Japanese felt the want of Cavalry most keenly. All the elaborate moves of Kawamura and Kuroki were necessary, owing to the want of a Cavalry screen, in order to deceive the Russians.

On March 2 the Cavalry of the Second Japanese Army was placed at Pan Chiatai to fill a gap in the line of the Third Army. The rest of the Cavalry were rightly employed in screening Nogi's march and eventually placing itself across Kuropatkin's communications north of Mukden ; but it was too weak to be of use. The Russian Cavalry did practically nothing to stop this turning movement, and even allowed this small body of Japanese Cavalry to threaten the Russian line of communication. The mere presence of this body of Cavalry on the line of retreat indicates what would have been the result of a mass of Cavalry employed in a similar manner. Mukden would have been a battle of fruitful results,

instead of a fight in which the victor was too exhausted to receive the laurels.

From the above it is hoped that it has been shown that in the late war it is not opportunities for Cavalry that have been wanting, but leaders and men to take them.

The lesson of the war is that Cavalry is as useful as ever, but that to obtain good results it must be trained in *morale*, placed under good leaders, and be used in its proper sphere, *i.e.*, to enable Cavalry to use its full power it must have room to move into action as well as in action. Its defensive power must be used to create offensive opportunities.

In fact, what is wanted is not Infantry turned into Cavalry, but horsemen trained to fight as Cavalry, imbued with the desire to get at the enemy, and trained to be good shots.



"OUR PATRON SAINT."



*CAVALRY IN FRANCE AND GERMANY, 1909*

THE awakening of interest in things military, of which there are signs in this country, owing doubtless to foreign competition, has created a very healthy curiosity in the minds of some of our officers as to the methods, resources, and preparations of the Continental armies against whom they may be pitted in war or with whom they may have to march in alliance, though information is often difficult to obtain for the purpose. Only nine years have elapsed since Europe, acting as one nation, despatched an army to the Far East to protect Europeans and to avenge an insult offered to Europe as a community. The writer had the good fortune to serve on the Staff of this army, and availed himself of the opportunity to learn as much as possible of the two principal armies of the Continent ; in particular, he seized the occasion to establish friendly relations with Cavalry officers, which have enabled him since to follow the developments of their tactical training. It is worth remembering that the armies of civilised Powers do not solely exist for the purpose of mutual extermination ; they have, in fact, many other important tasks in the protection of the European civilisation which is confided to their care, such as guarding the integrity of their respective countries against internal foes, and contributing to the virile development of its manhood by training in arms.

Wars between European nations have generally had the limited object of changing or extending some religion or government. Centuries have elapsed since the existence of a population was at stake as the existence of the European population of China in 1900. But it is idle to deny that these wars between civilised Powers have shown a tendency to increase in bitterness, while economic rivalry in peace undisguisedly aims at substituting the working population of one European nation for another. Owing to the cost of modern war, the enormous scale of modern armaments, and the inevitable difficulty of feeding the large population of a modern State under the stress of war, it is probable that the armed struggles of the future will be shorter and more intense. Decisive battles at an early stage are likely to exercise a determining

influence on the course of the whole struggle, and for this reason the rôle of the Cavalry, which is always maintained on a war footing, and which is capable of being employed from the very first day of the campaign, has by so much increased in importance.

In the actual state of European politics it is possible that the next great Continental war may take place between Germany and France, which may take the form of a duel between these Powers, or which may draw a coalition in on either side. The result of such a struggle must affect us closely, even if we are not engaged in it ; and the Cavalry forces of the rival states which will first come in contact deserve the closest attention which we can bestow on them. The greatest difficulty of forming a just opinion of these forces on either side of the frontier consists in the remarkable differences which exist in value and in training in the same army, depending on the character of the chief, the tactical doctrines locally in favour, and also on the quality of the rank and file, which varies in different provinces of Germany and France, though less in the latter country. The cavalry officers in each country are of notably level value, and probably include the cream of the officers of both armies in activity, zeal, and intelligence. A Cavalry officer, General Trémeau, has just been appointed to the highest post of the French army ; and the Kaiser was educated principally in the same arm. On the average, Cavalry commanders are younger in Germany than in France.

Because the rifle of the dismounted horseman was the principal weapon of the South African war, the Cavalry of our Army is still relegated to a very subordinate position in peace. When war comes it will have to be improvised again, as it was in 1900. Both in France and Germany, but particularly in the latter country, the two great wars which have already been fought in the twentieth century have confirmed the ideas which already prevailed as to the vital importance of efficient Cavalry. It is held that manœuvring before a battle, pursuit or retreat after a decisive collision, and even intervention on the field itself, are more than ever dependent on superiority in the Cavalry arm. In Germany the Cavalry service is in an especial degree the school of generals and Staff officers. Both countries dwell with pride on the dazzling exploits of their horsemen in the wars of the past ; in Germany, as well as in France, the epoch of Napoleon's campaigns and the feats of his Cavalry are held up as an example of what can be accomplished by well-mounted Cavalry led by daring and competent chiefs. It is,

no doubt, partly to preserve Napoleonic traditions that the Cuirassier regiments of the French army still retain their armour as field equipment. In spite of the memories thus evoked and the confidence which the Cuirassiers are supposed to feel, every other army has discarded protective armour; and it is generally believed that speed, activity, and, above all, the ability to resort to fire-action alternatively with shock are of far higher value. The retention of armoured Cavalry, however, must be considered to show a robust and perhaps fanatical faith in the importance of shock tactics, and in the opportunities which will occur for Cavalry charges on the battlefield itself, for obviously the weight of armour can be of no advantage in a pursuit.

The earliest records of her wars show France to have been famous for Cavalry exploits. Attila followed by his host of fierce warriors on ponies, the Norman chivalry, and the Saracens swept across her plains like a hurricane, just as Murat overran the Prussian monarchy after Jena with fifteen thousand Cavaliers. Even the victories of the English infantry at Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt and Verneuil failed to shake the trust of the French in the lance and horse. Cavalry action unquestionably suits the aggressive and impetuous national character. The Cavalry of Napoleon's army might well be the theme of a special study. It was formed out of the unpromising material of the revolutionary levies, for the great majority of the king's Cavalry officers emigrated. Some, however, returned to serve Napoleon. As early as 1796 the French Cavalry began to give a good account of itself in Germany and in the Italian campaign, where Murat found occasions to prove his skill, and although the mounted force was feeble in numbers and the country most unsuitable for its exploits, yet it repeatedly rendered important services. Marengo was converted from defeat into victory by the timely charge of the French Cavalry, and from that battle dates the all-important rôle the arm assumed in the Grand Army. During the five years' truce which preceded the Austerlitz campaign, the First Consul paid vigilant attention to the development of the Cavalry, and when the French crossed the Rhine a formidable mass of horsemen masked the invasion, and were used with an audacity, skill and rapidity which surpassed anything of the kind hitherto seen in Europe, and which was essential both to the strategy and tactics of Napoleon's method.

Since 1870 the utmost efforts have been made in France by the rulers of the Army to revive the methods and traditions of Napoleon's army. The Cavalry has, perhaps, followed its model too closely in

detail and has not sufficiently taken count of the new factors in tactics and in strategy introduced by the development of firearms. Yet critics who have followed the annual manœuvres of the French army since 1892 must agree that in France have been evolved more flexible, more original, and more audacious Cavalry tactics than elsewhere. While the presence or close proximity of large infantry forces in every simulated combat encouraged resort to shock tactics mounted, supported by artillery fire rather than by dismounted squadrons, nevertheless the most daring innovations on stereotyped practice were often to be seen. During the same period the Cavalry concentrations in Germany resulted in rehearsals of Frederic's operations, characterised by deliberate formation of several distinct lines in view of the enemy, each line having a frontage which rendered concealment impossible and any change of direction difficult and uncertain, while the French Cavalry commanders sought and attained a great flexibility and variety of tactics. Cavalry advanced guards were used to fix and deceive the opponent's masses. Behind such an advanced guard the remainder of a Cavalry Division would be exercised so as to deploy with the utmost rapidity in any given direction from deep columns on a narrow frontage, and even from a single column of route. Some of the best of the French divisional commanders maintained that Cavalry should rarely charge on a broader frontage than two squadrons. The vital importance of depth of formation, of economy of force, and of retaining reserves in hand longer than the adversary was insisted upon, and was held to outweigh the risk of being overwhelmed in detail owing to the tardy arrival of supporting echelons. Finally, the supreme importance of concealment and surprise was held up by the best instructors in France ; and it was recommended, both by such leaders as de Gallifet as well as by the theoretical teachers such as General Bonnal, that the necessary rapidity and tactical handiness to effect surprise attacks must be gained at the cost of all other perfections and accomplishments. These precepts have been reproduced in practice to a remarkable degree, and whatever chief is opposed to the French Horse in a future war will need to keep alert.

The differences of opinion which exist in England and the Continent as to the relative importance of employing Cavalry on foot or on horseback, for fire or shock effect, give a curious example of the unchanging character of the essential elements in warfare. This contest has been warmly maintained ever since any records exist of military history. Countries in which horses were easily obtained, where great plains had

to be traversed by contending armies offering many opportunities for sudden and serious Cavalry attacks on a dismounted foe, always bred the champions of chivalry. France, Hungary, Poland and North Germany were in Europe the home of the horse-soldier. South Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain produced the best Continental Infantry in former centuries. In these islands the best Cavalry were to be found in southern and eastern England ; the difficult country of the west and north facilitated fighting on foot, and evolved a race of archers and pikemen whose tactics were the dread of the Continent for many a long day. And yet the love of our countrymen for riding and for horses, their long, clean limbs and lithe figures, have always made it possible to raise British Cavalry which has been inferior to none other, when leaders with the necessary skill, energy, and imagination have been forthcoming. In feudal days, from the defeat at Bannockburn to the death of Richard III., English armies mostly fought on foot. But in our great Civil War Cavalry played the principal rôle on both sides ; and the triumphs of Marlborough and Wellington were largely due to the same arm. Britain would exercise a far stronger influence in contemporary European politics if she could place even three complete Cavalry divisions on the opposite coast within a fortnight of the order to mobilise, even if she did not increase her infantry by a single regiment. Tactical victory at an early stage of the next contest is so likely to be a deciding factor in the war that the forces which can most rapidly be brought to bear must necessarily count for most in the calculations of Continental Cabinets.

No soldier who has attended Continental manœuvres where large units have been engaged can be surprised at the reluctance in France and Germany to exalt the dismounted action of their Cavalry at the expense of the shock. The theatre of war on the French borders is likely to be very narrow in proportion to the force engaged. At all manœuvres a situation is soon produced where masses of infantry hold one another in check by fire-action. The intervention of the comparatively feeble fire-units of the Cavalry seem unlikely to produce much effect even on a flank, and still less in the centre of a battlefield. The increased power of horse artillery and machine guns seem to give the needful resource in fire-action. On the other hand, it is perfectly understood that a long-drawn struggle between masses of infantry must infallibly produce conditions which give opportunities for Cavalry charges such as perhaps have never yet been seen. The exhaustion, demoralisation, and failure of ammunition in two single days' intense fighting

before Metz in 1870 gave cause to ponder over these possibilities. But the greater length and the more intense and deadly fire of future battles, as well as other causes making for the same result, must in the future reproduce the conditions of Vionville and Gravelotte on a colossal scale. The shorter training of the troops and the much greater difficulty of exercising control over deployed infantry under fire all tend to facilitate the work of surprise by Cavalry ; nor is it difficult to picture the state of two armies, each consisting of five or six corps, after three or four days' desperate strife on the banks of the Meuse. Whenever skilful direction has won a decided success, and driven a large fraction of the opposing host from the field, as at Mukden, the corps of the defeated army which have held good will speedily find themselves exposed by gaps in the general line, or by the turning of a flank. Pursuit, or rear-guard action, must then devolve on the Cavalry ; for not only will Infantry be too exhausted to pursue, but the reserves will have been used up in the battle, and even fresh corps reaching the field are likely to find themselves too far distant from the critical point to deliver the *coup de grâce*. Cavalry and Cavalry alone can perform this duty—a duty on which the fate of the campaign may turn. If a beaten army is routed, as after Jena and Waterloo, the disaster is generally irretrievable, but if the vanquished can get clear of hostile contact, retreat twenty or thirty miles, and then rally for a fresh effort, as the Russians did after Mukden, the whole business may have to be fought out afresh. It is, then, to be discussed whether fire or shock-action on the part of the Cavalry is likely to give the best results in such a case. No Cavalry soldier of experience will hesitate to choose the latter, if the ground permits his horses to gallop across it. A fire-action will cause delay and serve the purpose of the retiring foe. In a circular issued to the British Cavalry after the Boer War, pursuit by fire-action was recommended, and the flank of the retreating enemy was designated as vulnerable. Against small forces such as the Boer armies the advice may be good ; but for what old-fashioned books call '*la grande guerre*'—war, that is, between national armies, the efforts of a few hundred rifles, whether on the flank or even barring the retreat of the defeated side, will effect little or nothing. The corresponding mounted strength, by charging the demoralised masses of retreating infantry with lance and sword, on the other hand, is capable of giving the final push, and of converting a defeated army into a rabble of fugitives.

As the dusk of the evening sinks on a stricken field there will on either side be gaps in the line. The fighting will have focussed round localities

which gave protection from the hail of lead. As the light fades, these localities will lose immediate importance, and the deployed lines of riflemen and the closed bodies of supports huddled up in dead ground behind them, will present a fine target and often an easy prey to an enterprising Cavalry chief. Clearly, certain conditions must exist. The ground must be rideable. The Cavalry must approach to within a mile of their enemy unperceived, and the attack must be pushed through with grim determination by successive echelons deploying from a deep formation. Having charged through their enemy, Cavalry can now fling themselves on foot and maintain a contest with the rifle, if the opportunity occurs. There is a considerable consensus of opinion, both in France and Germany, that dismounted Cavalry should not try to fight like infantry. Even on foot their *rôle* is different, for Cavalry can never, if only from lack of rifles, have the staying power and maintain the pressure of an infantry attack. Cavalry action on foot will rarely get beyond the stage of skirmishing; though in defence, and in brief encounters, especially for such localities as defiles and woods, dismounted horsemen will often be able to bluff their enemy and make him believe that he has to deal with infantry. Lastly, the value of the threat of action should never be lost sight of. The fate of many a fight has been settled, not by what has actually been done, but by what the contending generals believe their opponents can or will do.

In Germany, General Bernhardt has championed the extreme view that Cavalry should not hesitate to engage infantry on foot as well as on horse, and should push home a decisive attack with the same disregard to loss as the sister arm; but these views are shared by few tacticians, and are not officially advocated. It is recognised that such use of Cavalry would speedily end in its destruction at the hands of more numerous foes; but the general tendency is to demand more, and to aim higher than ever, both in theory and practice.

The Germans have gained a very important advantage over their rivals which may have the most far-reaching results. When the period of service with the colours was reduced from three to two years, the Germans retained the longer period for their Cavalry and mounted artillery. Before the change France had an undoubted superiority in both arms. The armament of her artillery was acknowledged to be superior, while the intelligence, initiative, and military aptitude of her horse soldiers, instructed and led by the best officers in the army, had formed a body of Cavalry whose equal did not exist in Europe. Cavalry officers who had the opportunity of closely observing the French army

before and since the change admit that a great deterioration is observable, as was inevitable, while the German service has considerably improved by dint of more scientific methods of instruction and unbounded zeal and industry. Exceptions, of course, are to be found on both sides of the Rhine. The writer has seen French squadrons within the last few years which left very little to be desired ; and also German squadrons whose slow and dull methods gave an impression of inactivity and weakness. Squadrons and regiments must vary considerably with their instructors, wherever the system prevails of delegating power and responsibility—the system of all the great armies. When it is remembered how much of the conscript's time is absorbed by 'house-maiding'—by the internal economy, that is, of his daily life : cooking, cleaning, mounting guard and piquet, fatigues, hospital, &c., and also how much there is to be learnt : how to ride, to wield lance, carbine, spade, and perhaps sword as well, patrolling, reconnoitring, skirmishing, manœuvring on horse and foot, the duties of the bivouac, outpost, cantonment, and crossing rivers—it will be realised how great is the advantage of the army which keeps its cavaliers for three years with the colours over the adversary with only two years' training. German leaders intend to exploit this advantage to the full, as can be seen by what is known about their plans for the concentration and deployment of the army on the French frontier in case of war. From what has transpired, there can be little doubt that the army corps will march by every available road in parallel columns, five or six of which will be grouped in an army command. These columns will be preceded by the Cavalry divisions, whose mission it will be to hurl back the opposing Cavalry and other covering troops, and thus to cover the march and conceal the plans of their infantry. The French, on the other hand, are expected to remain on the defensive at first, to group their forces by areas in deep formations, so as to be able to give battle to a flank as well as to the front. It is by no means certain that the French Cavalry will join in a tournament before the arrival of the infantry in the sphere of combat ; but this means yielding territory and roads to the foe. Both preconcerted plans of action may, and indeed are very likely to be fundamentally changed when the moment for action arrives ; but the existence of certain theories form a general guide, and are instructive to onlookers as well as to those primarily concerned. By studying how the game is likely to open we may form an idea of how our troops may intervene to the best advantage—*le cas échéant*.

C. B.



## THE QUESTION OF MOUNTED INFANTRY

A REPLY TO 'A RIFLEMAN'

BY 'LANCER'

A most able article, entitled 'The Question of Mounted Infantry,' from the pen of an old friend and rifleman, demands a courteous reply from the Cavalry man's point of view.

The writer claims that it is not possible for the same individual to excel both in the use of the rifle and in shock action. He therefore advocates the formation of mounted troops under three heads, viz.—

(1) Cavalry.

(2) Mounted Riflemen.

(3) Mobile Infantry (*i.e.* 'picked infantry soldiers trained with a view to their being sent rapidly forward on carts, cars, camels, or any available transport').

By all means let us have mobile Infantry—mounted for choice on cycles if they are to be attached to Cavalry—but let the mounted Rifleman be eliminated from the catalogue, for we can ill afford to mount him on horses which would otherwise be allotted to remounting the Cavalry in war.

A Cavalry man armed with the present rifle, and trained in accordance with modern views, can do all that a mounted Rifleman can do, and in addition can attack mounted. Cavalry have a double duty to perform. Can we spend horseflesh on the upkeep of an arm that can only perform half the job, and which will be in other respects just as expensive to train?

As Colonel Henderson says, 'the horseman of the American war is the model of the efficient Cavalry man.' And how was this? He goes on to explain, 'The Americans struck the true balance between shock and dismounted tactics. They were prepared for both, as the ground and the situation demanded, and they used fire and *l'arme blanche* in the closest and most effective combination.'

The keynote of a successful attack is struck by that word 'combination.' How can the combination of mounted riflemen with Cavalry men be compared to the instinctive and highly developed combination of Cavalry men *inter se*?

'A Rifleman' goes into the detail of the strategic reconnaissance and accompanies the Cavalry scout on his mission of exploration. A sudden meeting with a hostile patrol occurs—possibly round the corner of a wood, possibly at a sharp bend in the road. I put it to the reader, would he at this juncture rather have a lance in his hand or a rifle? Would not the rifleman have to gallop back quick with the imminent expectation of the point of a lance in his back? I think so. It is the capability of being able to attack mounted that would give the Cavalry man the moral and physical advantage.

Again, in the final stages of the great fight for information, when reconnaissance culminates in a tactical collision, 'dismounted action' ('Cavalry Training,' Section 144) will at the best have but a negative result. To check the hostile cavalry is not sufficient, it must be defeated and weakened morally and actually as much as possible.'

Cold steel is the supreme arbiter of the fight, whether used by Cavalry or Infantry, and, as Colonel Henderson says, it was found by the leaders of both Federals and Confederates that to attain decisive results mere development of fire was insufficient.

No less an authority than Sir John French gives his opinion that, 'whilst a well-posted squadron or two of dismounted men in a favourable position may greatly assist the action of Cavalry against its own arm, it must never be forgotten that it is only by the employment of "shock tactics" and the superior morale of the highly trained horsemen wielding sword and lance that decisive success can be attained.'

On the actual battle field, in the various phases where the Cavalry man has had, and assuredly will again have, opportunities for shock action, what part can the men who are merely mounted Riflemen take, except to prolong the infantry line? There they had far better be without their horses, and be in fact the mobile infantry to which reference has already been made.

In support of our contention that such openings for mounted action will occur again, and will be taken, we are given in history some surprisingly good examples.

At Beaumont in 1796 the Allies were formed for the main attack facing the French. Suddenly the fog lifted and the French left flank and rear were seen to be *en l'air*. The Allied Austrian and English Cavalry, which included the Blues, Royals, and 16th, and 1st, 3rd, and 5th Dragoon Guards, were skilfully led round under cover by General Otto and came down like a whirlwind on the enemy's flank.

In a few moments 20,000 Frenchmen were flying in disorder before 19 squadrons of Cavalry. 3200 men were killed and 350 prisoners and 22 guns were captured. As Mr. Fortescue says, 'the greatest day in the annals of the British Horse.'

There are many instances in the South African War of the 'galloping in' tactics on the part of the Boers.

At Tweebosch, where Lord Methuen was wounded, De la Rey with 1200 men rode straight into the British column. Could he have dared to ride into it if there had been even one squadron of British Cavalry armed with the lance to show a front? At Brakenlaagte precisely the same conviction must have been borne in on Colonel Benson. Was it not the Boers themselves who said, when lances were discarded by the British Cavalry, that it was the most foolish thing we had done in the war?

Now to deal with mounted troops when employed to gain time at any cost or to avert disaster.

At Eylau Napoleon with 49,000 men and 400 guns is facing 80,000 Russians with 500 guns.

To give time for the Corps of Ney and Davout to come up the Emperor is forced to send in Saint-Hilaire and Augereau. In the storm and darkness Augereau loses his direction, loses touch with Saint-Hilaire, and the column is driven back in wild confusion.

To close the gap thus made Murat with over 80 squadrons of his famous Cavalry is launched, and 'successive waves of horse pour up the snow-clad slopes. The Russian Cavalry scatter, the long line of guns is pierced, through the first and through the second line of Infantry this great assault is forced.' Who will deny the telling effect of 10,000 mounted men charging at so critical a moment? Could men who dismount to shoot have done this? I trow not.

At Königgrätz two Austrian Divisions were hurled against the victorious Prussian columns and prevented the retreat being turned into a disorderly rout.

Could mounted Riflemen have produced a similar effect—where the Infantry had failed to stop the Prussian advance?

The question of whether Infantry should be attached to a Cavalry Division is discussed by General Sir D. Haig in 'Cavalry Studies.' He takes the case of the 4th Cavalry Division after the battle of Le Mans in January 1871.

The men were employed all day long in reconnaissance in difficult country round Alençon, and had to put out strong outposts at night. The General therefore sent back for a battalion of Infantry to undertake

the outpost work. Of *Infantry*, not mounted Infantry, be it noted. They were short of forage in the country and wanted only men, not 600 additional horses also.

Finally let us consider the question of raids, which in certain cases it may become the duty of mounted troops to carry out with the object of deciding whether or not mounted Riflemen can perform this duty and leave the trained Cavalry for other work.

Let us look at the best known raid in history, that of Stuart round the army of McClellan in June 1862. With 2500 Cavalry and 2 guns he set out on June 12 from Richmond, and reached Taylorsville that night. Next day he gained the rear of the Federal Army at the Old Church ten miles north-west of White House. Here he found a Federal squadron drawn up to oppose him. A chance for the rifle, your Rifleman will say. But no; without any hesitation Stuart's leading squadron charged in column of fours with the sabre down the road and broke the enemy. Again the latter reformed, and again they were dispersed by the Confederate horsemen, who continued their successful march with the information they had been sent to gain.

Put in a nutshell the case is thus :—

In the British Army we haven't enough Cavalry, we haven't enough horses; we are therefore bound to train as Cavalry every man, every horse that we possibly can.

We cannot afford to devote horseflesh to the upkeep of an arm that can only do part of a Cavalry man's task.

What is the opinion among European countries on the subject? The Germans are just as much the experts in matters military as we are in all that appertains to the Navy. Have they any mounted Riflemen in their organisation, or do they arm all their Cavalry, Hussars included, with the lance?

'P.S.' in 'Cavalry in Action,' ably translated by Lieut.-Col. Formby, speaks the French opinion on the subject thus: 'We cannot imagine a hybrid animal, neither Cavalry man nor Infantry man, such as would be made by the creation of a mounted Infantry man, by which the horse would be degraded to the position of a means of transport pure and simple.'

By all means let us have a detachment of cyclists to form part of our Brigade organisation. These would not deprive the Cavalry of their sorely needed remounts or their hard-earned forage, and they would render inestimable service in almost any part of the globe where an ever-advancing civilisation has laid out its system of roads.

*RECENT PUBLICATIONS*

‘The Valour of Ignorance.’ By Homer Lea. (Harper & Bros.)

‘The Valour of Ignorance’ is a very remarkable book. It is written by an American strategist with the evident intention of alarming his countrymen. The picture he paints in eloquent and vivid pages of the unreadiness for war of the United States, and of the formidable resources for aggression of their most probable antagonist, is calculated to arrest the attention of the most self-satisfied and careless community. Mr. Lea dedicates his book to Elihu Root, and it is prefaced by two introductions, one of which is from the pen of Lt.-Gen. Chaffee, late Chief of the Staff of the American Army. ‘The decline of militancy and the control of the Western Hemisphere’ is the text of the first part, and the famous Message to Congress of President Monroe is quoted in which other nations are prohibited from ‘extending their system’ to the American continent. The author points out how powerfully the barriers of nature assisted to isolate the United States until the progress of naval inventions compressed the nations of the world into a relatively small space, so that nothing but force of arms can henceforth maintain what has now become a haughty challenge.

The unreadiness of a wealthy, luxurious, undisciplined democracy to exclude hungry competitors from the American shores of the Pacific is dwelt upon in burning sentences, and also the fateful recurrence of the law which fixes the fate of empires by the capacity for self-sacrifice of their inhabitants. The vast wealth, proud position, and broad dominions of the Imperial Republic will not save her in a contest with an armed nation unless she likewise submits to discipline and takes upon her stalwart limbs and shoulders the burden of arms. The following gives a fair example of the author’s style :—

‘It is unnecessary to recall the battlefields upon which this republic was born or the subsequent wars that have marked its growth and expansion, other than to recall the invariability of that universal law governing the beginnings and rise of nations. This country, as others that have gone before, has been built up from the spoils of combat and conquest of defenceless tribes. Its expansion has been no more merciful nor merciless than the expansion of any other nation. The same inexorable law of physical strength has governed it as all others. The very ease with which this commonwealth has expanded is responsible for the erroneous beliefs now prevalent concerning the true basis of its future greatness. The people have come to look upon themselves in a false though heroic manner, and upon other nations with the same indifference as they did the untutored savage whose sole defence was the solitude of his swamps and forests and a God that thundered in vain. This republic has forgotten that during the last few decades its relation to other countries has

been completely altered, not only because the ripple of its expansion has by a law of national growth reached out to other portions of the earth, but that modern means of transportation and communication have reduced the whole world into a greater compactness than were the United States in 1830. . . . The time of this nation's youthful achievements is past. Yet proportionately as defenceless as were the peoples it has conquered the republic goes on heedless of its fate, complacently contemplating the restless shadow of vast armed forces to the east and west of it. In considering the future of this republic one must do so, not from the closets of its politicians, not from its alleyways with their frenzied crowds, not from theorists nor feminists, for these are but the feverish phantasms and sickly disorders of national life. It must be regarded from the heights of universal history and empirical knowledge which appertains to national existence. . . . When a man has no aspirations, no object to attain during life, but simply lives to eat, he excites our loathing and contempt. So when a country makes industrialism the end it becomes a glutton among nations, vulgar, swinish, arrogant. It is this purposeless gluttony, the outgrowth of national industry, that is commercialism. The difference between national industry and commercialism is that while industry is the labour of a people to supply the needs of mankind, commercialism utilises this industry for the gratification of individual avarice—a fungoid growth that is the product of industrial degeneration. Military or national development, on the other hand, is not only responsible for the formation of all nations on earth, but for their subsequent evolution and for the peace of mankind. When the opulence and unmartial qualities of one nation stand in inverse ratio to the poverty and military prowess of another, while their expansion is convergent, then results those inevitable wars wherein the commercial nation collapses and departs from the activities of mankind for ever.'

If the author carries his doctrine to its extreme logical conclusion yet he is certainly correct in his fundamental theory, and all history proves, in the main, the soundness of his deductions. His task is to arouse his countrymen, and therefore he ignores, probably with intention, the elements of military strength which undoubtedly exist in the States of the Union, nor does he dwell on the failings and difficulties of the nations which he designates as rivals and prospective assailants. In a treatise whose marshalling of facts and arguments is extremely able, Mr. Lea describes the military and naval resources of the United States and Japan which would be available in case of an attack by the latter Power on the Pacific littoral. He is utterly merciless in exposing the neglect and decay into which the armed forces of his country have fallen, and he calculates with precision how a Japanese army of 200,000 men could be landed on the shores of California after the Philippines and other strategic centres of the Pacific had been taken by storm. The theory of a nation arising in its might to meet the invader after war begins is exposed and derided. The statistics of desertion and discharge for incapacity from all ranks in the army of the Union during the great Civil War, 1861-1865, as well as the appalling losses from sickness in an undisciplined host without proper medical organisation, are convincing proof of the unfitness of extemporised military levies to take the field against a trained enemy. The experience of France in 1870 is overwhelming in the same sense. Yet America continues to flout other States,

to defy Europe, to persecute Japanese immigrants, and to trust to her vast wealth and vast, if heterogeneous, population for the security of her empire.

Every page of this book is of burning interest to the politicians of this country. The scathing denunciation of a society whose basis and vitality rest upon money-grubbing, and whose most influential men are the successful money-grubbers, applies with equal force in England. We, too, stand within striking distance of armed nations with other ideals and sterner sense of self-sacrifice. In one important respect we are innocent of the reproach which the author levels at his countrymen of neglecting their vital arms. The British Navy still retains a great superiority over the next most formidable naval power, both in ships, officers and seamen, while our strategic position is of the same baffling strength as of yore.

Both in England and the United States the direction of the national forces by land and sea, as well as the diplomacy on which their most profitable employment depends, are conducted by party politicians whose ignorance of strategy and statecraft has time and again paralysed the efforts of the armies and fleets. If our army exists in a slightly better state of preparedness than the American, yet we lie much closer to probable foes, our bases of organisation are compact and would fall together if disaster overtook us, while the conceit of blank ignorance is as great a danger here as in New England. American financial resources are more secure than our own. The States when once roused to war could concentrate all their efforts against the invader without the distracting responsibility of guarding distant dependencies and keeping open the main routes of ocean traffic. Therefore the lesson applies to our people as forcibly as to the Americans. The worship of the Golden Calf is the most debasing of idolatries. The unnatural and decadent influence of feminists, peace-mongers, and other faddists and shirkers of the real conditions of national existence have only to attain a certain influence in any given State in order to render its destruction sure. Patriotic Englishmen have good reason to be on the alert, for these symptoms of decay are assuredly struggling to spread their baneful influence among the poor and most ignorant of our electors, whose sturdiness and common-sense continue to guard the national safety and honour. It will be well not to leave them without leaders of the right sort and exposed too long to specious arguments which they cannot answer.

An appendix gives the text of the existing treaty of alliance between Britain and Japan. It will be seen at a glance how important the provisions of this treaty may be to our ally. Canada has received scurvy treatment from her colossal neighbour and has had very little help from the mother-country in maintaining her rights. Yet Canada, too, regards with apprehension the colonisation of her western provinces by Japanese, and Canada, too, has shamefully neglected her armaments. The position of the Dominion would consequently be one of extreme interest in case of a rupture between the United States and Japan. It may be confidently foretold that if the event occurred or became imminent the fate of Canada would depend on her organised strength. If she does nothing more to prepare for the emergency than she is at present doing she will be compelled to take the law from the strongest of the contending powers without profit to herself and with risk of subsequent reduction to a condition of vassalage, but if she could mobilise

even 100,000 good troops for offensive warfare she would be mistress of the situation. After the United States, the future of Canada is most nearly touched by the problems discussed in 'The Valour of Ignorance.'

'The Rifle in War.' By Captain Eames, 10th Infantry, U.S. Army. (Published by the U.S. Cavalry Association.)

This book is interesting as showing that in the United States, where, as in this country, ideas on musketry have been dominated by the gun trade and by the breaking of records on bulls-eye targets, the light is at last beginning to shine.

The first half of it is devoted to an exposition of the mathematical study of the effect of rifle fire on the lines laid down by Continental investigators.

The author adopts the 50 per cent. zone as his standard, in place of the 75 per cent. zone used in this country in similar calculations, which gives misleading results, as it is impossible to contend that 50 per cent. alone of the shots would be effective.

The second half of the book contains an examination of the circumstances of the fire-fight, a chapter on the Fire Problems, giving exercises in Fire Control and appreciation of targets which are useful and can be modified to suit local circumstances, and a chapter on methods of instruction from which there is little to be learned.

There are several obvious mistakes in the book, such as the statement that the German '5' bullet tapers towards the base; and it has been carelessly produced, as is evidenced by the fact that there are two pages of errata.

It is a book which might find a place in an officer's regimental reference library, but would be of little value to an individual unless he were interested in mathematical investigations.

'The Chief Campaigns in Europe since 1792.' By General A. von Horsetzky, Commanding the First Austro-Hungarian Army Corps; translated by Lieutenant K. B. Ferguson, R.G.A. (John Murray.) 18s. net.

As a work of reference and a skeleton outline of modern military history, this volume cannot fail to be of immense value to the student. The translator has, with the author's permission, condensed many of his comments on tactics, organisation, and armaments into a most interesting introductory treatise upon the development of modern methods of warfare, and has reduced the thirty-eight large maps of the original work to five maps and twenty-four sketches, which amply illustrate the text.

Beginning with a brief account of the earliest campaigns of the French Revolution, 1792-95, *i.e.* the operations in the Netherlands, in Belgium, on the western frontier of France and on the Rhine, the author passes on to Bonaparte's first Italian campaign of 1796, and the Archduke Charles' simultaneous operations against Moreau in Germany.

The wars of 1797 and 1799 in Northern Italy and the Tyrol, and in Switzerland (Suvaroff) are next described, when Napoleon again comes upon the scene, and the campaigns of Marengo (1800), of Ulm and Austerlitz (1805), of Jena (1806), of Eylau and Friedland (1807), of Eckmühl, Aspern, and



Wagram (1809), of Moscow (1812), of Leipzig (1813), and of 1814 in France are clearly, though briefly, summarised.

A chapter is devoted to the Peninsular War, 1807-14, and the Napoleonic period then ends with the campaign of Waterloo.

Chapter XX. gives us an account of the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1828-9, then follow the suppression of the Polish Rebellion of 1831 by Russia and the successful Austrian campaigns of Custozza and Novara, 1848-9.

The account of the Hungarian struggle for independence, 1848-9, which is of deeper interest to the Austrian reader than to the general student, has been condensed by the translator into eighteen pages.

Chapter XXV. deals with the Crimean War, and after summaries of Magenta and Solferino, 1859, and the wars in Denmark, 1863-4, we come to more detailed accounts of the Austrian campaign of 1866, *i.e.* in Bohemia (Königgrätz), in Italy (second battle of Custozza), and in the Tyrol.

The volume finishes with chapters on the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, the war between Serbia and Bulgaria, 1815, and the Græco-Turkish War of 1897.

Throughout the book there are few comments, but the facts are complete, and as a clear, concise and consecutive account of modern campaigns in Europe we have none in the English language which will be of such assistance to the military student.

‘Letters from the Peninsula, 1808-12.’ By Lt.-General Sir William Warre, C.B., K.T.S. Edited by his nephew, the Reverend E. Warre, D.D., C.B., M.V.O. (John Murray.)

Sir William Warre came of a family connected with the wine trade of Oporto, and, obtaining his first commission in the 52nd Light Infantry in 1803, went to Portugal in 1808 as A.D.C. to General Ferguson.

His knowledge of the Portuguese language soon led to his selection for service on the staff of General Beresford, commanding the Portuguese Army, with which he served till the conclusion of the Peninsular War.

The letters are of interest as giving a graphic description of an officer's life during the Peninsular War, and are of special value to the student of these campaigns for the information they give of the organisation of the Portuguese Army and of the difficulties which confronted the Duke of Wellington in dealing with the Portuguese Government of that day.

The letters are well edited, each chapter commences with a clear summary of the events with which it deals, and there is an excellent map.

The work is a distinct addition to Peninsula literature.

‘The Royal Monmouthshire Militia.’ By Captain B. E. Sargeaunt, 12th Battalion The London Regiment. (London : Royal United Service Institution, 1910.)

This is a very clear and painstaking account of the services of a county regiment which was raised in the year 1660 ; the book, moreover, is thoroughly well got up and illustrated with a large number of interesting and rare photographs and cuts. The compiler has drawn his material from very many sources, and his record forms almost a monument of research, for there is far

more contained in it than concerns the history only of one single regiment of Militia. The Royal Monmouthshire Militia has been embodied on many occasions of danger threatening from within and from without—in 1696, in 1760, in 1778; during the Peninsula campaign, when it was embodied for a continuous period of thirteen years and gave 3000 soldiers to the Line; during the Hundred Days; during the Crimean campaign; and finally during the war in South Africa, when it gave two active service companies and a section which did excellent work on the Imperial Military Railways in the Orange River Colony. The regiment should be proud of this very exhaustive record of the long years during which it has rendered loyal and valuable service to the country, and made a name for itself far beyond the borders of the county wherein it was originally raised and from which most of its manhood has been drawn.

‘The Employment of Large Cavalry Bodies in Future Wars.’ Translated from the *Neue preussische Kreuzzeitung*.

There is no one subject dealing with the employment of troops in regard to which, during the last ten years, varying views, obstinately defended, have been more often expressed than upon this particular matter. As the improvement in arms made more and more difficult the employment of Cavalry, whether in battle or in the duties of reconnaissance, the more frequently has one heard it stated that the action of Cavalry was over and done with under modern conditions of war. Others, again, have been for holding back the mounted arm far from the actual battlefield, while handing over to it at the same time the work both of reconnaissance and of pursuit when the victory is achieved—a mission glorious but difficult; one, moreover, which consists in gathering the fruits of the success won by the other arms, especially by the Infantry. However, this is one point upon which all are agreed, that the *role* of large Cavalry bodies will be altogether different in the present day from the attacks led by Seydlitz in the campaigns in Silesia, or from those of the Napoleonic wars. But even here, as elsewhere, exceptions will serve to prove the rule. Of a surety we shall never again see the days of Hohenfriedberg or of Rossbach, when countless battalions were shattered under furious charges of Cavalry, when colours and guidons, cannon and the like glorious trophies gathered by the horsemen might have filled whole galleries in a Hall of Victory. All the same, there is no reason why, under favourable conditions, Cavalry should not again secure important results in action, in spite of the power of modern firearms, dealing death and destruction at great ranges. When the shattering effect of fire has exercised its influence on the other and hostile arms, it will still be possible for a Cavalry leader with a clear head and an iron will to find the occasion to gather laurels for himself and his following. For neither victory nor defeat are decided wholly by weapons, however terrible and death-dealing these may be, but also by the moral qualities of those who wield these instruments. It has been well said that in these days of short-service national-armies, new factors are thrust into view which are especially favourable to the employment of Cavalry in action under conditions theoretically impossible. On mobilisation the ranks are filled by a large number of Reservists, of whom many are in no way disposed to sacrifice their lives for

such sentiments as 'duty' and 'honour,' unless the Governments of the day are prepared to evince more energy in combating the demoralising doctrines of Socialistic agitators, who aim at the overthrow of all lofty ideals, of religion, of any idea of duty. With the present dispersed methods of Infantry fighting, extended in long lines where command cannot be thoroughly exercised, the sudden rush of a mass of Cavalry will be of immense effect, especially if some of the Infantry have already begun to think of retreat. But the results to be obtained in the present day by Cavalry may be even greater in the case already mentioned—that of pursuit after victory. It is true that modern military history has not much to tell us of instances where, after a victory, pursuit has been really pushed to the last gasp of man and horse. But the reason may be found not so much in the failure of the Cavalry itself as in the difficulty experienced by the leader in gauging exactly the right moment for advancing his masses of horsemen. Far more than in the past, future campaigns will see brought into the field numbers hitherto unknown; combats lasting for days and occupying a length of front which will make it very difficult for the man in chief command to seize the decisive moment, to form a clear idea of how matters stand in all parts of the field. After such a prolonged struggle, with men mentally and physically exhausted, military qualities of no mean order will be necessary to revive the *elan* required for pursuit, with the probability of more fighting, especially when it is remembered that modern firearms give opportunities for small parties when retiring to check pursuit by offering a resistance which nothing but a systematic attack may be able to overcome. The above shows clearly how extraordinarily difficult are the duties imposed on the leaders of the Cavalry, and how especially necessary it is to develop to the full during peace the necessary qualities for the overcoming of these difficulties.

If the action of Cavalry on the actual battlefield is now, as we have seen, more limited or more difficult than of old, there are at the same time many great tasks to be carried out in the work of reconnaissance, in screening the movements of its own army, in operations which may be conducted against the communications or the rear of the enemy.

The increase in the actual battle-power of armies, due to the improvement in firearms and the augmentation in the number of combatants, has the result of making the rearward communications far more vulnerable than was formerly the case. The vast modern armies, the numbers of guns and vehicles, the need for transporting for quick-firers quantities of ammunition far in excess of what was before required—all this has not only increased the number and the length of the supply columns, but also the number of supply magazines in the rear of the armies. The ordinary roads are not enough: railways and steamboats are all called upon for their aid.

But the protection of railway lines becomes increasingly difficult by reason of their length, and because they can be so easily destroyed and are so difficult to repair. It is in this direction that Cavalry may find paths to distinction, provided it is numerous, brave, well-led and animated by a bold and enterprising spirit. Last year (1908) the management of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* offered a prize for the best essay on 'the employment of large Cavalry bodies in independent operations against the flanks and rear of an

enemy.' The judges were Generals von Bissing, von Pelet-Narbonne, and von Kressenstein. Thirteen German and eight Austrian officers competed, the first prize being awarded to the Prussian Major von Holzing-Berstett, the second to the Austrian Captain von Lerch, the third to the Prussian Major von Ruffer, and the fourth to the Austrian Captain Wrangel and the Bavarian Lieut.-Colonel Wenninger. We have read the remarks made by the judges, and also the essays themselves, and now propose to give our readers some of these views on the employment of Cavalry as indicated above, and on the necessary preparation thoroughly to carry out the various operations connected therewith.

The first and most important point is the choice of the leaders for the large Cavalry bodies, and their systematic instruction during peace. For this we require a corps of officers who will freely accept full responsibility; who are active not only in body but in mind. We cordially agree with von Bissing when he declares that the qualities required of a Cavalry leader are of so special a character that many doubt whether they can possibly be found combined in any one man. It cannot be denied—and history confirms the statement—that real Cavalry leaders who are always at their best are but seldom to be met with.

None the less, we have had men like Seydlitz, Murat, or Stewart, who, though by no means faultless leaders, will remain for all time models of what a Cavalry commander should be; and one may hope that also in the future a useful, tireless Cavalry may find in its ranks a leader equal in time of war to the conduct of the most difficult operations. It is only necessary to be able to pick them out and to give them an opportunity of showing what they can do. I refer here to men like Schmidt, Edelsheim, and Rosenberg.

During peace it is, of course, extraordinarily difficult to gauge the real qualities of a Cavalry leader, especially when the hard work of the service may have prematurely used up qualities dependent upon the energy of youth. Again, in the Cavalry the commanders must pick out, earlier than in the other arms, even subaltern officers who show promise in their devotion to duty, zeal, energy and love of their particular arm. From these again special selections may be made of those who by experience and knowledge are likely to afford that support without which even a genius would find it no easy matter properly to command any really large body of Cavalry. The need of employing Cavalry on the flanks and rear of a hostile army—need rendered more hazardous and difficult of accomplishment than ever before owing to *terrain*, improvement in firearms, and facilities for transmitting intelligence—can only be met by a Cavalry which during peace has been thoroughly taught all the duties which may be required of it in war. Instruction in horsemanship of itself is not enough, although by this means it should be possible to obtain the sum of the combined effort of every man and horse. A special branch of instruction must be the destruction and repair of railway lines, of telegraphs, &c. The dismounted fight can no longer be confined, as formerly, to the use of the firearm in the defensive; for Cavalry must be able to fight in large numbers when taking the offensive, and must be trained in the proper use of machine guns. Again, the employment of large bodies of Cavalry against the flanks and rear of an opposing army necessitates the massing of the whole of the mounted force of the army. We must not overlook the

necessity of forming, when required and from such bodies as are available, Cavalry corps for special operations. But for this it is necessary that the whole of the Cavalry of an army should be a homogeneous body ; that every rider and each mount should be capable of being used anywhere, at any time, and in any manner. It is worth considering even whether the time has not come to do away with the difference between light and heavy Cavalry, so as to ensure uniformity of pace—an element of the first importance in a Cavalry body.

The operations in future wars of large masses of Cavalry will not imitate the celebrated raids of the American Cavalry, nor the deeds of the partisan or flying columns of the wars in Silesia, or of the Napoleonic wars. The methods will be altogether novel, they will be such as have never yet been employed. Even the most untiring, the most exacting of Cavalry commanders must, however, bear in mind, in the efforts he demands from men and horses, that he controls a body of men who have been most carefully trained, and that neither they nor their mounts can easily be replaced, and that therefore both differ widely from volunteer bodies hastily got together, or from the American horsemen who rode in the War of Secession.

‘Reiterdienst.’ By General Freiherr von Bernhardi. (Berlin : Mittler & Sohn, 1910.) Price M. 8.50.

This is another book by the author of the well-known work, ‘Cavalry in Future Wars,’ and is both an expansion and a development, and in some respects too a correction, of certain of the principles and teachings elaborated in the earlier publication. It will be remembered that the former book appeared as long ago as 1899—it was not translated into English until 1906 and has only just appeared in French—and it is only natural that the author should, influenced by the latest experience, have seen reason somewhat to remodel many of the views then expressed, while at the same time reiterating his firm conviction that the *role* of the mounted arm promises to be an even more exalted, if perhaps a differently constituted, one in the future than it has ever been in the past. He holds that Cavalry will no longer exercise, as of old, a decisive influence upon the issue of a battle by the charge of masses of horsemen ; such opportunities *may* occur, but they will be exceptional, and while he contends that the enormous size of modern armies has increased the vulnerability of their communications, it is only by the trained and successful combination of the fire-fight and the mounted attack that Cavalry can hope to open the way to the severing of these arteries. In the future the duties of Cavalry will be mainly confined to reconnaissance, screening, and raids against communications, and he draws many useful lessons for the conduct of this latter class of operations from the work of the Southern Cavalry in the War of Secession. General von Bernhardi does not believe that the opposing Cavalries will often meet in the mounted attack, and even such meetings as may occur will not of themselves have much result unless the rifle is called in to co-operate. He believes that it will become necessary to strengthen the fire power of Cavalry bodies by the attachment of wheelmen and other mobile infantry. The author does not hesitate keenly to criticise the new German ‘Cavalry training,’ while fully acknowledging the substantial advance which this text-book has made over those which preceded it ; but space does not

here permit of going into the arguments he advances in support of his views, while since they are concerned with purely foreign regulations, with which many of our readers may not be fully conversant, small advantage would accrue from following the discussion further. The General pleads for increased and better individual training both of man and mount ; he lays special stress upon the cultivation of *character* and of initiative in the Cavalry soldier ; and urges that throughout the whole course of instruction its application, under all circumstances, to the conditions of active service must be kept steadily in view.

It is impossible, within the ordinary limits of a review, to do justice to this very important work, the contents of which, for those cavalrymen who can read it in the original, will provide food for much valuable thought upon the possibilities of the future employment of their arm.

‘Der Deutschen Reiterregimenter Ehrentage.’ By Lieut.-Colonel von Kaisenberg and Major-General Buxbaum. (Oldenburg : Stalling, 1910.)

As the regiments of British Cavalry each hold in special honour some one day of the year whereon their predecessors have particularly distinguished themselves, so too in the German Army does every regiment in like manner keep holy some such especial anniversary. The authors of this work have set themselves to give an account in miniature of each one of the particular actions upon which the different regiments of German Cavalry look back with most pride, with the object, while gathering under one cover all those records of noble deeds, to encourage further the cult of the regimental spirit and to seek to spread abroad an even wider knowledge of the past services of the distinguished units composing the Cavalry of the German Army. There is much in this book which should appeal to the soldiers of all the nations, but Englishmen will be particularly interested in the recital of the exploits of such regiments as claim descent from those corps which at one time were our comrades in arms, and some of which still bear upon their standards and appointments the names of battles in which they fought beneath the British flag. In this book we find four such regiments. The 1st Hanoverian Dragoons (No. 9) were formerly the 3rd Hussars of the King’s German Legion, and their *Ehrentag* is the 27th December, 1870, in memory of Amboise. The 1st Hanoverian Uhlans (No. 13) were the 1st Dragoons of the Legion—the heroes of Garcia Hernandez—and now celebrate the part they played on the day of Mars la Tour. The 2nd Hanoverian Uhlans (No. 14) celebrate Peuilly on January 18, while the 15th Hanoverian Hussars were formerly the 1st and 2nd Hussars of the German Legion, and still hold high festival on September 25, the day, nearly a hundred years ago, when they fought for us under Picton against Imperial France and charged beside our 11th Hussars at El Boden. The authors are to be congratulated on having produced a very stirring book.

‘Die Kavalleriedivisionen im deutschen Kaisermanöver, 1909.’ By Colonel von Unger. (Published at the office of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.)

This very carefully compiled report on the German Cavalry operations in last year’s manœuvres has been drawn up by one who is an *Abteilungschef* in

the Great General Staff. It recounts all that occurred from day to day, and almost from hour to hour, on either side ; it contains a complete *ordre de bataille* ; and the text is illustrated by suitable maps and plans. It forms a model report, accompanied by comments couched in rather general terms ; and the whole is so arranged that the military student, conversant with the German language, will find no difficulty in following every movement. The author draws a distinction between screening movements as practised on the offensive and defensive ; ' screening,' properly considered, belongs, he holds, almost entirely to the defensive, or at any rate requires for the most part operations of a defensive character ; whereas the ' screening' occasioned by the forcing back of an opponent is really no more than an increasing of the difficulties of the hostile reconnaissance. True screening, maintains von Unger, is only possible in a terrain the points of ingress to which can be held and denied. The forwarding of information seems to have left something to be desired ; the technical methods employed appear in a measure to have failed, necessitating increased reliance upon the old-time mounted orderly. The author is careful to avoid expressing any opinion as to whether the organisation of a Cavalry corps was considered to have justified this novel departure, but he does not appear to have shared the opinion, which he admits is general, that such a body is clumsy, slow in action, and difficult to handle.

*Militär-Wochenblatt.*—As usual, there is not very much of special interest for Cavalry readers in the last quarter's issues of this paper. The number dated January 15, however, contains some remarks on the new German Cavalry musketry regulations issued on December 2 last, and which take the place of the text-book dated September 1906. The musketry regulations for the Cavalry have now been very greatly assimilated to those laid down for infantry, consequent on the vastly improved firearms now in possession of the mounted troops ; and several sections of the new text-book appear to be devoted to pointing out the many advantages possessed by the carbine 98 over that which it has now displaced. Indeed, in penetration, flatness of trajectory, and accuracy at ordinary ranges there does not appear to be any very appreciable difference between the infantry rifle and the new Cavalry carbine. The responsibility as musketry instructor of the squadron commander is now more carefully defined ; he is to be accorded as free a hand as possible in the methods he employs. More importance is attached to training in ' fire-control,' but while it is recognised that the musketry of the Cavalry is now brought more into line with that laid down for infantry, regret is expressed that the number of rounds provided for field practices is still very low. In the issue of January 29 there is a paper advocating the use of mounted infantry to relieve the Cavalry of much of the scouting and despatch-riding which at present are demanded of them. The writer suggests that so soon as the Divisional Cavalry has established the presence and position of the enemy, all further reconnaissances should be carried out by the infantry mounted scouts until the time for the actual opening of infantry fire arrives. The writer complains that during peace manœuvres troops are too often *hustled* into action—there is nothing between the Cavalry reconnaissance and the infantry deployment : he declares that the *preparation* for deployment affects the result of the whole course of the subse-

quent action, and that only by the use of well-trained Mounted Infantry, taking up the work where the Divisional Cavalry now lay it down, can Infantry enter upon the fire-fight properly prepared. It is proposed that an officer and twenty-seven N.C.O.s and men of each Infantry regiment (*anglice*, 3 battalions) should be instructed to take up many of the duties which now fall upon the Divisional Cavalry. This proposal will doubtless commend itself to Infantry officers; it has, however, probably now, as previously, been brought forward less in the interests of the Infantry than from a growing conviction increasingly apparent among German Cavalrymen that they can no longer permit their commands to be frittered away as is now too frequently the case.

In the number for February 17 there is put forward a plea for a simplification of school rides, on the ground that too often the commands there given are obeyed by the horse rather than by his rider. It is further suggested that the right hand and arm should no longer be carried hanging stiff at the side in a position which is unnatural and which is apt to cause the recruit to bring the left shoulder forward. The right hand, it is suggested, should rest on the thigh. It is in this paper further recommended that men should be encouraged to ride, whenever possible, on both reins and not on the bit only.

In the issues for March 3, 5, and 8, there is a lengthy criticism by an anonymous writer of the review of the operations of the Cavalry divisions in the last German manœuvres, which appeared in a recent number of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* (by Colonel von Unger), and which has since been published in pamphlet form. Commencing by rather deprecating criticism of manœuvre operations, wherein he says everything passes far more rapidly than on service, he then proceeds to subject von Unger's account to an unusually exhaustive and detailed criticism, and finally comes to the conclusion that the German Cavalry requires increased practice in and experience of the modern duties of reconnaissance; that commanders of all ranks are influenced too much by what comes within their immediate purview; that they do not sufficiently economise their resources. Cavalry is more than ever an important weapon in the conduct of war, but while its influence in action has declined, its efficiency during the period of operations has increased enormously, and it is in this latter direction that improvement must be aimed at.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.—The December number of last year opens with a retrospect, by General von Siebert, of the teachings of the Austrian Cavalry regulations up to 1897. He points out that prior to 1857 none of the drill-books appeared to contemplate the movements in combination of any body larger than a regiment, and that even as late as 1864 nothing larger than the brigade was recognised as the tactical unit, while such references as were made to larger bodies were concerned almost entirely with parade and ceremonial. To this the author attributes the want of success of the Austrian Cavalry as a whole in the campaigns of 1859 and 1866, greatly as individual regiments added to their reputations in those wars. Then follows a laudatory *critique* of the spirit of the offensive which is so noticeable a feature of the new German Cavalry regulations; there is a short paper descriptive of the work performed by a reconnoitring detachment in the manœuvres of last year in Galicia; and another on 'The Pursuit,' in regard to which the writer holds



that a pursuit is better not attempted unless there is a very considerable likelihood of the retreating enemy being early thrown into a panic, since otherwise the pursuit may easily degenerate into nothing more than a mere series of rearguard actions wherein the pursuer may well suffer equal loss with the pursued. The Cavalry commander should, it is contended, not only be a man of much war experience, so that he can readily judge of the extent of demoralisation of the enemy by defeat, but must also be to a considerable degree acquainted with the national characteristics of the foe. Rittmeister Viktorin, who commands a Cavalry machine-gun detachment, contributes a lengthy paper on the training of detachments of this arm; he lays particular stress upon the selection of pack-horses, declaring that it is not every horse that will *lead* well or that can be trained to do so. He gives data of distances covered at a rapid pace by his command, which appears to have attained to a high standard of mobility. This is an interesting and valuable article. This number closes with a very short dissertation on Cavalry divisional organisation, and it is urged that the division ought to consist of a standard strength of thirty-six squadrons—viz. of three brigades, each of three regiments of four squadrons—that the attendant artillery should be organised in three batteries each of four guns, and that the number of machine guns with the Cavalry division should be increased. It is significant that here too, as elsewhere, we find an insistence upon the need of Infantry support, despite the attention now given in the Cavalry to increased training in the fire-fight. This is not merely suggested in order to be on equal terms with the traditional enemy, who means to send mixed bodies of all arms to cover the front of his armies, but because, as the writer of this paper frankly admits, the German dismounted Cavalryman can never be the equal of the Infantry soldier.

The January number begins with an article on 'The Fire Power of Large Cavalry Bodies'; this paper is too long to detail all the arguments of the author, but while he calls for an increase of guns, he does not seem altogether to approve, or only under exceptional circumstances, of the attachment to Cavalry bodies of either machine guns or wheelmen—the former because he does not believe in the efficacy of machine-gun fire at any but a stationary target, and the latter because of the additional depth even a moderate number of wheelmen give to a column, while he would rather do without either because he seems to fear that their presence may cramp the purely Cavalry initiative of the commander of the whole. Major-General Gradinger contributes an account of the attack of Margueritte's Cavalry at Sedan—based apparently on the monumental work by the French General de Mandres. There is a brief description of the Austrian Landwehr Cavalry, and a paper about the evolution of the use of the bit, and then follows the first of what promises to be a series of examples of Cavalry action taken from actual war and worked out, in accordance with existing 'Cavalry training,' to their legitimate conclusions. Interesting for British soldiers is a short paper on the remount question in German South-West Africa; the horse which has done best in the country is said to be the German, from East Prussia, but owing no doubt to the expense of transport and the time lost in acclimatising, horses are now being drawn from the Cape Colony and also from Queensland and New South Wales, whence already over 600 horses have been imported. The Germans have now organised a dromedary corps, having purchased a number of these animals in the Soudan,

and nearly one thousand of these are now in possession of the Protectorate troops. Further, three companies are mounted on camels. The greater number of the mules in use are drawn from the Argentine, whose breed of horses appears to be in no greater favour with the Germans than with our troops.

The first article of the February number contains thirty-three pithy axioms by the well-known Cavalry general, Von Bernhardt, concerning the arranging and execution of tactical exercises for a Cavalry division ; they are illustrated by three sketches and are deserving of the attention of Cavalry officers. Then follows a paper by 'Immanuel' on the Cavalry attack against guns ; the writer contends that such attack is not often enough practised during peace and that its successful execution in war depends upon such a variety of circumstances that no rules can be laid down ; but he appears, from the experience of the two Cavalry attacks at Vionville by the brigades Redern and Bredow, to put forward the opinion that the attack in such circumstances mainly depends for success upon the skilful employment of numbers of supporting bodies of highly trained horsemen. In a paper entitled 'Against an Enemy's Flanks and Rear,' Major Kerchnawe continues the discussion with Count Schwerin on the subject of raids. There are a couple of short articles on 'Breaking' and 'Schooling' ; a long one on the training for and carrying out of long-distance rides—from a veterinary surgeon's point of view ; and a third on 'The Intellect of the Horse,' and many experiences are given in proof of the contention that the horse really does pursue a train of thought. An interesting paper describes the remounts used in the sixty mountain batteries of the Austrian army ; and Major-General Zobel contributes a short epitome of the present state of the remount question in the United Kingdom, and comes to the conclusion that there is in England a real dearth of horses suitable for military purposes, that we must spend more money, and that our regulation price for remounts is very low indeed.

*Spectateur Militaire*.—For some little time past there has been running through these numbers a series of articles on 'The Strategy of the Campaign of 1800 in Italy,' and in the issue dated January 15 will be found some interesting criticisms on the failure of the Cavalry under both Kellermann and Murat during the operations in June. The latter was held back altogether, and although the mounted men under Kellermann did actually cover the front of the army, they might as well have been anywhere else since they achieved practically nothing in the way of reconnaissance. For work of this kind, however, the Napoleonic Cavalry had not then been really trained ; it was employed solely on the battlefield itself, and then always supported by Infantry, and was in all respects inferior to the Austrian Cavalry. Of interest is a chapter of this series wherein is discussed what would have happened had the First Consul lost the day at Marengo, and Bonnal is quoted, who has declared that, but for the surpassing feebleness of the Austrian command and staff, Bonaparte *must* have been defeated—*malgré l'arrivée de Desaix*.

The number for February 15 has an article on the *service des renseignements*, wherein the author discusses what he considers the futility of expecting that the Cavalry should be able to obtain information of real value for the

command in chief, or indeed should be of use for anything but *reconnaissances rapprochées*. The author declares that information will for the future only be obtainable during peace by means of a carefully pre-arranged system and during war by the aid of spies. The different methods employed by the nations in the past are reviewed, and it will probably be news to some that we are presumed to be past-masters in the art of espionage—'*combien est puissant,*' complained Napoleon, '*l'or de l'Angleterre.*' This number also contains a description of the organisation of the Spanish army.

*Revue de Cavalerie.*—The last number reviewed of this journal should have been described as for October. In the opening article for November, an anonymous correspondent contributes a paper entitled '*Le Règlement de 1910,*' which appears to be in the main an exposition of the views entertained by the writer on the proposed revision of the Cavalry training manual, and in regard to which the War Minister has invited opinions from leading Cavalrymen. It is a plea for simplicity in manœuvre and clearness in methods and expression of command. The '*Étude sur Sedan*' is continued: the battle is divided into four acts and the story of the first, the *alerte du matin*, is explained by the extraordinary supineness of the Cavalry, whose *reconnaissances* do not in any one instance appear to have extended for a greater distance from the bivouac than a mile and a half. The battle is in a measure reconstructed: we are shown what was actually done or left undone by the Cavalry, and are then told—naturally by the light of subsequent knowledge—what should have been attempted and the correct method of execution. An excellent map of the Sedan country will be found of assistance to the Cavalry student who would follow what was and what might have been. Then follows an article on the duties of non-commissioned officers in the field, which the author holds to be daily increasing in importance owing to the multiplicity of detachments; the duties are not merely recounted, but their execution is explained, especially as they are affected by combination with the other arms. In the study on the question of bringing horses earlier to maturity, which has now run through several numbers, the writer considers that it should be possible to purchase remounts at three years, and that six months later their military training should begin; at four years the remount should be fit for the ranks, but should not during this year take part in manœuvres. The reorganisation of the French Cavalry is a question now much debated, and Commandant R. contributes another to the many schemes already suggested.

In the issue for December, Captain N. discourses on the need for a rational method of training men to the mounted combat; he is all for the use of the 'point,' and quotes Marshal Saxe, who is said to have expressed the wish for his Cavalry to be armed with such a description of sword as would *les empêcher de sabrer*. Again, the keynote of this article is the plea for simplicity in training, for the elimination of everything that is not absolutely necessary for the training for war,—more urgent for the Cavalry of France, whose period of army service is so brief, than for the mounted men of other nations. In the continuation and close of the '*Étude sur Sedan*' we are given an account of the attacks by Margueritte's Cavalry division in the morning and afternoon; the author has a great admiration for Ducrot, and declares that had his intentions been properly carried out, the Cavalry instead of dying gloriously in the afternoon would have

triumphed in the morning and assisted to secure a victory. The ground cannot be appreciated only from a map, and yet Margueritte was the only man in the whole of his division who possessed a map. The different charges are finely described, but we are assisted to understand the reasons for their failure, in spite of the devotion and heroism with which each was conducted. 'Le Règlement de 1910' is continued; it is, however, rather difficult to follow, being, to a greater extent than in the previous number, concerned with a detailed consideration of the paragraphs of the existing regulations. The paper on the duties on service of non-commissioned officers comes to an end in this number.

The January number contains a long and closely reasoned comparison of the French and German Cavalry regulations—to the advantage of the latter. The author finds that the general arrangement of the German text-book is superior and that both drill and manœuvre are greatly simplified in comparison with the methods laid down in the French manual. Against a Cavalry numerically superior, aiming always at riding down and enveloping the adversary, the only chance for the French horsemen lies in superior powers of manœuvre, and the writer finds that the French system is not sufficiently simple or elastic to admit of rapid and sudden changes of movement under all circumstances. 'Le Règlement de 1910' is continued. In this number begins a new series of practical schemes for small Cavalry bodies and for parties of all arms.

'An Introduction to Military Geography.' By Brigadier-General E. S. May, C.B., C.M.G. (Hugh Rees.) 8s. 6d. net.

The author calls this an 'introduction,' but it is an introduction which goes very far into the subject itself.

Physical and political geography are studies essential to the clear comprehension of all military problems, and officers will find in General May's work a clear outline on which to base their researches, and many useful and most interesting examples of geographical influence upon the conduct and result of campaigns.

This book should find a place in every regimental library.

'What to Apply in Tactical Problems.' By Captain Archibald F. Becke, late R.F.A. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd.) 3s. 6d. net.

A most useful book for officers preparing for examination; it contains concise illustrations of tactical problems drawn up in accord with the official text-books.

'A System of Free Gymnastics based on the Swedish System, including Light Dumb-bell Drill.' By Lieutenant Betts. (Gale & Polden.) 1s. 6d. net. This is described by the late Inspector of Gymnasia as 'the best manual on free gymnastics I have seen. The illustrations are from life, and accurately show the correct position of the body in each exercise.'

'The Game of British East Africa,' by Captain C. H. Stigand, is a book that can confidently be recommended to all sportsmen. It is invaluable to anyone going to shoot in British East Africa, and further contains much advice and good information for big-game hunters all over the world. (London: Horace Cox, Field Office, Windsor House, Bream's Buildings.)

'Travel and Sport in Turkestan.' By Captain J. N. Price Wood, 12th Royal Lancers. (London : Chapman & Hall, Ltd.)

Captain Wood gives in these pages a simple unassuming account of a shooting trip in Eastern Turkestan in the mountains at the head of the Tekkes Valley.

Leaving the railway at Rawal Pindi in May 1907, he struck the Russian line at Kabulsai (Russian Turkestan) in December of the same year, having travelled 2500 miles exclusive of side trips, and reached London by way of Orenburg and Moscow.

The traveller's avowed object was sport, and he brought home with him some good heads of Ibex-Karelini (wild sheep) and Asian Wapiti.

In addition to details of kit, stores, servants, shikaris, expenses, transport, &c., which cannot fail to be of the utmost value to those who follow after, the diary gives a description of the roads followed day by day, of meetings with petty chiefs, Chinese officials, Russian officers, and missionaries, and of the manners and customs of the inhabitants, as well as details of the sport both good and bad.

The book is profusely illustrated with snapshots, is provided with a good map, and as a useful and interesting account of a sporting trip will appeal to a wide circle of English officers.

'Gentlemen Riders, Past and Present,' by John Maunsell Richardson and Finch Mason, is in great demand by all interested in the Turf. It gives the portraits and records of the leading gentlemen riders during the past fifty years, a large proportion of whom have been soldiers. It is beautifully got up, the portraits are good, and the records ably and pleasantly written. The names of the authors are a guarantee of the success of this book, which all who read will enjoy. (London : Vinton & Co., 8 Bream's Buildings, Chancery Lane, E.C.)

'A Narrative of the Siege of Delhi.' By Captain C. J. Griffiths, late 61st Regiment. (John Murray.) 9s. net.

This work is the personal narrative of a subaltern of the 61st Regiment quartered at Ferozepore.

Chapter I. describes graphically the mutiny at Ferozepore, the attempted capture of the arsenal and the destruction of the cantonments, due to the inaction of the brigadier commanding the station.

Chapter II. gives an account of the march in June of a wing of the regiment to Delhi, 350 miles at an average of twenty-one miles a night.

Chapter III. describes the events of July and August during which the Army succeeded only by constant and desperate fighting in clinging to its position on the Ridge, then follow the assault and the five days' street-fighting before the city was finally evacuated by the mutineers.

Though of no great historical value, Captain Griffiths' story is intensely interesting as giving a graphic and convincing picture of the daily life of the humbler regimental actors in the great drama of sixty years ago ; their cheerful patience in the struggle against hardship and disease, their stern heroism in the face of overwhelming odds, and the bull-dog courage that carried them victorious through this the crisis of the Mutiny.

The plans and sketches are clear and instructive.

'To-day and To-morrow.' By Viscount Esher. (John Murray.) 7s. 6d.

Of the ten Essays which form this collection, the first five deal with questions of Imperial Defence.

General Gordon wrote in the postscript of a letter to the author: 'A well-intentioned man, seeking not his own advantage, is capable of judging any military, civil, financial, or political question (as well as the most experienced minister) in its *great* aspects,' and as such Lord Esher has studied the question of our national security.

The only conclusion, though one which he appears afraid to acknowledge even to himself, to be drawn from his discussions is that the organisation of the resources of the Empire upon a compulsory basis is essential not only to the maintenance of our position as a world power, but even of our continued existence as an independent State.

The mind of the reader unconsciously flies from the polished phrases and arguments of the well-read scholar to the columns of the *Daily Mail*, and Mr. Blatchford's 'Wanted a Man!'

'Field Fortification.' Notes on the Text-books by Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., late Director of Staff Duties. (Gale & Polden.) 4s. net.

Originally brought out in the eighties, when the author was a garrison instructor. Now in its sixth edition, revised and brought up to date.

'The Story of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. From the Outbreak of Hostilities to August 24, 1904.' By Lt.-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker. (Forster, Groom & Co. 5s.)

'Questions on the Russo-Japanese War, 1904.' By Lt.-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker. (Forster, Groom & Co. 1s.)

Sketch Map to illustrate the Russo-Japanese War, with Notes and References, also Flags representing each Army. (Forster, Groom & Co. 2s. 6d.)

Colonel Brunker's story of the Japanese War is a careful and clear summary of the operations and of the events that led up to them, based upon the best existing authorities.

The facts are given, and attention is directed to the salient points, and upon this well-knit skeleton the student can build up his knowledge by the perusal of the official accounts and other more detailed works.

The questions on the Russo-Japanese War are well framed and comprehensive, and the little volume has the usual complete chronological table of events and an excellent map.

Finally, the Military Map is first-rate; the hills are well shown by hachures, the communications are well marked, and inset are the plans of Port Arthur.

'Military History for Examinations, 1910-11. Questions on the Campaign in Virginia.' By Lt.-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker. (Forster, Groom & Co. 1s.)

This little book will be of great assistance to officers preparing for examination. The questions are comprehensive and there is an excellent chronological summary of events and a good map.

*NOTES*

RECENTLY before the Royal Dublin Society, Major Eassie, D.S.O., Army Veterinary Corps, read a paper on 'Some Variations in the Skeleton of the Domestic Horse, and their Significance' (communicated by Professor R. F. Scharff, Ph.D.). Major Eassie first stated that the skeleton in the domesticated horse frequently gave proof of degeneration from the type of the wild four-footed animal. He considered first the type of the skeleton in the natural four-footed animal, including those long extinct. In these, as he showed, the pairs of limbs lie in parallel plane, the bones and points facing forwards, and the joints being all under one another in a plumb line. In the degenerate horse he showed that the limbs fall inwards and out of their plane, and that they also subside in a spiral way, so that the joints face outwards instead of forwards. He showed that in the case of the horse with this condition of the limbs the cavity for the brain and spinal cord and the visceral cavity were collapsed and therefore small in capacity, containing small organs, functions consequently being everywhere inferior. He showed that this condition of degeneration was easily seen in the living horse. He then considered three main variations in the skeleton—in the relative length of the spine, in the relative length of the arm, in the relative length of the thigh. He showed that the short spine is a racial character in the Arab, and that it largely determines the beauty of the Arab, and that it is transmitted by the Arab invariably in the first cross. He showed that the beauty of the English thoroughbred was largely due to this character inherited from the Arab. He showed that the short spine was a primitive character in the horse preserved in the Arab and lost in many other races, and that the long spine is a defect, and that it determines the ugly vertical curvatures like, for example, the ewe-neck, the ungraceful carriage of the head, and the drooping quarter. He then went on to show that the relative shortening of the arm and thigh were ultimate phases in the evolution of the horse, and that the short, erect arm threw back the shoulder into the oblique position; that this obliquity allowed of the carriage of the body forward between the limbs and at the best advantage; that the short arm and thigh both made for speed, and that therefore the criterion of speed was to be found in the open angles of the elbow and the stifle. He then proceeded to demonstrate that action in the horse depended on the movement of the limb in parallel plane on the balance insured by the short arm, and the length of stride depending on the open angle, and to some extent that graceful carriage and rhythm of movement were not compatible with the long spine and its vertical distortions. He then exhibited photographs illustrating that all these characters were to be found in the English thoroughbred; that the Arab is a slow pony because of the racial defect

of the bent leg ; that the Canadian horses imported into Africa for the War had all the defects except the bent hind leg ; that the Australian horses had only the defect of the long spine. He suggested that the short spine, arm, and thigh respectively were dominant hereditary characters, and that degeneration in the horse was a recessive character. He thought that for the practical breeder all that was necessary was a clear idea of what determined beauty, balance, and speed, and to recognise degeneration which affects the qualities of strength, vitality, stamina, &c. Such small races as the Iceland, Russian, Burmese, and Kaffir pony, he said, were all degenerate. That degeneration was common in almost every country, partly because of the attempt to force size beyond what the locality determined, and mostly because of the fact that it was perpetuated because it passed unrecognised. As he showed, it was not altogether uncommon in the English thoroughbred.

### ' ROARING ' IN HORSES

THAT the percentage of horses which are affected by diseases of the respiratory organs is gradually increasing in England is an established fact. Many theories have from time to time been forthcoming to account for this, but I am not aware that at the present time a satisfactory explanation has been given.

There is little doubt that the unwholesome soft food with which dealers, more especially Irish dealers, get young horses up for sale, has a most deleterious effect, insomuch as young horses are often put into hard and exhausting work before the softening effect which this course of diet has reduced them to has been worked off.

' Whistling ' or ' roaring,' as everyone interested in horses knows (or should know), is the noise emitted in the act of inspiration, and is due to a wasting or atrophy of the muscles of the larynx, but more particularly to the muscles of the left side of the larynx.

This is almost invariably accompanied by the falling away of the muscles on either side of the windpipe, and can easily be detected, outside, by careful pressure of the fingers.

Though roaring is frequently developed after and in consequence of strangles or catarrh, it is more often a hereditary taint which may or may not be induced by any of these respiratory complaints.

Many attempts have from time to time been made to discover a remedy for the disease, which up to the present time have all proved abortive.

The most important of all these operations was that performed by Dr. Fleming in 1887, which consisted of making a long incision in the larynx and of entirely removing the arytenoid cartilage, and the vocal chord upon the side which was paralysed. This operation resulted in a temporary relief only, but in six months' time the animal became worse than before, owing to granulation of the tissue.

Tracheotomy has, of course, been practised in recent years with a certain measure of success. It has never been a complete success, attended as it



always has been with numerous drawbacks and objections, which are inseparable from the use of the tube.

The extraordinary successes which have, however, attended the brief series of cases lately operated on by Professor Hobday,\* may almost entitle him to lay claim to have discovered a specific. This operation, which was originally suggested by Dr. W. L. Williams of New York, has the distinct and definite advantage that it does very little, if any, damage to the cartilages of the larynx. The object of the operation is 'to strip off all the mucous membrane which lines the ventricle of the larynx, thus making two raw surfaces, which eventually adhere and cause the arytenoid cartilages to be fixed against the side of the glottis by cicatricial adhesion.'

Commencing in September last, Professor Hobday has operated upon a limited number of horses only. In three cases out of four the horses which, prior to the operation, had been either very bad whistlers, or in some cases such confirmed roarers that they were practically useless, are at the present all hunting, and no noise can be detected even when these horses gallop uphill.

The fourth case, the animal could not gallop more than a few hundred yards without evincing symptoms of the greatest distress. This horse has, up to the time of writing, hardly recovered the condition which he lost in consequence of the recent operation. When galloping he whistles slightly, but it may be assumed that this will disappear when he becomes fit.

The writer has been so much impressed by the success of these experiments that he himself had a thoroughbred hunter similarly operated upon about ten days ago. The horse underwent the operation without any apparent pain, and is making speedy recovery. It is fully expected that he may be hunted in eight weeks from the date of the operation.

J. C. BRINTON, *Major,*  
*2nd Life Guards.*

\* Frederick Hobday, F.R.C.S., F.R.S.E., late Professor Royal Veterinary College, Church Street, Kensington, W.

### PROBLEM No. 9

'I LEAVE IT TO YOU'

SUBALTERN Officers of the Mounted Branches of the Regular, Territorial, and Colonial Forces, at home and abroad, are reminded that the last day on which Solutions of the above Problem can be received by the Editor is May 14, 1910. The result will be announced in the July number.

### THE CHERFILS' MODE OF ATTACK, 1898

1. THERE are two alternative combinations for Cavalry and Horse Artillery:

- (a) To send the R.H.A. forward to a flank where they will have an opportunity of firing at the enemy as they advance (fig. 1).
- (b) To leave the guns and take the squadrons to the flank (fig. 2).

In either case the combination to be aimed at is that the line of fire of the guns should be at right angles to the line of attack of the Cavalry squadrons.

2. The first alternative is recommended when the ground at S (fig. 1) is such as to prevent a charge by Cavalry, but it should be remembered that in that case this rough ground favours the near approach of dismounted riflemen, whose fire may, if we are to credit recently published Hythe accounts, knock out our batteries in a few minutes.

3. Cherfils insists that we may risk our guns to the enemy's charges, as the latter are useless against R.H.A. in action. He ridicules the idea of Cavalry carrying off guns; he says that their squadrons will draw off after a comparatively useless waste of men and horses; at any rate, that they will lose far more men than the gunners. Meanwhile these squadrons have been lost to the main Cavalry attack, and, whatever else happens, the conqueror in the main Cavalry fight can always get back his Horse Artillery.




FIG. 1.

NOTE.—Cavalry may or may not get home against Horse Artillery in action: this is a matter of opinion, but the delicate mechanism of modern guns allows of them being very easily rendered temporarily useless. Our Cavalry pioneers might therefore be usefully taught something about the modern quick-firing gun of our most likely enemy.

4. The second combination will more generally be employed, especially if we have seized some commanding ground suitable for an artillery position, whilst covered ways are available for the movements of the squadrons.




FIG. 2.

5. Whilst premising that the enemy's first line of Cavalry is the premier target for our artillery to shoot at, Cherfils makes the following recommendation—one which will meet with scant approbation. Suppose, he says, the enemy's artillery is punishing our squadrons, then our artillery should keep on shooting at it, since (failing any other means of knocking out their artillery), if our guns can extinguish the fire of their guns, our Cavalry may be saved. Our guns may help our Cavalry at a subsequent period of the fight.

He then recommends, as a last resource, sending a couple of squadrons to threaten, and even ride through the enemy's guns, but never to attempt to take them; that, as he says before, is a futile procedure.

6. This idea of reducing the fire of the enemy's guns must now more than ever be a critical point to be kept in view by the G.O.C. Recently on a still morning in India, one minute's rapid fire of a battery completely shrouded the targets at a thousand yards with dust and smoke for three minutes.

The ruses which may draw the enemy's guns into premature action and

entail their subsequent discomfiture from guns or batteries reserved for that purpose, are obviously numerous. We know that the dust thrown up by the discharge of guns soon gives away their position despite smokeless powder.

7. He lays stress on the proved necessity for a reserve in a Cavalry fight, since, if your squadrons pursue, they are at the mercy of fresh-formed troops, and makes the suggestion that the brigade which has been employed in manœuvre in front, and which has by now cleared the front and rallied in rear, is naturally that from which this reserve should be formed. At the same time he favours a division formed of four brigades, and thus truly in equilibrium, with a head, two arms, and a body.

8. Now he turns to the important question, What should be the form of the Cavalry attack? He favours an echelon of efforts. Why? Because a charge badly supported is a mere useless butchery, however bravely it is entered upon. He says of the first line that if you shorten its retreat you annul the bad moral effect, and that good supports are those which follow at a short distance, echeloned on one or both flanks.

9. Turning to three regiments in the first line, which he refers to as the German attack, he says: 'It is not a success by the first line which assures victory; victory results only from a definite success. Three regiments in line are cumbersome, rigid and difficult to manage, and he desires his readers to note how the long line curls round the smaller one, and is taken in flank by the echelons at B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub> (fig. 3).'

10. As to which flank the echelons must be on, he says the ground will decide that; but, if it is flat, they must be on both sides: at the same time




FIG. 3.

the bulk should be on the opposite side to the artillery; a good rule is to send or leave the artillery where they can get a natural defence by reason of the accidents of the

ground in front, whilst you use the best ground for your Cavalry deployment. He places the reserve on the side away from the main supports, but a wind blowing heavy dust, raised by the advance of the leading lines, to one side or the other may influence its position. It certainly must not be blinded and thus rendered useless. The orientation of the attack in echelon will be fixed by the ground in such a way that that portion which is the head of the attack should appear on the most elevated ground, the most dominant terrain, so as to give it more moral impulsion.

11. With regard to the actual order to 'charge' he quotes 'Ardant du Picq' to the effect that the Cavalry should be launched when the solid knee-to-knee appearance of their squadrons has had its effect. The intoxication of the charge lasts only a few seconds; then it dies out and gives way to other thoughts—weaker thoughts.

NOTE (a).—To be first to charge is not everything: De Brack advises making the enemy charge over some obstacle if possible, and forthwith taking advantage of their disorder, or letting them charge too far.

NOTE (b).—The great consideration for us will be:—are their squadrons under the effective fire of our artillery? If they are (and the burst of the shells and nature of our

artillery fire should tell us this) we shall certainly wish to leave their Cavalry attack to be thrown into disorder before we send in our squadrons.

12. After these premises, our author proceeds to develop his favourite theory of the value of the echelon formation. His main argument is that at a little distance it cannot be distinguished from line; thus, the squadrons at A (fig. 3) will see no interval in the squadrons at B. And here we may notice that our guns on a flank can fire a little longer, if we have an echelon on the flank nearest to the guns, instead of a one-line formation. The supporting squadrons (most of them) are always to be placed on the side away from the artillery. The reserve is an exception.

NOTE.—We Cavalry soldiers must never forget that there is no clumsiness more deadly than to mask guns. There are, surely, only two ways of accounting for such a deplorable mistake, viz.—either a surprise, or want of nerve on the part of the Cavalry commander, which prevents him getting away from his artillery.

13. As to the deployment for the attack, Cherfils favours a late deployment from mass, quoting a stirring appeal from De Brack, who wrote: 'If we present a solid front at a slow pace, and still the enemy do not turn, we must all the same be resolute and break-neck enough to throw ourselves on him and charge determinedly.' And he adds: 'The French have always been good at this breakneck business.'

14. After a detailed examination into the distance which various formations require for deployment, he dilates on the advantage of being the last to deploy, and, incidentally, on the value of doing this calmly, methodically and in good order; but he omits any reference to a possibly very potent factor, and that is, that the enemy, if under the effective fire of our artillery, will be a much easier prey to the attack of our squadrons. This co-operating artillery fire is a question of terrain again, you may say; but our plan of attack must, if possible, be such as to eliminate this factor, and our principles should be based on the supposition that there is no advantage of terrain to either side.

15. Cherfils now proceeds to mention a means of making more certain of having the available time for deployment by economising space. Picturing the brigade in the act of receiving the order '*En bataille*' to the left, he says: 'If a brigade at Q (fig. 4) is in brigade mass with direction on K, and it is desired to deploy straight forward to attack the enemy's cavalry at K, at a trot 100 metres of space is devoured. But if, when in column of masses




FIG. 4.

formation at Q, the column be opened to deploying distance, and then line to the left is ordered, a very much shorter distance towards the cavalry at K is used up (fig. 5).'

He claims for the latter of the two plans, precision, extreme pliancy, and a third point to which he returns later. He enlarges, meantime, on the




FIG. 5.

economy of time and space which thus assures liberty to launch the attack directly against the enemy. The third point claimed is, that from column of mass the direction can be changed before the order 'line to the left' is given, and thus still more valuable advantages may be gained for your attack on an enemy, especially if he is already deployed and consequently committed to a definite line of attack.

A diagram (fig. 6) will make this plainer. Suppose no advantage of ground to either side; our own and the enemy's batteries have both unlimbered on a ridge westward, our own and the enemy's Cavalry both seek the low ground on the east for attack. It seems probable that the Cavalry which can go first, furthest and fastest in that direction will have the advantage:

- (i) because they are on the flank of the enemy's cavalry
- (ii) because they may succeed in making the enemy's cavalry mask his own guns, (iii) because the more obtuse the angle formed by the line of our Cavalry attack and the line of fire of our guns




FIG. 6.

the better. Therefore the Cavalry leader, having placed his artillery in readiness behind a commanding position in his left rear, will ask himself as he gallops parallel to the oblique advance of his mass of squadrons, 'How can I, consistently with the lie and nature of the ground, gain one or all of the three advantages for my side?'

The author supposes that our attack means a deployment from 'mass' to 'line of squadron columns,' and then 'form line,' and that it will take some time and space before a formed body is ready to charge. Whereas if the order is given as in the second case (fig. 5), to form 'line to the left' from column of 'masses,' bodies formed for attack at once begin to come up in succession, no gaps should be seen, whilst each formed body to some extent covers the wheel into line of the next. He goes further and ventures the assertion that a leader who has time and the nerve to do so, may first wheel the head of his column of masses and get still nearer to the enemy's flank.

16. Cherfils urges that it is a mistake to be afraid of the first line being outflanked by the enemy's more numerous squadrons in line; so much the better, he says, if they are: the outflankers are all the more surprised when they are caught by your echelons (fig. 3).

Each squadron of the second brigade should be in squadron column, so as to be master of its deployment up to the last moment; it can then act according to the 'apropos' of its attack. Pursuing his point, he derides the idea of alignment being judged from a profile point of view, and says a serrated edge, if it presents in full face the appearance of a living wall, is far preferable.

NOTE.—This reminds one of Von Schmidt's contempt for the inspecting officer who judges the dressing of a squadron from its flank.

As to the deployment for the attack, he says apropos, surprise, rapidity, and precision are the main points to aim at.

NOTE.—From 'Appendix A,' Report on Cavalry Staff Ride, June 1909.

THE FORMATION OF LINE.—The various methods of forming line before the attack should receive careful attention. The principal methods are two: (a) deployment to the front, and (b) wheeling into line towards a flank. The disadvantages of (a) are:—

1. The pace of leading troops must be checked, time is lost, impetus is lost.
2. If the enemy is already in line the distance between the two forces decreases and the danger to troops still in course of deployment increases; therefore, they may be attacked before they are ready, and deployment prevented.
3. If the head comes under artillery fire it is very difficult to deploy in good order; the leading troops are sure to go for the enemy without waiting for the rear to come up.

The advantages of (b) are:—

1. Simultaneous formation of the line is assured.
2. The impetus of the movement is not lessened to so great an extent.
3. The formation in the right direction is more certain; and
4. The possibility of surprise is greatly enhanced, as the enemy is kept in doubt as to the direction of the attack up to the last. The rule should, therefore, be to use the wheel, and only exceptionally to form on the head.

Long gallops in column by the larger units, and changes of direction of the head with the object of wheeling into line in a given direction, should frequently be practised by brigades; formation of column to a flank from a mass should also be practised.

17. SURPRISE.—He enlarges on the advantage a false crest in front of us may confer: the enemy sees us move forward and comes to meet us, but in the intervening valley we move away to a flank, and come from an unexpected direction, and so on. Ruses of this sort, a judicious disposition of echelons, an intelligent use of artillery, and the fortunate utilisation of a *point d'appui* of manœuvre should to a large extent limit the influence of the terrain.

With this comes a word of warning against what he terms 'fortress Cavalry,' who seek by passivity to gain an advantage which is only given to strong effort, stern resolution, and a burning desire to fight and conquer.

18. Rapidity must be sought by doing away with complications, superfluous words of command, and by simplifying procedure, and thus obtaining an automatic unclenching of the masses for the attack.

19. Two conventions which he advises may be added :—

(i) Every wing which is not supported by echelons should place a flank guard of at least a squadron, in squadron column, in rear of its flank.

(ii) Every squadron which is advancing and finds nothing to attack (*dans la vide*), and which cannot fall upon a portion of the enemy as an offensive flank, should remain in column and reserve itself for future action. Given the above, all that remains is the order '*En bataille*.'

20. Finally Cherfils speaks of the execution of the plan. He decries all idea of the divisional general sending orderlies to convey his orders.

Riding alone at the point where he can see best, whilst his staff officer with a flag leads the division, the general officer commanding the division summons the generals of brigades and artillery, whose staffs remain behind, and gives them his idea, after which they gallop off to carry it out. Once more our author brings in the primary point in a Cavalry combat, when he says 'If half the fight depends on the big "R" (Resolution), the other half remains in the big "I" (Idea). Let the Idea talk for itself, and not be stamped out under orders. The latter can veil by their dry formula a clear vision of the end in view.'

21. The questions advanced for the consideration of the Cavalry leaders appear then to be at the present date :—

(i) How far do I agree with Cherfils' deductions ?

(ii) To what extent, if any, are they modified by the increase in value of modern artillery, which we may consider approximately six times better than it was before the introduction of quick-firing guns ?

#### AFTER TEN YEARS' TRIAL.—THE OTHER POINT OF VIEW

##### *An Extract from the French Cavalry Journal of 1908*

Subtle combinations are most easily overthrown by new and unforeseen circumstances ; we must not try to be too cunning. Force and will are the principal factors in war.

The French Cavalry regulations enjoin simplicity above all things, and prohibit the dissemination of small forces, each charged with some special mission.

Let us suppose once more that our Cavalry leader has galloped to the front (which undoubtedly he should have done). He searches the horizon, and studies the terrain. He sees the enemy's Cavalry, a mile or two away, more or less, plenty of dust, a glimpse of the end of his line here and there on the windward side—nearer are seen the usual staff, patrols, *éclaireurs*, all hard to distinguish.

Now what are the enemy's dispositions ? It is extremely hard to make out. Perhaps they are not yet made. All the better, we have the initiative ;

let us avail ourselves of it. Time is short. They are trotting; now they gallop; the interval diminishes.

Our leader determines on his plan, a somewhat complicated one, it is true but he must be in the fashion.

But meanwhile the enemy has made a simple movement to right or left. This has completely changed the value of the intermediate ground.

What is to be done? The orders for our movements have already gone to the brigadiers, thence to regiments, and so on to the squadrons.

Already the leading squadrons feel the breath of the enemy's horses.

The remainder are echeloned in accordance with the Chief's plan. They know that their metier is to support, to overlap, and envelop—but what? They have seen nothing: the others, the leading line, screen everything from their view. Their squadron leaders keep them still in column, although only a few seconds from the enemy, whilst still at the hand gallop. Why blame them? They must know first where to go and what to ride at. The enemy still comes on, and they have little or no time to carry out their rôle.

If there is a shock it will be a feeble one indeed.

Moral effect? Where is it? The point of attack was to be surprised: to show as few as possible, and then overwhelm the enemy suddenly. But if he sees nothing, he fears nothing. If our squadrons are invisible they cannot possibly have any moral effect on the enemy.

Will the care which their intricate evolutions and their undecided objective involves permit them to throw themselves at the enemy's squadrons with dash and determination?

To turn such an attack into a success demands in the first place an extraordinarily good leader. How many de Gallifets have we?

These theoretical plans almost make one side with De Negrier and believe in M.I. tactics. (*La Cavalerie du service de deux ans.*)

But no: let us go back to our former simple tactics of the period just after the 1870 war, instead of these complications, which, even in peace time and however often practised, still seem to call for criticism.

NOTE.—Reference to this see Von Schmidt, 'Instructions for Cavalry,' page 171.

'Thus, once more, we must have steady, leading, resolute action on mistakes or misunderstandings occurring, or when the word of command is misunderstood, rapid perception of the decisive point, and a firm sure hold on the troops in each one's charge.'

## LONG-DISTANCE RIDES IN RUSSIA

THE following account of two experimental rides is summarised from articles in the Russian *Cavalry Journal* of January 15, 1910:—

### AN IMPROMPTU LONG-DISTANCE RIDE

While discussing the necessity for Cavalry to be prepared at all times for all eventualities the idea occurred to some of the officers of the Astrakhan Dragoons that they would ride from Tiraspol, where they were quartered, to Kishinev, a distance of 49 miles, in one day.

Two days later, on December 25, eight officers rode out on their own

VOL. V.—NO. 18.

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horses, which had had no preliminary training other than the ordinary daily work of a regimental officer's charger.

The start was made at 8 A.M. The day was fine. The temperature varied from freezing-point in the early morning to 59° F. at noon.

The first third of the distance was ridden at a walk and trot alternately for five minutes at a time, and the remainder of the distance at a trot for seven minutes and a walk for three minutes, alternately.

The party halted as follows :—(1) 6½ miles, 15 minutes ; (2) 16½ miles, a short halt, horses watered ; (3) 33 miles, 20 minutes, horses watered.

This last stage was left at 1 P.M. in order to complete the 16 miles which remained to Kishinev. The horses were still quite fresh, and were galloped over the last mile and a half, reaching Kishinev at 3 P.M.

The whole distance was covered in seven hours, or, excluding halts, in six hours, showing an average speed of seven or eight miles an hour respectively.

#### LIUTENANT SHIKUTS' RIDE OF 2390 MILES IN 42 DAYS

LIUTENANT SHIKUTS, of a Tartar lancer regiment, who left St. Petersburg on December 13, riding his horse Prizrak, reached Ripin, Poland, on the evening of January 2, thus completing the second half of his long ride of 2390 miles in forty-two days.

This last portion of the journey was made under considerable difficulties owing to the frost. The roads were so slippery that the horse fell more than once, and on one occasion the rider's leg was pinned underneath.

On December 17, near Ostrova, the horse cut his off foreleg so badly as to require veterinary attention and a rest of three days.

On the 22nd the cold made it impossible to start before 11 A.M., and a day's halt was made at Riejitsa for the same reason. The remainder of the route lay *via* Dvinsk, Kovno, Mariampol, Suvalki, Avgustov, Graev, Lomja, Ostrolenka, and Mlava.


On their arrival at Ripin, after a final march of 47½ miles, both horse and rider were in excellent condition. Next day the twenty-year-old horse was examined by a committee of officers, including the colonel commanding the Tartar lancer regiment and a veterinary surgeon, and was found to be none the worse for his long ride of 2390 miles. The condition of his legs and feet could not have been better. During the course of the day Lieutenant Shikuts took him out for two rides of a couple of hours each, when he went quite sound and freely. In the evening he ate 27 lb. of oats. During the journey there were days on which his corn ration amounted to as much as 38½ lb.

#### FIELD SKETCHING


THE sketch facing this page, executed by Corporal Clark, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars, is based on the idea that a scout makes a road sketch as far as point (x), where he finds himself unable to proceed farther on account of the presence of the enemy. He thereupon sketches in the country in front, joining his new work on to the original, thus giving an idea of the country occupied by hostile troops. The idea of this useful reconnaissance originated with Sergeant Anderson, 4th (Q.O.) Hussars. (The sketch was originally done one-third larger, *i.e.* about 9½ inches wide.)

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## FOREIGN

BY an oversight, for which the compiler of these Notes is alone responsible, the last number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL went to press without any expression of regret for or allusion to the recent death of Lieut.-General von Pelet-Narbonne, by whose decease the Cavalry service, and especially Cavalry literature, is to-day the poorer. Born in 1840, he early entered the Cavalry and took part in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870. He commanded in succession the 15th and 33rd Cavalry Brigades, and his last command was that of the 1st Division at Königsberg, after giving up which in 1894 he retired from active service. He then turned to literature and wrote much upon the employment and training of Cavalry, his great work 'Der Kavalleriedienst' being perhaps that best known in foreign armies. For some years past he had edited that well-known classic *Löbells Jahresberichte*, an annual record of everything of military interest in all the armies of the world. In the German army von Pelet-Narbonne will be greatly and deservedly regretted, and among Cavalry men of all nations his death will arouse sincere sympathy.

*Austria.*—Since the beginning of November last a Commission has been assembled to report upon diminishing the weight carried by the troop-horse, a diminution being imperative in view of the necessary increase in the number of cartridges for the future to be carried on the rider. Recommendations have been made as to a lighter picketing gear, girth, and mess-tin, while a new cloak transformable into a section of a tent is under consideration. A bayonet has been approved for the Cavalry—one permanently fixed to the carbine and so hinged as to fold back when not in use. Austrian Cavalry horses at present carry a weight of rather over 20 stone.

*Italy.*—Cavalry machine-gun detachments are now organised in sections, each of two guns on pack mountings; the weights are so arranged that no horse carries a greater load than 88 lbs. The *personnel* comprises 2 officers and 28 other ranks, all of whom are armed with sword and revolver, and the section has 40 horses; 18,000 rounds are carried.

*Germany.*—The *Neueste Nachrichten* announces that this year as an experimental measure a strengthened Cavalry Brigade, to be employed as an independent body, will be formed in the 5th Army Corps. It will consist of three regiments of Cavalry, a horse battery, a machine-gun detachment, and a detachment of pioneers. It is to act in all respects as a small Cavalry Division.

This year the total number of Cavalry squadrons is to be increased to 510 by the creation of two new regiments of Cavalry, each of five squadrons—one to be raised in Prussia and one in Saxony.

It has been decided that for the future the sword shall be carried on the saddle and the carbine on the rider.

It is reported that three new Cavalry schools are about to be established—at Spottau, Soldau and Beeskau respectively.

*Japan.*—Of the 78,420 of this year's recruits, 3940 are for the Cavalry. This number is considerably in excess of that for previous years, and is necessitated by the creation of the two new Cavalry Brigades.

*Russia.*—It has now been decided to arm the Cossacks as well as the regular line Cavalry with bayonets.

The Remount Department is about to be reorganised ; the head will be a senior general officer immediately under the orders of the War Minister. He will be responsible both for Cavalry and Artillery remounts, will make all purchases, arrange for horse-census, also for requisitions for animals and vehicles, and superintend the Government studs. He will have a staff of 13 officers.

*Spain.*—For the future, both at Ceuta and Melilla, three squadrons of Cavalry will be maintained ; the *personnel* of this mounted force at each of these places will be 30 officers and 352 of other ranks, with 340 horses. These will be furnished in turn from regiments in Spain.

*Turkey.*—The 1st (Constantinople) Corps is about to be reconstituted. So far as its Cavalry is concerned it will contain but four regiments, numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th, of which two will be quartered at Scutari and two in the western suburbs of Constantinople at Maslak.

#### THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK-OELS' CORPS.

THIS corps of foreigners was received into British pay in September 1809, and consisted of six troops of Cavalry and twelve companies of Infantry. The whole was commanded by Colonel Wilhelm de Dornberg, and the Cavalry by Lieutenant-Colonel Ernst de Schrader.

The corps saw service in the Peninsula, and at the action at the Crossing of the Bidassoa, when the Duke of Wellington wrote, ' I had particular satisfaction in observing the steadiness and gallantry of all the troops,' it lost one sergeant, six rank and file killed, and one major, two captains, four lieutenants and eighteen rank and file wounded.

Lord F. Bentinck, writing from near Cambris on August 16, 1813, to Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck, observed, ' In obedience to your directions I marched yesterday afternoon with the brigade of Cavalry under my command beyond Nulles and Villabella, and reconnoitred the enemy's column which was advancing upon Valls. As soon as we began to retire the enemy followed us both with Cavalry and Infantry, and a squadron of the 4th Hussars pressed closely upon our rearguard, formed by Captain Wulffen's troop of the Brunswick Hussars, and attempted to charge and overpower it. The enemy was opposed each time with determined spirit and resolution, and Captain Erichsen, with his troop, being sent to the support of Captain Wulffen, the enemy were driven back with the loss of one officer killed, another wounded, and between twenty and thirty men left sabred on the field ; sixteen prisoners and eleven horses fell into our hands. I had sincere pleasure in observing the spirit displayed by the officers and men of the Brunswick Hussars. Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader, at all time zealous, was particularly useful on this occasion in restraining the impetuosity of his men.'

It was not until 1817 that the Cavalry of the Duke of Brunswick-Oels' Corps ceased to form a part of the British Army.

B. E. S.

## THE 3RD (FRENCH) HUSSARS.

THE Esterhazy Regiment of Hussars was raised on February 10, 1764, by Colonel Count Esterhazy. In 1776 it ranked as the 35th Cavalry Regiment in the French Army, and as the fourth of the Hussar Regiments, but in 1789 it became the 5th, and in January 1791 the 3rd in seniority. The uniform of the Regiment was at first green with white facings and white overalls, but in the year 1776 red overalls were introduced.

In 1814 it took the name of the 'Régiment du Dauphin,' and in 1815 that of the 'Régiment de hussards de la Moselle,' but in 1825 it reverted to its former title of the 3rd Regiment of Hussars.

The 3rd Hussars served during the campaign in Flanders in 1792, and formed a portion of the advanced troops at the battle of Valmy on September 20 of that year. After figuring at Austerlitz, Jena, and other well-known battles the Regiment participated in the entry to Berlin in 1806, and afterwards served with great distinction in the Peninsula.

At Belfort in 1815, under command of Colonel Count Moncey, the 3rd Hussars displayed great bravery, charging repeatedly a force numerically ten times stronger than itself. In the third charge Colonel Moncey was wounded.

The illustration shows a bivouac of the Regiment at this time, it is taken from an engraving after Vernet in the possession of the writer. Colonel Moncey was appointed to the command of the 3rd Hussars in 1814 in succession to Colonel Rousseau, and he surrendered it to Colonel de Nadaillac in September 1815.

B. E. S.

## DICK TURPIN'S RIDE TO YORK

How did Dick Turpin's ride on Black Bess compare with long-distance records of recent times? This is a question which I have heard put once or twice, but without any definite reply, and have therefore felt impelled to look into it, and briefly the following is the result.

Dick Turpin was an interesting criminal and did a good deal of horse-stealing and robbery with violence in his time, and was deservedly executed at York in 1739, but he does not appear to have ridden there on Black Bess. The feat attributed to him by Harrison Ainsworth in 'Rookwood' was in reality performed by another equally reputable villain shortly before Turpin's time.

A highwayman, John Nevison, generally known as 'Nicks,' used to frequent the Chatham and London road in 1676, and there he robbed sailors making their way homeward with their pay. Having made a particularly successful haul of this kind close to Gad's Hill one night, he thought it best to get away to some distant spot at once, so that in case of its ever being brought up against him on suspicion he might be able to prove an alibi.

So he made off, at 4 A.M., to Gravesend, and while the ferry-boat was being got ready he fed his horse. Then, crossing the Thames, he rode to Chelmsford, where he rested and gave his horse some balls. Then he rode on through Cambridge and Huntingdon, and finally, with a few halts, to York, where he arrived at a quarter to eight in the evening at the 'Bowling Green,' and showed himself freely among his acquaintances. He had thus ridden

approximately 100 miles in fifteen hours. It rather knocks out the romance of the faithful Black Bess clearing turnpike gates and finally dropping dead in York on safely landing Dick Turpin there.

But the record of Nevison's ride is of interest : it is given in Defoe's 'Tour through Great Britain,' 1753, and in the 'Memoirs of Charles Baron de Pollnitz,' 1733.

R. S. S. B.-P.

### SAINT GEORGE OF KIRKLEATHAM

IN view of the day of the Patron Saint of Cavalry occurring on the 23rd of this month, we present to our readers the reproduction of an exceedingly curious and interesting old carving, which is the property of Mr. Newcomen, Kirkleatham Hall, Yorkshire.

Carved from one solid block of wood are a series of scenes from the story of St. George and his rescue of the Lady Sabrina from the dragon.

That the block is solid is said to have been proved over a century ago by a party of gentlemen at Kirkleatham, who made bets as to whether it was a solid block or that the delicately-carved figures were made separately and glued on. The test by which the case was proved was an heroic one. The entire block was steeped in a huge cauldron of boiling water—but it came out of the ordeal whole and unharmed.

In this wonderful work of art St. George is seen riding up through the forest, heedless of the dangers of the path, till he meets a princess in distress. She implores his protection and help against the dragon. St. George attacks the dragon, while the lady prays for his success.

The lamb beside her is seldom omitted in these old representations : it signifies her purity and innocence. Usually also a lion is somewhere in the background, representing the quality of bravery with which the Saint was invested. He is generally depicted as quite unconcerned with anything that is going on, looking the other way, in fact, but a reserve of power if required—not unlike a London policeman in character.

The last scene in the Kirkleatham block is perhaps the best, where St. George, having saved the maiden, rides homewards down the hill, the action of the horse in 'sliding the slope' being excellent. The lady herself is seen leading the subdued dragon by means of her girdle buckled round its neck. (The girdle has evidently been broken, but the buckle can be seen on the dragon's neck.) She is bringing the monster to her ancestral home, where her father, the king, looks forth from an upper window, and the retainers have even scaled the roof to be out of reach of the dreaded beast.

Of course the whole story is allegorical, but was intended to teach how a knight, imbued with the true spirit of chivalry (cavalry), should pursue the path of duty even though it be beset with difficulties and dangers like a haunted forest, and that in the case of purity, right and distress he should tackle any ugly situation with bravery and energy ; and having done his duty should ride away, without expecting reward, to further good and chivalrous work in the world.

R. S. S. B.-P





ST. GEORGE AND THE DRAGON.





DICK TURPIN

On 'Black Bess' clearing the Hornsey toll-bar, on his adventurous ride from London to York.—('Rookwood.')

## SPORTING NOTES

## RACING

THE Grand Military Meeting at Sandown Park this year was a huge success. Glorious weather prevailed and a record attendance was registered. The sport, the runners, and the riding were excellent. History repeated itself in the victory of Sprinkle Me on the first day for the Gold Cup, ably ridden by Capt. Banbury, and of Kennilworth on the second day, beautifully ridden by his owner, Capt. T. Godman. It is a pity that this fine rider is not oftener seen between the flags. The first race was marred by a bad accident to that celebrated horseman Capt. Percy Bewicke. He has only recently commenced riding in public again and was riding the favourite in the first race. Coming to the front at one of the last flights of hurdles another horse fell in front of his mount and gave him a crushing fall which resulted in broken ribs and a severe crushing. All wish him a speedy recovery with no ill results. The meeting ended with two fine wins by Capt. Paynter on his own horses. Details :—

## FIRST DAY, MARCH 4

THE COOMBE SPRINGS OPEN SELLING HANDICAP HURDLE RACE of 92 sovs.; winner to be sold for 50 sovs. Two miles.

Mr. J. Kelly's b g MARCELLIN, by Marco  
—Bestbelle, 5 yrs, 11st (inc. 7lb ex)  
S. Walkington 1  
Mr. J. Baylis's br g DANDALOO, 6 yrs,  
12st .....E. Piggott 2  
Lady Esme Gordon's ch g AMPHILL,  
6 yrs, 11st 11lb .....W. Bulteel 3  
Mr. Claud Sykes's Gun Barrel, 6 yrs, 12st  
4lb .....Capt. Banbury 0  
Mr. G. Duller's Veno, aged, 11st 5lb  
R. Morgan 0  
Mr. G. A. Prentice's Isthmian, 5 yrs, 11st  
5lb .....Capt. Bewicke 0

Mr. G. W. Smith's Itford, 6 yrs, 11st 4lb  
A. Reader 0  
Mr. D. McCalmont's The Sheikh, aged,  
10st 9lb .....Owner 0  
Capt. F. D. Grissell's Shale, 4 yrs, 10st  
9lb .....D. Morris 0  
Mr. J. F. Hallick's Winkbourne, 4 yrs,  
10st 9lb .....F. Dainty 0  
Capt. S. C. Holland's Galamart, 4 yrs,  
10st 7lb .....G. Goswell 0  
Mr. W. Dawtrey's Nundina, 6 yrs, 10st  
3lb .....G. Clancy 0  
Mr. G. Gully's Waterloo, 4 yrs, 9st 9lb  
(car. 9st 13lb) ....Mr. A. M. Crickett 0

A SELLING STEEPLECHASE of 92 sovs.; weight for age, with allowances; the winner to be sold for 50 sovs., if for 100 sovs. 7lb extra. Two miles.

Mr. C. Noel Newton's b g FLAX FIELD, by  
Bushey Park—Flax, aged, 12st 3lb  
Owner 1  
Capt. S. C. Holland's b g STORMCOCK II.,  
4 yrs, 10st 10lb Mr. A. Fitzgerald 2  
Capt. Michael Hughes's b g RAINHILL,  
6 yrs, 12st 3lb Capt. C. de Crespigny 3

Capt. R. C. de Crespigny's Bush Rose,  
aged, 12st 3lb .....Owner 0  
Capt. L. S. Denny's The Chemist, aged,  
11st 12lb .....Mr. Wyndham 0  
Capt. G. Paynter's More Trouble, aged,  
12st 3lb .....Owner 0

The GRAND MILITARY GOLD CUP of 395 sovs. ; 11st 7lb each, with penalties and allowances. Three miles,

Capt. E. Christie-Miller's b g SPRINKLE ME, by Rapallo, dam by Hackler, aged, 12st 7lb	.....Capt. Banbury 1
Mr. D. McCalmont's b or br g VINEGAR HILL, 5 yrs, 12st	.....Owner 2
His Majesty's ch g BAHADUR, aged, 11st	Major Campbell 3
Mr. J. J. Astor's Schwarmer, aged, 12st 3lb	.....Owner 4
Mr. E. P. Brassey's Barbed Head, 6 yrs, 11st 9lb	.....Owner 0
Col. Holdsworth's Safety Pin II., aged, 12st	.....Capt. Lawson 0
Mr. C. Noel Newton's Downpatrick, aged, 12st	.....Owner 0

Starting Prices: Evens Sprinkle Me, 3 to 1 agst Bahadur, 100 to 12 agst Vinegar Hill, 100 to 7 agst Barbed Head, and 20 to 1 bar four (offered).

Safety Pin II. jumped off at a cracking pace, and speedily held a six-length lead of

Sprinkle Me, Bahadur, Vinegar Hill, and Downpatrick, close up, being next, and Barbed Head bringing up the rear. The last-named fell at the water, and as they passed the stands Vinegar Hill had slightly headed Safety Pin II., with Sprinkle Me and Bahadur next, and Downpatrick still last. The only change after running about two miles was that Schwarmer had drawn into fourth place, but seven furlongs from home Safety Pin II. was well beaten, and Vinegar Hill was closely attended by Sprinkle Me, with Schwarmer and Bahadur side by side, next. After getting over the last jump Sprinkle Me challenged the leader, and gradually wearing him down won a fine race by a length and a half. Bahadur was third, four lengths behind the winner, Schwarmer fourth, and Safety Pin II. walked in last. Time by Benson's chronograph, 6 min. 50 4-5 sec.

The PAST AND PRESENT HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 127 sovs. Two miles and a half.

Sir Peter Walker's br or bl m BAIRGEN BREAC, by the Baker—Rupée, 5 yrs, 10st 9lb	.....Mr. J. Foster 1
Major J. D. Edwards's ch g BURRA SAHIB, aged, 12st 2lb (inc. 7lb ex)	Mr. H. A. Brown 2
Mr. D. McCalmont's b m BALLYMACOLL, 6 yrs, 11st 4lb	.....Owner 3
Mr. F. C. Stern's Bright Park, 6 yrs, 12st 3lb	.....Owner 0
Mr. C. Bewicke's Sachem, aged, 12st (car. 12st 1lb)	.....Capt. R. de Crespigny 0
Mr. C. Bewicke's Blunderbuss, aged, 11st 5lb	.....Owner 0

Capt. Michael Hughes's Vaerdalen, aged, 10st 10lb (car. 10st 11lb)	Capt. C. de Crespigny 0
Lieut.-Col. M. Lindsay's Dream On, 5 yrs, 10st 9lb	.....Mr. C. Walwyn 0
Capt. R. de Crespigny's Alert III., aged, 10st 8lb (car. 10st 9lb)	Mr. A. Fitzgerald 0
Major Kincaid Smith's Tattler II., 5 yrs, 10st 3lb (car. 10st 4lb)	.....Mr. Main 0
Mr. F. Midhurst's Witcracker, 4 yrs, 10st 3lb	.....Major Campbell 0
Mr. C. T. Carfrae's Plain Polly, aged, 10st	Owner 0

A desperate race won by a head.

The MAIDEN HUNTERS' STEEPLECHASE of 68 sovs. ; 12st each, with allowances. Two miles and a half.

Mr. J. J. Astor's b g SIDBROOK, by Whisperer—Clover II., 6 yrs, 11st 9lb	Owner 1
Mr. E. H. Leatham's b g THE AIRSHIP, aged, 11st 4lb	.....Owner 2
Capt. T. Godman's br m MARCH BROWN III., aged, 11st 9lb	.....Owner 3
Lord Gort's Hooligan III., aged, 11st 9lb (car. 11st 12lb)	.....Owner 0
Mr. Malise Graham's Chum, aged, 11st 9lb	.....Owner 0

Capt. A. Horne's Redcoat II., aged, 11st 6lb	.....Mr. Dudgeon 0
Col. Kenna's Hamlet, aged, 12st	Mr. Pilcher 0
Mr. E. R. Nash's Burgundy II., aged, 11st 4lb	.....Owner 0
Major P. A. Skipwith's Evelyn II., aged, 12st	.....Mr. Main 0
Mr. A. Strutt's Magic IV., aged, 12st	Mr. C. N. Newton 0
Mr. G. C. Wynter's Cherry Blossom II., aged, 11st 6lb	.....Owner 0

## SECOND DAY, MARCH 5

The UNITED SERVICE SELLING HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 137 sovs.; the winner to be sold for 50 sovs. Two miles.

Mr. H. Whitworth's br g SHYLOCK II., by Annagor—Mianna, aged, 11st 1lb	Lord Gerard's Ireland's Eye II., aged, 11st 7lb
Mr. J. B. Foster 1	Owner o
Capt. H. Street's b m ALICE DELVIN, aged, 10st 11lb	Capt. Murray's Bonny Success, 6 yrs, 10st 9lb (car. 10st 11lb)
Mr. Walwyn 2	Mr. Main o
Lord Dalmeny's b or br m ROSEGREEN, aged 11st 1lb	Mr. H. Grosvenor's Respited, 6 yrs, 10st 5lb
Capt. C. de Crespigny 3	Owner o
Mr. F. C. Stern's Paul Pry, 6 yrs, 12st 1lb	Mr. H. de Grey Warter's Battle Ground, aged, 10st 9lb
Owner o	Mr. E. Dorman o
Capt. G. Paynter's More Trouble, aged, 11st 13lb (car. 12st 2lb)	Mr. C. T. Carfrae's Plain Polly, aged, 10st 2lb
Owner o	Owner o
Mr. H. A. Brown's Dark Saint, aged, 11st 8lb	Mr. H. J. King's Storm King, aged, 10st 7lb
Owner o	Capt. Banbury o
	Won a good race by three-quarters of a length.

The IMPERIAL CUP (a handicap hurdle race) of 825 sovs. Two miles.

Mr. J. B. Joel's b g BLACK PLUM, by Per-simmon—Princess Athenais, 6 yrs, 11st 5lb (black, scarlet cap)	Mr. G. Gunter's b h Merrythought, by Diamond Jubilee—Guillemot, 6 yrs, 11st 6lb (light blue, black sleeves and cap)
F. Mason 1	Owner o
Mr. H. G. Johnson's b c BRIERY, by Eager—Briar, 4 yrs, 11st 3lb (old gold, black collar, cuffs, cap and buttons)	Mr. W. H. Walker's b h Indian Runner, by Ladas—Pintail, 5 yrs, 11st (blue and white check, cerise cap)
E. Piggott 2	R. Chadwick o
Mr. G. Edwardes's b h VIZ, by Vitez—Mabel II., 6 yrs, 10st 12lb (turquoise, white chevrons, turquoise cap)	Lord Suffolk's br g Tiger II., by Quid-nunc—Tigris Lily, 5 yrs, 10st 12lb (violet, green sleeves, white cap)
A. Newey 3	T. Willmot o
Mr. A. P. Cunliffe's b c Oilskin, by Mackintosh—Terezol, 4 yrs, 10st 6lb (white, black seams and cap)	Mr. J. W. M. Molyneux-McCowan's b m Balavil, by Laveno—Gallinacean, 6 yrs, 10st 12lb
F. Dainty 4	Mr. A. W. Wood o
Mr. R. Tyler's b h Newgrange, by Berrill—Wingfield's Prize, 6 yrs, 12st 9lb (red, amber sleeves, green cap)	Mr. J. F. Lloyd's b g Brookwood, by Quidnunc—Lady Glenwood, aged, 10st 10lb (blue bird's-eye, red cap)
S. Walkington o	Mr. N. Cuthbertson o
Mr. G. A. Prentice's b g Pitsea, by Florizel II.—Pitcroy, 5 yrs, 11st 12lb (crimson and gold, quartered, crimson cap)	Mrs. Charters's b g Broadside, by General Peace—Sweet Charlotte, 5 yrs, 10st 9lb (rose, butcher blue collar, cuffs, and cap)
A. Anthony o	P. Cowley o
Mr. J. D. Cohn's ch g Carnegie, by Fortunio—Bel Esprit, aged, 11st 10lb (turquoise, white hoops, black cap)	Mr. C. R. Hodgson's b g Balbriggan, by Bushey Park—Little Blanche, 6 yrs, 10st 7lb (light blue, black sleeves and cap)
J. Hare o	R. Morgan o
Sir William Cooper's ch h Carlowitz, by Vitez—Carol, 5 yrs, 11st 7lb (orange and white hoops, white cap)	Mr. A. Stedall's b c Combermere, by Ayrshire—St. Uncomber, 4 yrs, 10st 3lb (black and orange, halved)
C. Kelly o	J. Dillon o

**THE GRAND MILITARY HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 224 sovs. Two miles and a half.**

Capt. T. Godman's b g KENNILWORTH, by Ashleaf—Ballylusk, aged, 11st 4lb  
Owner 1  
Mr. D. McCalmont's br g N.B., 6 yrs, 11st 7lb .....Owner 2  
Mr. Claud Sykes's ch g WAND, 6 yrs, 10st 13lb .....Capt. Banbury 3  
Sir T. Gallwey's Leinster, aged, 12st 5lb  
Major D. G. Campbell o  
Mr. J. Orr-Ewing's Red Scot, aged, 11st 3lb .....Mr. Graham o  
Col. Holdsworth's Safety Pin II., aged, 11st 1lb .....Capt. A. Lawson o  
Mr. E. P. Brassey's Barbed Head, 6 yrs, 10st 12lb (car. 10st 13lb)  
Capt. C. de Crespigny o  
Capt. R. Hamilton-Stubber's Killester, aged, 10st 6lb .....Mr. Walwyn o  
Mr. M. Thorneycroft's Aberdonian, aged, 10st .....Owner o  
Starting Prices: 7 to 4 agst Leinster, 4 to 1 each agst N.B. and Kennilworth, 6 to 1 agst Wand, 7 to 1 agst Barbed Head and 100 to 8 bar five (offered).

On settling down Kennilworth was clear of Red Scot, Safety Pin II., and Leinster, Wand being last. As they came past the stands N.B. had gone into second place, his nearest attendants being Killester, Barbed Head, and Safety Pin II., Wand still bringing up the rear. When half the distance had been covered Killester became second, followed by N.B., Safety Pin II., Barbed Head, and Leinster in that order. At the third fence on the far side of the course, Barbed Head made a bad blunder and left Leinster in third position just in front of N.B. Approaching the pay-gate Leinster took up the running, but was soon headed by N.B. The latter was repassed by Kennilworth between the last two fences and he beat N.B. easily by four lengths; Wand was third, a couple of lengths behind the second. Killester was fourth, Safety Pin II. fifth, Leinster sixth, and Barbed Head last. Time by Benson's chronograph, 5 min. 30 3-5 sec.

**THE TALLY-HO STEEPLECHASE of 68 sovs.; 12st each, with penalties and allowances. Three miles.**

Capt. G. Paynter's ch g R.I.C., by Quidnunc—dam by Brown Prince, aged, 12st 7lb .....Owner 1  
Mr. J. J. Astor's b g SIDBROOK, 6 yrs, 12st 2lb .....Owner 2  
Mr. E. H. Leatham's b g THE AIRSHIP, aged, 12 st .....Owner 3  
Mr. C. Noel Newton's Downpatrick, aged, 13st 7lb .....Owner o  
Mr. M. Graham's Weathercock II., aged, 12st 9lb .....Owner o  
Mr. Colwyn Phillips's Starlight VIII., aged, 12st 2lb .....Owner o  
Mr. B. Birkbeck's Insham, 5 yrs, 11st 4lb (car. 11st 6lb) .....Owner o

Capt. J. H. Gibbons's Petone, 5 yrs, 11st 4lb .....Owner o  
Capt. A. Horne's Red Coat II., aged, 11st 4lb .....Mr. Dudgeon o  
Col. Kenna's Twister II., aged, 11st 4lb  
Capt. Pilcher o  
Mr. V. H. Simon's Canny Mon, 6 yrs, 11st 9lb .....Owner o  
Mr. G. C. Wynter's Cherry Blossom II., aged, 11st 4lb (car. 11st 7lb) ..Owner o  
A good race, won by a length and a half.

**A MAIDEN STEEPLECHASE of 87 sovs.; weight for age, &c. Two miles and a half.**

Capt. G. Paynter's b g ROMER, by Black Duck—Theobroma, aged, 12st 7lb  
Owner 1  
Mr. D. McCalmont's BALLYMADUN, 4 yrs, 10st 5lb .....Owner 2  
Capt. S. G. Holland's b g STORMCOCK II., 4 yrs, 10st 10lb .....Mr. Walwyn 3  
Capt. R. C. de Crespigny's Rex, aged, 12st 7lb .....Owner o

Mr. E. P. Brassey's Wardstown, aged, 11st 4lb .....Owner o  
Mr. R. McGillicuddy's Grenadilla II., aged, 11st 12lb .....Owner o  
Mr. T. H. Sebag-Montifiore's Bulawayo, 4 yrs, 10st 5lb .....Mr. Sandeman o  
Won cleverly by a couple of lengths.

At the West Norfolk Hunt races, which were patronised by Her Majesty the Queen and Princess Victoria, the King's Cup was won for the third time by Mr. J. A. Keith. The Prince of Wales's Cup and the West Norfolk Plate were won by Mr. Malise Graham's (16th Lancers) Chum, Mr. R. A. J. Beech, of the same regiment riding. These steeplechases of  $2\frac{1}{4}$  and 3 miles respectively followed each other, and in neither race did Chum start first or second favourite. Her Majesty presented the King's Cup to Mr. Keith and congratulated him on his many wins. A Military Steeplechase was won by Mr. G. C. Poole's Bob Sawyer (owner).

At the Folkestone Races the Military Hunters' Steeplechase was won by Lord Gerard's Silent II. (owner).

The Royal Artillery annual meeting at Aldershot was as usual most popular and sporting. The weather was all that could be desired, and there was a large and aristocratic gathering. The going was hard and unfortunately two riders had the misfortune to break their collar-bones. In the opening event, despite breaking his collar-bone, Mr. C. F. Lawrence pluckily remounted and finished third. Results :

The R.A. Welter Steeplechase : Col. F. V. Wing's Fusee II. (owner), 1.

Open Handicap Steeplechase : Mr. D. McCalmont's Ballymacoll (owner), 1.

The Royal Artillery Gold Cup : Mr. C. T. Walwyn's Andora (owner). There were six runners, only three completing the course.

The R.A. Ubique Plate : Mr. F. Medhurst's Witcracker (Mr. C. T. Walwyn), 1 ; Major Kincaid Smith's Tattler II. (Mr. A. K. Main), 2. This was a fine well-ridden race, won by a neck. Mr. Medhurst presented a splendid cup for this race, but, winning it himself, presented it to the second.

The R.A. Light-Weight Steeplechase : Mr. T. Sandeman's Rifle Green (Mr. Denby), 1.

#### RACING ABROAD

**SOUTH AFRICA.**—At the Johannesburg Summer Meeting, Lord Douglas Compton (9th Lancers) won the Transvaal Handicap with Macristine, Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams's Mist being second, and Major J. Cooper's Tirlevallen won the Goldfields Handicap. Most of Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams's horses were offered by auction at the meeting as, owing to the appointment of a Governor-General, he is leaving South Africa. His departure will be keenly felt by racing people and as a thorough sportsman he will be greatly missed.

#### POINT-TO-POINT STEEPLECHASES

The Grand Military Point-to-Point races, by kind permission of the Duke of Beaufort and the Badminton Hunt, were held this year at Calne, in Wiltshire. Beautiful weather was experienced, but the going was heavy, and there were several nasty accidents, three or four valuable horses being lost.

The Army and Navy Light-Weight Steeplechase brought out no fewer than thirty-three starters, the entries numbering forty-seven. Mr. E. H. Leatham's (12th Lancers) The Airship was an easy winner, with Mr. A. S. Summers' (19th Hussars) Cossack IV. second, and Mr. H. S. Scott's (4th Hussars) Bantam third. Unfortunately in this event Mr. W. S. Pilcher, of the Grenadier

Guards, came down heavily three fences from home, his horse being killed and he himself sustaining a broken thigh. In the Welter event there were twenty-five starters. Colonel T. L. N. Morland's (King's Royal Rifles) Dominion was first, Col. H. M. Grenfell's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Montague second, and Col. G. Forestier-Walker's (Royal Field Artillery) Ned II. third.

Three teams representing the Royal Wilts and the North Somerset Yeomanry and the Royal Field Artillery competed in the South-Western Mounted Brigade Race for Col. Le Roy Lewis's Cup, and the first-named were easy winners, Major Ulric O. Thynne's Fanciboy and Capt. R. F. Fuller's Monastery, both of the Royal Wilts, being first and second respectively. The Duke of Beaufort, Col. F. C. Keyser, and Col. Le Roy Lewis were the judges; Mr. R. Carnaby-Foster and Col. S. H. Toogood acted as clerks of the course; and Capt. Gilbert Henry was the starter.

The 5th Dragoon Guards held their Point-to-Points on the old Fairyhouse racecourse with the following results:—

The Subaltern Cup: Mr. R. C. Partridge's Rush (owner). Ten ran.

An Open Race: Capt. Chippendal Higgins's Rathnagan (Mr. K. Potter). Sixteen ran.

The Regimental Cup: Capt. M. A. Black's The Spider (owner). Sixteen ran.

The 5th Lancers races took place in conjunction with the York and Ainstey Hunt over a course about five miles from York. The course was a stiff one, but in splendid going order, and several thousand persons witnessed some capital racing. Results:—

5th Lancers Regimental Light-Weight Cup: Mr. E. H. Sleight's Tiny (owner). Thirteen ran.

The York and Ainstey Cup: Mr. J. Wormald's Royal Kendal (owner). Fourteen ran.

5th Lancers Regimental Heavy-Weight Cup: Major Jardine's Jim Hickey (owner). Nine ran.

The joint races of the Herts Yeomanry and Mr. G. R. Smith-Bosanquet's Hunt were held at Northants. Results:—

Yeomanry Officers' Cup: The Earl of Essex's Gipsy Hall (Capt. Sheppard).

Mr. Smith-Bosanquet's Cup: Mr. G. Roddick's Sherborne (Mr. C. Roddick).

Herts Yeomanry Race: Corp. Slyfield's Bricket Lass (owner).

The Irish Army Point-to-Point races took place at Two-mile House, co. Kildare.

The Light-Weight Cup presented by His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant brought out twenty-five starters. A splendid race resulted in Capt. J. B. George's (Royal Irish Regiment) Bective (owner) winning by three-quarters of a length from Capt. N. P. R. Preston's (R.F.A.) Yorkshire Relish (owner), with Mr. J. Bagwell's (Norfolk Regiment) Countess of Cork (owner) a length off third.

The Welter Cup presented by Gen. the Right Hon. Sir Neville G. Lyttelton, G.C.B., commanding the forces, secured twelve starters and was won by Capt. F. W. Hunt's (A.V.C.) Samson (owner), Mr. J. K. O'Malley's (R.F.A.) The Prince (Mr. K. M. Potter) second, and Mr. A. H. Connell's (Royal Scots



Fusiliers) Stringhalt (owner) third. Won by three lengths, two lengths between second and third.

A Match between the North Irish Horse and Kildare Hunt, with teams of three aside, was won by the Kildare Hunt by thirteen points to eight. Mr. H. B. Alexander's (K.H.) Sonny first, Mr. E. C. Herdman's (N.I.H.) Ellistown second, Capt. W. A. Pallin's (K.H.) Red Stain third. Won by three-quarters of a length, six lengths between second and third.

The 18th Hussars Point-to-Point races were held at Doncany, co. Kildare. Results :—

Regimental Race : Mr. C. V. Alcock's Rushlight (owner). Twelve ran.

Open Race : Major Dixon's Midnight Hour (Capt. H. Dixon). Ten ran.

Chargers' Race : Mr. Gore Langton's Beeswing (Mr. Joynson). Eight ran.

The annual steeplechases of the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and the Royal Horse Guards took place near Melton Mowbray in conjunction with the Quorn Hunt Steeplechases. The programme included six events, which attracted 153 entries. A large company assembled, and Capt. Forester, Master of the Quorn, and Mrs. Forester entertained many guests, including the Duke and Duchess of Teck. Results :—

Royal Horse Guards Steeplechase : Viscount Castlereagh's Combersmore (owner), 1. Thirteen ran.

Quorn Hunt Light-Weight Steeplechase : Mr. T. E. Brooks' Jim (owner), 1. Fourteen ran.

1st Life Guards Steeplechase : Mr. J. J. Astor's Coptic (owner), 1. Although carrying a stone overweight, Coptic won by ten lengths. Unfortunately Mr. J. G. Leigh's The Irishman fell and broke its back. Fourteen ran.

2nd Life Guards Steeplechase : Mr. Newton's Silver Penny (owner), 1. Eleven ran.

Quorn Heavy-Weight Steeplechase : Mr. R. L. Fenwick's Ben Nevis (Mr. T. E. Brooks), 1. Twelve ran.

The Mounted Infantry Point-to-Point races were at Farringdon in the H.H. country.

The Chargers' Sweepstakes, for officers' horses serving at Longmoor and Bordon and hunted with the Woolmer Drag Hounds, brought out a field of sixteen. It was won by Capt. M. J. M. Campbell's (Connaught Rangers) Kathleen.

Thirty-two turned out for the Inter-Battalion Cup, a popular victory being Mr. N. G. S. McGrath's (Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) Emma Gee.

The combined Grafton Hunt, Brigade of Guards Inter-Regimental, Queen's Bays, and Royal Bucks Hussars races took place near Astwell Mill in the heart of the Grafton country. Good entries and beautiful weather ensured a most successful sporting meeting. Results :—

Brigade of Guards Inter-Regimental Race : Capt. Paynter's Crecora (owner), Scots Guards, 1 ; Mr. Pilcher's Talbot (Mr. Pike), Grenadier Guards, 2 ; Mr. Hopwood's Gayton (owner), Coldstream Guards, 3. The Coldstream Guards won on points. Fifteen ran.

Queen's Bays Welter : Lieut.-Col. Kirk's Priestess (Capt. Browning). Seven ran.



Queen's Bays Light-Weights: Mr. Sneyd's Algasine (owner). Thirteen ran.  
Royal Bucks Hussars Race: Trpr. W. Seaton's Chance VI.

The Royal Artillery Point-to-Points were run in the H.H. country. The Light-Weight Race was won by Mr. C. C. Anstey's St. James (owner). Eleven runners. The Heavy-Weight Race was won by Col. G. Forestier-Walker's Ned II. Seven ran. An open race brought out twenty runners, and after a splendid finish Mr. G. R. Elliott (3rd Dragoon Guards) on Brownie won by a length.

At the 3rd Rifle Brigade and Royal West Kent Regimental meeting near Alton, in the H.H. country, there was a fine open race, which secured twenty-six runners, and was won on the post by Mr. G. K. Worthington's (3rd Dragoon Guards) Shield (owner).

The Royal Scots Greys and Royal Artillery Bulford races were held near Swindon.

The R.A. and R.A. Bulford Welter Race was won by Major G. H. Geddes's Royal Monte, and Major Geddes also won the R.A. Bulford race. The Royal Scots Greys Cup was won by Lord Ebrington's Nell.

The R.A. and R.A. Bulford Light-weight Race was won by Col. H. S. Horne's Sportsman, and the Charger Race by Capt. F. C. Bryant's Kitty.

The Northamptonshire Yeomanry Steeplechase took place at the Pytchley Hunt Meeting, and was won by Trooper C. W. Townsend's Bobs (owner).

The Staff College Point-to-Points were held near Brecknell. Results:—

Light-weight Race: Capt. H. H. C. Johnson's (60th Rifles) Snowstorm (owner). Nineteen ran. Soldiers' Race:—Major S. F. Mott's (60th Rifles) Proposition (owner). Heavy-weight Race: Capt. A. D. Green's (Worcestershire Regt.) Melrose.

The Shorncliffe Drag Hunt Races were held near the Folkestone Race-course, a large number of spectators being present. Results: Heavy-weight Race: Mr. N. E. Rycroft's (11th Hussars) Soho (owner). Light-weight Race: Major T. T. Pitman's (11th Hussars) Dunmoe. Open Race: Mr. G. W. Aylmer's (4th Dragoon Guards) Hilda (owner).

The 11th Hussars races, held at Smeeth, resulted as follows:—

Regimental Light-Weight Race: Mr. A. F. Peyton's Autumn Leaf, 1.

Regimental Heavy-Weight Race: Mr. J. Lowther's Best, 1.

Open Race: Capt. Pilcher's Despair, 1.

Subalterns' Light-Weight Race: Mr. A. F. Peyton's Gibson Girl, 1.

Subalterns' Heavy-Weight Race: Mr. J. Lowther's Best, 1.

The Earl of Chester's Imperial Yeomanry held their races near Eaton Hall. The Regimental Cup, presented by the Duke of Westminster, was won by Lieut. de Koop's Best Friend (owner), the Duke of Westminster's Wedge (owner) being second. The Duke of Westminster had previously won the cup about half a dozen years in succession. Sergt. Rutter's Trilby (owner) won Col. Lord A. Grosvenor's cup in the N.C.O.s' and Troopers' Race. After the races the Cheshire Hounds, under the mastership of the Duke of Westminster, met in the quadrangle of Eaton Hall.

The South Notts Hussars Regimental Cup was run for at the Earl of Harrington's Hunt Races at Woodborough and won by Sergt. Wagstaffe's Little Pop (owner).

The South Staffordshire Yeomanry Challenge Cup was run for at the Hunt Races, near Lichfield, and resulted in a win for Mr. W. H. Webb's Grey Bird (owner).

The Mounted Infantry Races took place at Basing Park. Results :—

Open Sweepstakes : Mr. G. H. Phipps Hornby's (Rifle Brigade) Cornet (owner). Ten ran.

The M.I. Heavy-Weight Cup : Capt. Disney-Watt's (Leicester Regt.) Langton (owner). Twelve ran.

The M.I. Light-Weight Cup : Mr. R. E. Phillip's (19th Royal Irish Regt.) Prince Rupert (owner). Eighteen ran.

### POLO

A much-needed third polo ground is in course of construction at Aldershot which will be greatly to the advantage of all regiments when quartered at Aldershot. The expenses entailed by the Polo Club are consequently heavy, and all regiments are requested to contribute a small subscription of 5*l.* towards this expense. For the sake of sport, and Army Polo in particular, it is hoped that all regiments will kindly assist. Donations will be received and acknowledged by the manager, Capt. B. Liebert, Braeside, South Farnborough.

The American Polo Association, in reply to the provisional challenge for the International Polo Cup sent by the Hurlingham Polo Committee, telegraphed that it accepted, provided the formal challenge was received not later than June 1. The Hurlingham Polo Committee accordingly selected Capt. J. Hardress Lloyd as captain of the English team to compete, with full powers to select the team, and such additional players as it may be desirable to send. Captain Lloyd having accepted the invitation of the Hurlingham Committee, has selected Viscount Valentia, Major-General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, and Major F. Egerton Green to act as his advisory committee.

We hear by cablegram that the English team recently taken out to California by Mr. Gill, and for which several officers of the 20th Hussars were playing, has won the Spreckles Cup and the Polo Championship of California.

On the cordial invitation of the Americans a Hurlingham team has lately crossed the Atlantic to take part in the Lakewood Polo Club Tournament (April 1 to 20) at Georgian Court, the seat of Mr. J. Gould, New Jersey. It consists of Capt. Belville, 16th Lancers, Capt. de Crespigny, 2nd Life Guards, Capt. E. D. Miller, and Mr. W. S. Buckmaster, with Major the Hon. J. Beresford, 7th Hussars, as reserve man. Messrs. Whitney, Milburn, Waterbury, and Stoddard and many other good sporting Americans will be competing, and these kind hosts are mounting the players.

### POLO ABROAD

The Inter-Regimental Tournament, Egypt, played at Cairo, secured an entry of seven teams, viz. two from the 7th Dragoon Guards, two from the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade, two from the 3rd Coldstream Guards, and one from the 1st Yorkshire Regiment. The final between the two teams of the 7th Dragoon Guards resulted in a win for the second team by 4 goals to 3.

1st team : Capt. Mansel, Capt. Whetherly, Major Clay and Capt. Lindsay.  
2nd team : Lieuts. Watson, Lane, Wood, and Finlay.

The final for the Subalterns' Cup was between the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards and the 7th Dragoon Guards team, which comprised the same quartette that won the Inter-Regimental. Contrary to expectations, the Coldstream Guards won by 5 goals to 4.

Coldstream Guards : Lieuts. Lord Fielding, A. G. Tritton, G. A. Campbell, and H. D. Bentinck.

*South Africa.*—The Christmas Tournament at Johannesburg (Rhodes Cup) secured an entry of six teams, viz. : 3rd and 15th Hussars, 9th Lancers, Bloemfontein Garrison, Pretoria Polo Club, and Rand Polo Club.

The Pretoria Polo Club, for whom Major Fitzgerald was a host in himself, defeated the 9th Lancers by 6 goals to 5, and the Rand Polo Club by 5 goals to 1, but after a fine game for the final with the 15th Hussars were defeated by 7 goals to 6. At the call of time the score was 6 goals all, but in the play off the Hussars hit the winning goal. It was a fine performance of the 15th Hussars, starting a team and winning so soon after their arrival from India.

Teams : 15th Hussars—Mr. C. H. Whittle, Mr. R. Osborne, Mr. R. Barry, and Major L. E. Kennard (back). Pretoria Polo Club—Mr. A. D. Graham (9th Lancers), Col. F. W. B. Koe, C.B. (A.S.C.), Capt. J. C. Browne (A.S.C.), Major G. J. Fitzgerald (R.H.G.) (back).

News of the Indian Inter-Regimental Polo Tournament, played at Meerut, has just come to hand. In the semi-finals the King's Dragoon Guards, represented by Messrs. Hawkins, Wienholt, Leslie Cheape, and Capt. Wickham (back), defeated the 17th Lancers, represented by Major Tilney, Capt. Melville, Major Cardew, and Capt. Lockett (back), by 4 goals to 3, after a fine, fast game. In the other semi-final the 10th Hussars—Capt. Annesley, Mr. Palmes, Col. Vaughan, and Mr. Palmer (back)—defeated the Inniskilling Dragoons—Messrs. Colemore, Burnham, Capt. Ritson, and Mr. Bowen (back)—by 5 goals to 3. It was a grand game, but the Inniskillings made rather erratic shooting or, report says, might have won outright.

In the final the 10th Hussars somewhat easily beat the K.D.G.s by nine goals to four, and so for the fourth year in succession carried off the Cup. They are a splendid team, magnificently mounted, all their ponies being well bred and fast enough to win races in addition to being beautifully schooled. The 12th Lancers also put a good team into the Tournament, but were unlucky to draw the 10th Hussars in the first round, and not having the best of luck the 10th somewhat easily defeated them.

The Subalterns' Tournament followed the Inter-Regimental at Meerut, and the 10th Hussars were again the victors, defeating the 12th Lancers in the final by 3 goals to 2 after a splendid game. Fifteen minutes extra time had to be played before the 10th secured the winning goal.

Teams : 10th Hussars—2nd Lieut. M. A. de Tuyll, Lieut. E. W. E. Palmes, Lieut. R. C. Gordon Canning, and Lieut. W. L. Palmer. 12th Lancers—Lieut. C. E. Bryant, Lieut. R. S. R. Wyndham-Quin, Lieut. B. G. Nicholas, and Lieut. R. B. Wood.

The Punjab Frontier Force Tournament final lay between the 23rd Cavalry and the Guides Cavalry, the former winning after a fine match by 3 goals to 2.

Teams: 23rd Cavalry—Mr. Paske, Capt. Strettall, Capt. Egerton, and Mr. Gannon (back). Guides Cavalry—Capt. Wylly, Major Davies, Mr. Browne, and Capt. Carey (back).

It is reported from India that the Maharajah of Cooch Behar is organising a polo team to visit England this season and afterwards to go to America. It is also reported that Count de Madre, who has been wintering in India, intends taking his Tigers to India, and that his team will include Capt. F. W. Barrett (15th Hussars), Capt. B. H. Matthew-Lannowe (4th Dragoon Guards), Mr. L. St. C. Cheape (King's Dragoon Guards), and Mr. W. E. Palmes (10th Hussars).

*India.*—The final of the Indian Army Infantry Polo Tournament was between the 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas and the 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas. An interesting game resulted in a win for the 2nd Gurkhas by 2 goals to 1.

The Indian Polo Association Championship was played for as usual at Calcutta in Christmas week. The teams competing were Calcutta Club, Kishengarh Durbar, Viceroy's Staff, 1st Royal Dragoons, 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, 2nd Rifle Brigade, and the Pilgrims.

The final between the Calcutta Club and the Maharajah of Kishengarh's team produced a grand game. Both teams were well mounted and disciplined, and the combination on both sides was splendid. The score was 4 goals all within two minutes of time, when Campbell scored twice in quick succession and secured victory for the Calcutta Club by 6 goals to 4. The umpires were General Mahon and Capt. Ritson (Inniskilling Dragoons).

The spectators included the Viceroy and Lady Minto, a large gathering of the Indian population, and all Calcutta society. At the conclusion of the game Lady Minto graciously presented the Challenge Cup and four small replicas to the winners.

Teams: Calcutta P. C.—Capt. H. Campbell (the Guides), Mr. C. W. N. Graham, Capt. F. W. Barrett (15th Hussars), Mr. F. St. J. Atkinson (9th Hodson's Horse) (back). Kishengarh Durbar—Kunwar Ratan Singh, Thakore Rewat Singh, Maharajah of Kishengarh, Moti Lal (back).

Sixteen Regiments entered for the Native Cavalry Tournament at Lucknow. The final was one of several close and exciting finishes and lay between the 39th Prince of Wales' Own Central Indian Horse and the 26th Prince of Wales' Own Light Cavalry, the former winning by 5 goals to 3. They were represented by their sporting chief, Col. Watson, C.I.E., Khan Bahadur Jemadar Mahomed, a fine player, Capt. Hewlett, and Capt. Todd. Next year they may go for the Inter-Regimental.

The 10th Hussars won the final of the Lahore Polo Tournament, beating the 12th Lancers by 10 goals to 2.

The Bombay Tournament was won by the 34th Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse.

The Lucknow Tournament secured an entry of nine teams. The final between the 12th Lancers and Pilgrims was won by the former by 9 goals to 3. The 15th Hussars (the holders) were unable to compete. Unfortunately Kunwar Ratan Singh playing for the Pilgrims fell in the second chukker, breaking his collar-bone, and Prince Hitendra took his place.

That celebrated polo regiment, the 1st Durham Light Infantry, won the  
VOL. V.—NO. 18.

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Infantry Tournament at Lucknow, defeating the 2nd Gordon Highlanders in the final by 6 goals to 1.

The saddest news from India is the death of Colonel Sladen, commanding the East Yorkshire Regiment, who was killed in a station game at Fyzabad. His loss is a great one and deeply regretted.

### FOOTBALL

A magnificent match between officers of the Navy and officers of the Army took place in the presence of the Prince of Wales at the Queen's Club. It was a distinguished gathering for a distinguished game. Many eminent Rugby Unionists surrounded the Prince, who was received by the President (the Earl of Clarendon) and Mr. E. A. Stoddart (the Secretary) and given a loyal welcome by thousands of spectators.

With a glorious spring afternoon and turf in first-rate order, a fine, clean, hard match of the best sporting 'Rugger' was witnessed. There was a great deal of excellent forward play of the robust type. The Navy excelled in the tight, in getting possession, but the Army was swift in the break up, and many of their close rushes were very effective. It was anybody's game up to the finish, when the Navy came off victorious by two goals, three tries (19 points) to the Army's two goals (10 points).

The forward play, the keenness and intelligence of the halves, the tackling, always something to remember, were the features of a most enjoyable match.

### THE ARMY CUP—(RUGBY)

The Prince of Wales witnessed a terrifically hard final tie for the Army Cup at Twickenham between the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment and the 1st Leicestershire Regiment. The Gloucesters won by a try to nil. Play was continued through two strenuous 'forties' as well as an extra half hour, but both teams looked little the worse for it. The enthusiasm was great, and both sides gave a fine exhibition of pace, courage, tremendous tackling and remarkable stamina. Time arrived with no score, but in the extra half-hour Corpl. James, in a short dribble, hurled himself across with two opponents clinging to him and secured the try for the Gloucesters. It was, however, wide out and Miller could not convert. At the conclusion his Royal Highness, who was accompanied by Major-General Heath, President of the Army R.U., handed the Cup to Capt. Pagan, whom he heartily congratulated. Medals were also presented to both sides, each being greeted with salvoes of applause.

### (ASSOCIATION)

The final match in the Army Cup Competition (Association football) was decided at Aldershot in the presence of their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales, the Princess Mary, and about 25,000 spectators. The finalists were the Royal Marine Light Infantry from Gosport and the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers (Aldershot) the holders. It was a fine match, which resulted in a win for the R.M.L.I. by two goals to nil. The Princess of Wales graciously presented the cup and medals.

## CAVALRY CUP (ASSOCIATION)

In the semi-finals the 21st Lancers at Fulham defeated the 5th Lancers by three goals to nil.

The 3rd Dragoon Guards, after tying with the 19th Hussars, replayed at Aldershot, and on this occasion won the match.

The final between the 21st Lancers and the 3rd Dragoon Guards took place before a large crowd on Monday, April 4, at Fulham. It was a good hard, exciting game, and at the close, although extra time was played, the result was a draw of one goal each, which necessitated another meeting. This was held on the following day, when after a stern struggle of three hours' duration, the Lancers proved victorious by one goal to none.

After the match the cup was presented by Brig.-General Kavanagh (Commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade, Aldershot). Teams :

21st Lancers : Pte. Strickland (goal), Pte. Aitken and Corpl. Moss (backs), Pte. Fryer, Sergt. Pring, and Sergt. Jones (half-backs), Pte. Sparling, Pte. Grant, Pte. Cox, Pte. Durham, and Corpl. Simpson (forwards).

3rd Dragoon Guards : Lieut. Cliff (goal), Corpl. Stewart and Corpl. Atkins (backs), Pte. Shaw, Sergt. Cox and Sergt. Jenkins (half-backs), Bandsman Rowe, Bandsman Bolsover, Pte. Allen, Pte. Watson, and Pte. Barnes (forwards).

## FOOTBALL (ABROAD)

The final for the 19th Hussars Cup (Association football) at Rawalpindi was between the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers and the 2nd Black Watch. It resulted in a tie of one all after ten minutes extra play. In the replay the Northumberland Fusiliers won by a goal, and Lady Milbank presented the Cup to them.

## HOCKEY

The second annual match between the Navy and Army at Beckenham resulted in an easy victory for the Navy by five goals to one. Last year the Army won by seven to two, but this year the Navy showed vastly improved form. The game was vigorously contested on both sides, with plenty of hard hitting, but the long drives of the Navy halves and backs were generally made with more judgment than those of their opponents.

## ARMY TOURNAMENT

The final between the 1st Bedfordshire Regt. and the Army Service Corps took place at Beckenham, and after a vigorous game resulted in a win for the Bedfordshires by three goals to nil. The Bedfordshires were the holders and can now boast an undefeated record extending over two seasons.

India. The Eastern Command Native Army Hockey Tournament resulted in a win for the 33rd Punjabis, who defeated the Brahmans in the final by three goals to one.

## BILLIARDS

The final stage of the Amateur Billiard Championship was played at Glasgow, when Mr. Lonsdale wrested the championship from Major Fleming, the holder. The hall was packed, and both men played splendid billiards, the winner making as his highest breaks, 79 and 102, while Major Fleming scored 65, 100 and 96. The final scores were : Lonsdale, 2,000 ; Fleming, 1,882.

## INTERNATIONAL HORSE SHOWS

We publish with this number a plan of the Jumping Course to be used at the International Horse Show at Olympia this year, June 6 to 16.

It will be noticed that the dimensions of the arena and the distance between the jumps are the same as last year, also that most of the jumps are the same. The rampart, dummies, logs, and guns have been done away with, and an Irish bank added.

The other jumps are the bush fence, triple bar, wall, wattel, gates, post and rails, and railway crossing. The distance between the gates of this fence should be carefully noted. The Course at the Royal Naval and Military Tournament, May 16-June 1, will be similar to this, except that there will be no bank.

There is also to be a Wide Jump Competition and a competition for pairs of officers, as well as the High Jump, at the International Horse Show.

British officers competing at the International Horse Show, either in the jumping classes or any of the others, such as Chargers, Hacks, Hunters, Polo Ponies, &c., will have free entry, stabling, forage, and transit of horses to and from Olympia, free luncheon and tea, and seats for themselves and wives on the days on which they are competing.

The other International Horse Shows to which it is hoped to send representatives are :—

Paris, March 20 to April 12.  
Rome, May.  
Madrid, May.  
Barcelona, June.  
Lucerne, July.  
Ostend, August.  
San Sebastian, November.

Brussels, May 10 to 27.  
Buenos Ayres, commencing May 10.  
Olympia, London, June 6 to 16.  
The Hague, July 4 to 11.  
Varsovic, Russia, July.  
Spa, August.

The authorities of the Buenos Ayres Horse Show undertake to pay all expenses of officers attending, and request that horses of competitors should reach Buenos Ayres one month before the opening of the show.




It is very much to be hoped that this year our officers will give a good account of themselves at these Shows.

Further information can be obtained from the President, International Jumping Competition Committee at the Horse Guards, London, S.W.

# INTERNATIONAL HORSE SHOW

## OLYMPIA JUNE 6<sup>TH</sup> - 16<sup>TH</sup> 1910

### DIAGRAM OF JUMPS



SKETCH-PLAN OF COURSE














TABLE OF METRICAL EQUIVALENTS

100 yds	= 91.44 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
50 yds	= 45.72 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
25 yds	= 22.86 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
10 yds	= 9.14 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
5 yds	= 4.57 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
2 yds	= 1.83 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1 yd	= 0.91 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1/2 yd	= 0.46 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1/4 yd	= 0.23 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1/8 yd	= 0.11 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1/16 yd	= 0.06 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1/32 yd	= 0.03 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds
1/64 yd	= 0.01 m	1 m	= 1.09 yds



NOTE: The Secretary reserves the right to alter, amend, or add to the above diagram of course.  
The dimensions indicated are approximate, and may vary in detail from time to time.

EXHIBIT: Secretary International Horse Show  
12, Avenue de la République, Paris 12


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## THE A.S.C. CIRCUS.

ON March 10th, 11th, and 12th, in the A.S.C. Riding School, Woolwich, and on the 18th and 19th in the A.S.C. Riding School, Stanhope Lines, Aldershot, performances were given by the Army Service Corps, in aid of the A.S.C. Compassionate and the 19th Hussars' Cottage Homes Funds, a similar entertainment having been given on March 16th for the 19th Hussars at the South Cavalry Barracks, Aldershot, and it is hoped that both funds will have considerably benefited.

The Riding School on each occasion was made gay with bunting and floral decorations, and the proceedings were enlivened by the Regimental Band. At every performance there was a crowded gathering, and the excellent and varied programme under the direction of Captain Charles Hull, A.S.C. (formerly 19th Hussars), and Lieutenant T. Sinfield, A.S.C., was fully appreciated by all present.



'JUMBO' (LIEUT. O'FLYNN) AND 'JERRY.'

It is interesting to note that, with the exception of the two ponies, which are the private property of Captain Hull, all the animals belonged to the corps, and regularly performed their daily tours of duty during the time.

'Nil sine Labore' is the motto of the Army Service Corps, and it was evident that the excellence of the whole performance was only the result of sheer hard work, patience, and perseverance on the part of all those who participated.


Captain Hull, in opening the proceedings, introduced 'Abdul,' an Arab horse, in a haute école act, a magnificent exhibition of equestrian skill, and his clever performing horse 'Bantam' proved himself extremely sagacious.

Bareback vaulting and leaping on two horses were carried out by Trumpeters Mulholland, Faulkner, Smith, and Rooke, who, though averaging but sixteen years of age, and with very short service to their credit, achieved difficult feats with much dexterity. Mention should also be made of the amusing bare-backed scena entitled 'Master and Man,' in which Captain Hull,

assisted by Trumpeter Mulholland as groom, performed some daring and original riding tricks.

The thanks of both regiments are due to Miss Dorothy Sinfield for her attractive exhibition in tandem driving with her trained horses 'Black Beauty' and 'Black Bess.' With scarcely a perceptible movement she made them go through many graceful evolutions in the ring, and afterwards aroused much enthusiasm with a wonderful jumping display on 'Sportsman,' which is indeed a high-spirited animal.

Of course a circus would not be complete without a 'strong man.' He was found in the person of Driver Smith, familiarly known as 'Ajax,' who concluded his feats with a 'tug of war,' which consisted of placing himself between, and taking the entire strain of, two horses pulling in opposite directions.



MISS SINFIELD TANDEM-DRIVING.

The two ponies, 'Jerry' and 'Nobbler,' were almost human in intelligence, and were yet another proof of the marvellous training which they have undoubtedly received.

The lighter side of the performance was entrusted to 'Jumbo,' the clown (Lieutenant A. J. O'Flynn), assisted by a small band of merry-makers, including a Teddy-bear and 'Jokomoko,' a wonderful performing donkey. These, with their funny antics and witty sayings, kept the audience in roars of laughter.

There was never a dull moment, and the greatest credit possible is due to the Army Service Corps (Woolwich) for their painstaking enterprise, and for the skill and high standard which was attained throughout all the different items of the programme.

## RACQUETS

The Military Championship Challenge Cup Competition opened at Princes Club with an entry of ten, viz.: Army Service Corps, 2nd Battn., the Cameronians, 6th Brigade Royal Field Artillery, 2nd Battn. the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st Battn. the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 2nd Battn. The Prince of Wales' Own West Yorkshire Regt., 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1st Battn. the Bedfordshire Regt., Royal Engineers and 2nd Battn. Grenadier Guards.

After many fine matches the final rested between the Army Service Corps represented by Major J. Puckle, D.S.O., and Capt. A. Berger and the Bedfordshire Regt. represented by Capt. J. Leader and Lieut. C. H. Ker. The Bedfords came out the winners by four games to two: 15—11, 16—13, 15—11, 12—15, 9—15, 15—5 (91 aces to 70). It was Berger's day, ably backed up by Buckle, whereas neither Leader nor Ker were quite at their best. The holders, 50th Brigade R.F.A. (Col. C. D. King and Capt. B. H. Bond) did not defend their title, so the Bedfords thus secured the Championship. The Championship for the singles received an entry of eighteen. In the semi-finals Capt. Luther defeated Capt. Berger, last year's winner, and Capt. Wilson-Johnston defeated Lieut. Godfree. In the final Capt. W. B. Wilson-Johnston of the 36th Sikhs defeated Capt. A. C. G. Luther, 1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry by three games to love. Captain Wilson-Johnston played splendidly throughout his matches, and takes the championship for the Indian Army.

## ATHLETICS

The Egyptian Army of Occupation held their meeting at the Ghe Lireh Sporting Club, Cairo. The 7th Dragoon Guards won the General's Cup. Some results:

Putting the Weight: Major Clay, 7th Dragoon Guards.

High Jump: Lieut. Middleton, Shropshire Light Infantry.

100 Yards: Pte. Balfer, 7th Dragoon Guards.

Two Miles: Corpl. Eastmond, 1st Welsh Regiment.

Long Jump: Pte. Collier, 7th Dragoon Guards.

Half-mile Championship of the Army: 2nd Lieut. Blackwood, 1st Yorkshire Regiment.

120 Yards Hurdles: Capt. Lindsay, 7th Dragoon Guards.

One Mile: Sergt. Morris, 3rd Coldstream Guards.

Quarter-mile: Pte. Swabs, 1st Yorkshire Regiment.

Officers V.C. Race: Lieut. Wood, 7th Dragoon Guards.

Quarter-mile Egyptian Army: Atra Mustapha.

The Bengal Presidency Athletic Association 17th annual sports took place at Calcutta.

The Quarter-mile championship was won by the holder, Lieut. N. I. Whitty, 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment.

Half-mile: Lieut. C. C. Tee, 1st Royal Irish Rifles.

The British Army Championship Shield was won by the 1st Royal Irish Rifles, mainly due to the fine performances of Sergt. Miller.

The Native Troops Shield was carried off by the 93rd Burma Infantry.





CHARGE OF THE 23<sup>rd</sup> LIGHT DRAGOONS AT TALAVERA.  
1809.

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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JULY 1910

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## *WAR AND THE 'ARME BLANCHE'*

MR. CHILDERS, at the beginning of his book, quotes two passages from page 187, 'Cavalry Training' (1907), as constituting an epitome of the case he wishes to combat.

The first is: 'It will be seen that thorough efficiency in the use of the rifle and in dismounted tactics is an absolute necessity. At the same time the essence of the Cavalry spirit lies in holding the balance correctly between fire-power and shock action, and while training troops for the former they must not be allowed to lose confidence in the latter.'

He challenges the assumption (1) that thorough efficiency in the use of the rifle and in dismounted duties is compatible with thorough efficiency in shock action; (2) that thorough efficiency with the rifle is confined to dismounted tactics; (3) that the essence of the Cavalry spirit is here correctly defined, because he declares it to be, as so defined, a hybrid spirit, impossible to instil and impossible to translate into balanced action.

The second quotation runs: 'It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge and the terror of cold steel.'

He challenges both the form and essence of this; its form, because the words imply that the speed of the horse and the magnetism of the

charge are exclusively connected with the use of the cold steel ; its essence, because he declares the principle laid down to be fundamentally unsound.

An Introduction by Field Marshal Lord Roberts expresses entire agreement with the author's main thesis. He would not, however, entirely do away with the sword. He recommends a sword-bayonet that can be used on horseback as well as on foot. He grants that mounted attacks may be made against Cavalry caught unawares or against broken Infantry. But he adds his opinion that ' all attacks can now be carried out far more effectually with the rifle than with the sword ' ; presumably by means of mounted fire.

Thus weighty professional support is given to this attack on the principles of Cavalry action as laid down in our training manuals ; principles accepted by Cavalry opinion in all armies of to-day.

The author founds his case chiefly on the South African and Manchurian wars, fought with modern weapons and under present-day conditions. Earlier wars he regards as not sufficiently up-to-date. We are specially bidden to study our own great war.

Following his own advice, he carefully traces the part played by Cavalry in South Africa, and shows that our successes were mainly due to the rifle. The results placed to the credit of the *arme blanche* are (1) Elandslaagte, (2) Klip Drift, (3) Diamond Hill, (4) Welgevonden ; accounting for 100 Boers put out of action, or, allowing for possible unrecorded instances, 200 at most ; and, he states, the opportunities lost through overtraining in the use of the steel and inexperience in the fire-arm are without number.

He cites, on the other hand, many cases of successful mounted attacks or charges by Boers, Geduld, Vlaktefontein, Mooifontein, and eight or nine others. These engagements were very like each other. The Boers generally galloped up on to our men, who tried to beat them off with dismounted fire. In superior numbers, they carried our screen of scouts with them, sometimes shooting from the saddle and sometimes not.

It is on his deductions from these Boer charges that Mr. Childers bases his idea as to the right way of handling mounted troops in the attack. The instances he quotes really prove nothing more than that mounted men, if unopposed by swordsmen, can gallop to close range and inflict great loss on parties inferior in strength. In none of these cases were the British armed with swords, with which they could make a counter-attack.

Now, take one of the four British cold-steel charges—Diamond Hill. Here some sixty or seventy British Cavalry charged at least 200 Boers, and drove them back.

Mr. Childers, counting heads, says that the casualties here practically equalled each other. They did ; but he overlooks the object of the charge. It was made to save some guns, against which the Boers were closing in, unstopped by our inferior number of rifles. The handful of swordsmen stopped them at once. At the same time, the moral effect of this counter-attack was very obvious, as a fresh party of the enemy, who had a good opportunity, made no attempt to cut off our men while returning.

This action shows that the *arme blanche* can win against odds. In the instances quoted above, the Boers were as a rule superior in strength.

We may ask : Could not the Boers have done as much or more in their charges if they had been armed with and expert in the use of the sword ?

The author fails to prove that a mounted counter-attack with swords, if we had had them, would have been useless against the Boer charges. On page 247 he dismisses the idea somewhat contemptuously. But is the idea so preposterous ?

Take the Boer charge at Roodeval ; which, under the fire of 1,500 rifles and six guns, on an open plain, though faltering at 300 yards, 'stumbled on in fragments to within 100 yards.' He says the extraordinary thing about this 'Piece of brilliant recklessness' was not its failure, but 'that it came so near success and met with so little punishment.'

The British losses are given as seven killed, fifty-six wounded, and 150 horses wounded.

Mr. Childers is ill-advised to bring forward this example as an argument against the sword. No stronger case could be made for the *arme blanche*.

What would have happened to this line of swordless horsemen, faltering within 300 yards of the British, if Grenfell had had, say, 150 swordsmen to slip into their flank ; and how would the value of the 150 swords in this case have compared with that of the 150 rifles ? The author gives the Boer loss at roughly 100. There were 1,500 rifles against them. We may therefore credit the 150 rifles with ten Boers.

Apparently, this aspect of the question does not occur to Mr. Childers. He dilates on the British losses, which, according to his account, were caused mainly by fire from the saddle. From these he exhorts the



reader to judge 'of the moral effect of this form of fire, coupled with the spectacle of the charge baulking the aim of the defence.'

Surely, the lessons to be drawn from this episode are all in accordance with the teaching of our manuals. These enjoin the use of fire in conjunction with the mounted attack. And what would have been the result had the Boers been steel-armed Cavalry, bent on killing, supported by a battery of quick-firing guns, whose fire would certainly have had a far more damaging effect than that of rifle fire from the saddle?

Mr. Childers derides shock tactics, insisting on the literal interpretation of shock, as mass striking mass.

The intention to kill is the soul of Cavalry action with the *arme blanche*; and it is the sharp point of the steel weapon, in the hand of a skilled and resolute rider, that counts in shock tactics.

Mr. Childers denies that there is any analogy with the bayonet. But it may be argued that, as fire facilitates the movement of the Infantry soldier and clears his way to the bayonet attack, so the speed of the horse, assisted by fire, renders possible the decisive use of the sword. The enemy may refuse to stand, but something has been gained, and we will have at him again, now or later.

Reliance by Cavalry on the rifle alone will not bring decisive results. A strong Cavalry will always seek rapid decision by the sword. A Cavalry weaker, physically or morally, will resort to the defensive power of the rifle. But these tactics cannot give victory; they can only defer the issue. Either we must surrender our will to that of the enemy or at last meet him with the steel.

All Cavalry leaders who have seen war know that only confidence in the steel weapon can keep alive the spirit of eager offence; the longing to get to close quarters. That fact alone would justify the insistence of our manuals on the importance of the *arme blanche*; that fact alone would explain why America, Japan and the Continent of Europe still maintain the sword and lance.

The late Colonel Henderson has been freely quoted to support the views of Mr. Childers; but he says, in the 'Science of War,' that the Cavalry soldier must be taught to consider himself as 'first and foremost a soldier of the charge and *mêlée*.' 'If he is not sometimes allowed to lose himself in the exhilaration of a charge, his dash invariably deteriorates.'

Mr. Childers thinks that skill with the sword and rifle combined is beyond achievement. Our Cavalry teachers think otherwise. They are

men who have seen, practised and studied war, and their opinion is not lightly to be put aside.

It should be remembered that our system of training in the use of cold steel is moving with the times. It is now vastly more practical than in the days before the South African campaign. Ceremonial display has been abandoned. The value of the deadly point is taught. But the lesson of all for Cavalry to learn is that great results in battle cannot be had without loss. Our many little wars, where easy victories are gained at a small price in blood, are apt to make us forget this truth. In South Africa the losses of our Cavalry in action were very few, considering the long duration of the war. Compare them with those incurred in the great Cavalry fights of history. And there is no instance in the South African war of a British Cavalry charge being stopped by fire.

The arguments of Mr. Childers, his deductions and conclusions, at least show that mounted men can sometimes get home against rifle fire. He thinks that, having got in, they should use the rifle in preference to the sword ; and this is where his views clash with those of the Cavalry school of thought.

The charge—we mean the charge with the cold steel—will not be an affair of every day. Occasion must be watched for keenly. It is quick to come, and quicker to go. It will often be prepared by fire, and helped by clever use of ground. But it will only be seized by the quick opportunist leader, and it will only be consummated by horsemen well trained, drilled and disciplined, who are united by the determination to ride in and kill.

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On page 406 will be found a review of this book by the General Staff.

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*SHORT SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN  
THE PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF TACTICAL  
EXERCISES FOR CAVALRY DIVISIONS*

BY GENERAL VON BERNHARDI

(Translated from the February No. of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*)

1. IN order to make the fullest possible use of the time at disposal, the tasks set to the troops should cover the whole field of Cavalry employment. In doing this a sharp distinction must be drawn between co-operation in the battle of all arms and fights between bodies of Cavalry acting independently. For co-operation in the battle both the frontal attack from a position in reserve and the flank attack from the wing of an army must be practised ; also the dismounted attack on the flank and rear of an enemy and against his reserves. Fights of independent Cavalry should be arranged as the outcome of reconnaissance and screening operations and raids on the enemy's communications. Chief importance is to be laid upon battles of encounter.

2. In these exercises the troops should, as a rule, be employed by units on parallel alignments, without, however, entirely excluding formation in 'lines,' which circumstances will occasionally render necessary. The employment of troops by units calls for great initiative on the part of all subordinate leaders within the limits created by the plan of action of the supreme commander ; therefore the greatest stress should be laid upon the independent action of all parts of the force.

3. The strategical tasks of Cavalry will often lead to advances in separate columns, the effective co-operation of which in the fight is not always easy to attain. Special importance should therefore be attached to such exercises. It will often be possible to conduct a stubborn fire-fight with one part of the force until the remainder can arrive upon the scene ; one column may have to fall back upon the columns next to it before a superior enemy in order to avoid being itself beaten in detail. It is therefore of great importance to maintain as far as possible uninterrupted communication between columns and to regulate their advance by fixing the rate of march. When these exercises do not take

place in the manœuvre area, the roads leading to the peace station drill grounds should be utilised as far as possible for the purpose.

4. During these strategical operations special stress is to be laid upon the effective employment of dismounted fire in combination with the mounted attack ; it will often be possible by this means to neutralise hostile superiority.

5. Fighting on foot is only to be made use of when the end in view cannot be attained by other means ; when, however, a dismounted fight is once decided upon, the attack must be carried through with the greatest determination. The wish to be speedily again in the saddle must never be allowed to detract from the energy with which the fight is conducted.

6. If the strategical task in view seems likely to require a rapid resumption of the advance, after carrying through an offensive fight on foot, it is desirable to dismount only in such numbers as will enable the mobility of the led horses to be maintained in order that they may be brought up quickly after the fight. In such cases it is preferable to engage more units (regiments, squadrons, &c.) in the fire-fight and keep their led horses mobile, rather than a smaller number of units whose horses are incapable of being moved. At the same time it must always be borne in mind that the fire power necessary for carrying the fight through must, under all circumstances, be developed, and that a mounted reserve of the strength necessitated by the situation must be retained. In all dismounted actions on a large scale a dismounted reserve is also necessary.

7. In the defence and in cases where it is merely a question of bringing a sudden burst of fire upon hostile columns on the march or reserves, and then rapidly disappearing, it will usually be possible to dismount practically the whole of the men, leaving the led horses immobile.

8. As far as circumstances permit, Cavalry must also make full use of their mobility in dismounted action in order to gain favourable lines of attack, either those where the ground will help their advance or which offer possibilities of converging and flanking fire. From the dispositions made for an attack it must be clear where and how the decision is to be brought about.

9. In the case where a body of Cavalry which has dismounted, with immobile led horses, has captured a locality which it is intended to occupy for the present in order to secure its possession for possible eventualities, it is advisable to occupy it with either the odd or even numbers and send back the other numbers for the led horses. The mounted reserve will often be able to bring up at least part of the led horses. Mobile led horses must be brought up at a smart pace.

10. Under all circumstances, care must be taken to dismount and to mount again out of fire of the enemy. In this connection artillery fire must also be taken into account.

11. When hostile Cavalry or cyclist detachments are present, or the population is hostile, attention must be paid to providing adequate security for the led horses. In such cases the artillery also require special protection.

12. In all cases of moving or assembling troops within the area of operations more attention must be paid than formerly to the possibility of hostile artillery fire : this is rendered imperative by the great range of modern artillery and their power of employing indirect fire. Closed columns which offer a good target may, then, only be made use of on those occasions when there is no possibility of being reached by artillery fire. In all other situations more open formations must be adopted.

13. In passing over ground which is under or exposed to hostile artillery fire it will often be necessary to give up altogether any close tactical formation of the larger units and to allow individual squadrons to cross the exposed zone without any regard to keeping touch or maintaining proper distance, but making the best use they can of the ground in whatever formations they think most suitable. Such action compels the artillery to make constant alterations both in direction and elevation. In accordance with the direction from which the artillery fire comes, those formations must be chosen which will present the smallest possible target to the cone of dispersion of the shrapnel—that is, 'column' or 'line,' according to circumstances. It is also advisable to make constant changes of direction, in order to avoid taking the same line as that of the burst of the shrapnel.

14. The troops must be practised in rapidly assuming manœuvre and attack formations at some pre-arranged assembly point from formations such as are indicated above, but for which no detailed instructions are contained in the regulations.

15. As a formation for manœuvre the 'double column' is much to be recommended. It facilitates a rapid assumption of an attack formation in two lines either to front or flank.


16. The aim should always be to employ the regiments of a brigade on parallel alignments, and to this end also the double column, with regiments one behind the other, is a useful formation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A German Cavalry brigade usually consists of two regiments. The 'double column' of a brigade would be one regiment in double column of squadron columns, followed by the other in the same formation.

17. In forming line from 'double column' in a brigade it is best, if sufficient time is available, first to bring up the rear regiment at deploying interval, and then for each regiment to form line. If rapidity is necessary, the leading regiment deploys at once, and the second provides supporting squadrons and flank protection and, if necessary, prolongs the front.


18. For flank movements the 'double column' should generally be used. If, after wheeling into line, an attack is to be ridden, the squadrons in second line drop back to their proper distance. Squadron leaders in the rear line are responsible for prolonging the leading line, if necessary, and for protecting its outer flank by an echelon.

19. In every flank movement, especially when made in column of troops and exposed to attack from the front, a special protection for the



head of the column should be provided by a second squadron riding parallel with the leading squadron. On wheeling into line to the flank, this squadron forms an echelon in rear of the outer wing. Similarly, in 'double column,' when regiments have five squadrons on parade, the head can be strengthened by a squadron.<sup>1</sup>

20. Line of squadron columns is a formation in which changes of direction are not easy to carry out, and in which intervals and distances, especially in undulating country, are difficult to maintain. The conveying of orders is also difficult where neither trumpet calls nor words of command can be employed. It will often, therefore, be advisable to group every two squadrons into a double column (line of squadron columns in groups). The regimental commander has then only two columns behind him which can form line by deploying on both flanks.



<sup>1</sup> A German Cavalry regiment has five squadrons in peace and usually four in war.


21. This formation can be assumed from line of squadron columns by closing in ; from double column and column of troops—to the front by bringing up rear squadrons—to the flank by wheeling heads of squadrons and closing or opening to the required intervals.

22. It is obvious that, when manœuvring, words of command will not, as a rule, be capable of being heard in units of the size of a squadron and upwards. The use of trumpet calls also must be strictly limited if misunderstandings are to be avoided. Signals, too, will often remain unrecognised in the dust in country where the view is obstructed and in the excitement of the moment. There only remains the verbal order. Troops must therefore be given practice in manœuvring by orders conveyed by gallopers. So as to be able to send orders simultaneously to the different units and to any troops detached it is advisable not to be too sparing in gallopers.

23. According to the German Regulations, ' regimental calls ' ( ' divisional calls,' ' squadron calls ' ) are only to be given as warnings for some other trumpet sound about to follow. I am personally of opinion, however, that these succeeding calls where they could possibly lead to misunderstanding on the part of other troops should be replaced by orders conveyed by gallopers. The ' regimental call ' is especially important, because it cannot possibly give rise to misunderstandings ; by its use the regimental commander is enabled to assemble his regiment rapidly behind him, even from out of the larger units. If, for example, the regiment is moving forward in a certain direction and the commander wishes to deploy it rapidly in another, perhaps to meet the threat of some new enemy appearing on the scene, he has himself only to ride in the new direction, sound the ' regimental call,' and then send gallopers to the squadrons with orders as to how they are to form. The squadrons, on hearing the trumpet sound, at once change the direction of their heads in such a way as to be able to form line of squadron columns by the shortest route behind the commanding officer, and then take up whatever new formation is ordered. Should no such subsequent order reach them, they act on their own initiative according to the situation.

24. In the attack on Cavalry it is not so much a question of developing a numerical superiority as of riding the enemy down by the greater cohesion and momentum of the charge. Against an enemy whose strength is known, therefore, the attack should not be made with any larger force than he has deployed, but the greatest possible stress must be laid upon the cohesion with which it is ridden. Troops not required in the attacking line should be kept in hand as reserves, so that they can be

used either against a fresh enemy or to bring about the decision in an indecisive *mêlée*. In indecisive Cavalry fights the last reserve thrown in usually achieves the victory. In the same way supporting squadrons which follow in second line should only throw themselves into the *mêlée* when the situation demands it: they should not, therefore, ride too close to the attacking line.



25. All detachments which find themselves on the outer, unsupported flank have as their constant and invariable duty the reconnaissance by patrols of the ground and enemy on that flank. They are, however, also responsible for taking advantage of any and every favourable opportunity, which may offer, to intervene in the fight in furtherance of the plan of the supreme commander, even in default of orders to do so.

26. In all formations and evolutions the spirit of the offensive must be evident, the *will* to dictate the law to the enemy. Opportunities for enveloping and outflanking movements can often be led up to by having parts of the division echeloned to the front.

27. It must be the constant endeavour to attack on exterior lines, and by so doing at the same time to threaten the enemy's line of retreat. It is therefore advisable to gain the space necessary for the deployment of the brigades in good time, in order to be able ultimately to make a concentric attack. In no case can it be an advantage to adopt a rearward echelon previous to the deployment for attack. If such a formation becomes necessary owing to local conditions or the enemy's movements it can be assumed *during* the deployment for attack.

28. In every fight it should be perfectly clear from the dispositions of the leader in what direction the main attack is to be made—what is to be the 'decisive point' of the engagement. An envelopment of both flanks is, therefore, only to be recommended where great numerical



superiority exists. In most cases the course indicated will be to attack one flank of the enemy with all the strength available. To attain this object it may sometimes be desirable to shift the basis of attack of the whole division towards one of the flanks during the deployment.

29. So far as circumstances permit, every opportunity must be taken to rest one flank upon ground which affords protection.

30. In attacking guns every endeavour must be made to approach the batteries from a flank, since artillery, especially the French artillery, can only with difficulty alter the direction of their fire. Where a frontal attack is unavoidable, the new methods of fire of the artillery and the new kinds of projectiles they use nowadays against Cavalry targets render suitable attack formations a necessity. There is no prospect whatever of only one line of Cavalry in single rank being able to reach the guns. It is essential that several such lines should be launched to the attack, in any case, at least two, one behind the other, at 250 to 300 yards distance, and these must be followed up at about the same distance by closed bodies in columns of troops. The men in the extended lines should not ride at too close intervals, at least several paces apart. The greater the depth of the attack, the greater is the prospect of success. An additional object of the closed bodies in rear is to overthrow any hostile reserves which may attempt to disengage their captured or threatened artillery.

31. In attacking infantry the chief consideration is to divide the hostile fire and draw it off into different directions, in order to allow the lines in rear, as far as possible, to break through the intervals which are not swept by fire. Wide fronts and attack from different directions, with corresponding disposition in depth, should therefore be aimed at. As a rule, where the enemy are neither shaken nor surprised, success can only be achieved by launching masses to the attack.

32. As long as the strength of the opponent is still uncertain it is not advisable to put in the whole fighting force. In such cases, which are the normal in the collisions of strategical Cavalry, it is necessary to remain in depth and develop your fighting strength gradually as the situation begins to get clearer; the employment of dismounted action is in general the most suitable to such occasions.

33. Attacks on foot are to be practised frequently in large and even the largest units, both against an enemy in position or holding a locality and in battles of encounter. Approach and deployment must be completely covered from artillery fire, either by the nature of the ground or by distance. The led horses must invariably be disposed and protected as they would have to be in actual warfare.

## *SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE*

BY LIEUT.-COL. G. DE S. BARROW

THERE are three ruling factors in war—the Physical, the Intellectual, and the Moral. Any one or two of these qualities, however highly developed in an army, will never bring a war to a successful conclusion ; the possession of all three is essential. A greater development of one will, however, counteract, to a certain extent, a deficiency in either or both of the others. But this is true only to a limited degree. For instance, the most perfect plan theoretically is only actually perfect so long as the army is morally and physically capable of executing it. That army which possesses these three qualities in a greater degree than its antagonist, and at the same time properly balanced, so that the desire does not outrun the performance, will be the victor, as far as it is humanly possible to foresee. There is one other factor, equally present and equally powerful and against which man cannot contend, viz. Fortune, ‘ that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power.’ All that the soldier can do is to leave to Fortune as little as possible, by developing to the utmost the physical, mental, and moral qualities of all those who are placed under his authority.

As regards the material on which the officer has to work, it naturally depends in the first place on the national characteristics. Confining ourselves to a consideration of the question from the point where the soldier first comes in, we find that the physical quality depends on peace training, peace preparation, good staff and regimental arrangements during war (ensuring, as far as the exigencies of war permit, shelter, rest, regular rations, and no unnecessary fatigue), and, where mounted troops are concerned, good horse management.

The intellectual quality also depends mainly on the peace training, *i.e.* good education and training in the various formations and in the military institutions of the country ; on a proper system of decentralisation which forces men to take their proper share of responsibility and to

fit themselves accordingly ; and on the moral feelings which inspire men with a desire to improve themselves through sheer love of their work and pride in their profession. And, lastly, we get the moral quality, which on its part is largely based on the other two ; for a deficiency in one or both of these will lower the moral tone, just as a consciousness of physical and intellectual superiority does, *per contra*, raise it. Patriotism, national honour, the magnetism of a great leader, and other similar causes also affect it.

Not only is it evident, therefore, that all three factors are necessary, but that they are also interdependent, and must act and react on each other.

In developing the physical and intellectual qualities by a sound system of training we are developing the moral quality also.

There is now and has been at all times a certain number of persons who give an exaggerated importance to the physical factor to the exclusion of the other two. It is the physical factor which is determinate, which can be actually seen, and therefore it appeals more readily to the superficial observer.

In the history of war the evidence in favour of the decisive influence of the moral and intellectual qualities are overwhelming ; but human nature is so constituted that it is infinitely more affected by what appeals to its physical senses than by the abstract forces. A man may be stricken by a mortal malady which, if comparatively painless, will cause him much less active concern than a toothache.

But the axis on which all the other factors—physical, moral, and mental—revolve is human nature. The rifle is still fired by a human finger and the sword wielded by a human hand, and man is *at least* as susceptible to surprise to-day as history tells us he was 2,000 years B.C.

It is not necessary, however, to furnish arguments here to show that there is still a place for the Cavalry on the modern battlefield. The readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL are not likely to be influenced by the false prophets who have at all times tried to prove the contrary. I say 'at all times' because we find in the year 1543 the French Cavalry armed with the Infantry pike and arquebus, because certain Frenchmen of that period had arrived at the conclusion that in face of the deadly fire of the arquebus shock tactics were no longer possible, and that the only thing to do was to turn the Cavalry into mounted arquebusiers, corresponding to the mounted rifles into which some people would like to convert the British Cavalry in the present day. And we read in Fortescue that

'The mounted service had become strangely unpopular with the English at this time (1626), whether because the eternal sieges of the Dutch war afforded it less opportunity of distinction, or because missile tactics had lowered it from its former proud station, it is difficult to say.' How surely does history repeat itself!

What it is important for us to know is :—

(a) What *results* may be expected from the tactical employment of the Cavalry with the other arms, and whether these results will be in any way commensurate with the sacrifices which, admittedly, will generally be entailed.

(b) *In what ways* the Cavalry can best assist the other arms.

Let us see what the lessons of the past have to teach us on these points. They seem to bring three main facts prominently to our notice, viz. :—

1. That, as in strategy so in tactics, it is the massed action of Cavalry that produces decisive results ; or, as put in 'Cavalry Studies,' 'The war of masses necessitates mass tactics.'

2. The extraordinary results attendant on suddenness and surprise, results which on occasion justify a departure from the principle of mass action.

3. That the losses incurred by Cavalry in battle and when attacking the other arms have relatively very little to do with the result.

After the first Silesian war, Frederick the Great rearranged his ideas on the employment of Cavalry, and after the second Silesian war this arm appeared on the stage as a principal character after a long period passed in supernumerary rôles. In short, it was *rediscovered* that Cavalry was an instrument which could decide battles. And this being so, Frederick, with the big ideas of a great soldier, shaped this instrument in such a manner that when it struck it did so with the weight of a sledge hammer. And the Austrians were not long in following his example. At Lowositz, which has been described as a model Cavalry battle of the eighteenth century, 69 Prussian met 71 Austrian squadrons ; at Prague 80 Prussian fought against 70 Austrian squadrons ; at Kollin Ziethen attacked with 65 squadrons ; at Rosbach the 43 squadrons under Seydlitz broke up the whole of the enemy's line ; and at Leuthen Lucchesi made a successful attack with 80 squadrons and was then himself borne down by Driesen with 60 squadrons. In order to get an idea of what these numbers meant it may be noted that our Cavalry division of 4 brigades contains 36 squadrons, or, if the squadrons were of the same

size as those of the Prussians and Austrians at that period, the equivalent of 48 squadrons.

When circumstances called for it Frederick engaged his Cavalry without any consideration of losses, as at Kollin and at Hochkirch, where it was sent forward, as the Austrian Cavalry was at Königgrätz, in order to save the remains of an army. And Napoleon acted in the same way. With him the object of the battle was the *first* thing, to be attained at all costs. 'At Aspern his Infantry was inferior to that of the enemy, he had no reserves in hand to fill the gaps, a hostile counterstroke was what he most feared. He, therefore, launched 5,000 Cuirassiers against the unbroken Austrian lines. These horsemen did not break through a single battalion, *they left 3,000 on the ground behind them*, but they checked the Austrian offensive till reinforcements could be brought up during the night, and a disaster was averted' (Director's Comments, Cavalry Manœuvres, 1909). Again, 'At Wagram it was Napoleon's plan to pierce the Austrian centre. For this purpose he sent forward a mass of horsemen under Bessières against the Austrian infantry and artillery. *The losses were terrible*, and still the Austrian lines maintained their position. But so occupied were they by the furious and repeated charges of the French Cavalry that Napoleon was able to carry out his object of advancing his great battery of 100 guns to close range, and it was this battery which prepared the way for the two infantry attacks which subsequently decided the day' (Director's Comments, Cavalry Manœuvres, 1909). These are instances of where the casualties, terrible as they were, weighed nothing in the balance against the results obtained.

After Aspern and Wagram come Somosierra and Borodino. On the Somosierra was posted the Spanish force of 10,000 or 12,000 men. Sixteen guns were placed in the neck of the pass and swept the road leading up from the plains, which was very steep. The French infantry was deployed for the attack, when Napoleon suddenly arrived on the scene and immediately ordered the Polish Lancers of the Guard to attack up the Causeway. The leading ranks were cut down by the fire of the Spanish batteries, and there was some confusion, but they were soon rallied, and continuing the attack put the whole Spanish Army to flight. 'This exploit,' says Napier, 'so glorious to one party, so disgraceful to the other, can hardly be matched from the records of war.' The most significant fact connected with it is not that these Polish Lancers attacked up a mountain pass nor that they put a whole army to flight, but that they were ordered to attack in order to save the delay and the losses which the infantry would have incurred

in advancing more slowly over this fire-swept zone ! One wonders what some modern-day critics would have said of this charge had it failed. Napoleon would have been worse than a fool in ordering it. As it is, they are silent concerning it.

At the Battle of Borodino the second Cavalry Corps of Montbrun was sent deliberately against the Great Redoubt, and ' then,' says Marmont, ' was seen something unprecedented in the annals of war—a fort defended by many guns and several battalions attacked and captured by a Cavalry column.'

The Cavalry ' intervenes in the prologue, in the principal act, and in the *dénouement* ' (' Cavalry Studies '). Here are examples of its employment during the opening stages. The Italian Army is deploying for the Battle of Custozza when, on one flank, Bechtoldsheim, with three troops of Cavalry, rides through the Pisa Brigade, already deployed, and falls on the head of the Forli Brigade, which is still in column of route, and which is put to flight in irretrievable confusion (for a more detailed account see ' Cavalry Studies,' pp. 300–302). On the other flank, Pulz, with fifteen squadrons, charges an Austrian corps of 30,000 men, and, though the actual method of attack is not above criticism, the results are such that these 30,000 men retire to Villafranca, at a distance from the battle-field, and there they remain, too shaken for employment, during the remainder of the day.

It is true that neither Pulz' nor Bechtoldsheim's squadrons were fit for any further use for some time after these exploits, but what did that matter when they had succeeded in placing 30,000 men *hors de combat* at the very outset of the battle ? Four years later the French had a similar chance between Vernéville and St. Privat, which they failed to take.

My only reason for referring now to such a well-known action as Bredow's charge is that there are certain points connected with it which cannot otherwise be conveniently dealt with. It was between 1 and 2 P.M. of that long summer's day when the Third Prussian Corps had drawn on to itself four hostile Army Corps. The 6th Division (11th and 12th Brigades) is still clinging to its ground, opposed by the whole of the 6th French Corps, of which two divisions are still intact, and is also threatened by the 3rd Corps. The 24th Regiment of Prussian Infantry is extended in a single line of skirmishers from the Rezonville-Mars-la-Tour road to the Roman road. There are no supports, ammunition is low,

the men are exhausted. The nearest assistance, that of the 20th Division, cannot be hoped for before another hour. Vionville must be held. It is essential that the French should not obtain the moral ascendancy of a success in this part of the field before the arrival of reinforcements. It is suggested that the situation might yet be saved by an attack of Bredow's Brigade. Von Bruddenbock, commanding the 6th Division, says 'What! Cavalry charge unbroken infantry! Impossible!' Colonel von Voigts Rhetz, C. of S. of 3rd A. C., at first says, 'Cavalry charge unbroken infantry! Impossible!' and finally Bredow, on first receiving the order says also, 'Cavalry charge unbroken infantry and artillery! Impossible!' However, there is nothing else to be done, it is the last chance, and so Bredow makes his preparations and carries out the attack, the details of which are too well known to most cavalymen to need description here. In spite of the fire with which the brigade was met with in front and on the flank from the Roman road during the crossing of the 1,000 yards which separated it from the enemy's line (2,400 yards was the total distance traversed), not more than 50 men and horses were left on the ground. Skilful use was made of the cover afforded by the ground in order to carry out the approach march and first deployment. Had it not been for this the charge would doubtless have failed. Whether the credit is due to Bredow for having utilised the time while he was waiting and doing nothing to reconnoitre the ground in his vicinity, or whether it is due to Voigts Rhetz who pointed out to him the line he had better take, does not very much matter—the lesson remains the same as to the necessity of reconnoitring all the country in the neighbourhood of a Cavalry formation while it is awaiting the moment for action.

The chief points to notice with regard to this action are :—

1. That the Cavalry was well to the front, and therefore at hand when required. It had not to be sent for, when it would probably have arrived too late. It was there on the spot, and, according to Kaehler, a whole division might just as easily have been placed there also.

2. The use made of the cover afforded by the ground, the result of previous observation.

3. Everyone seems to have taken it for granted, as so many would do nowadays, that the charge was an impossible one against the French infantry and artillery, and only justified by the desperate nature of the situation.

4. In spite of this belief the small number of casualties incurred during the advance. The total losses out of an effective force of 800 horses was

16 officers, 363 men and 409 horses, by far the greater proportion occurring during the return journey.

5. The effect of suddenness of action and partial surprise, from which great results were obtained with small means ; and, finally,

6. The result. The offensive movement of the 6th Corps was stayed, and during the remainder of the day the French did not attempt any further offensive on this side. The situation was saved.

The French official account itself admits that the charge of the German Cavalry had really attained the object of the commander of the 3rd Prussian Corps, that the moral of the Prussian troops was greatly raised by the feeling that a serious crisis had been averted, and that, on the other hand, the moral effect on the French, as well as the material disorder resulting from the charge, was the principal cause of the evaporation on their part of any desire to return to offensive operations throughout the remainder of the day.

Bredow's six squadrons had lost half their strength, and if they had lost every man and every horse it would have been nothing compared with the magnitude of the success achieved.

On another part of the same field and at another hour, viz. about 5 P.M., the Cavalry once more intervened in what was fast becoming a hopeless situation for the Germans. ' The 4th French Corps was advancing in great force on Mars-la-Tour, the 10th German Corps was approaching the battlefield, and the 38th Brigade was endeavouring meanwhile to hold the French in check. The brigade had, however, after desperate fighting, been thrown back with a loss of 57 per cent. of its strength. The German chiefs look round once again for the Cavalry to save them, and there to hand, near the south-east of Mars-la-Tour, stands the 1st Regiment of Dragoons of the Guard. It is ordered to charge the advancing French infantry. It is represented to General Voigts Rhetz (not the same Voigts Rhetz as was C. of S. to the 3rd A. C.) that the charge cannot succeed, and his reply is, " Yes, the regiment will not succeed, but if it stops the enemy for ten minutes only and every man is killed it will have fulfilled its mission ! " The regiment receives the order to attack. An officer having reconnoitred to the front reports dense masses of French infantry following after the 38th Brigade. The ground is unfavourable, being intersected by several lanes. The regiment forms column of troops and moves forward, coming under a heavy fire. Front has to be diminished to column of route in order to get over the difficult ground ; then reform troops and wheel into line and attack.



'The enemy's skirmishers run into groups and pour a heavy fire into the ranks of the Dragoons. A mitrailleuse battery also joins in. Result : one-third of its effectives lost to the regiment, *and* the salvation of the 38th Brigade, together with the aversion of all those difficulties and dangers in which its overthrow would have involved the German forces now hastening to the battlefield. Here we have an example of a Cavalry charge delivered over unfavourable ground in order to save, by delaying the enemy, a desperate situation, and delivered against an infantry advancing in the full tide of victory. The reinforcement of the 38th Brigade by two weak battalions (equivalent to the utmost number of rifles the brigade could have put into the firing line had it been so armed) would never, under the circumstances, have checked the onward course of the "dense masses" of French infantry.' (Director's Comments, Cavalry Manceuvres, 1909.) The American Civil War is sometimes referred to in order to support the contention that the rifle is always and everywhere more useful than the sabre. I have already alluded to the fallacy of basing all one's military conclusions on *one* war, whether that war be called normal or abnormal; otherwise the sword and lance might well have been discarded in the sixteenth century, if not much earlier. But surely the American War cannot justly be brought forward to prove the ineffectiveness of the *arme blanche*. In a recently published book dealing with the armament of cavalry we find these words, having reference to the American Civil War: 'Infantry on both sides learnt to despise the sword . . .' Do the facts justify so sweeping a statement? No, they do not. The writer of the above-mentioned book invokes the name of the late Colonel Henderson in support of his own pet theory. But when Henderson's convictions are not in accordance with his own the reason is attributed to 'a strange logical hiatus.' There is no logical hiatus as far as Henderson is concerned. The truth is he had studied war too well not to know that, however much one may argue about it, there *is* such a thing as 'terror of the cold steel.' He tells us of this thing himself more than once. He tells us, for instance, in graphic wording how '250 Virginia horsemen, resolutely handled and charging at exactly the right moment, had the honour of bringing in as prisoners 600 Federals, including 20 officers and a complete section of artillery,' besides killing and wounding 154 more, while their own loss was only 11 killed and 15 wounded.

In war it is the pitiless *logic of facts*, of the things *done*, not of the things which have not been done or attempted, which outweighs all

other logic. The historical examples just quoted (and there are numberless others to draw from if required) are sufficient to establish the validity of the statement that it is the massed employment of Cavalry which must, as a rule, be looked to for decisive results ; that suddenness of action (or surprise) on the part of small bodies has sometimes a like effect, though the results will probably be not as far-reaching ; and that the question of the losses incurred is quite a secondary one.

It is very necessary, in order to keep our ideas clear on the subject of Cavalry on the battlefield, that we get these three points, especially the last, firmly fixed in our minds.

There are people however who, while admitting the possibility of the results, provided one has the means, deny the feasibility of procuring these means, because of—

1. The impossibility of posting large bodies of Cavalry, such as divisions, so close to the fighting line that the right moment for action can be seized when it comes.

2. The difficulty of bringing up large masses of Cavalry towards the attacking point, owing to the long range and quick-firing weapons of the artillery and infantry.

3. The intersected nature of modern battlefields ; and

4. The absence of a marked objective on which to charge.

It may be replied to these arguments—

1. That they are mere assertions unsupported by facts, whereas the whole of military history up to a recent date goes to disprove them.

2. That they are the same sort of arguments as have been brought up over and over again during the last 500 years and which have just as often been shattered by actual facts.

3. That an examination of the battlefields of the wars of the last fifty years will show that half of them afforded opportunities of posting, in many places, brigades under cover at 1,200 yards to 1,500 yards from the firing line and of bringing them up to this in comparative shelter and of deploying for the attack. That which two brigades at Custoza and one at Vionville were able to do, might just as well have been done in each case by three brigades or a division, as far as the ground was concerned.

We admit the difficulty, but we deny the impossibility, of employing Cavalry on the modern battlefield. Had Frederick, Napoleon, and the German commanders on August 16, 1870, been influenced by the *arme blanche* critics of their days, and of the old times before them, Rosbach,

Aspern and Wagram would not have been victories ; Eylau and Mars-la-Tour would have been bitter defeats.

And as to the absence of a ' marked objective.' If the long extended lines of to-day, with their supports in rear, do not offer a sufficiently solid objective to Cavalry, the less dense these lines are the more chance is there for the Cavalry to get through them on to the artillery, as Bredow did at Vionville, or on to the formed bodies, as Pulz did at Custoza. It may be possible on occasions to avoid the enemy's advanced lines altogether, and it is quite sufficient to attack the lines in rear in order to check those in front ; in fact, this is the more efficacious method.

And whilst on the subject of the ' objective ' it may be pointed out that Cavalry must have a definite objective in tactical as well as in strategical operations. and that the want of one leads to certain failure. I would instance, with reference to this, the charges of the Light Brigade at Balaklava and of the 3rd French Lancers at Vionville. In the former case Nolan was the bearer of a written order from Lord Raglan to the effect that the Cavalry was to advance rapidly and prevent the enemy from carrying away the guns (*i.e.* the English guns taken in the line of the Turkish redoubts). Lord Lucan was so situated that he could not see the enemy or the guns indicated. He said to Nolan, ' Attack what ? What guns, sir ? ' Nolan replied, with some asperity, ' There, my lord, is your enemy ; there are your guns,' at the same time pointing, according to Lord Lucan, in the direction of the left-hand corner of the valley, instead of towards the Causeway heights, which was the direction Lord Raglan intended. Nolan's gesture was evidently intended to be a general one ; but Lord Lucan chose to interpret it as definite, and, in this way, *i.e.* owing to the objective not being indicated in a manner which allowed of no misinterpretation, the Six Hundred were sent on their fatal ride.

In the second case, viz. the charge of the 3rd Lancers, we read in the French official account that ' the regiment should have received the order to charge " the Prussian batteries," but without their being, so it appears, especially designated. . . . Unhappily no precise objective had been given to the Colonel. . . . On crossing the Rezonville crest the Lancers had certainly been able to discover on the horizon the batteries of Vionville, but having arrived at 400 mètres from the enemy the two squadrons found themselves face to face with an infantry square without being now able to see any artillery.' An attempt was made to change direction to the right, with the result that the extreme left wing of the regiment alone struck the square and suffered very severely, whilst the

remainder charged the air only, and finished up in the ditches which lined the main road. The F.O.A. says, 'the charge had been delivered into space, whilst at the same time suffering from the effects of enfilade fire, happily of short duration.'

The possession of a rifle and the ability to fight on foot have enormously increased the value of Cavalry on the battlefield as well as in the strategical reconnaissance, for it is now able to fill many *rôles* which were formerly denied it, and of which some of the principal are :—

1. The temporary occupation of a portion of a position pending the arrival of the other arms.
2. The delay of hostile columns marching towards the battle.
3. As a mobile reserve in the hands of the C.-in-C. for the purpose of rapidly reinforcing any portion of his line which is hard pressed.
4. For the counterstroke, when the opportunity is not favourable for mounted action.
5. For the occupation of defiles or strategic points till the infantry can come up.

All being duties in which it cannot permanently replace, but in which it can be of material assistance to the other arms.

Examples of the employment of Cavalry in some of the duties enumerated above will be found in General Haig's 'Cavalry Studies,' especially in 'The Attack Staff Ride.'

There is no question of the employment of Cavalry, mounted or dismounted—it must fight on horse or on foot, and also combine the two methods as the circumstances require, and *when* to use the one or the other form is what we have to practise ourselves in.

But this is certain : if we ignore the power which the possession of a modern rifle gives us and decline to make use of this power when the situation demands, or if, on the other hand, obsessed by the physical factor, we neglect the mental and moral factors and refrain from shock action when the psychological occasion is calling for it, then we shall lose 90 per cent. of our value in war.

'To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under Heaven.'

## 'THE ALFONSO CHASSEURS'

MÉLILLA AND THE ARME BLANCHE, SEPTEMBER 1909

Translated from the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*

By COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

THE 20th of September 1909 was a glorious occasion for the Spanish Cavalry—a day whereon a mere handful of daring horsemen saved a whole brigade from disaster and turned a possible defeat into a triumph.

Early on the morning of this day the division under General Tovar started from Mélilla in a southerly direction with the intention of chastising the Kabyle tribes of Beni-Sicar, Beni-Said and Beni-Bugafar. The Brigade Morales, which is here more particularly concerned, and which was composed of one squadron of the 21st Regiment of Alfonso Chasseurs, two mountain guns and four battalions of Infantry, arrived at its destination, Taxdirt, about midday without opposition. In the reconnaissance which followed in the afternoon, the Cataluna battalion finding the advanced guard, came under a heavy hostile fire from some commanding heights, but, although much exhausted, the battalion succeeded in capturing in succession four of the positions held by the enemy. The squadron, acting further to the left, had come into action dismounted, and supported with carbine fire the Infantry advance. None the less, the forward movement of the battalion was presently checked, and the enemy, suddenly attacking the left of the brigade in overwhelming force, necessitated the deployment in this direction of two of the remaining battalions; the fourth, or Tarifa battalion, was still held in reserve some distance to the rear.

The situation of the advanced battalion now began to cause anxiety; the men were thoroughly exhausted—they had fasted long, the heat was intense, the ammunition also began to run short and there was no reserve supply. The position could no longer be held in face of the increasing numbers and menace of the enemy, and orders were thereupon given that the battalion should fall back, covered by the dismounted fire of the Chasseurs, while the reserve battalion was directed to advance

on the right and in support of the retiring advance guard. No sooner did the enemy perceive the retreat commence than, to the number of about 1500, he hurled himself with yells of victory upon the wavering Spaniards. The men of the battalion fought hard with the bayonet, but in a moment were cut off and surrounded, and it seemed as though the



annihilation of this battalion, and the rout of the brigade, were alike inevitable.

At this supreme moment General Tovar, the divisional commander, turned to his staff officer, a young lieutenant-colonel of Cavalry named Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, and shouted: 'Quick, Cavalcanti, take command of the squadron and charge!'

The Chasseurs had now for some time been out of cartridges, and, having remounted, had drawn back into a narrow and shallow depression.

Cavalcanti galloped to the squadron, took command, and by making good use of the terrain succeeded in reaching unobserved some rising ground on the flank of the Kabyle attack, whence the ninety horsemen composing the squadron could plainly see the critical situation of the Cataluna battalion. Cavalcanti now ordered the charge, and with the officers\*—Alvarez, Gasco, Martos and Prudan—well in front, the Chasseurs flung themselves on the enemy's flank. The surprise was complete. The tribesmen endeavoured to beat off the attack by means of a hot but badly directed fire and by hacking at the horses with their swords, but nothing could hold back the Spanish troopers. Sabring to right and left, they broke through the hostile ranks, and so tremendous was the moral effect of the charge that the Moorish attack was brought to a standstill. The squadron had but just rallied when a fresh gathering of the enemy came into view, and now against these the Chasseurs, of whom but *forty* remained mounted, charged anew. This second charge threw the tribesmen into complete disorder, and by this time—the head of the Tarifa battalion having arrived on the scene and the guns having also come into action—the enemy's offensive was altogether shattered. The Spanish horsemen, however, were still to be reckoned with, and although but *eighteen* men now kept their saddles, these charged for the third time, and finally put the enemy to flight !

The casualties in the squadron amounted to eight killed and seventeen wounded ; those among the horses are not given, but they suffered greatly from the heavy sand and from having been for fourteen hours under saddle without having been fed or watered. The losses actually inflicted upon the enemy by the *arme blanche* totalled upwards of one hundred. An overpowered battalion was saved from disaster, and the awkward situation of the brigade was cleared up and relieved by the timely action of the Cavalry, which thus converted a defeat into a victory. *The issue of that day at Taxdirt was decided neither by gun nor rifle-fire, but by the sabres of an efficient and well-led squadron of Cavalry employed exactly at the right moment.*

Cavalrymen of all ranks will appreciate at its full value this fine performance of the Alfonso Chasseurs.

\* Another officer, described as ' the well-known gentleman-rider Lieutenant Spencer,' was also apparently attached to the squadron ; but his horse had fallen with him just prior to the commencement of the first charge. He followed on foot, rallying the many dismounted men and saving many of the wounded from the hands of the enemy.









A ROYAL REVIEW ON BLACKHEATH.

1759.

## *'CONTACT SQUADRON'*

By MAJOR E. C. HAAG, *18th Hussars*

IF it were possible to have a meeting of all commanding officers, and to ask them in succession for a definition of a 'Contact Squadron,' it is tolerably certain that no two answers would be alike, yet that each answer would be correct. The reason may be the following :—

In reviewing the Cavalry drill-books written during the last twenty years one finds that the term 'Contact Squadron' has several meanings. In the early drill-books 'Contact Squadron' meant a squadron in a neck-lace of squadrons advancing, each keeping in touch with the other. Nowadays, we understand 'Contact Squadron' to mean a squadron which finds strategical patrols and their reliefs, and which is ready to push aside any resistance which such patrols may meet with. We are, however, told that during recent large Cavalry manœuvres it was suggested that this 'Contact Squadron' should be called a 'Succour Squadron' and not a 'Contact Squadron.'

Reading books on Cavalry one finds that a 'Succour Squadron' is one which closely follows a long line of Cavalry advancing to the attack, and which is ready to fill such gaps in the alignment as may occur as the line extends or contracts. The expression 'Contact Squadron' is, perhaps, too general a term.

One is inclined to believe that it would be better to give definite technical names for the various duties for which a 'Contact Squadron' may be detailed. There are five or more distinct kinds of 'Contact Squadrons.'

*First Case.*—In an engagement of 'all arms' it frequently occurs that the attacking forces lose touch for the time being of the retreating defeated forces.

Battles nowadays will last for three or four days, so that the troops in attack will become too exhausted to follow up the retreating forces.

To make good the ground which they have gained is all that can be expected of them at the time.

The idea of large bodies of Cavalry in pursuit is good in theory, but it is almost impossible in practice.

At no time in a modern engagement, other than Cavalry *versus* Cavalry, will the enemy be so routed as to allow himself to be pursued and cut up, as we see depicted in 'battle pictures' or described by people with more military imagination than knowledge.

It is, however, practically certain that after an important engagement, squadrons or a squadron will be at once detailed to keep touch with the retreating enemy, these squadrons being later followed up by large bodies of Cavalry that may be available. The duty of the squadron is to keep touch or contact, and this squadron is, therefore, essentially a 'Contact Squadron.'

For example, take the retirement of the Boers after the relief battle of Ladysmith. The Boers were allowed to retire practically unmolested, and for days, even weeks, nobody knew definitely of their disposition or line of retreat. Touch had been completely lost. Cavalry was available, fresh and ready after the battle of Peter's Hill, and why 'Contact Squadrons' were not sent forward for the purpose of maintaining as well as getting touch has never been explained.

*Second Case.*—When a large force which has only protective Cavalry with it feels that it is about to become engaged in a 'rencontre' battle, it seeks to gain success by immediate and scientific touch with the advancing enemy. It is essential, therefore, that the G.O.C. should at once know the line of advance of the enemy; the amount of deployment undertaken against him; the position of reserves; and whether it is possible or advisable to retire or rush forward rapidly in order to gain the best site for the employment of his troops.

For this purpose a 'Contact Squadron,' in contradistinction and in addition to the Advance Guard Squadron or Cavalry, should be specially sent forward to make the necessary reconnaissance, and to maintain touch and contact, so that the G.O.C. may be able to have constant news of his opponents' doings.

*Third Case.*—We have the 'Contact Squadron' which is employed in strategical reconnaissance, and which finds and does parent to the strategical patrols.

*Fourth Case.*—When large bodies of troops, such as Division or Army Corps, are marched along several parallel roads, it may occur that owing to the network and lie of the roads being not truly parallel, that some of the roads are widely separated by rugged, mountainous, difficult, and enclosed country. It is then often advisable to supplement all modern inventions of inter-communication, such as signalling, wireless

telegraphy, balloons, &c., by a ‘Contact Squadron,’ sent out on purpose to maintain touch between the two advancing forces on either side.

This is an extreme case, and does not often occur; but I quote it as a possibility. There is always in such cases the great danger of one column becoming engaged before the column on the right or left can come up in support and in time to co-operate by an ‘Extension in Line.’ The risk is too great to trust to a calculation of space and time, and most Generals would willingly sacrifice a squadron from the front for such a duty in order to minimise such a danger.

*Fifth Case.*—A ‘Contact Squadron’ employed in a long necklace of squadrons acting as protective Cavalry. This is the ‘True Contact Squadron.’ It is purely tactical. In order to distinguish which particular kind of squadron is meant, it might be advisable to christen them as follows :—

1st Case —	A Battle Contact Squadron	called	<i>Touch</i>	Squadron
2nd „ —	Advance Guard Contact Squadron	„	<i>Head</i>	„
3rd „ —	Succour or Parent Squadron	„	<i>Parent</i>	„
4th „ —	Inter-Communication Squadron	„	<i>Link</i>	„
5th „ —	True Contact Squadron	„	<i>Contact</i>	„

In all cases it is impossible to lay down a line of conduct or mode of employment for the leader, as it varies in every instance according to the nature of the country; the *moral* and vitality of the enemy; question of supplies; and the available horse energy of the squadrons themselves.

The most difficult is the third case, the employment of the ‘Parent Squadron.’

Experience will go to show that supposing the squadron to be at war strength, if employed at this duty it will be exhausted and its energies absolutely sapped after three days, when it should be replaced and relegated to the reserves for rest. Three days is an optimistic maximum.

In all five cases the difficulty is to know whether the contact is ‘Real or False.’ In the case of the ‘Parent Squadron,’ its patrols may be held up in a difficult or intersected country by a few skirmishers.

After a few saddles have been emptied by rifle fire from an invisible enemy, say in a country full of hedge-rows, and where it is difficult to make progress other than by the roads, patrols are inclined to get ‘sticky’ and lose their dash.

The best remedy is to bring up reinforcements and clear the way for them by rapid and sudden attack, the guiding rule, however, being for the squadron leader never to put all his eggs in one basket, and always to remember to keep a reserve in hand. Should the strength of

reserves employed for the removal of the resistance, however, be inadequate, it may happen that the whole squadron may become absorbed in the task, and should the terrain be favourable to the enemy, successful handling of men and the power of the modern rifle may keep the 'Parent Squadron' at bay, although the enemy be vastly inferior in numbers. The resistance offered may be so effective that the squadron leader may be hoodwinked into the belief that he is in contact with a force equal or superior to his own, whereas, in reality he is in contact only with a group of patrols using guerilla tactics to checkmate any attempt of his at a flank movement, and who, profiting by intricate country unfavourable to Cavalry, have brought the squadron to a standstill. This is a case of 'False Contact.'

The squadron leader may have to call for reinforcements, a thing that the brigadier would most unwillingly grant, inasmuch as it would weaken his brigade and spoil its concentration. The only way of testing whether contact of 'False or Real' is by pushing forward and by hard fighting. This, of course, means casualties; and, therefore, the 'Parent Squadron' should not be employed as such for more than three days at a time, as the strain is too great.

There is another reason, and a more serious one, why the 'Parent Squadron' should be replaced by a Relief Squadron after the third day.

The primary object of the Cavalry Division is to get a strategic insight and clear up the situation for the General-in-Chief. There is a tendency nowadays to economise and send out as few strategic patrols as possible from the Cavalry Division which has this enormous task in hand.

These patrols, to be of value, must not be allowed to sit in the pockets of their 'Parent Squadron,' and should be given freedom of action and be miles ahead. These patrols may get ambuscaded or shot down, and nobody be any the wiser.

The G.O.C. Cavalry Division may imagine that he has several strategic patrols out searching for information which the General Commander-in-Chief expects his Cavalry Division to furnish without delay. He may be absolutely ignorant of the fact that they have been cut down hours ago, or so reduced by casualties as to be perfectly useless, and that his Cavalry Division is advancing without or with insufficient strategic patrols out in front.

This is very apt to occur in warfare. It is the duty of the 'Parent Squadron' to see to it that it does not. If the 'Parent Squadron' is to be saddled with this responsibility, one is inclined to put the question: Whether it would not be better to leave the choice of the amount of

patrols to be sent forward to the squadron leader instead of the G.O.C. Division ?

The amount of ‘Parent Squadron’ to be sent out would, of course, always be determined by the Divisional General.

We must also realise that as a ‘Parent Squadron’ follows in the trail of its strategic patrol, it must, on account of its isolated position, ensure its safety by protective patrols. We may easily, therefore, realise how great is the strain on the squadron, and that it is even doubtful whether it will last three days in war time.

‘False Contact’ in the case of a ‘Touch Squadron’ is the most dangerous, for here the squadron leader is sent forward to maintain touch with the ‘Retreating Forces.’ Should he meet with resistance, as above described, he may content himself with sitting down passively in front of this resistance, reporting and believing that he is in touch, whereas, in reality the touch is unreal, and he is in contact only with a small force specially detailed to play with and hold him.

The other cases that I have enumerated, such as the ‘Contact Squadron’ and the ‘Link Squadron,’ need not be discussed. Their line of contact is obvious.

If the above suggested nomenclature were adopted and embodied in our drill-book, a squadron leader being detailed as a Parent, Touch, Link or Contact Squadron would at once know what duties lay before him, whereas, at present the squadron leader, if called upon to use his squadron as a ‘Contact Squadron,’ may not be perfectly clear as to what is expected of him without a certain amount of explanation or ‘pow-wow’; certainly waste of time.

The habit of distorting an order into a long explanatory ‘pow-wow’ is a disease and should be discouraged.

This new nomenclature might help to minimise the temptation to embark on a wordy explanation of the duties expected, might save time.

‘Slip’ squadrons quickly with as little discussion as possible. Time is too valuable an asset.

The theories of to-day are oft the falsehoods of yesterday ! War oft makes them lasting heresies ! Damn theories, let us remain practical !

Attack—attack quickly—attack persistently and tenaciously. Keep on at the ‘attack’ and chance the casualties.

That is, I believe, the most successful way of leading a squadron detailed for contact duties.

## BALANCE

By 'Asp'

FIVE or six years ago, or, we may say, shortly after the South African War, there was a feeling throughout the mounted branches of the Army that our methods of training our remounts were not conducted on the right lines. The courses of training were too rigid and riding-school was regarded too much in the light of a parade. Remounts were not trained on common-sense principles and the results obtained by the ride, as a whole, were taken as a standard, instead of the work of each individual horse. Young horses were worked too much in ranks, and if a troop of remounts could parade in line, move at a fast pace without breaking out of the ranks, and generally give satisfaction when acting collectively, they were usually considered to be fit for passing into the squadron. Individual training of horses was not given much attention.

The results of this system of training were not satisfactory. If a horse is not well trained he is not well balanced, and only a well-balanced horse is in the complete control of his rider. Again, it is only this balance that enables a horse to accomplish long journeys without undue fatigue and to remain sound after prolonged work in rough country. It stands to reason that a horse which supports its weight and the weight of its rider on all four legs proportionately, *i.e.* the well-balanced horse, is capable of much more work than the animal which uses only his fore legs for most of his work, to say nothing of the former being a much pleasanter conveyance, and therefore economising the strength of its rider. An examination of the horses of a regiment will show that lameness in the fore legs is much more prevalent than lameness behind. This is proof in itself that horses are inclined to put a large proportion of their weight on their fore legs. If we watch a riderless horse galloping about a paddock we notice that when he turns he will do so much more often on his fore hand than on his haunches. This is another proof of the greater inclination a horse has to use his fore legs than his hind ones. Again, if we mount a raw horse, we notice that, when he turns, his quarters



swing out, that is, he turns on his fore hand. It is, therefore, plain that in training the remount we have to combat this inclination in every way possible, in order to make him able to carry the weight he will be called upon to carry on all his legs, evenly, on all occasions, whether going in a straight line or on the turn. This is the principal object of training, and if we bear this in mind, and, moreover, thoroughly understand when our pupil has reached this desirable stage, we have mastered the most essential point in equitation. With a balanced horse, 'figures of eight,' 'circling,' and all other movements of the riding school come more or less naturally.

We hear a great deal about this 'balance.' Every writer on equitation devotes much space to it, and there is no doubt that if every Cavalry soldier thoroughly realised its great importance the efficiency of the arm would be increased. That great Cavalry leader Oliver Cromwell thoroughly realised the importance of this balance. When he was permitted to raise his first troop of horse he had admirable material from which to fill his ranks. The men were accustomed to perform long journeys on horseback as a matter of everyday occurrence, and they found from experience that the balanced horse was the one which was most satisfactory. The unbalanced horse was eliminated by the civilian from his stable, and he kept only the horse which could cover distances without unnecessary fatigue. This fact, and this fact alone, enabled Cromwell in the short space of two years to turn out regiments of Cavalry which carried everything before them. At Naseby his Ironsides crossed the ditch between themselves and the enemy in good order, and bore down on the Royalist Horse, who were expecting to have them at their mercy when thrown into disorder by the broken ground. It was the fact that each of Cromwell's troopers rode a well-balanced horse which was in the absolute control of the rider which enabled him to carry out the above plan. This balance gave him the initiative which is what we want to gain in war. He acted on the offensive and avoided everything of a passive nature. Cavalry leaders have much to learn from Cromwell. Handy horses mean handy squadrons, and the latter mean making the enemy conform to your movements instead of altering your plan to suit his. The whole question of success in Cavalry warfare depends on the balance of the horse. Without this balance the squadrons will not be in existence after a few weeks of the hard work which the Independent Cavalry will be called upon to do in future campaigns. The question as to whether Cavalry should be armed with the sword, the lance, or the



bayonet must take second place in this most vital matter of the training of our horses, and the horse has rightly been described in our training manual as the Cavalry soldier's most effective weapon.

Frederick the Great paid special attention to the training of his horses. He established riding schools and used every means possible to ensure that the education of his troop horses was thorough. No horse was allowed to be passed into the ranks until he could twist and turn, start and stop, at the will of his rider. This means perfect control, and this control is only possible with a balanced horse. The result of this training is seen in the successes which Frederick achieved with the Cavalry arm. He had great leaders in Seydlitz and Ziethen, but these leaders were imbued with his own ideas and realised what was their true weapon and used it to the utmost advantage.

We have realised nowadays the importance of the training of our remounts, and the question is how this balance must be obtained. Balance means 'distribution of the weight by the height of the neck bent at the poll; propulsion by means of the hocks being brought under the body, and lightness by the loosening of the lower jaw.' Mr. Fillis, in his excellent book, 'Breaking and Riding,' says: 'When we know this we know everything, and we know nothing. We know everything because these principles are of universal application; and we know nothing, because they have to be applied practically.'

Mr. James Fillis probably selected the very best horses as his subjects. The number of horses he trained to high school work was very small compared with the number of remounts we are called upon to train. Hence we cannot hope to pass into the ranks of a regiment annually horses trained to such a pitch of perfection as were those of Mr. Fillis. We have all shapes and sizes of horses dealt out to us, some which can never be satisfactorily trained owing to short necks, low breeding, and faulty conformation, but we should ensure that our methods are at any rate based on sound principles, so that the result is for the most part satisfactory.

A few years ago there was a rage for long-reining. Every young horse was put through a course of this, and the 'Training Manual' of 1904 strongly advocated this system. The manipulation of the reins appeared simple, and the result was that every instructor was allowed to handle them, whether he understood the principles of their use or otherwise. In a short time it became manifest that horses' mouths were hardened by this system of instruction. The horse bored, set his jaw, carried his

head low and moved on his fore hand. In other words, he was not balanced, and so the method fell into disfavour. It was not the system that caused this, but the abuse of the system. Like every other method of training horses, it required knowledge, care, and patience to achieve good results.

There is at present a growing inclination to adopt the method of flexion laid down by Mr. James Fillis. This method is admirable, but requires a long time, and it is infinitely more difficult than the long-reining system. It is not every man who has the hands and the experience to train a horse on Mr. Fillis's lines, and with this system one man cannot undertake the training of more than one horse at once. What we want, therefore, is a sound and easy way to produce a balanced horse in as short a period of time as possible. The only way to do this is to use the long reins, but to use them with care. The long reins are only a means to an end. When a horse performs all the movements in the reins he is by no means trained, but he has gone a long way towards completing his education. The long-reining should not be done as a separate course, but should be combined with riding the horse. The man on the horse's back makes or mars the animal ; everything else is merely to assist him to turn out the finished article. Therefore, when a horse is being taught any movement with the reins, it is necessary to get on his back immediately afterwards and teach him the same movement mounted. In this way the horse is made to realise that he is being taught something by the man on foot which he will be called upon to do when the man is on his back. Instruction on foot and instruction mounted must go hand in hand during the horse's education.

To obtain the balance with the long reins we must bear in mind always the definition of the balance. The question of the height of the neck, the bend at the poll, and the propulsion by the hocks must be continually uppermost in our minds. What we want is elasticity in the horse's movements. He must be like a spring under the rider—a spring over which the rider has absolute command to release or contract at will. There must be nothing rigid in the horse's movements, for rigidity means loss of control. For this reason all methods of flexion which are based on the tying up of the horse's head in any fixed position must be avoided. By these methods the horse's neck may be bent in the desired position, but it will remain in this position. There is no 'give and take,' and this 'give and take' is one of the most important points to aim at in the art of horsemanship. What we wish to strive for in our preliminary training

of the horse by the man on foot is the absolute sympathy of the man with the horse. When the horse 'gives' to us we must 'give' to him. It is impossible to do this by mechanical means, and in all methods of training the object at the opposite end of the reins to the horse's mouth must be an animate and not an inanimate one. By Mr. Fillis's methods this sympathy is very highly developed, but, as we have seen above, although it would be ideal to have every horse trained on these lines, it is almost impossible to do so in practice. It is for this reason that the long-reining system is advocated as an excellent practical substitute, but not quite on the lines on which it has been carried out heretofore.

In long reins a horse will generally carry his head low. We may use the bearing rein to raise his head, but this again means rigidity, and perfect sympathy is destroyed. If we run the reins direct from the horse's mouth to the pad about the wither, we get the head in the correct position but lose the benefit of the rein round the hind quarters. It is most essential to have the outer rein running round the quarters to induce the horse to bring his hocks under him and to prevent his quarters flying outwards. If we do not use the outer rein in this way, then the whole benefit of long-reining is lost. The conclusion we therefore come to is that we must devise a system by which the reins run from the horse's mouth to the height of the wither, and also pass round his quarters. By this system we get the feeling on the mouth brought to bear from the position whence it will eventually come when the horse is ridden, and the outer rein supports the quarters in exactly the same way as the rider's leg will subsequently support them. The method advocated in this article is as follows :—

The reins should run from the bit through a small pulley (one for each rein) fixed on the saddle pad as near the height of the wither as possible. From this pulley they run at right angles down to second pulleys attached to the girth on either side, and from there the inner rein would run direct, and the outer rein round the quarters, to the instructor's hands. By this method we get what we want—that is, the correct position of the head and neck and the control of the hind quarters. The horse goes kindly and there is no boring. The reins run smoothly and there is a sympathetic connection between instructor and pupil. The pad should be a strong one, and the one advocated by Mr. Sydney Galvayne in his book, 'The Twentieth Century Book on the Horse,' has been found most satisfactory for this purpose.

By this system a practical method of 'balancing' is obtained. The

horse is in the complete control of the man. In the old system, the pull on the reins was always in a downward direction, and it was only natural that the horse should lower his head to avoid this pull. The balance was thus destroyed, and hard mouths and horses moving on the fore hand were the results. With the method advocated here the feeling is always from the direction of the wither to the mouth. The line of least resistance would be when the corners of the horse's mouth are on a level with the wither. The horse therefore naturally adopts this position of the head and neck, and this is the position we are striving to make him adopt.

In conclusion, it is only necessary to add that every horse presents a new problem to the instructor. Temperament, conformation, and the fact that the horse may have contracted bad habits before he has come under our care, all necessitate that the course of instruction should often be varied to suit the particular case. The main principles, however, remain the same. Careful individual training is as essential in the case of the horse as it is in that of the soldier. For a cavalryman to use his lance and sword effectively he must be well mounted on a well-balanced horse. A good swordsman on a badly trained horse will be defeated by his inferior on a handy animal. The pace of a squadron is judged by its slowest horse. After prolonged marching the slowest horse will be the badly balanced one. He will become weary of carrying his unevenly distributed weight, and will lose condition through the strain that he has to undergo in trying to keep up with the rest. We should, therefore, use all means in our power in peace time to produce this balance in our horses. Knowledge in training and sympathy with our mounts are the two most essential factors. The former can be acquired by studying the methods of the masters in this art and putting these methods into practice; the sympathy is already developed, more or less, in every Cavalry soldier. We should always keep before us the maxim that, after skilled leadership, it is not the weapons but the quality of the man and the training of the horse which win the Cavalry battle.

*THE LOCAL FORCES IN OUR WEST AND EAST  
AFRICAN COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES*

It is not my intention to go at length into the details of organisation of our Local Forces in Africa. Indeed, even if it were possible, it appears to me that such details would be of questionable value and of doubtful interest ; and, moreover, they are to be found in the recently published ' Handbook of the Land Forces of British Dominions, Colonies, and Protectorates,' the fourth volume of which deals entirely with Local Forces in Africa.

An attempt is made here to give a brief description of how certain Forces were born and grew to their present dimensions, what strategical and tactical problems confront them, and, to a lesser extent, what possible future developments may await them.

The tables at the end of this Paper will, however, facilitate a broad comparison of the establishments of the different Forces, and will obviate the necessity of further reference to the numbers of units, companies, squadrons or batteries, and of men that make them up.

The following groups are those dealt with :

1. The West African Frontier Force ;
2. The King's African Rifles.

WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE

The West African Frontier Force, which is maintained by the Colonial Office, comprises the local military Forces in the Gold Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Southern and Northern Nigeria. In Sierra Leone there is also an Imperial Garrison, to which only a brief reference will be made.

Prior to 1899 the Forces of these various Colonies were independent of one another, but in that year a committee under Lord Selborne recommended their amalgamation under the designation of ' The West African Frontier Force,' the assimilation, so far as possible, of pay and conditions of service, and the appointment of an Inspector-General. The Force is recruited locally from the various native tribes, while the officers and

British non-commissioned officers are lent by the War Office and seconded for a period not exceeding five years.

It is first proposed to trace very briefly the military history of the various Colonies in order to show how the West African Frontier Force grew from existing Local Forces in the case of each.

The two oldest Colonies are the Gold Coast and Gambia, where settlements were made in the reign of Queen Elizabeth by certain west-country merchants who started an extremely profitable traffic in slaves with the West Indies and America. For two centuries this slave trading was carried on with much success, and the settlements prospered exceedingly, but, on the suppression of slavery, trade of every description languished until about the middle of the last century, when the value of the natural products of West Africa was realised. Since that time progress has been practically without interruption, and the revenue of all our possessions in this part of the world has grown steadily.

*Gold Coast.*—The first European settlement on the Gold Coast was made in the fourteenth century, and in 1618 an English Trading Company established itself there. Since that time several of the European Powers attempted with varying success to form trading stations; however, by 1871 England obtained sole sovereignty over this portion of the coast, and to-day what is known as the Gold Coast consists of the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories, with an area which is practically the same as that of England, Scotland, and Wales. It is bounded by French territory on the north and west, and by the German Colony of Togoland on the east.

In 1873 a Force, raised at Lagos, was brought to the Gold Coast for service in the Ashanti War, and on the termination of the war a portion of it was left in the country and became the nucleus of the Gold Coast Constabulary. This Force in 1879 had an establishment of 16 officers and 1,263 native rank and file. It was reorganised in 1901 and became the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force.

*Gambia.*—Gambia, which, save for a short coast line, is surrounded by French territory, is the smallest of our West African possessions, being only about half the size of Wales. As has already been mentioned, its trade was dependent on the legality of slavery, and when this was suppressed, trade declined and eventually fell off altogether.

In 1899, consequent on the rapid development of French influence in West Africa, the British Government declared a Protectorate over the valley of the Gambia. Prior to 1902 a company from the West India

Regiment was stationed in the Protectorate, but since that time it has been garrisoned by a company of the West African Frontier Force. This was at first a company from the Sierra Leone battalion, but it has since been separated from it and given its present title of Gambia Company of the West African Frontier Force.

*Sierra Leone.*—In 1788 a strip of coast land was partly ceded to, and partly purchased by, a naval officer. This was the commencement of the Colony of Sierra Leone. Additions were made from time to time, and in 1896 a Protectorate was established over the Hinterland. To-day the size of the Colony and Protectorate is nearly equal to that of Scotland. It is bounded, roughly speaking, on the north and north-west by French territory and on the east by the independent Republic of Liberia.

Until 1890 a body of police, partly civil, partly military, was the only Force in the Colony. In that year Frontier Police were raised; these were, in 1901, converted into the Sierra Leone Battalion of the West African Frontier Force, which now has its headquarters at Daru on the railway near the Liberian Border, and has an establishment of four companies.

There is also an Imperial garrison at Sierra Leone, which includes British and West African companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, Royal Engineers, West India Regiment, West African Regiment, Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, and Army Ordnance Corps. The West African Regiment must not be confused with the West African Frontier Force; the former is under the War Office, the latter under the Colonial Office, and the conditions of service are entirely different.

*Southern Nigeria.*—What is now known as Southern Nigeria was formed in 1906 by amalgamating Southern Nigeria with the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. It is about the same size as the Gold Coast.

Lagos consists of various native States, the first of which to be ceded came into the possession of the British Crown in 1861.

In 1864 Captain Glover, R.N., raised a Force of Hausas at Lagos. This Force became the Lagos Constabulary, and was in 1901 reorganised under the title of the Lagos Battalion West African Frontier Force. In 1906, on the amalgamation of Lagos with the other provinces of Southern Nigeria, it became the 2nd Battalion Southern Nigeria Regiment.

The Central and Eastern Provinces came under British protection in 1885, and in 1900 were called Southern Nigeria.

The first Local Force was raised in 1891. This was the nucleus of the Southern Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force which in 1906 became the 1st Battalion of the Southern Nigeria Regiment.

*Northern Nigeria.*—Northern Nigeria, which is more than five times the size of England and has a population of about nine millions, was secured to Great Britain by the Royal Niger Company, from whom, in 1900, the Crown took over the administration of the country.

The first Force raised by the Company consisted of Constabulary. The men were mainly Hausas, armed with sniders and old pattern mountain and machine guns.

In 1897 the British Government, consequent on the attitude of the French and their encroachments on the Niger, decided to raise a Local Force in Northern Nigeria, and in the name of this Force we first find the title 'The West African Frontier Force.' The task of raising and organising it was entrusted to Sir F. (then Colonel) Lugard. This was no easy matter, for the Niger Company's Constabulary had exhausted the available supply of Hausas, and it was necessary to recruit Yorubas—a pagan tribe, which had hitherto successfully resisted the advance of the northern tribes.

These men were difficult to train, and it was necessary to sanction a very large proportion of British officers and non-commissioned officers in order to insure efficiency.

The Force was to consist of :

- 2 Batteries (of 6 guns each).
- 1 Company of Sappers.
- 2 8-company Battalions (each 1,200 strong).

At the end of the first year the Force was still some 400 below its strength ; but as the Imperial Government assumed the administration of the country, such of the Royal Niger Company's troops as were willing to enlist were transferred to the Imperial service and more than made up the deficiency. The absorption of the Sokoto Empire opened up a new and better recruiting area, and it was found possible to discontinue the enlistment of Yorubas.

This Force, originally raised as the West African Frontier Force, became in 1901 the Northern Nigerian Regiment of the West African Frontier Force.

The physical characteristics of our various possessions in West Africa differ considerably, but for the sake of brevity they can be classified, as regards military operations, under the following headings :

- (a) Desert open country.
- (b) Cultivated open country.



(c) Bush country through which a man on horseback or on foot can easily force his way.

(d) Forest country with more or less dense undergrowth.

The uncultivated country is covered with dense grass from four to ten feet high. With the exception of a few Government constructed roads the majority of the routes are mere footpaths along which men or animals can only move in single file.

As a general rule, in West Africa human transport only can be used. This and the difficulty of obtaining supplies locally necessitate the employment of small columns, and even these have great depth from front to rear, and are consequently peculiarly vulnerable in the flanks.

It is not proposed here to touch on the question of bush tactics, about which various works have been written by authors of great experience and ability.

Up to the present our West African troops have not had to fight against any foe more formidable than the native tribes.

Those inhabiting the dense bush country turn their surroundings to their own advantage. Our superiority in arms is minimised, while the old pattern rifles, out of date guns, and bows and arrows of the enemy are made the best use of. In Sierra Leone, Southern Nigeria, and Ashanti the enemy dig trenches close to the path, and if not discovered by the flankers, discharge their guns at the head of the nearest European at a few yards range. In Sierra Leone and Ashanti they make stockades across the paths, the turning of which is a dangerous and slow process. In the more open country, such as is met with in the southern portions of Northern Nigeria, the pagan tribes are mainly armed with bows and poisoned arrows, while in the north of that Protectorate the enemy is mounted and armed with swords, spears, a few guns, and bows and arrows.

Generally speaking, the West African soldier is tractable, faithful, and attached to his officers. Ready to learn and often enthusiastic over his training as long as the novelty lasts, he is wanting in perseverance, so that constant repetition and insistence on a high standard of training is more necessary than is the case with European and Indian troops. On the other hand, he is very hardy, extraordinarily mobile, and can be relied on to do his twenty-five to thirty miles a day for a considerable period.

It must be remembered that the ancient civilisation of which the somewhat degenerate relics are at the present time discovered in Northern

Nigeria and the French Soudan came partly from the north by routes that are still followed by trading caravans and partly from Southern Egypt and the British Soudan. This civilisation was brought by the Moorish Mahomedans, who gradually forced the pagan fetish-worshipping tribes southwards, and, generally speaking, the best fighting material is to be found among their descendants, the northern tribes, who have pushed their conquests to the fringe of the forest-covered coast region ; but these are usually somewhat fanatical Mahomedans, and a proportion of pagans is necessary as a counterbalancing element.

The most important and numerous tribesmen recruited in Northern and Southern Nigeria are Hausas and Yorubas. The Hausas are before all things traders, but produce the best fighting material on the West Coast. They are intelligent, sturdy, brave, active, and reliable. They are quite black but are not of the pure negro type.

Opinions differ as to the fighting value of the Yorubas. They are smart, intelligent, and have done good work in the past.

The Gold Coast Regiment is recruited from a very large number of tribes, none of which preponderate noticeably.

In Sierra Leone the Mendis and Timinies are practically the only tribes recruited. The former are pagans and are hard-working, thrifty, and fond of fighting. Their intelligence is not very high. The Timinies are more intelligent than the Mendis, but not so hard-working. They make good soldiers.

Enlistment is for six years, and a man may extend for a second period of six years ; after ten years he can re-engage up to twenty-one years.

A reserve has recently been formed, which men are encouraged to join on discharge. Reservists are trained for fourteen days annually.

There is no reason why the native soldier of West Africa should not be just as good a shot as his British *confrère*. Up to a few years ago this was not recognised, and not only was he armed with an inferior weapon, but also a very much smaller number of rounds were allowed for the recruit than were assigned for the trained soldier's course. It has been practically demonstrated lately that recruits trained under the present British Musketry Regulations produce as good a figure of merit as the average regular soldiers at home. Consequently the course for the Regular Army, with a few very slight modifications, was adopted for 1908.

The only mounted corps at present is the Mounted Infantry Battalion of three companies in Northern Nigeria.

Many natives are naturally good horsemen and others become so after a comparatively short training. Their scouting is excellent. They are now armed with the lance.

The horse of the Western Soudan is a useful kind of weedy beast. If well fed and looked after he does a hard day's work, but is not suitable to carry heavy weights. Unfortunately in all the country south of the eleventh parallel of latitude the tsetse fly is met with and the use of mounted troops impossible. Even north of this line many horses are lost from this cause.

The Artillery is armed with 2.95" Q.F. guns.

Each company of Infantry and Mounted Infantry has a .303 Maxim. The carriers for these guns are enlisted men.

The Infantry soldiers are armed with .303 M.L.E. rifles, Mounted Infantry with M.L.M. carbines, and Artillery with M.E. carbines.

It is considered by some that a short rifle or carbine would be more suitable than the long rifle in the bush, and no doubt the Force will eventually be armed with it.

The equipment is of brown leather. A long cape is issued instead of the great coat and a machete is supplied. This is a large broad-bladed knife which is useful for all manner of work.

The uniform consists of a Zouave jacket, worn in review order and for walking out, blouse, shorts, shirt and jersey, all of khamki, kaarband, fez with tassel, putties and sandals.

Water transport is used as far as possible, and the waterways are of great assistance, particularly in Northern Nigeria. Shallow draught stern wheel steamers, steam canoes, or native dug-outs are used. Railways have been constructed or are being made in all the Colonies, and every year more roads are opened up and more motors make their appearance.

In the northern possessions camels, ponies, bullocks, and donkeys are available, but, generally speaking, carriers will still have to be relied upon, for even in the north it is only in the dry season that animals are safe from the tsetse fly.

To British officers and non-commissioned officers life with the West African Frontier Force has much to recommend it.

The term of service is for one year actually in the country, after which a free passage home and two months' leave on full pay is given. If a return for a second tour is elected two more months' leave and a free passage out are given. For those who remain in West Africa for more

than twelve months ten days' extra leave on full pay is given for each completed month. The regulations only allow of officers and non-commissioned officers being seconded for five years, so that three tours is all that anyone can do.

Both junior officers and non-commissioned officers often find themselves in command of detachments in out-stations, and the responsibility generally is far greater than is the case at home.

The personal element plays a very important part in dealing with the soldiers of West Africa. With patience and kindness almost anything can be accomplished, and it adds an enormous amount of interest to the work to realise that at any time, with but a few hours' notice, an officer may be on the march with the troops he has trained, to put peace instructions to the test of war.

Active service is most likely in Southern Nigeria, Northern Nigeria, and Sierra Leone being next in order of merit.

For sport generally Northern Nigeria comes first, but in parts of all the Colonies there is a first-rate big game shooting. Good bird-shooting is to be got nearly everywhere.

There are dull out-stations, of course, but the number of these is being constantly reduced.

#### KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES

The King's African Rifles consist of five battalions which are the garrison of our Protectorates in East Africa. These Protectorates are British East Africa, Nyasaland, Somaliland, and Uganda.

The following is a very brief outline of the growth of the different battalions that make up the Forces.

*British East Africa.*—The Protectorate of British East Africa we owe to the energy of the Imperial British East Africa Company, which originally obtained from the Sultan of Zanzibar a lease of part of his mainland territory, that is to say, a narrow strip of coast land. The Company afterwards also acquired that great hinterland which marches with Uganda and Victoria Nyanza on the west, with Abyssinia in the north, and with German East Africa in the south.

Previous to 1895 the Local Forces were composed of a fluctuating number—200 to 1,000 men—of Zanzibaris, Sudanese, Swahilis, and Somalis, organised and trained by British officers lent to the Company.

When, in 1895, the Company's territory was transferred to the

Imperial Government, a portion of the previously existing Force was formed into the East African Rifles, and in addition an Indian contingent about 300 strong was raised, the total Force being about 1,000 men.

Three years later the East African Rifles were reorganised as five companies of Sudanese, three of Swahilis and the Indian contingent, which latter returned to India in 1900, its place being taken by another Swahili Company. In 1901 the Sudanese companies were reduced by one, and a company was organised into a camel corps for Jubaland. Next year the Force became the 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles.

As a rule either the 1st or 2nd Battalion is also stationed in British East Africa, and a detachment of two companies is found by one of the battalions in this Protectorate for service in Zanzibar. The cost of this detachment is borne by the Sultan's Government.

*Nyasaland.*—The Protectorate of Nyasaland, formerly known as British Central Africa, was opened up by the African Lakes Company. The first Local Force was formed in 1888 and consisted of an irregular body recruited in the country and commanded by Sir F. (then Captain) Lugard. Three years later a Force of Sikhs was raised in India for service in British Central Africa, and in 1894 this Force amounted to three British officers, 200 Sikhs, 150 native Regulars and a varying number of Irregulars, and was chiefly employed in the suppression of slave trading. In 1896 a regiment called the British Central Africa Rifles was raised. This in 1898 became the 1st Battalion Central Africa Regiment, composed of nine companies, of which three were for service in North Eastern Rhodesia.

In 1901 the North Eastern Rhodesian companies were replaced by police.

The 2nd Battalion which was raised in 1899 for garrison duty in Mauritius saw service afterwards in Somaliland, Ashanti, and Gambia. It was administered first by the War Office, later by the Foreign Office, and is now under Colonial Office control, and so has had varied experience.

In 1903 both battalions were reorganised and became the 1st and 2nd Battalions King's African Rifles, one of which is usually stationed in Nyasaland and one in British East Africa. The establishment of the two battalions is now identical (four companies) and both draw their recruits from Nyasaland. An Indian contingent permanently stationed in the Protectorate forms, for all practical purposes, part of whichever battalion is also there.

*Somaliland*.—A British Protectorate was established over the coast of Somaliland in 1887.

Originally the Local Forces consisted of a small police levy, but in 1900 further military levies were raised for an expedition against the Mullah. These levies numbered 100 Camelry, 400 Mounted Infantry, and 1,000 Infantry, and they were in 1901 re-named Militia.

Operations continued during 1902, when the Militia were strengthened by the 2nd Battalion Central African Regiment, and also during 1903 and 1904, when the Force was successively reinforced by British and Boer Mounted Infantry, the 1st Battalion King's African Rifles, and troops from India ; but, in spite of the defeat of the Mullah's Forces at Jidballi in January 1904, operations were indecisive, and merely resulted in an agreement whereby the Mullah accepted Italian protection and bound himself not to raid our friendly tribes. These friendly relations prevailed until the end of 1908, when the Mullah became active, and has remained in this unpleasant condition ever since.

The Somali levies which took part in this campaign formed the nucleus of the 6th (Somali) Battalion of the King's African Rifles when it was raised. Afterwards it was decided to recruit for it entirely in India, and this was done for a time ; but in 1908 it was reorganised again, four companies being recruited in Somaliland and two in India.

*Uganda*.—In 1890 the Kingdom of Bunanda was brought under British administration as represented by the Imperial British East Africa Company. Other provinces were added, and in 1894 a British Protectorate was proclaimed in succession to the administration of the Company.

The first Local Force, raised in 1891, consisted of the remnants of the Sudanese troops left behind by Emin Pasha in 1888 ; it was about 800 strong and was called the ' Uganda Rifles.'

Three more companies, recruited from the same source, were raised in 1893. The standard of discipline was not very high, and in 1893 an attempt was made by the Sudanese to mutiny ; the attempt was not very serious, and order was soon restored. In 1897 a much more serious mutiny occurred, and it was found necessary to bring troops from British East Africa and India to take part in operations which eventually resulted in the rebels being completely crushed with an estimated loss of 570 killed and 549 wounded, our casualties amounting to 280 killed and 655 wounded.

These events of course entailed a complete reorganisation of the troops in Uganda, and two battalions were formed with a very large proportion of British officers, and recruited partly from Sudanese and partly from Swahilis and Baganda.

In 1904 the 5th Battalion King's African Rifles was reduced and incorporated as an Indian contingent in the 4th, which now consists of six companies of African troops and the Indian contingent of 200 rank and file.

This is a very brief sketch of how the King's African Rifles have grown from native levies or troops maintained by trading companies into the existing homogeneous and well-trained Force that is charged with the defence of the four Protectorates.

In the case of expeditions the troops are commanded by the senior officer of the King's African Rifles, unless the expeditionary Force is drawn from more than one Protectorate, when the Inspector-General, whose headquarters are at the Colonial Office, is, as a general rule, employed to take command.

As regards the selection of officers for the King's African Rifles, the system is at present the same as for the West African Frontier Force ; that is to say, an officer makes application to the War Office to have his name noted as desirous of serving with one of these Forces. The names of candidates are noted in the Military Secretary's Department, and when vacancies occur those names that have reached the head of the list are forwarded to the Colonial Office for approval by the Colonial Secretary, who is advised by the Inspector-General. Normally officers are taken in order, but application is sometimes made for officers with special qualifications, such as a Mounted Infantry or signalling certificates, and the possessors of them are taken irrespective of their position on the Military Secretary's list.

Officers selected are given a free passage from England to the Protectorates and back. They are seconded for three years, during the first of which they are on probation. This period may be extended up to five years.

A candidate for first appointment as a subaltern in the King's African Rifles must be :

1. An officer of the Regular Army, Special Reserve, Yeomanry, or Reserve of Officers.
2. More than twenty-two and less than twenty-eight years of age at the date of appointment.

3. Unmarried.
4. Qualified by having completed two years of service or three trainings.
5. In possession of a Hythe certificate or its equivalent, and if a Special Reserve or Yeomanry Officer, reported as fit for promotion to the rank of captain.

The promotion of officers in the King's African Rifles is entirely by selection—seniority alone confers no right to it—but, as a matter of fact, seniority usually governs promotion to the command of a company, provided an officer's reports are satisfactory.

The rates of pay range from 300*l.* a year for a subaltern to 700*l.* a year for an officer commanding a battalion. There are also certain allowances given to special appointments, and all officers receive 30*l.* to purchase their kit on first appointment. These rates of pay and allowances are practically the same as received by the officers of the West African Frontier Force.

British warrant and non-commissioned officers are seconded from their regiments for two years with the King's African Rifles, and may be employed for a period not exceeding five years.

As there are in East Africa areas which vary in altitude from sea level to over 17,000 feet, so there is almost every sort of country from mangrove swamps on the east coast to tracts such as Somaliland and Jubaland, and the country south and west of Abyssinia, that are practically waterless deserts covered with stunted bush. At a slightly higher altitude are the open plains and bush-covered country, in which probably the best big game shooting in the world is to be obtained, while higher still are the bamboo and cedar forests of Mounts Kenia and Elgon and the Aberdare range, which lies roughly speaking between them. In Uganda and Nyasaland there is not such great variety of country, which, for the most part, is park-like, with here and there dense tracts of bush or forest and also great stretches of marshy country.

But the most remarkable physical characteristic in East Africa is the region of the Great Lakes, which stretches from Nyasa in the south to Rudolf in the north-east and Albert in the north-west, and which, with the exception of Tanganyika, are fringed partially or wholly by our Protectorates.

With such a variety of country it is hardly necessary to mention that the training of the King's African Rifles is not governed by local conditions; but apart from considerations of terrain in East Africa the various battalions are liable to be called on to serve anywhere, and have



to be prepared to meet an enemy capable of using arms of precision with effect in the open, as well as native tactics in bush country.

As with the West African troops, every effort is made to preserve the natural mobility of the natives, and, unlike our neighbours in German East Africa, the authorities forbid the use of boots, and sandals are only permitted under certain conditions.

The standard of musketry has recently been raised, the latest Musketry Regulations being taken as a guide in this matter, and the Africans have recently proved themselves to be quite up to the standard of the Indian contingents.

In addition to the Infantry of the King's African Rifles, there are two companies mounted on camels, one in Jubaland and one in Somaliland, and three Mounted Infantry companies (two pony and one mule mounted) in the latter Protectorate.

It is the opinion of the Inspector-General that the camelry in Jubaland should have a proportion of Mounted Infantry with them, and in his report for 1908 he wrote : ' I have no doubt in my mind that camel corps working in the Jubaland bush would be extremely vulnerable unless they were accompanied by ten or twelve horsemen, who would scout ahead of the line of march. It is ridiculous to expect a man mounted on a riding camel to scout effectively in bush country.'

In Somaliland this difficulty is overcome by having three Mounted Infantry companies. The ponies come from Somaliland, but it is becoming increasingly hard to obtain them there, and it is probable that in future Arabia and Abyssinia will supply a proportion of them.

The fighting qualities of the Soudanese are well known. Those who are serving in both the 3rd and 4th battalions are now very old—too old. They were never properly grounded in musketry, and consequently the men are not good shots. It is now nearly impossible to obtain Soudanese recruits from the Soudan, so that it is probable that the Soudanese element will gradually disappear in the 3rd and 4th battalions. Efforts are now being made to raise fifty recruits for each battalion from the Soudan, but it is doubtful whether the men will be forthcoming.

On the other hand, certain Nilotic tribes, such as the Bakedi, who inhabit the country along the upper waters of the Nile in Uganda, can be drawn upon. These men are promising material, and if only the old fighting spirit of the Soudanese can be grafted among these new recruits they should make excellent soldiers.

The Swahili are good fatigue men, but have not as a race any great

fighting instincts, although there are brilliant exceptions. In some ways they are rather like the Egyptian fellaheen. There is only one company of Swahilis in the 3rd battalion.

At present only one company is formed of Nandis. The men are perhaps too young at present, but they promise well, and are cheery, clean, easily managed, and good fighters.

Should the Nandi do as well as is expected, it is likely that another company will have to be formed from this tribe, in view of the probable failure of Soudanese recruits.

There is one company of Abyssinians in the 3rd King's African Rifles. They have only been raised recently, so it is too soon to say whether they will be a success. It is believed that they are good fighting men.

The company is shaping well, but requires firm and tactful handling. There may be difficulty, moreover, in getting Abyssinian recruits to keep it up to strength.

As regards the natives of Nyasaland, they can best be described by quoting what Captain C. W. Barton, D.S.O., King's African Rifles, has written concerning their characteristics :—

‘The native of Nyasaland makes an exceptionally good soldier, several expeditions proving him to be courageous and cool in action, an untiring marcher, cheery and good-tempered under all circumstances. He places implicit confidence in his officers, and becomes much attached to them. Extremely docile by nature, he is easily disciplined, and serious crime is unknown. He is honest and trustworthy and free from religious or other prejudices. Keen to learn, he picks up all drill very readily, and takes a pride in turning out well. With a naturally good eye he shoots well, and takes the greatest care of his arms and equipment. It has been found possible to entirely replace Sikh drill-inspectors by African non-commissioned officers who pass an examination for promotion.

With an enlistment for six years it is possible to produce good signallers, Maxim gunners, and scouts capable of understanding what to find out and how to express the result of their observations.

The tribes from which the soldiers are recruited are :—

Yao.

Manganga.

Atonga.

Augoni, a tribe of Zulu origin.

Awemba from N.E. Rhodesia.

On enlistment or re-engagement every man must take the oath of allegiance.

The original term of enlistment is for three years (for six years with the 1st and 2nd battalions); approved men may re-engage for further periods up to twelve years, and on completion of twelve years' service men may be permitted by their commanding officers to re-engage to complete a total of twenty-one years, beyond which service may be extended in special cases.

The pay of the native ranks in the different battalions varies according to whether the men receive rations or not. In the 1st, 2nd, and 6th battalions the men receive free rations and their pay varies from 31s. to 15s. a month.

In the 3rd and 4th battalions the men are supposed to purchase their own rations and the pay varies from 53s. to 22s. a month.

Up to the present the battalion in Nyasaland is the only one with a reserve. This is available for service anywhere with the 1st and 2nd battalions.

It is proposed to organise reserves in British East Africa and Uganda.

The clothing of the native ranks of the King's African Rifles is very similar to that worn by the West African Frontier Force, except that the former have not the Zouave jacket, while their jerseys and putties are blue instead of khaki-coloured and their fezzes are black.

They are armed with M.L.E. and M.E. rifles, and their equipment is practically the same as that of the West African Frontier Force.

Except in Somaliland, where burden camels are used, and in Jubaland, where either mules and carts or burden camels can be made use of, according to the season of the year, carrier transport is necessary. On most of the Great Lakes, on certain stretches of the Juba, the Zambesi, and Shire rivers, water transport can be used.

The Uganda Railway, which lies wholly outside Uganda, connects Mombasa on the coast with Lake Victoria Nyanza, and in Nyasaland a railway connects the navigable water of the Shire river with Blantyre, the headquarters of the Protectorate. This railway will be extended to Lake Nyasa.

A certain proportion of all the native tribes, and particularly of the Somalis, are armed with guns; the remainder being armed with broad-headed spears and shields.

As regards both these forces, the West African Frontier Force and the King's African Rifles, there are two points to which attention might be drawn.

The first is what can best be described as the magnificent policy of bluff which has hitherto enabled us to maintain peace and good order among peoples, whose numbers run to millions, by means of some 8,000 or 9,000 of their own fellow-tribesmen organised, trained, and disciplined by a handful of British officers and men. A recent striking example of this was when the Governor of Northern Nigeria, escorted by about 100 native Mounted Infantry, interviewed the comparatively recently conquered Sultans of the north, who were accompanied by literally miles of mounted followers.

This fact—namely, that we rule in East and West Africa on sufferance of the majority and by reason of our racial superiority—emphasises to a very marked degree the necessity for great personal influence on the part of the British officers of the force.

The quality of all troops depends largely on this factor ; but in East and West Africa it is of almost inconceivable importance both on account of the nature of our rule and also because of the tractable and childlike characteristics of the native soldier.

The second point is, perhaps, somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, but it is unquestionably one to which attention should be drawn.

It is this : each of these Colonies pays entirely for the troops that are quartered in it. That means that neither force can ever be regarded as a whole. Each Colony is bound to consider the necessity for a certain number of troops from a purely local point of view. And, consequently, can a Governor be wholly condemned when, harassed by financial difficulties, he urges the reduction of troops and the substitution of that cheap and pernicious type of soldiery, viz. armed and partially trained constabulary. The important point, however, is that both the West African Frontier Force and the King's African Rifles should be regarded as Imperial forces and not as local troops, for there is not a single Colony in which they are quartered that has not at least one international boundary, and this in itself may be said to make them essentially Imperial, and it is consequently desirable that they should be controlled and have their establishment fixed by some Imperial authority—either the Colonial or War Office—and not be liable by reason of a fluctuating revenue or an economical government to have their establishment reduced to a bare safety point.

The solution of this question does not appear to present insuperable difficulties, at all events on the East Coast, where the Imperial grants from the Colonial Office far exceed the total cost of the King's African Rifles.

It should, therefore, be possible to divert from these grants a sum sufficient to maintain the force, which could then, as far as establishments and distribution go, be controlled by the Home Government.

On the West Coast the case is different. There the majority of the Protectorates are, so to speak, paying concerns, independent, save in one case, of any Imperial grants, and it would be necessary, except from Northern Nigeria, to obtain grants from them in order to enable the Colonial Office to maintain the West African Frontier Force. Whether this is an insuperable difficulty it is not for soldiers to decide; but that the result is desirable is a case with extremely strong arguments in its favour.

## WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE

Corps	Constitution	Headquarters	Companies		
			Batteries	Mounted Infantry	Infantry
Northern Nigeria Regiment	Staff . . . . .	Zungeru .	—	—	—
	Battery . . . . .	" .	I	—	—
	1st Battalion . . . . .	" .	—	—	9
	2nd Battalion . . . . .	Lokoja .	—	—	9
	Mounted Infantry Battalion	Kano .	—	3	—
Southern Nigeria Regiment	Staff . . . . .	Lagos .	—	—	—
	Battery . . . . .	Calabar .	I	—	—
	1st Battalion . . . . .	" .	—	—	6
	2nd Battalion . . . . .	Lagos .	—	—	6
	Depot Company . . . . .	" .	—	—	I
Gold Coast Regiment	Staff . . . . .	Coomassie .	—	—	—
	Battery . . . . .	" .	I	—	—
	Battalion . . . . .	" .	—	—	8
Sierra Leone Battalion	Battalion . . . . .	Daru .	—	—	4
Gambia Company	Company . . . . .	Bathurst .	—	—	I
		Totals .	3	3	44

Approximate total numbers 8,000

## KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES

Corps	Constitution	Headquarters	Companies		
			Mounted Infantry	Camelry	Infantry
Nyasaland . . . . .	1st Battalion . . . . .	Zomba .	—	—	4
	Indian Contingent . . . . .	" .	—	—	I
British East Africa . . . . .	2nd Battalion . . . . .	Nairobi .	—	—	4
	3rd Battalion . . . . .	" .	—	I	5
Uganda . . . . .	4th Battalion . . . . .	Kampala .	—	—	6
	Indian Contingent . . . . .	" .	—	—	2
Somaliland . . . . .	6th Battalion . . . . .	Ainabo .	3	I	—
	Indian Contingent . . . . .	" .	—	I	I
		Totals .	3	3	23


Approximate total numbers 3,400.





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## *HORSEMASTERSHIP*

By MAJOR C. O. HEAD, R.H.A.

It might be thought that there is little left to be said on this subject, and such is the case, but its literature is now so voluminous that, from an instructional point of view, it has defeated its own object ; few care to dip into it in search of the advice that would be useful.

Considerable attention has of late been devoted to horse-training ; no doubt a useful science, but, in the writer's opinion, of far less importance than the subject under notice. The advantage of starting a campaign with horses in perfect condition and thoroughly sound is so obvious as not to require comment ; but through the exigencies of training, the system of forage supply, and sometimes through the want of more care or knowledge on the part of unit commanders, this ideal state is under present conditions unattainable.

To take these impediments in order. The training of troops is of course essential : by judicious management it could be carried on not only without prejudice to the horse, but even to the advantage of his fitness, but the difficulties in the way of doing so are great. Horses cannot be kept in hard training for very long : they get stale, and require rest and change of diet. In this climate the winter is obviously the time when the troop horse should be allowed his rest, partly on account of its unfavourable weather, but more because it is less likely to be the period of active service. In India the hot weather is for the same reasons the season devoted to this purpose. All unduly hard work in these respective periods should be carefully avoided, unless it is considered that the necessities of training justify the waste of a certain amount of horseflesh. In that case it would be better to tell off certain horses for the purposes required, and keep them specially for it while the remainder enjoy their rest.

One of the chief difficulties in reconciling training and condition, and one it is difficult to remedy, is the divorce which at present in many



cases exists between responsibility and command. The men entrusted with the care of the horses and held responsible for them have only partial control of the exercise and work to which they are subjected. Those who share this latter power and yet are not directly responsible for the condition of the horses are liable to lose sight of its importance in their efforts to procure effects which more immediately concern them. Cavalry manœuvres make serious demands on the horses' condition ; at their end the latter are not in an ideal state for the commencement of a campaign, and weeks, if not months, of rest and light work are necessary to restore them to full strength and vigour.

Little need be said about the system of forage supply. In England it works well ; the scale is sufficient to allow of horses being got into thoroughly good condition, provided the work demanded of them is not unduly severe. In India the reverse is the case : the scale is in some places insufficient, the quality is often indifferent, and for supply reasons indents have to be put in two or three months in advance. The last is a great objection, as in that climate it is quite impossible to predict with certainty what class of grain or what amount of it horses will eat with advantage two months later. The accordance of the actual supply with the indent varies locally, but any discrepancy is solely within the discretion of the Commissariat officer. The running account is desirable for both countries, as in no stable can horses be kept in good condition on the same class and quantity of food all the year round ; but in India its application requires some modification for the satisfaction of the horsemaster.

So great an authority as Colonel de Lisle, in the January 1909 number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, states that in his opinion the scale of forage in India is sufficient. Of course its sufficiency varies locally, as there are great local differences in the prices of grains ; it also depends on the size of the horses. The quality of grass also varies locally, and its quantity may have to be supplemented considerably. Sand in Northern India can only be used for bedding for about three months in the year. It is too cold in the cold weather, and becomes an insanitary bog in the rains. Oats would no doubt be the best grain to give the horses ; but last year at Meerut their price was practically prohibitive : the so-called 10-lb. grain ration would have purchased barely 5 lb. of oats.

Passing from extraneous influences, which have been touched on merely to point out some of the difficulties with which horsemasters must contend, we will now refer to the duties of unit commanders, the

stud-grooms of the Army. At the expense of originality it may not be gratuitous to remind them of the Eastern adage, 'It's the master's eye that makes the horse grow fat.' The importance of seeing their horses as nearly as possible every day can hardly be exaggerated. That walk round the stables before going hunting or after polo is even of more use than might be expected from the time it occupies, as, besides there generally being something that requires attention, it displays an interest in the animals which communicates itself to subordinates, with beneficial results.

Familiarity with every horse is essential to good management. Horses get out of condition and health quickly and recover slowly. To notice their ailments promptly and take timely steps to remedy them should be the aim of the horsemaster. Also, they vary considerably in constitution and health; while perhaps it is easy in normal circumstances to keep three-fourths of them looking well, the remaining fourth are sometimes given up in despair, and if possible are hidden round the corner at inspections.

We have possibly all met with a subaltern or sergeant-major who says to us, 'Nothing will make that horse look well; if he could eat the oats of every horse in the stable it would make no difference to him.' An open mind should be preserved as to the value of this remark; possibly the horse suffers from being given more oats than he can digest, in the vain hope that they will do him good. It is safe to say that from 95 to 98 per cent. of the Army horses at home could with judicious management be got into really good condition. Occasionally, but rarely, a horse will be found of such nervous temperament or delicate constitution that it is impossible to put any condition on him. Such horse, after fair proof, should be cast, as he would be quite useless after the first week or two of active service.

The eye, the hand, and the thermometer are the assistants of the horsemaster. The eye will notice a general loss of condition throughout the stable, thereby giving warning that something—hay, water, ventilation, &c.—is at fault; or it will detect the tucked-up flanks and staring coat of a horse out of sorts and requiring prompt treatment. The hand will feel the loose skin of the healthy horse or the drum-like hide of one with his liver out of order, and will detect undue heat or swellings. The thermometer will supplement these by telling the horse's temperature, which, if above normal, denotes fever.

The tools of the horsemaster are the bran-mash, the oil-drench, and

the fever-drink. Horses slightly out of sorts can be restored to health by bran mash, more serious disorders require treatment by drenching with oil, preceded and followed by bran mash; the use of the fever-drink is denoted by its name. The latter varies in composition, but any farrier-sergeant with a proper knowledge of his business can compound it. Fever is usually caused by chills or over-exertion, and if not treated promptly it has the most injurious effect on the horse's condition. The patient, besides having his fever-drink, should be kept warm in a well-ventilated stable and thoroughly rested.

For the horses in good health, regular and sufficient feeding, plenty of good water, long slow exercise and good bedding will suffice to bring them into good condition. Every endeavour should be made to get them big and keep them so; hard work will soon reduce them. The practice of letting horses down low in the non-training season is a bad one; at home they want oats to warm them, and if allowed to get thin, especially in India, it is difficult to pick them up again. It is better to keep the bulk of the forage account balance on their backs and ribs than in a fund. Good hay and oats are the best food; artificial foods are expensive and hurtful, fattening a horse's inside rather than covering his outside. The forage balance should be built up by savings in bedding and on sick horses, and by a small toll on the corn of some particularly robust horses. Bedding should be as ample as in any hunting stable: a careful sergeant-major will in fair weather save considerably in bedding and at the same time keep his horses well bedded.

Bad riding on the part of the men, especially in India, handicaps the horsemaster. A nervous, excitable horse, if badly ridden on parade, will return to his stable fretting and irritable—a state in which he can enjoy neither rest nor food. So in teaching riding men should be taught to study the nature and temperament of their horses as well as the mechanical arts of sitting on and regulating motion. A violent kick in the ribs may be necessary to start a lazy horse, but it might make an excitable one prance and fret for an hour after its administration. Only horses of placid, even temperament should be selected for the recruit to ride; nervous horses are often quite happy in the riding school, but not with bad riders.

A large amount of orderly work is a source of trouble in horse management. The regularity of feeding is upset, the horse stands about in cold and wet, and he is frequently not in stables at a time when he can be inspected. Partial mitigation of the trouble is to insist on seeing these

horses at convenient times, and, in giving the necessary instructions to the orderlies, make them responsible for their condition.

Summing up these remarks, the principles of successful horsemaster-ship are as follows :—

1. See every horse daily.
2. Insist on the regularity, as far as practicable, of the watering, feeding, and exercise of *every* horse.
3. Act promptly with horses that show the slightest signs of being out of sorts.
4. Select riders to suit the horses, and encourage them in caring for them.
5. Select horses specially for the work required of them.

There are no rigid rules for feeding, but these general principles may be accepted. Dividing the corn into four feeds is better for the horses than three, but gives more trouble to the men. Another disadvantage of it is the difficulty of properly supervising the making out and giving of the fourth feed. Food should generally be given at the stable hours, when everybody will be present to assist in giving it. One quarter of the hay ration might be given at the commencement of midday stables ; it keeps the horses quiet while they are being groomed, and the men can keep it up to their heads, so that it is not wasted by being trampled on. The balance of the hay should be given after evening stables. Bran mashes should be given in the evening once or twice a week in barracks, and it is best not to mix them in the dung barrows. Green food and carrots should be given when funds will permit, and no opportunities of grazing, either in barracks or in a field hired for the purpose, should ever be missed.

The necessary trouble these steps entail would be well repaid by the self-satisfaction derived from having a body of horses in perfect condition, and by the credit and comfort that would be attached to their possession, but principally by their far greater value for active service than would be the case if they were in poor condition.

## SOME NOTES ON 'REITERDIENST'

BY 'LANCER.'

SUCH importance is attached on the Continent to the views of the veteran General v. Bernhardi and so great a success was achieved in England by the translation of his 'Cavalry in Future Wars,' that widespread interest naturally attaches to his latest publication, 'Reiterdienst,' of which an excellent translation by Major G. T. M. Bridges, 4th Dragoon Guards, our Military Attaché at the Hague, is already in the press.

The General joined the Army in 1869, at the age of 20. He gained the coveted Iron Cross in the 1870 campaign, and subsequently served as General Staff Officer of the 1st Division, and as Chief of the Staff of the XVIth Army Corps. For some years after 1897 he was head of the Military History Section of the Great General Staff. In 1900 he was given the 31st Cavalry Brigade and in 1904 promoted to the command of the VIIth Army Corps. He has thus had a varied and thoroughly practical experience with troops, and his views in consequence acquire additional weight. He has been distinguished throughout his career for originality of thought and tenacity of view, and even in retirement continues to work in the service of the arm.

General v. Bernhardi in his earlier work dealt, theoretically, with the employment of Cavalry; in the present one he treats of it from a practical point of view and puts his finger on many errors that exist in the present system of training.

In the introduction the Author states that the improvements in the firearms of all three arms and the size of modern armies have reconstituted the *rôle* of Cavalry, and extended its sphere of usefulness in certain new directions. He frankly admits that the influence of Cavalry on the field of battle has diminished and that the mounted combat of masses will be the exception. On the other hand, the strategic *rôle*, consisting of reconnaissance and raids, has greatly increased in importance. Early information will be of greater advantage than formerly, as movements of large forces have to be initiated long beforehand, and dispositions once made can subsequently be altered with difficulty.

The subject is arranged in three main parts. The first deals with the strategic and tactical action of Cavalry in war as a basis for training ; the second gives a review of the peace training which the Author considers practical ; in the third certain questions of organisation are discussed.

## PART I

(a) The action of Cavalry acting independently will consist mainly of the three following duties :—

Reconnaissance. Screening. Raids.

Reconnaissance will be carried out by reconnoitring squadrons, with patrols pushed out from them. He points out that arrangements must invariably be made to relieve these squadrons and patrols, and that the probability of having to alter the line of relay posts must be kept in view when organising the transmission of reports and orders. He warns Squadron Leaders to be sparing in the number of patrols they send out ; but emphasises that the desire to spare patrols must never result in sending cyclists to reconnoitre. The latter must be reserved for carrying back reports, and for forming relay posts, for which they are admirably adapted.

The art of scouting lies in the choice of suitable commanding positions from which observation with field glasses can be made—preferably at mid-day, when columns are sure to be on the move.

In peace manœuvres scouts are prone to ride too close up to the enemy, and are driven off without having effected that quiet observation which is needed. At night, patrols must avoid large farms or villages ; they must keep watch on the inhabitants of any building they stop at, and always have a back way of escape reconnoitred. It is best for patrols to lie up in a wood, at some distance from where their forage and victuals have been commandeered. Relay posts should be pushed forward to junctions of main roads, with a few mounted men to protect them.

To the Divisional Cavalry falls the task of tactical reconnaissance, and of screening. The latter must be actively carried out, if possible with the aid of cyclist troops to drive back the hostile reconnoitring detachments.

As regards raids, the Author predicts greater attention will be paid to such undertakings in proportion as the usefulness of Cavalry on the battlefield diminishes. The size of modern armies precludes their living on the country, and they will be dependent on their communi-

cations for food, as well as for ammunition. In the later stages of the campaign, opportunities will assuredly occur, and a strong force of more than one Cavalry Division, strengthened by Cyclist Battalions and R.E. with bridging material, will be required to carry out a really effective Raid.

(b) The tactical action of Cavalry may be divided into :—

The Cavalry fight.

The co-operation on the battlefield with the other arms.

Mobility being the chief characteristic of Cavalry and the root reason of its existence, anything that limits this mobility is opposed to its special qualities and its purpose. For this reason the mounted attack should be its recognised form of attack. Not only is it swift in its decision, but complete in its effect.

Where large forces of independent Cavalry are face to face, the combination of mounted and dismounted Cavalry in co-operation with artillery will probably be employed. In the absence of sufficient information, both sides will employ dismounted action in order to gain time for reconnaissance. After the combat, the beaten side will certainly employ the rifle to cover their retirement. The Author's subsequent suggestions for the dismounted action of Cavalry are founded on Infantry tactics and entirely opposed to the teaching of our Cavalry Training.

He favours immobile led horses left far away from the firing line ; and holds that Cavalry must make long advances on foot, distributed in depth with supports to reinforce, which will culminate in an assault. He disapproves, however, of the substitution of the bayonet for the sword.

On the main battlefield the Cavalry should be massed on the flank and in front of the main body.

In co-operation with the other arms the Author warns the Cavalry not to wait for opportunities for mounted attack, but to seize every chance of engaging the enemy with the rifle.

He suggests that vigorous action against the enemy's flank and rear, against his Ammunition Columns and Heavy Artillery, would probably have greater effect than attack with doubtful success on his Infantry line.

History gives few examples of a satisfactory pursuit, and for this reason, that the victor has had probably a strenuous day, and that ammunition, food, and water are lacking. A pursuit must be early foreseen and preparation made to carry it out. Men and horses must be fed betimes, forage carts taken, and at all costs the night after the battle must be made full use of.

In considering certain tactical questions, the Author dwells on the

relative advantage of Échelons and successive lines. He favours forward Échelons either for offensive or defensive action, especially when one regiment is acting independently; and advocates some extended formation for crossing zones which are, or may be expected to be, swept by fire. If the fire comes from the front, columns with small frontage would be useful, and if from the flank, line formation is indicated. He backs the Cavalry who ride knee to knee, armed with the lance, against Cavalry who ride in looser formation and have not the lance, even though they may be numerically superior.

## PART II

PEACE TRAINING.—All peace training must be directly preparatory for war. The principles mentioned in Part I. afford the foundation on which the system of training will be built. Great importance is attached to the systematic schooling of the horse, to fit him to take his place quietly in the ranks and to remain under perfect control at the faster paces; and the individual training of the man to make him efficient in the field, a bold horseman, a good shot, and to give him quick and independent judgment when left to himself.

Training in riding and in musketry, should be carried out hand in hand from the very beginning.

Recruits can best receive their early education in the Riding School, but remounts should be trained as much as possible in the open country. Judging distance is of such importance nowadays that more attention should be devoted to it, and the system of passing word down the firing line should be practised frequently.

Officers should receive theoretical as well as practical instruction, which might be grouped under the headings of—

1. Strategical lessons—to enable them to realise the movements of a modern army on which they, as Patrol Leaders, would be called upon to report.
2. Cavalry history—to give them an insight into the difficulties of actual warfare, to compensate for lack of war experience.
3. Strategic and tactical employment of Cavalry with practical lessons in the various means of transmitting information.

This instruction is completed by means of Staff Tours—more practical than war games—while the duties of patrol leading can be taught by regimental 'Patrol rides.' These should be progressive, embracing all the various forms of patrols and be supervised by the Brigadier.



Non-commissioned officers should receive instruction on a similar system of Squadron Rides supervised by the Commanding Officer.

The Author deals next with the culminating forms of peace training—Cavalry Reconnaissance Exercises and Manœuvres. Among the many points which he mentions in connection with them are the following :—

The length of column of a skeleton force should be marked by flags, to give patrols practice in estimating troops.

Full amount of transport should always be furnished, as in this lies one of the great difficulties of leading large bodies of Cavalry.

Too many maps should not be issued, as they would not be available in an enemy's country.

Rest days must be allowed for horses to recuperate.

Officers should attend a course of instruction as umpires in order that their decisions should be uniform and have unquestioned authority.

The squadron forms the tactical unit and the foundation on which the successful leading of Cavalry depends. The greatest attention must, therefore, be paid to its training, both mounted and dismounted, stage by stage.

The test of a trained squadron is that every horse should move square to the front, keeping the direction ordered, at the correct pace. That every horse should move with his neck bent and back arched, and go with an easy feeling of the rein. More importance should be attached to long steady movements, keeping correct pace and direction than to quick changes from one formation to another ; which in war will seldom be required.

It is useful for the squadron to practise following its Commander, keeping all the time under cover, with only general orders from him.

When working in the regiment, considerable freedom should be allowed to the squadron, but it is of the greatest importance that it should be kept well closed up as a compact unit.

During drills the various Commanders should regularly fall out to give subordinates opportunities of leading.

### PART III

Part III is very short and deals with the organisation of the Cavalry. The Author considers that the increase of Cavalry, though necessary, is financially impossible ; that the ideal Division consists of three Brigades each of three regiments, and he advocates the addition to it of Cyclist Battalions, and motor transport.

He regards an Inspector of Cavalry with a proper Staff as essential to the uniform and systematic training of the Cavalry, and suggests that in close conjunction with the General Staff, he should observe what improvements are effected in other countries and see that any information likely to be useful is passed on to the troops.

In conclusion, the Author warns his brother officers against sticking too closely to old tradition and exhorts them to weigh the altered conditions of the present without prejudice, and above all, avoiding false situations, to aim at such training as will fit the Cavalry for war.

It is not possible within the limits of this review to do more than touch on special points of interest ; but those who cannot study the book in the original will find the translation eminently readable ; and I would strongly recommend it to every officer interested in his profession.

## IMPRESSIONS

BY AN INFANTRY TRANSFER

A TRANSFER, being received into the fold when of riper years, does not accept the dogmas of tradition unquestioned, he thinks things out for himself; the impressions therefore created on his mind, as for the first time he really becomes intimate with the characteristics and work of Cavalry, may be of use in helping officers, born and bred in that arm, to understand how others see them, and thus possibly to promote that intimacy between the four arms without which great successes in war are impossible.

*In the field.*—To one who has spent many years toiling along in rear, in absolute ignorance, or trying to get on terms with an evasive mounted opponent, the sense of power and possibility conferred by the possession of a mounted command is as great as it is pleasant.

An infantryman is usually in ignorance of what is passing, and if he detects an opportunity to use his command, is often unable to seize it till too late. In the Cavalry it is different: a cavalryman generally knows what is going on, and if he sees an opportunity can take it.

The increase of power, either defensive or offensive, gained by mounting a body of men, be it Section, Company, Battalion, Brigade or Division, is enormous. Match a single mounted Section, Company, Battalion, Brigade or Division against a corresponding dismounted unit, and the mounted unit wins every time, provided it has the one necessary condition for Cavalry—space to manœuvre and fight.

*Space to manœuvre and fight.*—In South Africa there was this room to manœuvre, and to enable us to fight on equal terms with the Boers we were forced to turn a large portion of our force into mounted men.

In Manchuria there was little room to manœuvre, and the Russian Cavalry were so wedged into the front of fortified battlefields that they were unable to fight.

*Mobility.*—The factor, then, that confers this superiority of the mounted arm over the dismounted is mobility, and this mobility is useless unless there is space in which to use it.

*Knowledge of other arms.*—Now, to the transfer who fully realises the impotency of Infantry against a mobile Cavalry often arises the question, 'Why are the Cavalry condemned to a rôle of immobility by being badly

placed by the G.O.C. in C. ? ' and secondly, ' Why are the leaders of the Cavalry, who have been given every opportunity of using their mobility, trying to attain by fire power, at heavy cost, what they can attain with trifling opposition by mobility ? ' In both cases the answer is the same, ' Lack of comprehension on the part of the leaders of the necessities and characteristics of the other arm. '

It takes more than the month's attachment to the Cavalry accorded to the G.O.C. while at the Staff College to understand anything about Cavalry ; and it takes more than the musketry course at Hythe to teach the Cavalry Leaders the full power of Infantry fire from positions of their own choosing.

Occasionally one hears of an exchange between Cavalry and Infantry, sometimes of a transfer from Artillery to Cavalry, but never of Cavalry to R.A. and R.E. ; and yet these are the corps from which the largest proportion of our G.O.C.s and their Staffs are drawn.

*Shock tactics.*—It is generally supposed that the Infantry transfer, educated as he is in the invincibility of fire power, views shock tactics with disfavour. This is by no means the case : there is no greater advocate of shock tactics, used in their proper place, than the ex-infantryman. He, perhaps more than anyone, realises to the full the value of mobility. Having had practical experience in the matter, he knows that to dismount and take up a position in the hope that a mounted force, with room to manœuvre, will come and attack is folly ; he realises that to sit down means to be ignored, and thus lost to your side, or later to be compelled to mount and face the enemy on horseback. As it is with Cavalry and Infantry, so it is with Cavalry *versus* Cavalry—the greater mobility, given equal numbers, will win. He who can manœuvre and fight with cohesion at a gallop will beat him who can only manœuvre and fight at a trot.

In the transfer's opinion, the mounted attack is by no means limited to Cavalry *versus* Cavalry ; he knows full well that there are times when a mounted attack on Infantry is not only possible but easy, and that the effect of such an attack would be most far-reaching. He can call to mind occasions on which a mounted attack could have got home into his company or battalion ; and no doubt the Artillery transfer could tell you of similar occasions when his battery lay equally open to attack. But these occasions are, as a rule, the result of surprise or demoralisation, and no one will on peace manœuvres own to being surprised or demoralised by blank ammunition : the ' Cease fire ' always

goes before the retreat begins, with the result that the Cavalry is never practised in the pursuit.

*Manœuvres.*—It is always the same at manœuvres, at Staff rides, and at conferences—the Cavalry of one side are supposed to have neutralised the Cavalry of the other ; they are never given credit for having made the slightest impression on the other arms in the main fight. The result of such training in the end will be that they will believe themselves incapable of influencing the main fight, and will therefore give up the attempt.

*Training.*—Troops must be trained for what is expected of them in war, and in this matter of training there are some occasions in which it looks very much as if the cart is put before the horse.

*Reconnaissance.*—The first duty of Cavalry in these days of big forces and large deployments is, without doubt, reconnaissance. Early information is absolutely vital to enable a Commander to deploy strategically to the best advantage ; armies cannot be moved like pins on a board. To aid this reconnaissance probably comes the mounted attack against the enemy's Cavalry, followed by, possibly, a dismounted action to gain further information or to prevent the enemy gaining it. But the object of all these three is reconnaissance ; it stands first, and as such should especially be taught. Yet how often are our Subalterns trained in the conduct of a strategic patrol or our Squadron Leaders in the employment of a contact squadron ? The whole system of getting the information on which the G.O.C. makes his most vital decisions is left to the care of amateurs.

*Inspections.*—At present squadrons are tested at inspections more in drill, equitation, and the mounted attack of single squadrons than in the service of reconnaissance, horsemanship, and tactics ; and until reconnaissance is placed at the head of the list in inspections, human nature being what it is, it will not be sufficiently taught.

*Training with other arms.*—Again, in the inspections of regiments and Brigades of Cavalry it is quite the exception for the Inspecting Officer to ask to see them in conjunction with the other arms ; and until it is found that at inspections units will be asked to work in conjunction with the other arms, they will not train with them.

*Signalling.*—The question of signalling is perhaps of more importance to Cavalry than to Infantry, for not only are the distances over which messages have to be sent much greater, but generally the information that has to be sent is more important. The signalling in the Cavalry is good, but to get full benefit out of it is much more difficult than in the Infantry ; to work a helio with a rapidly moving Squadron of Cavalry

requires an expert. Still, it is possible, and to a transfer it appears that many Cavalry officers do not make sufficient use of their signallers, thereby delaying the transit of vital information, and incidentally wasting horse-flesh. In this respect they are by no means the worst offenders ; the place where the chain of information generally breaks down is between the Cavalry and the Infantry. It is nobody's ' pigeon ' to see to this matter. The Cavalry Brigade, the Infantry Brigade, and the Divisional Command, each has its Signalling Officer. These are the sized bodies with which we usually train, and when a Brigade of Cavalry is working with a Division of Infantry it never seems to be anyone's particular job to ensure that someone with the main body is told off to take messages from the Cavalry.

*Musketry.*—Although perhaps dismounted action ranks behind reconnaissance and mounted action in the scale of importance of training, it deserves none the less the most careful attention. In fire discipline and the dismounted attack \* there is no doubt that the Cavalry as a whole are behind the Infantry. Why this should be the case is not clear, unless it is that its importance is not recognised. In the seven years for which Cavalry enlist there should be time to teach fire discipline.

There is another point which requires clearing up, and that is whether dismounted Cavalry are to be asked to advance to the assault or not. At a recent Brigade Field Firing a portion of the force did actually advance to the assault and occupy the position ; but the general consensus of opinion was that this was not the *rôle* of Cavalry, and that the movement was wrong. To a transfer it appears that there will be occasions on which Cavalry will be required to dismount and take a position on foot.

What is to happen if our independent Cavalry drives the other off the field and then runs up against a long line of protective Cavalry, aided perhaps by M.I. who have taken up a position screening all the enemy's main columns, and whose position is too lengthy to be ridden round ? Determined men will not move for fire power only, especially if they know that their opponent is incapable of delivering an assault. If this screen refuses to move for our long-range fire or our threatening attitude, and where perhaps there is no space to manoeuvre, are we to give up the attempt to get information ? Just in the same way as it is necessary for Infantry to finally occupy the position of the enemy whose fire power they have subdued, must Cavalry be prepared to assault a position. The difference merely lies in the fact that while Infantry will be asked

\* The German Cavalry drill is much more explicit than ours ; it recognises the final assault in the dismounted attack.

to assault positions of strength, the Cavalry will only be required to assault positions held by Screens, Rear Guards, and such like detachments.

To enable them to be able to go anywhere and do anything, Cavalry must be accustomed to the idea of, if necessary, assaulting the position, and the dismounted attack of large bodies must be practised during peace.

*Organisation and economy.*—In its organisation and interior economy Cavalry in some respects is far superior to Infantry, while in others it lags far behind.

*Double company and squadron system.*—The self-contained Squadron, with its Squadron Leader and Squadron Second-in-Command, and its S.S.M. and S.Q.M.S. for discipline and administration respectively, and its four Troop Leaders, each with their own responsibility, is far preferable to the centralised system of the Infantry Battalion, with its eight dismounted Company Commanders and over-worked Colour Sergeants.

The Double-Company system has been tried in our Infantry, but it does not seem to answer as favourably as the Squadron system in our Cavalry, the reason being perhaps that in the days of wide extensions in the field 200 men were found to be too big a force for one man to command ; and in barracks, with our system of regimentally trained recruits, small numbers, and no horses, there is not enough work for a Company Second-in-Command.

*Territorial and link system.*—But there is one point in which Infantry is ahead of us, and that is in its territorial system, with its linked battalions and affiliated second-line units. The link in the Cavalry is merely nominal, the depôts are situated arbitrarily, and there is no connection between any special Yeomanry regiment and a corresponding regiment in the Line. The result of all this is that recruits for any regiment come from all over the United Kingdom ; that a Regular unit has no one under its particular care, and that officers who do not wish to serve abroad with their units the whole period of foreign service, and who cannot get a Yeomanry Staff billet or exchange home, are forced to retire. Through this cause a large number of valuable officers are annually lost to the Army. Till the link between two Regular regiments is made a living thing, officers and N.C.O.s being able to claim to serve with the home unit after a certain number of years abroad, and till the Regular regiment has some special interest in some particular Yeomanry regiment, and until the county or group of counties has some interest in the regiment or group of regiments, the best results will not be obtained ; then, and not till then, will the exodus of officers from regiments stationed abroad cease, the Yeomanry get picked men as Adjutants, the regiment Abroad

get its fair share of good and well-trained recruits, and the regiments derive the untold benefit of men being held together by territorial as well as military ties.

*Health of men.*—There is no doubt that the horsemastership in the Cavalry is good ; but it is only too frequently the case that officers who take most care of their horses take least care of their men, and while the stables are a picture of cleanliness, barrack-rooms are an exhibition of dirt, and while the feeds of the horses have every attention, the dinners of the men are not thought of. There is no excuse for this ; the efficiency of the unit depends upon the health of both men and horses ; and although in the Cavalry the private soldier who grooms his horse has more work to do than the Infantry private, the Officer and Sergeant who do no grooming and ride all day should be far better able to look after their men's health than the Officer and Colour Sergeant of the Infantry.

The health of the men is not solely the care of the Medical Officer any more than the health of the horse the care of the Veterinary Officer ; although in this latter case the Regimental Officer is, in a very short-sighted manner, absolutely discouraged from treating any minor complaints himself.

*Armament. The lance.*—It has been the lesson of history that, other things being equal, a Cavalry armed with swords will be at a great disadvantage against a Cavalry with lances. If this be so—as is the case—and all the Cavalry of European nations which we are most likely to meet are armed with the lance, then surely we ought not to ask our Cavalry to enter the lists ill-equipped to carry through the fight. Our Hussars should be trained in the use of the lance, and our Lancers allowed to carry it. When once the enemy's Cavalry is beaten, the lance, if found an encumbrance, can be thrown away ; but if at the beginning it is found a necessity, it cannot be improvised.

*The bayonet.*—Again, too, if what has been written as to the necessity of the final assault in the dismounted attack be true, our Cavalry must be given some weapon to assault with. Could not the new straight sword be adopted to fit on the end of a rifle ? Other nations have decided on the necessity of some such weapon ; do not let us dismiss it too lightly.\*

In conclusion, in exact divergence from the opinion of some people, so great is the belief of Infantry transfers in the possibilities and future of a well-trained Cavalry that in many cases they have consented to lose many years' seniority, and to serve below those many years their junior, in order to take part in it.

\* The German Cavalry are now armed with the bayonet.



*CHARGE OF THE 23RD LIGHT DRAGOONS AT TALAVERA*BY CAPTAIN CECIL BATTINE, *late 15th Hussars*

A HUNDRED and one years have elapsed since the capitals of Europe were electrified to hear that twenty thousand British soldiers had penetrated almost to Madrid, then held by the French, and had repulsed in fair combat a two-fold numerical superiority of Napoleon's veterans in a series of combats which had extended over two days. The retreat of Sir John Moore's army had revealed to the British people the great commander who fell at Corunna ; it also revealed the fighting qualities of the army which he had in a great measure trained and prepared for serious war. The withdrawal of Napoleon's reserves from the Peninsula and the critical struggle waged on the distant Danube had encouraged the British Government to renew their military efforts in Portugal. The command of the Expeditionary Force was conferred on a young general whose reputation had been made in India, and whose conduct had recently been called in question for his share in negotiating the Convention of Cintra, by virtue of which the French evacuated Portugal, but at the price of conveying the French Army to Brest on British ships. In those days the British people were extremely jealous of the honour of their arms. Any British Commander who ceded a battle-field to the enemy without employing two-thirds of his forces to gain victory would have been sure of a court martial, and would have run a good chance of a military execution. Sir A. Wellesley, however, was not responsible for the Convention of Cintra, and came from the Court Inquiry with untarnished honour. He shortly afterwards assumed command in Portugal and began that wonderful career of victory which once again carried the Red Cross of St. George to the walls of Paris.

The news of Napoleon's check at Aspern probably stimulated the advance on Madrid, which brought about the battle of Talavera. King Joseph succeeded in uniting his own corps with Victor's to crush the invading army with which they established contact on July 27, 1809. The situation of the allied army was most unfavourable, for not only were they menaced in front by superior forces under King Joseph, but an army of equal strength, commanded by Marshal Soult, was marching to intercept them in the Tagus valley, and of its strength and exact locality

Wellesley was ignorant. Cuesta, the Spanish commander-in-chief, was jealous of his British colleague, and his movements had been so lethargic that the most favourable opportunity of striking a blow before the French concentration had been lost. The allied army then took up the position which they defended on July 27 and 28 in the following order. The Spanish corps, about 30,000 strong, held the town of Talavera and a ridge which ran at right angles to the Tagus. The front of the Spanish position was covered with cork and olive woods, and was not easily accessible. The same ridge prolonged itself for about two miles. The Portina ravine and brook marked the front of the defensive line ; on our extreme left this rivulet rose in a valley which measured about 1,000 yards in breadth. The British and German Infantry, twenty-eight battalions, prolonged the line of the Spanish corps to the source of the brook so that the left was re-fused, and a detachment was posted to the north of the valley on the opposite hills. Three strong brigades of Cavalry constituted a reserve to the Army ; they were subsequently reinforced by a division of Spanish Cavalry whose solid appearance had a good effect behind the British line. The intention of the French leaders was to roll up the left of the allied army while the raw Spanish troops, unable to manœuvre, were held in position by a containing force, and three separate attacks in strength were made with this object, the first on the afternoon and evening of the 27th, the second on the morning of the 28th, and the last after 2 P.M. of that day. Each of these attacks was pressed against the British position with great energy and each repulsed by the steady fire of the deployed line, followed by sharp counter-strokes inflicted with the bayonet, and at the last by charges of Cavalry. The heat was so intolerable that on the 28th, in the interval while Joseph conferred with his marshals, the soldiers of both armies left their ranks in large numbers to drink on opposite sides of the rivulet. The last general assault by the French was preluded by an attempt to completely turn the English line with two divisions of Infantry. In order to check this manœuvre Sir A. Wellesley ordered the 1st German Hussars, under Colonel Arentschild, and the 23rd Light Dragoons, under Colonel Seymour, to attack the head of the hostile column in the valley while other troops threatened it in flank.


It was the crisis of the battle. All along our line the French were pressing their attack with fury. Our troops had lost heavily, and were worn by hunger, fatigue and hard fighting. When the two Cavalry regiments formed line they advanced at a canter, which quickly increased in pace as they moved down the valley, led by their respective

colonels, but without advanced patrols, ground scouts or other precaution. The ground appeared to be perfectly open and the mass of hostile Infantry within easy reach. Swords were drawn and the line began to gallop, but the 23rd rode faster than the German Hussars. Suddenly the English Colonel beheld a deep ravine immediately barring the line of his advance; without drawing rein he sent his horse at the obstacle and got across with difficulty. The German colonel, writes Napier, observed 'I will not kill my young mans' and halted his line. But the British troopers, already excited by the pace and by the prospect of charging home, were galloping fast and followed their colonel. Some horses cleared the wide ditch; some fell in and others crashed on the top of them. Many men and horses were killed or injured, and the whole regiment was checked so that it emerged on the far side in twos and threes. Notwithstanding this misfortune the charge was pressed home. Little or no harm was inflicted on the French Infantry, past whose ranks the stream of horsemen galloped, but beyond them again, three regiments of Cavalry came to meet the incursion. The English Dragoons, whose horses were spent by the fury of their attack and whose ranks were in great disorder, faced the encircling mass of French horsemen without hesitation, but more than half of them were cut down, and the remainder escaped across the valley, where a division of Spanish Infantry had taken post on the hills north of it.

While this charge was being delivered another British brigade of Cavalry, Cotton's, had driven home an attack which had been very successful; even the desperate ride of the 23rd brought the advance of the French Infantry to a stand-still, nor was their out-flanking manoeuvre ever completed. The comparative failure was the consequence of careless reconnaissance and too eager advance before the right moment came for increasing the speed to charging pace, but we cannot refuse to admire the impetuous courage of our troopers. It evidently produced a powerful effect on the enemy, who abandoned their projected manoeuvre while all attention was concentrated on the attacking Cavalry. The very fact of the disaster at the ravine may have given the impression that the British General controlled a reserve of Cavalry which he could hurl upon the French column when he pleased, as in fact he afterwards did at Salamanca. The French commander probably thought that if the Cavalry assault consisted of that one line the attack would never have been pushed home after the check in crossing the deep obstacle. Boldness carried beyond the verge of rashness is not to be encouraged in Cavalry tactics, but it is certainly more effective than excessive timidity.

## CHARGE OF 23RD LIGHT DRAGOONS AT TALAVERA 357

It is interesting to note thus early in his career as an army commander how Wellington used his Cavalry. He generally placed it under the superior command of a single divisional general and distributed behind his line of battle by brigades. These brigades were used to drive home the murderous counter-strokes of the Infantry, which was trained to rally at once after the bayonet charge, while the Cavalry when present hunted the broken assailants back to their own lines. Wellington always found difficulty in teaching his Cavalry to rally in good time and return to their place in the line, and never understood that such nice calculation of the pursuit was not really possible without sacrificing its driving power and dash. On the other hand this scheme of using Cavalry as a second line proved most effective and powerfully contributed to the victories of Salamanca and Waterloo. Wellington's method, however, cannot be compared with Napoleon's plan of massing his Cavalry in offensive operations. The relatively poor performances of the Cavalry at Vittoria, Wellington's great offensive victory, and the feeble pursuit of the beaten Army, can to some degree be accounted for by the tactical error of not massing the Cavalry for a powerful stroke at the flank of the French when the infantry stormed the position and compelled the hostile forces to retreat.



The Four Squadron Guidons of the 23rd Light Dragoons carried at Talavera are now preserved in the Royal United Service Museum, Whitehall.

The frontispiece was specially drawn for the JOURNAL by Major R. Wymer.

*CAVALRY IN FRONTIER WARFARE \***A LECTURE GIVEN AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, QUETTA*

BY CAPTAIN D. C. CROMBIE, 23RD CAVALRY F. F.

IN considering the subject of Cavalry in frontier warfare, I propose only to discuss its employment in expeditions on the north-western boundary of India, where our frontier marches with those of Persia and Afghanistan. But I exclude these countries themselves, as a field of operations, from this discussion, as the conditions of fighting there vary somewhat from those of the warfare of which I shall speak ; and I shall confine myself to a consideration of our expeditions against the tribesmen of the frontier and of the country they inhabit.

This borderland—with its rocky, precipitous hills, deep stony ravines, narrow tracks leading over difficult passes into restricted valleys—and occupied, as it is, by a cunning, elusive, and, in some cases, comparatively well-armed enemy, presents a theatre of operations probably more unsuited to the mounted arm than any other in which Cavalry is likely to be called upon to act. Let us see what Cavalry has done, and can be expected to do, in such an inhospitable area—more especially in its mounted rôle.

An idea is very generally entertained in other branches of the service, and even encouraged by some writers on tactics, that Cavalry is of little use in the rugged broken country of the frontier. There are some parts, of course, which are practically impassable for Cavalry, and where its employment mounted is *nil*. But there are, nevertheless, many large valleys, such as those of the Panjkora, Swat and Kurram rivers, where Cavalry can be most effectively employed and where its action has many times been decisive of results. Nevertheless its action is much restricted, not only by the nature of the country, but also by the character of the enemy.

For instance, in this kind of warfare the strategic rôle of Cavalry is reduced to a minimum. There is no screen of hostile horsemen to pierce,

\* By kind permission of *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*.

in order to discover the whereabouts and intention of the enemy's columns; for the enemy has no Cavalry and does not move about in columns. There are no mobilisation arrangements to upset. Influenced rather by fanaticism and opportunism than by any known laws of strategy, the enemy is highly erratic in his movements. He carries out the maxim 'Scatter to march, assemble to fight' to a degree of perfection probably not foreseen by its author; with the result that, except when about to give battle, he can scarcely be said to exist at all as a fighting force. The Pathan will fight you to-day. To-morrow he will vanish. The day after to-morrow he may present himself at your camp in the peaceful guise of a vendor of fowls and eggs, and in the evening may amuse himself by firing a few shots into your camp. Then, finding his meagre store of rations running short, he may go off for fresh supplies to his village, to return in a day or two in time to resist the passage of your force over some—to him—conveniently difficult kotal. You cannot use Cavalry strategically against an enemy of this description. No useful purpose would be served by attempting to do so.

On the frontier, therefore, the rôle of Cavalry is mainly tactical and protective.

An important element—one that is too often lost sight of—which enters into the tactical employment of Cavalry, is the fact that frontier tribesmen have a wholesome—some say exaggerated—dread of the mounted man in the open. The moral power of Cavalry, always great, is here extreme. And the reason is not far to seek. The Pathan is a mountaineer and has little knowledge of the horse or of riding in his own country. If he rides at all, it is usually upon a small half-starved country pony. In his excursions into British territory he does see horses, but only at a distance, and he does not acquire that familiarity which breeds contempt for them or for their riders. He meets an occasional Indian Cavalry sowar on furlough in his own or in some neighbouring village. Sowars as a class are not remarkable for their modesty and, in the intercourse which arises, you may be sure that the prowess of the mounted arm suffers nothing at the sowar's hands. If the latter, in addition, happens to have brought his horse with him, and if this happens to be a country-bred of brilliant colouring and uncertain temper, the effect is heightened. No one has told the tribesmen, except those of them who are Infantry Reservists, that the foot-soldier, if he keeps his head, has nothing to fear from the mounted man. They probably would not believe it in any case. Add to all this the fact that, by ancient usage,

the horseman has a *prestige* of his own among Orientals, and we see that the average Pathan is predisposed to fear the Cavalryman. The result is that when the two meet on service the former does not keep his head, and suffers accordingly. Experience teaches and confirms what before was only instinctive. The dread which oppresses him—exaggerated or not—is at any rate very real.

I have laid some stress on this fact, as it is of vital importance in considering the mounted employment of Cavalry on the frontier.

A very good instance of this moral power is afforded by the action which took place near ZAGAI in the Mohmand country in 1897. A brigade under General Jeffreys was employed in destroying villages. ZAGAI village, almost at the head of the WATELI valley, was one selected for punishment. It lies on the lower slopes of a hill, with low spurs jutting out on either side of it. At 5 A.M. on September 20 the brigade started out from camp. Although the enemy were seen hanging about the hills on the left flank watching the march of the troops, there did not appear to be any large gathering of them anywhere; the column was moving up the centre of the valley and thus kept the enemy in doubt as to its real objective. Consequently, no opposition was met with till the troops approached ZAGAI. Covered by a squadron of the 11th B. L., the brigade marched to within 2500 yards of the village, when the Cavalry reported it to be strongly held, and moved off to the left to protect that flank. As soon as the low spurs on the right and left had been occupied by the Buffs and Guides Infantry respectively, the 38th Dogras marched on the village itself while the guns opened from the centre. The attack was entirely successful and the destruction of the village commenced.

While this was going on, the enemy had been collecting. Some could be seen on the top of the hill behind ZAGAI, while others tried to come across the adjoining valleys on the right and left. Those on the right succeeded, and were soon sharply engaged with the Buffs. On the left, however, a large body of at least 600 tribesmen was collected on the hills and endeavouring to reach the scene of action. But to do this they would have to cross the open ground, and they found themselves unable to do so in the face of the Cavalry posted there. Every time they descended to the level this weak squadron—it was only 50 strong—trotted forward. On each occasion that it did so, the tribesmen hurried back to the high ground. The mere threat of the Cavalry was too much for them. Finally they abandoned their attempt to cross the valley,

and, shouting abuse at the mounted men, they made a wide *détour* along the hills and did not arrive at ZAGAI till our troops were evacuating it. Thus 50 mounted men had kept 600 Pathans at bay by their sheer moral power.

And you will observe they remained mounted all the time. This is the essence of the whole thing. Had they dismounted it would have been a different matter. I even venture to suggest that had there been 50 Infantry in their place, they would have covered the left flank only with the greatest difficulty and some loss.

In this action we find Cavalry employed in its familiar *rôle* of covering the flank of a body of troops in action—doing it, too, most effectively. By an extension of this principle we can infer that even a small body of Cavalry, on account of its moral power, would be of the greatest utility when employed in protecting columns on the march as advanced, flank and rear guards. This is, of course, provided that the ground is suitable for their mounted action. (I shall have a few remarks to make on suitability of ground later on.) The work of protecting the flank of a column by piqueting the heights is an extremely harassing one for the Infantry, and I wish to lay stress on the principle that Cavalry should be freely used for protective purposes whenever, and as often as, the opportunity occurs. After all, columns are not eternally passing through tangis or crossing over narrow kotals, and the secluded valleys that are so frequently met with on the frontier afford an excellent opportunity for relieving the Infantry, at least temporarily, of their arduous work. This is especially the case where the line of march crosses a series of deep nullahs, difficult to reconnoitre. A few sowars trotting along them can quickly search them to a safe distance on either side of the column, and this without in any way delaying its march.

At ZAGAI we have seen the Cavalry employed mounted on the defensive. Let us now consider its action in the attack. There is sometimes a misconception as to the pace at which Cavalry can attack in frontier warfare; and the difficulties of the ground are often exaggerated. Cavalry is not always given full credit for its ability to traverse really difficult ground. The pace at which rough ground can be crossed is not fully realised, nor the fact that, for effective action against Pathans, extreme rapidity of movement is not even essential. Of the many successful charges executed by Cavalry on the frontier, the great majority have not been faster than a hand gallop or even a canter; very few can have been said to approach the normal pace of the charge.



On August 2, 1897, the troops on the MALAKAND forced their way through to the relief of Chakdara. But before doing so, they had to deal with the enemy, who were holding the heights on either side of the CHAKDARA road. The Infantry and guns had little difficulty in driving off the enemy, who, in large numbers, poured down on to the KHAR plain towards KHAR village. Two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, who were concealed behind a spur, charged them and did great execution; the retreat was turned into a rout and the Guides pursued as far as the Swat river. The attack took place over a level plain, where the KHAR polo ground now is, and no doubt the pace of the charge was extreme. In addition to this, the enemy were already somewhat demoralised by the treatment they had received at the hands of the Artillery and Infantry. From their position of concealment the Guides' attack came as a complete surprise. So circumstances were exceptionally favourable for the action of the Cavalry.

But the day before, these two squadrons charged under much more normal frontier conditions. They were ordered to reconnoitre from NORTH CAMP along the road to CHAKDARA and to seize the AMANDARA defile, preparatory to the passage of the column on its way to relieve CHAKDARA. To do so they had to pass between the heights above-mentioned. When they moved forward from NORTH CAMP, the enemy immediately detected their intention, and came boldly down to the comparative level to resist them. It was the first occasion, in this campaign at least, that the Cavalry were conspicuously in action and they had not yet had an opportunity to assert their moral superiority. The Guides promptly attacked. One who took part in the charge told me that, on account of the nullahs, boulders and bad ground generally, they were unable to move faster than a trot. Yet, with small loss to themselves, they were able to kill 100 of the enemy, who retired to the heights overlooking the road. As the enemy thus commanded the road, the Cavalry were unable to proceed and General Meiklejohn abandoned, for that day, his attempt to relieve CHAKDARA. Beyond the fact that the Cavalry re-established its moral power—which afterwards bore good fruit—the action was therefore indecisive of results.

This affair is a particularly interesting one, as exemplifying the scope of Cavalry and also the limitations of its action, its effective use on bad ground while the enemy is in the open, and its inability to deal with the enemy when he abandons the low ground and takes to the hills. We have seen how these same heights were quickly carried by the Infantry

on the following day ; and how the Cavalry again came into action as soon as the enemy descended on to the KHAR plain.

In the action at SHABKADAR, 1½ squadrons of the 13th B. L. charged up the bed of a nullah thickly strewn with stones and boulders. On account of the bad going, they were in extended order and did not attain a speed faster than a hand gallop or fast canter. Yet they swept through the whole of the enemy's front from left to right and suffered few casualties. The enemy began to retire as soon as the squadrons appeared, and our small force of six Companies and four guns were extricated from an engagement which was beginning to assume the appearance of a disaster.

We may conclude, therefore, that neither great speed nor exceptionally favourable ground are essentials for the successful attack of Cavalry. Perhaps it is not over-stating the case, if I say that ground over which Cavalry can canter in open order is good enough for its attack against Pathans. Unfortunately, the enemy knows this too, and rarely comes down into the open when there is Cavalry in the vicinity. At NORTH CAMP he did so, it is true, of his own accord, but I attempted to account for this on the score of his inexperience at that time. At LANDAKAI and KHAR he was driven down by the Infantry and guns. At SHABKADAR he was enticed down by the quite unrehearsed retirement of our Infantry. At ZAGAI he wouldn't come down on any account. Given that the ground admits of it, the other three essentials for the success of the Cavalry attack appear to be—surprise, boldness in action—and the most important and most difficult to attain of all three—the presence of the enemy.

I have quoted the action at KHAR in 1897 as an instance of Cavalry used in the attack and also in the pursuit. But opportunities for the latter—the pursuit—do not often occur in frontier warfare. The tribesmen, as we all know, prefer to fight on the hillside and, like other irregular warriors, are particularly nervous about their flanks, rear and line of retreat. If attacked from either of these directions, they are pretty certain to abandon their position. They nevertheless rarely take steps to protect their flanks. An almost solitary exception to this habitual omission was the position taken up by the Afridis for the defence of the SAMPAGHA Pass in Tirah, where their flanks were covered by sangars. This is all the more remarkable when we take into account their marked tendency to threaten the flanks and rear of our own troops. The retreat of our force from MAIZAR was one long struggle to prevent our flanks from being enveloped by the masses of the enemy. The country is fairly

open, and had we had Cavalry they would greatly have assisted the tactics of ZAGAI over again. But we had no Cavalry ; the few sowars that were attached to the force were sent galloping to SHERANNI for help.

The value of Cavalry in completing a victory and making the most of it, if the ground is suitable, has been exemplified at KHAR. It must be borne in mind that, in our operations against hill tribes, our main object is nearly always to inflict as severe and disastrous a defeat on the enemy as possible, wherever he is met with—to kill as many of them, in fact, as we can, under the circumstances. Owing to the suddenness and rapidity with which Pathans can retreat when they find things becoming too hot for them, it is very difficult for our comparatively slow moving Infantry to follow up and reap the full benefit of the defeat. This is the work of the Cavalry. It is their duty to pursue, where the ground permits. They should, therefore, place themselves in a favourable position for the pursuit either by holding themselves in readiness on the flank—which after all is the ordinary *rôle* of Cavalry in civilised warfare—or by taking up some position in the enemy's rear where, mounted or dismounted, they can intercept the enemy's retreat. If they can do so unperceived by the enemy, well and good. But it must be remembered that Cavalry, moving along the low ground, will probably be in full sight of the enemy on the heights. The latter, always sensitive, as I have said, for his flanks and rear, will quickly divine the intentions of any movement in that direction. This may induce him to abandon his position prematurely, and the Cavalry will not only be baulked of their prey, but the enemy will also escape the close range fire of the Infantry and guns. In other words, the enemy will have been manoeuvred out of his position, which is bad tactics on the frontier.

It is, therefore, advisable that Cavalry should not make any pronounced flanking or wide-turning movement except under good and continuous cover ; they should rather remain in some concealed position in prolongation of the Infantry line of battle and there await the opportunity to pursue. The ideal would be for the Infantry and guns to so manoeuvre as to drive the enemy across the front of—or at any rate towards—the Cavalry, who can then pounce out and finish off the business. This ideal is not always aimed at, and still more rarely achieved. At LANDAKAI, in 1897, such tactics were carried through to an issue which just failed of complete success. A large part of the enemy were cut off from the hills by the movement of Infantry and mountain battery on

our right, and their only line of retreat was across the open ground, and they would be exposed for a mile or two to the attacks of the Cavalry. Seeing their danger, the enemy made off so precipitately that the Guides only caught up the rearmost of them as they reached the foot of the hills.

Such perfect combination of the three arms is of rare occurrence on the N.-W. Frontier. Partly owing to the wily, suspicious, elusive character of the enemy, but mainly due to the configuration of the country, good combination is difficult to carry out. And Cavalry have to trust very often to fortuitous circumstances and luck for an opportunity to pursue.

Such an opportunity occurred at WANA in 1894. The Waziris had rushed the camp in the early hours of the morning and, in the confusion that ensued, the enemy had penetrated far into the camp before any regular resistance could be organised. However, the camp was eventually cleared of the enemy, who, estimated at 1500, were in full retreat by dawn towards the INZAR KOTAL. The 1st P. C., 50 sabres strong, were ordered to pursue.

Whenever a camp is attacked, or sniping becomes so general as to make an attack seem probable, the Cavalry should saddle up at once. A proportion of the men stand to the horses, while the remainder are sent to defend their share of the perimeter, which should be a small one. On this occasion no horses had been saddled up, the affair had been too sudden and the general confusion too great for that. It was found too, when the time came, that all the syces had disappeared; one can hardly blame them, for they are a low class of native and quite unarmed. However, the 1st P. C. were off in pursuit ten minutes after the receipt of the order. The retreating Waziris had got a good start, but they had a good way to go—nearly 5 miles—before reaching the security of the INZAR KOTAL. The 1st P. C. were soon up with them, and charged, inflicting great loss. After pursuing for some time they were re-formed under fire from all sides and charged again, pursuing as before. The ground was beginning to rise and the horses were tiring, so, rallying for a last effort, the squadron charged up a steep slope among olive trees till the ground became quite impracticable, when they dismounted and followed the enemy with their fire till they disappeared over the kotal. The Cavalry had inflicted severe loss on the enemy with but trifling loss to themselves.

The free action and free ranging power of Cavalry on the frontier is

much hampered by several causes. One is the comparative helplessness of a Cavalry camp to protect itself from an attack at night, when isolated from other troops. The perimeter of a Cavalry camp is larger in proportion than that of an Infantry one. The number of men available for the defence of this larger perimeter is small, as a considerable number of them have to remain among the horses to prevent a panic. The horses afford a large mark for the enemy's bullets, and they are liable to stampede. The Pathan has not the same respect for a dismounted sowar as he has for a mounted one, and such a camp would prove an irresistible attraction for all Pathans in the neighbourhood.

There are occasions when small bodies of Cavalry could occupy villages at night where they would be comparatively secure from attack. Such means of protection would be employed when the Cavalry are sent off independently for sudden raids for a short time and without their baggage.

For their transport is slow moving and would be liable to constant attack if not strongly escorted. To avoid multiplying these escorts, the transport of the Cavalry moves with the transport of the respective columns.

We must conclude, therefore, that on the frontier Cavalry must be closely backed up by Infantry, and in fact must belong to a column of which the other arms form a part. At night it will generally camp with the other arms. So that the range of the independent action of Cavalry is restricted to the distance it can cover in a given time. This time is not necessarily governed by the length of daylight, for Cavalry can leave camp before dawn. But, unless they intend spending the night in some distant village, they should be back in camp by sunset, for by that time the Infantry will have collected round them all the roving spirits in the neighbourhood and the Cavalry will risk being waylaid in the dark. Taking an all-the-year-round average, 15 hours out of the 24 is not an unduly large figure to put down for the time that Cavalry has at its disposal for independent work. Now, Cavalry can cover a lot of ground in 15 hours. Even though the fact that the time spent in going there and coming back—as it were—must enter into our calculations of space, you must admit that the distance that can be covered is considerable. And you must also remember that during this time the Cavalry will be able to move with the greatest rapidity—always compatible with the nature of the ground—for it can be disencumbered even of its first line transport, which can come on with the main column.

The value of surprise, so great in military operations in other parts of the world, is equally great against Pathan tribesmen. On the frontier it is difficult for the slow moving Infantry to effect a surprise. The fleet-footed enemy are easily able to keep up with its march, and from their points of vantage on the hills can keep a watchful eye on their movements. But, unfamiliar with horses and having no mounted troops of their own, the mobility of the Cavalry does not seem to enter into the calculations of the tribesmen ; with the result that they are peculiarly liable to be surprised by Cavalry acting independent of the other arms.

There were several instances of this in the KABUL KHEL expedition of 1903. Take the case of GUMUTTI. A column of all arms moved out from BANNU to co-operate in the KABUL KHEL country, with columns entering it from other directions. A squadron of the 1st P. C., which preceded this BANNU column, arrived at GUMUTTI, taking its inhabitants completely by surprise. Large numbers of them were outside the walls tilling their fields. This was a great opportunity for the Cavalry to cut down many of the villagers before they could regain the shelter of their towers ; and had the Cavalry been able to do so, there is no doubt that they would have materially reduced the subsequent determined resistance of the defenders. But the instructions they had received prevented them from doing so ; and the opportunity was let slip.

On the same day a column from KOHAT crossed the KURRAM river before daybreak and entered the hostile country near BULAND KHEL. The main column was preceded by its Cavalry, 2 squadrons of the 3rd P. C. who had received orders to reconnoitre SHEWA, and there to await the arrival of the remainder of the column. The 3rd P. C. arrived at SHEWA at 9 A.M. The country they passed through was excellent for the mounted employment of Cavalry, but it was found to be entirely deserted by its inhabitants, who, as the noise of firing very soon proved, had collected in the hills to oppose the remainder of the column and harass their march. The Infantry came on slowly, destroying villages and blowing up towers, and eventually arrived late in the evening at SHEWA where they rejoined the Cavalry, who, according to their orders, had been inactive since the morning.

A few days afterwards a column proceeded from SPINWAM to destroy some villages at the head of the KAITU river. The Cavalry went on ahead, found the villages deserted, placed a cordon round them by piquetting the low hills which surrounded them and awaited the arrival of the Infantry. These arrived accompanied as usual by the enemy. The

Cavalry piquets were then duly relieved by the Infantry and the work of demolition commenced. But there had been so much delay that the column did not return back to camp till some hours after dark, a dangerous situation when opposed to an enterprising enemy.

From the last two incidents I make two deductions—(1) that when Cavalry works independent of Infantry, the enemy will generally remain in the neighbourhood of the Infantry, thus affording an opportunity for Cavalry to lay waste the country and destroy villages uninterrupted. This they should do much more quickly than Infantry, and they should consequently be able to cover a wider area ; and (2) that in order to do this they should be provided with sufficient explosives themselves, or should be accompanied by a sapper officer with all the necessary paraphernalia. This could be loaded up on led horses in much the same way as the entrenching tools are at present.

In citing these incidents from the KABUL KHEL expedition, my object has been to show how Cavalry can be used independently of the other arms ; that its mobility, as always, brings with it facilities for effecting surprise ; and that the value of the mounted arm in this rôle is not always perhaps taken full advantage of.

This may be accounted for partly by the paucity of the numbers of Cavalry employed in frontier expeditions, and the consequent reluctance of the superior commander to risk such comparatively small bodies of men in isolated action. One rarely reads of more than two squadrons being placed under any one commander. Usually less. The question would be worth considering, whether large numbers of Cavalry might not be employed with advantage. The objection to this would be the lengthening of the column that it would entail, and the additional arrangements that would have to be made for supplies. It must be remembered, however, that in most localities where Cavalry can be most effectively employed, the ground will probably be cultivated, so that Cavalry can live mainly on the country. Water, however, presents a difficulty, as its presence very often varies with the seasons. Thus, in the MOHMAND expedition of last year, though the Cavalry depended entirely on the country for its forage, water was so scarce that probably the numbers of the Cavalry could not have been increased.

Cavalry is the only arm that really has any chance of capturing the small bodies of raiders that constantly invade some parts of our frontier. News is generally received in cantonments some considerable time after any definite act of hostility has been committed. So the raiders have

an excellent chance, either of getting well on their way back across the border, or of concealing themselves in the country itself, before our troops can get in touch with them. Cavalry and Infantry are sent off simultaneously and independently of each other. It is the business of the Cavalry either to hold up the raiders till the Infantry arrives, or to block their egress out of British territory, or to capture the raiders themselves. A case in point was the capture of Multan's band by the 19th Lancers at Peshawar the other day.

Cavalry is invaluable for keeping up communication between the different parts of a long column ; and, owing to its ability to concentrate quickly towards a threatened point, is most usefully employed as escort to large convoys on the line of communications.

Cavalry should not be required to provide piquets for the protection of a camp containing Infantry, for, as I have already pointed out, their place is with their horses. Nor, as a general rule, should Cavalry be employed in piquetting such hills as are generally met with on the frontier, to protect the march of an Infantry column.

In fact, even on the frontier, the Cavalry soldier should be parted as little as possible from his horse. He is a mounted man and is trained to act mounted. He is far more effective in the saddle than on foot. On foot he loses all the moral power that his horse and its mobility confers upon him. He should, therefore, act mounted whenever he possibly can—even to stretching a point. It is to emphasise this principle that I have referred solely in this lecture to his mounted action.

By this I do not mean to minimise the value of dismounted action. This is another *rôle*—and a very important one—of Cavalry in frontier warfare.



*MACHINE GUNS WITH CAVALRY*

By MAJOR J. E. REYNOLDS LANDIS, *Sixth Cavalry, U.S.A.*

(From the Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association.)

IN the Italian Cavalry manœuvres near Udine in September 1908 (at first one brigade of Cavalry, later one division of Cavalry operating against another), experiments were made in the employment of machine guns. These guns were Maxim machine guns, without shields, packed on horses. Two of them constituted a platoon, which also included one officer, twenty-three men and thirty-four horses. The ammunition, except the first supply for the firing line, was transported on carts.

The experiments were confined to the use of machine-gun platoons attached to brigades, instead of to regiments, but did not include uniting platoons in a group under command of an officer of higher rank than a lieutenant.

On the march, the guns having been experimentally placed in different parts of the column, it was found advisable, when the advance guard was not very strong, to place these guns at the head of the main body. If in rear of that body, they could not be brought into action, even at most rapid gaits, until the opposing main bodies had come into contact. If placed with a small advance guard they were too exposed to loss. At night it was considered best to keep them in the midst of the main body.

In action, special conditions were considered as warranting the use of the guns separately, though the application of the principle that the guns should be kept together was found to give the best results.

When the platoon had taken up an advanced position, it was found advisable to have a portion of the escort dismount so as to be in readiness to make use of fire action.

No definite deductions seem to have been made as to the method by which the escort could best fulfil its mission with the guns or as to its position with respect to the guns, but difficulty was sometimes had with led horses that were unaccustomed to machine-gun fire.

The following ideas, advanced by Captain Viktorin, set forth an organisation for these guns, and a method of employment of them and their escort that may well engage our serious attention, illustrated as they are by such practical examples.

Extracts from 'Examples of the Employment of Machine Guns with Cavalry,' by Captain Roberto Segre, General Staff, Italian Army in the *Rivista di Cavalleria*, May 1909, translated by Major J. E. R. Landis, Sixth Cavalry :—

The group of machine guns with Austrian Cavalry is made up of two platoons, each including two Schwarzlose machine guns which are a little lighter than the ordinary Maxim.

Each gun is served by three men, including the gunner, has two men to bring up ammunition, and is transported by four horses (one carrying the gun and 500 cartridges, and three carrying 1,500 cartridges each). Taking into consideration the four men leading the horses, there are with each machine gun nine men and thirteen horses.

Each platoon is under the orders of a lieutenant who has with him one range-taker, two orderlies, a sergeant-major, and an armourer ; the platoon includes also a caisson drawn by six horses, and two spare horses.

The group is commanded by a company officer (usually a captain), accompanied by a trumpeter, and the two caissons are in charge of a non-commissioned officer. The total for the group is therefore three officers, fifty-nine men, eighty-three horses, and two caissons.

The group is directly under the orders of the commander of the Cavalry unit to which it is attached ; that is, usually, a Division Commander ; sometimes a Brigade Commander ; exceptionally a Regimental Commander. This system corresponds to the tendency to keep machine guns at the disposition of officers commanding larger units—a tendency which is evident in the regulations for the drill of groups of machine guns with Cavalry.

One group of machine guns (the third) covered about 815 kilometres in five weeks, during four of which it was on the march or in manœuvres.

The saddles had been gone over, one by one, before starting, modifying wherever necessary the stuffing of the pack-saddles so as to leave the withers and backbones of the horses entirely free.

On the march, in addition to the usual halts, after from 15 to 20 kilometres the group halted for three-quarters of an hour, during which all the horses were unsaddled in order to allow their backs to cool off ; then, having been watered, were resaddled with the greatest care.

Even in manœuvres endeavour was made to do likewise ; and so, in spite of pretty warm weather, of covering more than 800 kilometres, of going into action sixty-four times, and manœuvring at rapid gaits even over very rough ground, often jumping obstacles, the commander found that the group had not a single horse with a saddle gall.

In marches in the vicinity of the enemy, the group was always kept well to the front. Captain Viktorin, commander of the group, in his report states : ' At first the group was employed rather circumspectly and not pushed too far to the front ; but very soon all were convinced of its qualities of mobility and of rapidity in coming into action ; so that it was always placed with the main body of the advance guard or was assigned to detachments that were to operate against the flanks of the adversary or were to be employed in making demonstrations.' Then he adds that machine guns in a Cavalry column can never be put too far forward, because if, in case of an encounter with hostile Cavalry, they should have to be brought up from the rear, though they should employ very fast gaits, they would never make up the precious time that would have been lost. On the other hand, the danger of losing them is not real : so small and mobile a nucleus as is the firing group can always easily find for itself a way out of any critical situation. Sometimes, in fact, the employment of the group was more than audacious, it was rash ; and proof of this is the frequency with which the group was used in the charge.

The horse that carries the gun carries also 500 cartridges ; therefore the firing group may be made up of four of these horses, with the corresponding four leaders, and of sixteen men. Considering also the three officers and the other men attached (non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, and orderlies), we obtain thus a nucleus of thirty-three men (twenty-eight sabres, taking into account the horse leaders), which differs from an ordinary Cavalry platoon only by the four led horses.

Captain Viktorin states that in difficult situations he always used to advance with the firing group only, formed as above explained, leaving the horses carrying ammunition with the caissons of the Horse Artillery. The 500 cartridges per gun seemed to him sufficient for a first supply ; and he remarks that a detachment so small may readily take advantage of the terrain and therefore much more easily reach firing positions, all unknown to the enemy. At most Captain Viktorin admits that there should be included, under such circumstances, in the firing group one horse carrying ammunition ; with this, the first supply of the group becomes 3500 cartridges.

In addition, this composition of the group has the advantage that it is not necessary to worry about what may happen in critical situations. Especially in combats between bodies of Cavalry, with their rapidly changing phases, circumstances may arise in which the group, when moving, has not time enough to unpack in order to repulse with fire a

charge of the enemy, even though for this a very short time is necessary, twenty-five seconds according to Captain Viktorin. At such a time those thirty odd horses, with only four led horses, can draw sabre and charge in close order, the guns behind the line ; and if the charge is carried out with decision there is great probability not only of avoiding the complete destruction of the group, but even of getting it out of a critical situation with very slight losses.

In fact the group did charge several times. In the manoeuvre of September 11 there were two charges. In the beginning of the action the commander of the group, who had only three machine guns with him because the fourth had been pushed forward with a reconnoitring detachment, having caught sight of an opposing Infantry detachment, at once put a platoon into action, and started to place the third gun on top of a hill when he saw a small detachment of the enemy's Cavalry preparing to charge the two guns already in action. Then, without hesitating, he left behind the pack horse and its leader, and with the persons about him and the men of the third machine gun, he unexpectedly attacked and succeeded in repulsing the platoon of the enemy.

Later, while the two bodies of Cavalry were getting ready to charge each other, the group was falling back from a position that was too exposed when the commander noticed that the enemy was trying to attack his squadrons in flank. He decided then at once to oppose this attempt by charge, arranging his group, thirty sabres, in three lines (the first formed of officers, trumpeters, and orderlies, the second of the gunners, and the third of the pack animals). But the little squad was ruled out of action because other squadrons of the enemy came up.

Another example of the charge took place at dawn on September 17, when the group, with its escort, was pushing ahead of the Division to take position to the south of the bridges at Tacz. While the group, having caught sight of some squadrons of the enemy advancing in the direction of the vineyard where its commander intended to post it, was increasing the gallop to reach the good position, a platoon of the enemy was sent against it. The commander of the group, considering that if he should not charge with the group he would be constrained to fall back at the gallop, and certainly would not be able to get his guns in action before the encounter of the main bodies, because the wooded character of the other portions of the terrain rendered it difficult to find a position for machine guns, decided at once to charge the opposing platoon. This latter was, in fact, repulsed by the prompt arrival of the escort, and

the group succeeded in then taking up position and in operating very effectively against the main body of the opposing Cavalry.

It is, however, proper to add that the Austrians themselves made objection to this method of operating.

The group was often employed as an arm by itself. In all armies it is generally held advisable to employ machine guns in couples because a single gun may sometimes not be able to keep up a prolonged fire, either through derangement or through the rapid heating of the barrel. In fact, with Cavalry units, this having to keep up a prolonged fire will not be a usual thing, especially in fights between Cavalry ; and derangements do not happen so often in modern, improved machine guns.

Therefore this frequent employment as an arm by itself seems to correspond perfectly to the characteristics of a machine-gun unit with Cavalry.

Captain Viktorin insists several times on the absolute necessity of the horses of the commander of the group, as well as those of the other officers, of the men themselves, and of the pack horses, especially those carrying guns, being the best obtainable.

He remarks that in an encounter between two bodies of Cavalry the time that can be used in firing before the machine guns are masked by their own squadrons, or at any rate before the meeting takes place, is so limited that the commander of the group, as soon as the commander of the Cavalry has settled upon his own plan of action, must always boldly advance as rapidly as possible to succeed in finding a place where, in time, he can properly bring his machine guns into action ; and that the firing group, attentive to his signals, must then come up to him even at full gallop as soon as the position has been chosen.

This time is calculated by seconds, we may say, but we must remember that four machine guns can then easily fire 1600 shots a minute.

Captain Viktorin remarks that it is well that the escort should not be changed too often. The attention of the *personnel* of the group is too absorbed in its own fire to be able to pay attention to anything else ; the escort must therefore secure it from unpleasant surprises. It would not be doing its work properly if it should remain united alongside of or behind the gun ; rather it is probable this would be a cause of injury, because while the group is trying to take advantage of the terrain so as not to be seen by the enemy that group of horsemen would present a large target and would attract the attention of the enemy. Then, acting in this manner, it would frequently not succeed in fulfilling its duty because it would permit surprise by parties of the adversary, and in

order to oppose them—even if it could succeed in doing so in time—it would then too often mask the guns, cutting them off from the possibility of making use of their only means of combat, fire action.

The real duty of the escort is to see to it that in the immediate vicinity of the guns—be these in position or on the march—the terrain shall always be scouted.

Captain Viktorin thinks that to attach a group of four machine guns to a large body of Cavalry, as is done in Austria, is preferable to attaching a platoon of two guns to each regiment. Especially in actions between Cavalry, he remarks, the many machine guns of the regiments would probably only result in deranging the deployment and would hardly succeed in their mission, since—in such an encounter—their positions can be only on the flanks of their own troops.

Then, too, it is easier to attach to a regiment a platoon from a group, when that is necessary, than to make a group homogeneous by uniting temporarily two or more platoons ; so much the more since it would then always lack a trained commander accustomed to the organisation. In addition, we must also consider that the platoons are commanded only by subalterns, while the group may be commanded by a captain ; by an officer, that is, who can best carry on the operations with that initiative which is absolutely necessary.

The first employment of machine guns will take place, for the most part, according to the directions—however brief—of the commander of the Cavalry ; but when their chief has rapidly and well followed out the instructions of the commander, his mission is very far from being ended. Without awaiting further orders he must promptly fit his own action to the successive rapidly changing aspects of the action between the two bodies of Cavalry ; must anticipate the intentions of his own commander ; must, without hesitation and without delay, act effectively against an adversary who is thinking of withdrawing ; must as well, with a rapid glance, note a suitable position which will permit him to stop the pressure of the enemy when the latter has the upper hand.

This opinion is not, however, accepted by all even among the Austrians. Others have expressed the opinion that instead of making of machine guns a fourth arm, a sort of Horse Artillery of minor efficacy or a compressed Mounted Infantry, it would be better employed as an integral part of a regiment, to be detached from the latter only when it is necessary. In conformity with this opinion it has been added that the system now followed leads among other things to a too independent employment—such as, in fact, was made of the third group during the manœuvres.

**PROBLEM No. 9****RESULT**

THE response to this competition is disappointing. Very few solutions have been sent in, and of those received from eligible candidates none have been adjudged to have earned a prize. The following, submitted by an officer who is not eligible for an award, is the best, and is considered sufficiently meritorious to be published :—

**SOLUTION**

Gussie judged that the tactics of his trusty sergeant would gain for him *at least* ten minutes for undisturbed work on the bridge. Indeed, as he dismounted the ten men with him and told off two as horse-holders, the outbreak of distant scattered shots showed that Barlasch had already begun to bluff. Ten minutes was not much, and would allow of no cutting of slabs or tamping of charges. While the eight men were collecting the explosive, &c., Gussie realised two or three things. One was that he could only fire twelve separate charges. Another was that this hardly seemed to be a case for going for the girders (which happened to be timber road-bearers).

If he attacked the road-bearers, each would require  $3\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of gun-cotton—say, four slabs. With his thirty-two slabs he could, therefore, cut eight road-bearers, or those over two spans of the bridge. This would mean the destruction of two spans ; but all the piers would remain standing, and the rails would almost certainly remain hanging across their tops unharmed.

If, on the other hand, he attacked the timber pile piers, each leg would require three slabs of gun-cotton. With thirty-two slabs available he could cut ten legs, and have two slabs left over. Thus all the legs of piers B and C (the two highest) and two legs of pier A could be destroyed, and each rail could be cut in one place so as to prevent the track hanging in a festoon over the gap. The result of this arrangement would be that three spans of the bridge would be down.

Gussie decided on the latter course, the distribution of his material being as follows :—

	Slabs	Primers	Detonators
Pier C (4 charges of 3 slabs) . .	12	4	4
Pier B (4 charges of 3 slabs) . .	12	4	4
Pier A (2 charges of 3 slabs) . .	6	2	2
Each rail (1 charge of slab) . .	2	2	2
	<hr/> 32	<hr/> 12	<hr/> 12

He divided his eight men as follows :—2 for A party, 3 for B party, and 3 for C party.

To each he issued the stores as detailed above, together with nails and string and fusees. To C party he gave the hammer, and left A and B to use stones.

He ordered each party to go down to their pier and to fix the charges as low as possible above water on each leg, on the inner side of the two outer legs and the front of the two inner legs. By this arrangement the extra thickness of the bracing on the two outer legs would be avoided. Two slabs of each charge were to be placed across the breadth of the leg, and the third (with the primer in it) on top. Gussie was to arrange the two rail slabs himself; and, after asking if all were ready, would give the signal for lighting fuzes by whistle. At pier A each man would light one charge; at B and C two men would light one charge each, one man would light two, of which the fuse ends were arranged close together. All were to scatter as soon as the fuze was alight, and regain the horses as quickly as possible.

By the time that Gussie was able to sound the signal to light, the firing had become heavier and closer, but no bullets seemed aimed at those on the bridge. All happened as arranged, and a volley of detonations rang out just as the party reached their horses and were mounting in order to cover Barlasch's retirement. Gussie had time for one peep at his handiwork, and saw that it would take the enemy some time before trains could again be got across that river.

#### NOTE BY MANAGING EDITOR.

Owing to doubt having been expressed as to the extent to which Officers may now contribute articles to the 'Cavalry Journal,' in view of the recent amendment to paragraph 423 of the King's Regulations, it is notified for general information that the 'Cavalry Journal' is issued with the sanction of the Army Council. Officers are consequently encouraged to submit papers for publication, on the understanding that should their articles prejudice questions under consideration by superior authority, or criticise existing orders or regulations, the Editor will make such emendations in the text as he may deem advisable.



## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Spectateur Militaire*.—During the quarter under review it is in the May number only of this journal that anything of special Cavalry interest is to be found. There is an abridged translation of the remarks, published originally in the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* and since then in pamphlet form, by Colonel von Unger of the German General Staff, on the work of the Cavalry Divisions in the Kaiser manœuvres of last year. For those who cannot read the original this translation by Lieut.-Colonel Zeude, of the 14th Dragoons, may be found useful. It is not yet concluded. The issue of May 1 contains also 'Les souvenirs militaires du Chef d'escadron Mathieu' during the years 1787 to 1815, being the memoirs of one who served in the Artillery during all the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars from the firing of the first gun in 1792 until the end of 1814. He describes his campaigns with much terseness, seems to have troubled himself little about politics, was most loyal to those under whom he served, and had an absolute veneration for the Emperor. His battle record is remarkable even for those days, and it is greatly to be regretted that he did not describe his experiences at greater length. In the retreat from Moscow he and his battery of twelve guns won great praise from Poniatowski and Sebastiani. These May numbers also contain a very full account, with maps, of the Imperial Japanese manœuvres of November last. The management also publishes the official remarks on the French manœuvres of last year: in regard to the work of the Cavalry it is noticed that there is much improvement in the way in which commanders suit their methods of employment to the particular needs of the moment. The only fault found is that there were one or two occasions when Cavalry bodies failed to profit by the opportunity afforded them for purely shock action.

*Revue de Cavalerie*.—There commences in the February number a series of papers descriptive of well-known Cavalry combats, which ought to prove instructive as well as interesting. The one herein described is that which took place on April 22, 1809, near the village of Egglofsheim during the battle of Eckmühl. The writer follows for the most part—as does also Mr. Loraine Petre in his 'Napoleon and the Archduke Charles'—the account given by Bismarck, who commanded a squadron of *chevaux-légers* in the Wurtemberg Cavalry Division, but does not altogether agree with that officer's deductions, since the chief credit for the preparation and orders for, and the actual conduct of, the initial charge ordered by Savary is awarded to Saint-Sulpice. The writer criticises in some detail the movements of the four divisions of Cavalry, and ascribes the success of these French horsemen mainly to the presence of a reserve, and to the fact that in the *mille* resultant on the charge the French

were better equipped both for attack and defence than were their adversaries. The French Cavalry, *très experts en escrime du fleuret*, relied almost entirely upon the point in the individual combat—it is by no means certain, we are told, that the heavy Cavalry sword of 1809 possessed an edge at all—and the men composing the two divisions of Cuirassiers engaged (Nansouty and Saint-Sulpice) were armoured back and front, whereas the Austrian Cuirassiers wore only breastplates. The moral which the writer draws from this hundred-years-old battle is that the Cuirassiers should not be done away with, unless the actual number of Cavalry regiments can be augmented—which is out of the question. The comparison of the Cavalry training methods in France and Germany concludes this month: the remarks on dismounted work are well worth perusal. 'Le Règlement de 1910' is concluded, but appears to have in a measure departed from the idea with which it opened, having become itself almost a training manual rather than a collection of suggestions for revising portions of that already existing.

The March number opens with a brief *réchauffé* of the different criticisms offered by the Director of Manœuvres at the 'pow-wows' held at last year's Cavalry concentration, and these are well worth study. The following gives a good idea of the general crispness and point of the Director's remarks:—'*il ne suffit pas de galoper—il faut galoper à propos!*' Then follows a paper urging increased simplicity in the next Cavalry training manual; but one seems to detect signs that there is some danger that this craving may be carried too far and that matters of real moment and importance may be dropped. The series of articles of a veterinary character on the possibility of bringing remounts earlier to maturity, and therefore into the ranks, is concluded in this issue.

General Geslin de Bourgogne died on March 27, and the April number of this *Revue*, of which he was one of the founders and to the pages of which he frequently contributed, voices the very real regret which all ranks of the Cavalry of France will feel at the loss of one of their most distinguished commanders. De Galliffet and now de Bourgogne! 'He was a gentleman, very valiant and liberal, of great assuredness and a great heart,' and General de Bourgogne was, moreover, a man of great personal charm, generous, kind-hearted, and deeply religious, and bearing ever with a noble serenity the many blows which Fortune had dealt him in his later years.

Under the title of *règlement d'emploi et de combat* we have in this number another article something on the lines of *le règlement de 1910* which ran through the November-February numbers. *L'âme du soldat* claims to be an essay on practical military psychology—a study to which we have so far not paid so much attention as it seems to deserve. With this number the *Revue* completes a quarter of a century of existence.

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.—Major-General Buxbaum opens the March number with a short paper entitled 'Tradition,' wherein, taking as his text the remarks in Bernhardt's latest Cavalry work on the importance of the study of past history, the writer utters a warning note against the temptation to accept too literally this exhortation by so great an authority. Respect for tradition, declares Buxbaum, does not mean that we are to hold fast by old forms and ideals, merely because they enjoy the *cachet* conferred by old age, but that in

the light of modern methods and under novel conditions we are to act in and with the same spirit which in the past led to the results the recollections of which are for ever preserved and quoted and sanctified under the name of 'Tradition.' Here follows a very long and somewhat technical article on the organisation, equipment and employment of a Cavalry telegraph detachment; the writer points out that, properly organised, such a body will not only expedite the collection and forwarding of intelligence, but by relieving despatch riders and orderlies of much of their labours will result in more horsemen being available for their more legitimate work in contact with the enemy. The account of the attack at Sedan by Margueritte's Cavalry Division is concluded in this number; the compiler, while giving full credit for the gallantry of the successive charges, considers that they were undertaken too late in the day to have any prospect of material effect, and that, moreover, insufficient preliminary directions were conveyed by Margueritte to his subordinate commanders, that confusion was added by Ducrot, who issued subsidiary orders to regimental colonels, while on the fall of the divisional general there was some doubt as to whether Galliffet, or Clicquot, who was his senior, was to succeed to the command. The writer agrees, however, that, undertaken in the morning, a concerted attack by the whole of the French Cavalry could have captured the batteries of the Prussian XIth Corps, and that even early in the afternoon a resolute charge might have had a certain measure of success against portions of the German Infantry. Finally, there is a paper on the medical organisation for a Cavalry Division in the field, a description of the Austrian Government horse-breeding establishment at Kisber, and an account of the training scheme for the Servian Cavalry.

The April number contains unusually few articles of general interest; there is a paper on 'Pistols and Pistol-shooting,' wherein the author appears to press the advantage of a pistol, firing a heavy charge and bullet, as the subsidiary armament of Cavalry; and there are two papers specially devoted to the horse—the one dealing with his intelligence, the other with his self-consciousness.

The first paper in the May journal contains some remarks by Lieut. Stronsdorff on the best armament for Cavalry and the most practical methods of carrying the same. The writer is very decided as to the absolute necessity for the Cavalryman to be provided with both a steel weapon and a firearm; he does not believe that by rifle fire alone will Cavalry be able successfully to oppose the bodies of hostile Cavalry—that even if *portions* of these can thus be held back, the remainder must be met and overthrown by shock tactics. He contends further that since modern armies are upon mobilisation largely made up of Reservists, whose marksmanship has rusted and whose fire-discipline has deteriorated, their fire-effect will not be very great while their dread of Cavalry may be excessive; on these grounds he claims that Cavalry, *qua* Cavalry, will have in the future no lack of opportunity. In regard to armament for purely mounted action he would lay aside the lance in favour of the sword. In the pursuit and even for single combat he admits the advantage possessed by the former over the latter, but he does not agree that the moral effect of the lance prior to or during the charge is any greater than that of the sword, while in the *melé* the lance is actually at a disadvantage. He further points out that

even in the matter of *reach* the lance has not the superiority claimed for it, for since it must be grasped at the balance the trooper thus armed cannot lean so far forward or stretch out his arm to the same degree as the swordsman. For moral effect the writer quotes Seydlitz in proof that this lies mainly in the mounted man rather than in the particular weapon of his steel armament. He urges then that Cavalry be armed with a light, handy cut-and-thrust sword, while for dismounted work he advocates a rifle equal to that of the Infantryman, the provision of *not less* than 80-100 rounds per man, with reserve ammunition carried on pack animals and in light, specially organised ammunition columns; the rifle to have a two-edged fold-back bayonet permanently attached to the fore-end and to be carried on the rider's back; the sword to be strapped to the front of the saddle—on the near wallet. Major-General Buxbaum has a paper on 'Cavalry Corps,' a subject which since the last Imperial manœuvres has been engaging the earnest and special attention of German Cavalry officers; the General suggests that the somewhat disappointing results of this new formation were chiefly due to the fact that regiments were brought together under brigade and divisional commanders with whose methods they were not familiar. He proposes the permanent creation and maintenance of eight Cavalry Divisions and the periodical interchange of the units composing them as a first step towards the formation, when desired, of a Cavalry Corps. Colonel von Hellingrath contrasts, in 'Divisional and Corps Cavalry,' the organisation in the armies of various European nations, and comes to the conclusion that the German system, in spite of some shortcomings, is on the whole the best. Among minor articles there is one on Field Marshal von Wrangel as a Cavalry leader, and another on the organisation of the medical service in the field for mounted troops.

*Militär-Wochenblatt.*—Articles of Cavalry interest in this journal are few and far between. Colonel von Heidborn, who commands the 8th Cuirassiers and whose name appears to be a new one among those of military writers, has a paper in the issue for March 22 on 'The Lance Exercise for Cavalry.' He complains that as a rule this is practised far too frequently dismounted, the result being that movements and turnings of the trunk are actuated from the legs instead of, as they must be when mounted, from the waist. He prescribes a course of free-gymnastics in order to promote the exercise of the special muscles which the use of the lance requires. The same writer has a series of papers in the numbers dated April 9, 12 and 14 on 'Proposed Alterations in the Riding Instructions dated August 31, 1882,' which he appears to consider as not now sufficiently applicable to recruits; while he seems to suggest that the whole might well be rewritten in the light of the more modern principles enunciated by men like General von Rosenberg and others of the later school.

Infantry General von der Boeck contributes to the issues of May 10 and 12 'Some Remarks on the Organisation of the German Cavalry,' which constitute for the most part a very eulogistic review of General von Bernhardt's latest book on 'Cavalry'—now being translated into English. General von Bernhardt himself, however, has written an interesting and important series of papers for the numbers of June 4, 7, and 9, entitled 'The Action of the Three Arms and the Organisation of the Cavalry.' These appear to have been written in reply to

a review of his book, and the author takes the opportunity to announce his views even more clearly. He holds the opinion that anything like the action of the three arms, as hitherto understood, is already quite out of date. The Cavalry arm is proportionately too weakly represented to exercise any real influence in action when used as now in conjunction with the other arms: the proportion of Cavalry, already small in peace, is still smaller on mobilisation. The division only controls a limited number of squadrons, which have no weight as a fighting unit; while the remainder of the Cavalry is organised in more or less independent bodies, having their own especial mission, and which are consequently not in the position to act in combination with the other arms in the sense which has hitherto been understood. On the actual modern battlefield, Bernhardt declares that only *two* arms—Artillery and Infantry—will for the future contend; from any real share in the action Cavalry is henceforth and to all intents and purposes shut out. Cavalry should therefore annually be trained purely as strategic Cavalry and in the actions which such employment engenders, while for the due fulfilment of this *role* it is imperative that its offensive fire-power should be appreciably increased. These letters are too long to quote at greater length, but the above appears to constitute their *Leit-motif*.

A new book which is about to be published in Germany should be of interest to Cavalry officers: it is a 'Life of the Red Prince.'

'Anweisungen zum Reitunterricht für die Kavallerie.' By Stallmeister Schmidt. (Munich: Piloty and Loehle, 1910.) Price M. 11.

Stallmeister Schmidt is already well known as the author of at least one text-book on the art of military riding; he was for very many years employed as an instructor at the Cavalry Schools of Hanover and Munich; and he is therefore eminently well qualified for the work he has here undertaken—to explain and teach in the simplest possible language the principles to be followed in so schooling both man and horse as to arrive at the perfect combined action of the two. He is convinced that only a horseman of the first class can be a good Cavalry leader, he lays stress upon the importance of all ranks being trained under similar conditions, and that officers and men must learn not merely how to ride but to train a horse. He fully recognises, however, that all cannot possibly attain the same standard, and requires that, when arranging methods and details of instruction, a very clear line be drawn between what can and should be assimilated by all, and what belongs to the domain of art and consequently can only be encompassed by those possessing special qualifications. Stallmeister Schmidt preaches no new dogma; he accepts the principles upon which for many years past have been built the foundation of all riding instruction, and shows how they may best be adapted to military needs; he succeeds admirably in making everything very clear—so simple indeed are his explanations that the book may confidently be placed in the hands of the German non-commissioned officer—while he is careful not merely to lay down hard-and-fast rules, but he points out faults which may arise and explains how they may be met and corrected. The author's reputation will no doubt have secured for his book a thoroughly favourable reception from the officers of the army for which he has so long laboured, but its contents should attract a wider circle of readers outside the country for which primarily written.

'Durch !' Being a biographical sketch of General von Rosenberg. By Fritz Bley. (Berlin : Fleischel & Co., 1910.) Price M. 5.

The family of this well-known soldier and sportsman came originally from Bohemia, but owning also property in Silesia emigrated thither after the close of the Thirty Years' War. Heinrich von Rosenberg was born in 1833, and from boyhood showed every sign of becoming a good and bold rider, a taste which was cultivated to the fullest extent by his uncle, who had ridden and hunted much in England and who maintained a large stud. Young Rosenberg joined the 1st Uhlans in 1853 during a period when riding for sport was neither understood nor practised in the Prussian Cavalry, and he found that he had to teach himself all that he would learn of race-riding both on the flat and across country. He was consequently always in the saddle, riding for friends or his own mounts, and long before the outbreak of the war with Austria he was known all over Prussia as one of the best horsemen in the Army. In the war of 1866 Rosenberg was employed as galloper to General Hartmann, commanding a Cuirassier division, and distinguished himself in many encounters, and especially at Tobitschau. After the war he was transferred as 'Rittmeister' to the newly-formed 13th Uhlans—the old 1st Dragoons of the King's German Legion of Garcia Hernandez fame—and in this appointment did much by teaching and example to inculcate among his comrades a love of riding for its own sake. 'It is impossible,' he always maintained, 'to keep up Cavalry efficiency during the piping times of peace without sport.' On the declaration of war by France in the summer of 1870, von Rosenberg was the senior squadron commander, and he took the field with four thoroughbreds. The 13th Uhlans formed with the 4th Cuirassiers and the 19th Dragoons the 11th Brigade, under General von Barby, and covered the advance of the Second Army. He was present at Vionville-Mars-la-Tour, marched from Gravelotte to Rheims, from Rheims to Bu, was at Berchères and Lavaré, and returning home a major was in 1876 promoted lieut.-colonel and posted to command the 3rd Zieten Hussars. In 1880 he was appointed to command the 30th Cavalry Brigade in Metz, and eight years later became a major-general and Inspector of Cavalry. In this appointment the improvement he effected is universally acknowledged; he was no mere parade-soldier; he endeavoured always to train his men in peace for active service and for victory in the field. 'Siegen ist der Zweck' was his motto, and the Prussian Cavalry owes it largely to his teachings and methods that its efficiency to-day is of so high a standard. This book is little more than a sketch, but it brings before us the best type of regimental officer, one, too, who was a thorough sportsman and a very charming personality.

'General Karl von Schmidt.' A sketch of his life and services. By General von Pelet-Narbonne. (Berlin : Mittler u. Sohn, 1902.) Price 1 M. 75.

The German Cavalry so universally acknowledges the immense debt it owes to the example and teachings of General von Schmidt, that it is matter for wonder that so far the only account of his life and services is contained in this Beiheft of the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, written by his friend and former comrade, General von Pelet-Narbonne. Von Schmidt was born in 1817, the son of an Artillery officer who had served with distinction in the Napoleonic wars and won the Iron Cross at Waterloo. Young von Schmidt was educated at Stralsund, and joined the Cadet Corps in Berlin, being appointed in August 1833 second

lieutenant in the 4th Uhlans, a regiment in which he served for twenty-nine years, and which now bears his name. From the very first he worked hard at his profession and produced, for regimental circulation only, several pamphlets on drill and manœuvre, but it was not until 1863 that he published the first of those works on the training of Cavalry which brought him prominently to notice and which were speedily accepted as text-books. In this year he was transferred to the command of the 4th Cuirassiers, which in the war of 1866 formed part of the 13th Cavalry Brigade with the Army of the Maine, but which was never very seriously engaged. Upon the declaration of peace Von Schmidt was again transferred, this time to the command of a newly-raised regiment, the 16th Hussars. On the outbreak of the war with France, the 16th were posted to the 6th Cavalry Division, under Lieut.-General the Duke of Mecklenburg, and at Vionville Von Schmidt succeeded to the command of the brigade, but was very severely wounded in the upper part of the thigh—a wound from which he suffered all the rest of his life, which never properly healed, and which was ultimately in great measure the cause of his death. He recovered in time to rejoin his brigade, with the rank of major-general, before Paris, and found himself temporarily in command of the division, the Duke of Mecklenburg having been injured by the explosion at Laon. He took part in many operations against the Army of the Loire. He was at Orleans, La Sologne and Le Mans, and finally emerged from the campaign with the reputation of the first Cavalry leader in the Prussian Army. The comparative leisure which now was his he utilised to the full to place on record the results of the experiences he had enjoyed in the field; he wrote much on the modern employment of Cavalry, enjoined on all ranks the need for continuous study, urged the cultivation of individuality and initiative, experimented with measures for reducing the weight borne by the horse, and finally insisted on the provision of a first-rate firearm for Cavalry with consequent increased instruction in dismounted work. He was now at once given a Cavalry Brigade in Magdeburg, but was employed on the Commission—of which he was naturally one of the most progressive members—to revise the Cavalry regulations in the light of the experience of the war just concluded. In 1874 he was appointed President of a similar Commission, and in a report which he presented at its close he laid very great stress upon the importance of dismounted work, and especially recommended that the sword should for the future be attached to the saddle and no longer to the rider. In 1875 he was appointed to the command of the 7th Cavalry Division, but he seems for some time past to have been in bad health. His old wound was causing him much suffering, and while actually on a tour of inspection he was taken seriously ill and died in Danzig on August 28.

General von Schmidt was so far in advance of his time that it is possible that all that he achieved and all that he tried to do for his arm is to-day better understood and appreciated than were his labours during his life. Loyal support by his juniors and by men like the Red Prince and others of his superiors and contemporaries, many of his seniors were antagonistic to his views, and he had at times heavy opposition to overcome. He had worked hard at his profession all his life, he had drawn experience from the operations both of war and of peace, and all ranks of the army he adorned are now fully sensible of all that its efficiency owes to Karl von Schmidt.

'Prince Rupert Palatine.' Published by Eveleigh Nash. London. 15s.

Mrs. Stewart Erskine gives us here the story of the General of the Horse of King Charles I.

She tells us that Gustavus, whose pupil Rupert was, had brought together the three arms of the service into one coherent whole, but that Rupert had not clearly realised the fact. We need go no further to find out the reason he failed to win decisive battles on land (or on sea).

At Edgehill he left the Army in pursuit of some runaways. At Marston Moor he allowed himself to be surprised ; at Naseby he again left his army in the battle in pursuit of runaways.

A commander must never under any pretext take his troops away from the battlefield until the battle is decided. For whilst he is away the tide of battle will turn against his army, and he will share in its ultimate defeat.

In war strategy aims at one result, a battle. The first laws of war show the necessity for preparation for the handling of masses, and of the impulsion given to their movements. Of these first laws Rupert had some notion, for we are here told of his studies. But he failed because he could never concentrate his efforts ; he ignored the value of the economy of forces ; he used his whole force to do what a small detachment would have done as well. Let me explain. At Naseby, after he had overthrown Ireton's Cavalry, he galloped off in pursuit with all his warriors instead of sending only a small detachment, sufficient to keep the runaways on the run (Economy of Forces), and keeping the bulk of his force to attack the Puritans still on the field (Concentration of Efforts).

He had already done the same foolish thing at Edgehill. This is the cause of his lost battles. Rupert had many splendid qualities. He was always eager for battle. He was fierce and rapid in his attacks. He was a splendid rider, but at his best poor Rupert was no more than a real hard fighter both by land and sea. And the authoress has given us a very fine account of his life. In the battles of the future when our Cavalry has defeated the hostile Cavalry their job will only have just begun. Their victory is only just the beginning of the real struggle.

The job of our Cavalry is to work for our Army and against the enemy's army.

More than ever will the importance of Cavalry on the battlefield be felt in the help and co-operation it can give to our Infantry and Artillery, that is to our Army. For 'does not the Cavalry ride swiftly into the danger, whereas the Infantry can only advance slowly into it ?'

This is the lesson of all time, from Epaminondas to Naseby, on to our time and for the future.

Rupert had splendid soldiers ; he generally overthrew his immediate opponents, and ended by losing his battles for no other reason than his mis-application of these principles.

In the second Anglo-Dutch Naval War, before the great four days battle, a French squadron was on its way from the Atlantic to join the Dutch in the North Sea. Rupert took twenty ships to the western part of the English Channel, while the remainder under Monk sailed East to meet the Dutch. The English had the worst of this battle, owing entirely to the momentary weakening of their fleet by Rupert's ships being away in another direction.



There was no need for this ; the whole English fleet united should have fallen on the Dutch before the French could come up.

A small detachment of one or two vessels would have been a sufficient force to watch the French approach.

Had it not been for the bad behaviour of some of the Dutch captains this battle would have resulted in a crushing defeat for the English.

Rupert sinned through ignorance.

He lost his protector, King Charles I., through his losing of battles, which in turn came through his ignorance of the real vital principles of war.

P. A. C.

'General Gatacre.' By Beatrix Gatacre. John Murray. 10s. 6d. net.

A strenuous story, charmingly told, but ending, alas ! in bitterness and disappointment.

Born of a long line of Shropshire knights and squires, Sir William Gatacre's boyhood was spent among the healthy surroundings of a sporting English country home, till, gazetted to the 77th Foot in 1861, he joined his regiment in India, where he served until invalided home in 1867.

Evidence had already been given of the young officer's independence and extraordinary physical endurance in a solitary expedition to Leh and Skardo, during which he made a march of 196 miles over snow in four days ; and in November 1870 the same spirit led him to visit on foot and against orders the scenes of the then recent fighting round Metz.

In February 1873 he entered the Staff College, and in 1875 became Professor of Topography at the R.M.C., Sandhurst, from which appointment he passed to the Headquarters Staff at Aldershot as D.A.Q.M.G.

In 1880 Sir William rejoined his regiment at Dover and accompanied it again to India, where he held several temporary Staff appointments, till in 1884 he succeeded to the command at the age of forty.

Little more than a year later he was appointed Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Indian Army, and in 1888 his first opportunity of active service came with his appointment as Chief Staff Officer to General McQueen, commanding the Hazara Field Force in what is known as the Black Mountain Expedition of 1888.

The story of the Colonel's extraordinary march from the Headquarter Camp on the top of the ridge down to the camp of General Galbraith's column at Kunhar, in the Indus Valley, a descent of 7,000 feet in fourteen miles, and back again in one day is well known ; of the escort of Khyber Rifles, hillmen born and bred, not one could live with him, and he returned alone to the Headquarter Camp after fifteen hours' walking and climbing.

For his services in the Hazara Expedition Colonel Gatacre was decorated with the D.S.O., and from that time his employment was constant and active.

In 1889 and 1890 he acted for Brigadier-General George Wolseley in command of the Mandalay Brigade in the palmy days of the Burmese dacoits ; from 1890 to 1894 he was Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army, and from 1894 to 1897 he commanded the Bombay District ; 1895 saw him in command of a Brigade in Chitral ; in 1896 he was promoted to the command of the First Class District of Quetta, and while holding this appointment in 1897 the

General did what is probably the finest work of his life as the Chairman and moving spirit of the Commission which stamped out the plague in Bombay.

In 1898 General Gatacre commanded the British Brigade at the Atbara and Omdurman, and was rewarded for his services with the K.C.B.

Now, after thirty-seven years' service, of which twenty-three had been spent in India, the General settled down to the command of the Eastern District at Colchester, from which he went out full of high hope in October 1899 to command the Third Division in South Africa, and to which he returned in May 1900, when relieved of his command in the field.

This is the saddest chapter in a gallant gentleman's life ; the worldly hope on which he had set his heart had turned to ashes in his hand ; that fair career on which his heart was set had come to a sudden ending, and in March 1905 his retirement was gazetted. In November of the same year the General's restless energy led him, in the interest of the Kordofan Trading Company, to the rubber forests of Abyssinia, where he died of fever in the following January near Gambela. His character is fittingly recorded on the tablet in Claverly Church in these words :

'Strenuous in action and gifted with an exalted sense of efficiency and discipline, he trod his path in life with an unswerving devotion to duty ; his simplicity of character, his great courage and powers of endurance, and his manly tenderness of heart won him the admiration and affection of all who knew him. Whom God loveth he chasteneth.'

'A Précis of Strategy.' By Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Bird, D.S.O., late Professor, Indian Staff College. 3s. 6d.

Strategy as set forth in the works of Clausewitz, Jomini and the like is heavy reading ; but Colonel Bird has contrived in these pages so to condense the great principles they teach, and to illustrate them by historical examples and by clear and sufficient diagrams, that the very beginner can understand and appreciate them.

We have more than once called the attention of our readers to Colonel Bird's admirable methods of teaching, and this his latest effort is no less valuable than those that have preceded it.

'Tactical Principles and Problems.' By Captain Hanna, United States Cavalry. (George Barta Publishing Company, Menasha, Wisconsin, U.S.A.)

Captain Hanna is an Instructor at the Fort Leavenworth Army School, and this book is evidently the result of his employment.

It contains a series of studies in Applied Tactics, worked out in great detail on maps of the country surrounding Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The exercises are elementary, and are confined to small forces of Cavalry and Infantry ; but the principles are sound, and the author has taken infinite pains to explain the minutest detail of the operations he describes.

The problems dealt with include the leading of patrols, both Cavalry and Infantry, advanced and rear guards and outposts, attack and defence, and the pursuit ; and the book is well worth the careful study which the author claims for it.

'The American Civil War.' By John Formby. With sixty-six Maps and Plans. (John Murray, London.)

There is only one other single-volume work dealing with the American Civil War as a whole—*i.e.* the book written by Colonel Edmonds and Mr. W. B. Wood, which is so useful to the student of the military operations of that period.

Mr. Formby's aim is rather to condense the general history of the war by land and sea with its causes, its results, its politics, its diplomacy, and the contemporary events which influenced it.

In this he has succeeded, and his volume is quite the most important as well as interesting contribution to the literature of the American Civil War that has been published in recent years.

The maps are abundant, good and clear, and the work should find a place in every military library.

'Finance and War.' By Captain R. S. Hamilton-Grace, p.s.c. 13th Hussars. (Hugh Rees, Pall Mall.)

This brief but valuable essay on a subject which few soldiers think of studying certainly gives the reader food for much thought.

Dealing first with the cost of wars from the seventeenth century to the present day, the author shows the various expedients by which it has been met; and, after discussing the effect of war on money and *vice versa*, goes on to his consideration of the financial situation in England on the outbreak of our next serious war under a system of free imports and with an income tax at its present level.

'Machine Gun Tactics.' By Captain Applin, D.S.O., 14th Hussars. (Hugh Rees, 119 Pall Mall.) 6s. net.

The author is an enthusiastic believer in the latent possibilities of the machine gun, and in this small book he tells us all he expects of the weapon with Cavalry, with Infantry, in fortress warfare, and in minor operations. The historical facts which support the theories of employment advanced in each chapter are taken from the Russo-Japanese War, in which these guns were employed with increasing frequency and effect as the war went on; and there is a most interesting account of the machine guns of foreign armies.


In short, this is quite the most complete and suggestive treatise on machine guns we have yet read, and we strongly recommend it to our readers.

'The A B C of the Army.' (Gale & Polden.) 1s.

A companion volume to the 'A B C of the Navy,' giving a summary of the characteristics of each rank of the Army.

'Breeding Horses for Use, or Equine Eugenics.' By Francis Ram. (Swan Sonnenschein & Co.) Price 6d.

Mr. Ram's principle that it is by hard practical tests and not by their appearance in the show-ring that the sires and dams of the equine population should be selected is sound enough, but his scheme for carrying it out appears to us to be altogether beyond the limits of practicability.



POPE PIUS VI. BLESSING OFFICERS OF THE 12th LIGHT DRAGOONS.  
VATICAN, 1794.

CAPTAIN ROBERT BROWNE, CAPT. LIEUT. MICHAEL HEAD, LIEUT. THE HON. PIERCÉ BUTLER.



## NOTES

### REGIMENTAL MEDALS

IN the medal collection of the Royal United Service Museum are a number of regimental medals. The illustration shows those of the Regular British Cavalry. There are also a number of Yeomanry medals, which it is proposed to illustrate in a subsequent number.

The following inscriptions are on the medals :—

10th Prince of Wales' Own Royal Hussars. 1843. Presented to Sergeant John Day, 10th Royal Hussars, as a mark of esteem.

22nd Light Dragoons. 1815. Seringapatam, 1799. Conicul, 1800. Java, 1811.

17th Lancers, or Glory. Presented as token of regard to Troop-Sergeant-Major P. Farley by the N.C. Officers and Privates of Captain Willets' Troop 17th Lancers.

16th Lancers. A gift from Lieut.-General Sir John Vandeleur to Francis Lambert, of the 16th, the Queen's (L.D.), Lancers. Oporto, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onor, Busaco, Salamanca, Vittarea, Nive, Peninsula.

14th Light Dragoons. William Hanley, Corporal 14th Light Dragoons. Fortitudine, Blasco Sancho, 26th July, 1812. Peninsula.

9th Queen's Royal Lancers (large medal). Peninsula. Presented to Regimental Sergeant-Major Thomas Godding as a token of esteem and in testimony of his faithful and meritorious services for upwards of thirty-two years. March 1837. Present at the Sieges of Buenos Ayres and Flushing, at the battles of Aroyo de Molino, Vittoria, St. Sebastian, Pyrenees, Orthes, and Toulouse.

9th Queen's Royal Lancers (small medal). Peninsula, Edinburgh, 20th March, 1837. Presented to Regimental Sergeant-Major Thomas Godding by the Non-Commissioned Officers of the Regiment as a token of esteem and testimony of his gallant and meritorious services for upwards of thirty-two years.

A. L.

### POPE PIUS VI. BLESSING OFFICERS OF THE TWELFTH LIGHT DRAGOONS

IN 1793, during the wars of the French Revolution, a French army advanced against Toulon, which was defended by a few British, Spanish, Neapolitan and Sardinian troops.

Among the 'succours' despatched from England to the Mediterranean were the Twelfth Light Dragoons.

Before the arrival of the regiment, however, Toulon was abandoned and arrangements were made for attacking the island of Corsica.

Part of the regiment landed and was present at the taking of Bastia, which surrendered on May 22, 1794; the remainder sailed to Italy and landed at Civita Vecchia, a fortified port on the Tuscan Sea.

The conduct of the officers and soldiers while stationed in Italy so attracted the attention of Pope Pius VI. that his Holiness caused his thanks to be communicated by Cardinal de Zalada, his Secretary of State, in the following letter :—

From the Vatican : May 30, 1794.

The marked consideration which the Holy Father has always entertained, and never will cease to entertain, for the generous and illustrious English nation, induces him not to neglect the opportunity of giving a proof of it, which is now afforded by the stay of a British regiment at Civita Vecchia. As His Holiness cannot but applaud the regular and praiseworthy conduct of the troops in question, he has determined to evince his entire satisfaction by presenting a gold medal to each of the officers, including General Sir James Stewart, Baronet, and Colonel Erskine,\* though absent; and since these medals, twelve in number, are not at present in readiness, nor can be provided before the departure of the regiment from Civita Vecchia, the Holy Father will be careful that they shall be sent as soon as possible to Sir John Cox Hipplesly, who will be pleased to transmit them to the respective officers, making them acquainted at the same time with the feelings by which His Holiness is animated, and with the lively desire which he entertains of manifesting, on all occasions, his unalterable regard, whether it be towards the nation in general or towards every individual Englishman. In thus making known to Sir John Cox Hipplesly, member of the British Parliament, the dispositions of the Supreme Pontiff, the Cardinal de Zalada, Secretary of State, begs leave to add an offer of his own services and the assurances of his distinguished esteem.

Three of the officers proceeded to Rome and had the honour of being introduced to the Pope, who received them in a very gracious manner, and taking a helmet into his hand, ejaculated the wish 'that Heaven would enable the cause of truth and religion to triumph over injustice and infidelity,' and he then placed it on Captain Browne's head.

The officers present were Captain Robert Browne (afterwards General Browne-Clayton), Captain-Lieutenant Michael Head, and Lieutenant the Hon. Pierce Butler.

W. H. G.

\* The colonel and lieutenant-colonel of the Twelfth Light Dragoons.

## THE TROOPER'S PIPE

AN old Fifteenth Hussar recorded that in crossing the Pyrenees to Bayonne our army in the Peninsula appreciated to the full the value of brandy and tobacco, two articles which they considered as necessary to a winter campaign as powder and ball.\*

There is little doubt that the use of tobacco in moderation acts as a sedative, aids digestion, drives off mosquitoes and other disease carriers, and is an effective germicide.

In the climatic extremes of the North Indian borderlands the Pathan tribesman, when shivering from exposure, will often seek relief in tobacco-smoking, even if the barrel of his rifle has to take the place of a pipe-stem and the breech of the pipe-bowl.

But there are times to smoke and times not to smoke. Seydlitz at Rosbach threw his pipe in the air as the signal to charge, and it should be clearly understood that a pipe is just as much out of place when its smoke by day or its light by night may betray the owner as it is out of place in the encounter with cold steel. A match struck on a dark night is visible at great distances, and we know that during a night sortie from Ladysmith the Boer sentry over a gun revealed his position by striking a match to light his pipe, with the result that he unintentionally guided his enemies, and the gun was captured.

The following translation gives the opinion of one of Napoleon's Cavalry leaders on the value of pipe smoking:—†

'One must try to give the taste for pipe smoking to the Light Cavalryman.

'Why?

'Because it keeps him awake.

'The pipe is a secondary distraction which, far from keeping him away from his duty, attaches him to it and renders it less irksome to him. It gives him composure, passes the idle hours, relieves the tedium of his thoughts, and keeps the man in bivouac near his horse. While he smokes his pipe, seated on a truss of hay or grass, no one will think of taking the forage from his horse and giving it to another; he sees that the horse is feeding, that he is not being kicked by other horses; the provisions in his wallets cannot be stolen; then the man notices repairs to be done to his saddlery, or some improper fitting of the kit to be adjusted. Without getting bored he will keep an eye on a comrade's horse, and the comrade, under an obligation to him for this service, goes in search of water, forage, and provisions for their mutual benefit.

'The time for relieving the outposts comes round, and he has to go. To sleep there is forbidden. What a resource the pipe is then, which drives away sleep, hastens the long hours, makes the rain feel less cold, and hunger and thirst less painful!

'And if you have long night marches, after the fatigue of an active day, those marches on which sleep attacks you and becomes a veritable and invincible suffering to you, and a cause of numberless severe injuries to the horses, nothing keeps you awake better than the habit of smoking your pipe.

\* *Twelve Years' Military Adventure*. Pub. Hy. Colburn. London, 1829.

† *Avant-Postes de Cavalerie Légère*, par le Général F. De Brack. Paris, 1830.



'The pipe necessitates our carrying a flint and steel and tinder ; with this we also can light the bivouac fire.

'The smallest matters on a campaign, where the men are reduced to so few resources, have each their degree of importance. The pipe is a means of barter, of pleasure, and of rendering a service in our life of comradeship ; if lent under some circumstances to a comrade it makes one indeed a friend in need.

'Whatever Aristotle and the cabal who follow his doctrines may say of it, smoke yourself, and make your light dragoons smoke.'

Since the above lines were written the introduction of matches and cigarettes has added considerably to the danger of setting fire to dry grass, crops, or hay, and it has become imperative to stop smoking on night marches if concealment is desirable or in the proximity of the enemy.

The briar-wood pipe must always be the inseparable companion of the hardy northern type of manhood, but an improved method of lighting it is required, and perhaps some kind of repeating flameless match may commend itself to the inventor, with the object of preventing the waste of matches which is now so patent a fact to every householder.

'CARABINIER.'

### NOTES ON THE NATAL MILITIA MANŒUVRES

By MAJOR G. J. FITZGERALD, Royal Horse Guards, Assistant Military Secretary,  
South Africa

As the main part of the Natal Militia Force is composed of mounted men, I thought it might perhaps interest the readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL to know something about the Local Forces in South Africa, and, having been asked to stay with Colonel Sir Duncan McKenzie, K.C.M.G., C.B., who commands the Force, I had a chance of studying the different methods of bush fighting which this Force had adopted in the last Natal rebellion in 1906.

The Force consisted of :—

	Strength
The Natal Carabiniers . . . . .	378
Border Mounted Rifles . . . . .	182
Zululand Mounted Rifles . . . . .	161
Umvoti Mounted Rifles . . . . .	188
Natal Mounted Rifles . . . . .	186
Northern District Mounted Rifles . . . . .	160
Durban Light Infantry . . . . .	240 out of 400
Natal Royal Regiment . . . . .	104 out of 184
3 Field Batteries (15 pounders) . . . . .	196

with detachments from Natal Transport Corps, Medical Corps, Veterinary Corps, Telegraph Corps, Natal Service Corps, and Engineer Corps, the whole making a total of about 2000 men.

The mounted troops were well mounted on sturdy little ponies, some of which hardly looked up to the weight, but nevertheless did all the hard work required of them. The average price of the mounts was about 25*l.*—horses and ponies being scarce in Natal now. The three field batteries are horsed by contractors, two batteries being well horsed while the third was not so well horsed. The shooting of the batteries was good, and considering the number of recruits in the ranks, the drill was good. Owing to the high altitude of the camp of exercise, the gunners found it hard at first to adjust their fuzes, being used to practice at sea level. Sixty rounds per gun is allowed each year for practice. The whole Force was under canvas about seventeen miles from Pietermaritzburg for ten days' training—they also have three days' training in each quarter, some of the men in outlying districts having to ride in over eighty miles. They insure their horses—30*s.* for 30*l.* a year. Each man is allowed 10*l.* a year for his horse, and 1*s.* a day for forage while in camp. There is a capitation grant of 4*l.* per man paid to each Corps, and 3*l.* each recruit for the mounted regiments, and 30*s.* for Infantry.

Troopers while out training receive 5*s.* a day; corporals and bombardiers, 6*s.*; staff sergeants, 7*s.*; all other ranks, 9*s.* If on active service, after sixty days 3*s.* a day extra is given. The men find everything except camp equipment and their arms. Two hundred rounds per man a year is allowed for practice.

The day in camp begins with troop, squadron or regimental drill from 6.30 to 8 A.M., and considering again the number of recruits (*viz.* 60 per cent.), the drill of all the corps is exceedingly steady, and compares favourably with an English Yeomanry Regiment, except that there is more shouting and noise, especially the case where there are a number of Dutchmen in the troop or squadron, as they require a lot of shouting at to get them to move quickly; but one finds Englishmen and Dutchmen, who were fighting against one another a few years ago, now knee to knee in the ranks and no ill-feeling of any sort left. At 10 A.M. the whole Force turns out for a field day, which lasts until 4 or 4.30 P.M., with an interval of an hour for lunch, so the horses are not given much rest, and considering the hilly and rocky nature of the country and the enormous distance some of the flank detachments have to cover, it is wonderful how well the small ponies stand the work.


The discipline in camp was excellent—during my stay there I never saw a single case of drunkenness. The Natal Carabiniers for the first offence of drunkenness fine the man 5*l.*, and then discharge him.

The Natal Engineers were busy in camp putting up electric light in the G.O.C.'s mess tent, and their search light, which is fixed on a waggon, was used with great success in the Natal Rebellion, 1906; it can go over any ground an ordinary waggon can go over, a separate waggon being required for the oil to run it.

The Natal Veterinary Corps has an excellent mode of carrying their medicine, &c., in two wooden boxes on a pack mule, the lids of which let down and form a table, the inside being full of drawers all labelled so that any medicine, &c., can be found immediately without taking the boxes off the mule. This system might easily and cheaply be adapted by our Cavalry.

For savage warfare in a bush country they adopt a formation as below, one squadron finding the advance, flank and rear guards, the remainder of the

Regiment and its transport being inside the large square so formed, each of the faces work in pairs :



They can easily be reinforced by the main body in the centre.

A quicker mode of tying horses head to tail than we have is to take over the off stirrup leather of each horse over the saddle, and tie the bit reins with a short half-hitch to the stirrup iron—this is quickly untied with one pull : then instead of wasting time in taking over the bit rein again they hold it in their hand and ride with the bridoon, and so are ready to dismount again and drop the bit rein on the ground, when most of their horses are taught to stand still directly the rein is on the ground. So often I have seen English Cavalry waste a few precious seconds by taking their bit reins over, just at the most critical moment when they ought to be up in the saddle and away again.

A good way the Natal Force had of knee haltering when rope or reins are not available was to halter with the stirrup leather, starting with the buckle on the inside of the off leg, then bringing it round the off leg and twice round the near leg, and if it is too long twist the stirrup leather round itself between the legs and then fasten in the buckle.

Each squadron was told off in turn to charge up to a row of men with empty paraffin tins who busily beat them with sticks, so as to get the horses accustomed to a noise like the Zulus make when charging and hitting their assegais against their shields ; the horses very soon got accustomed to this, and even when hobbled and out grazing this was tried and did not cause a stampede. One was greatly impressed by the way the men looked after their horses ; never a moment was wasted for grazing, which is a thing that might be encouraged more with our own mounted troops.

One morning an alarm was sounded, no one having the slightest idea of it, as some men were tent pegging, some bathing, &c., and all the horses were out grazing. In eighteen minutes from the time the alarm sounded, the Natal Carabiniers were mounted and ready to move off, and the Durban Light Infantry marched off to the defensive position allotted to them in eight minutes. The horses had to be driven in to the lines from grazing, men to dress and saddle up, so eighteen minutes was not a bad performance.

A very good way of encouraging men to take an interest in their turn-out

struck me when I went to see the Natal Carabiniers turn out for their Grand Parade. The Adjutant inspects the guard, twenty-eight men (which includes lineguards), and then selects the best turned-out man, which is hard to do when every man is well turned out. The man having been selected is then taken up to the O.C., who presents him with a whip with the silver crest of the regiment on it, and makes him his orderly for the following day; the man is then hoisted by his comrades in his troop and carried round the lines, the majority of the regiment being spectators at this parade, which takes place every evening while in camp, and the keenest interest is taken in who shall have the whip presented to him. The consequence is that the turn-out is really excellent in every way, and would be a lesson to a good many regular regiments in camp.

I learnt a good method of crossing Infantry over a river when one has waggons, viz.—

- (1) Man to swim over with a light rope.
- (2) Attach to the end of the rope the yokes of the oxen and pull them over.
- (3) Swim the oxen over separately.
- (4) The trek chain to be pulled over and oxen then yoked.
- (5) Attach rope to trek chain and inspan the oxen to pull the waggon into the stream and so form a bridge.

Outposts were placed out every night and snipers told off to try and get through in the middle of the night, which they very seldom were able to.

The saddles were rather like the old pattern of the Household Cavalry, viz. stuffed pannels, the Colonial preferring them to any other, as they are easily adaptable to either horse or pony. Shooting from their horses is practised, the horses standing quite quietly. In dismounted work one man holds about ten horses.

After having been nearly a week with the Natal Force, I then went to the Transvaal Camp of Exercise, about fifteen miles from Johannesburg. Their Artillery is driven by black boys from the carriage with eight mules. It is doubtful if under fire the mules would be able to be driven in this manner. The Imperial Light Horse and Southern Mounted Rifles were all well mounted; it was the first camp of exercise that the Hon. Hugh Wyndham had been able to take the whole of his regiment, viz. S.M.R., to, and considering this, it was wonderful to see how well they got over the country, the majority of them being Dutchmen.

A Maxim gun on a motor came into action and was able to get over the most mountainous country roads.

The camp was for only five days, but was very well attended by the Volunteers under the command of Colonel Beves.

### IMPORTANT

The Staff of the Journal is limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain the Journal direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers: every effort will, however, be made to trace the moves of regiments.

## CANADA

Extracts from the report of 'The Inspector-General' on the training of the Canadian Cavalry, 1909.

## CAVALRY

The cavalry corps of the West are commended for their 'praiseworthy degree of keenness,' and some of their camps are said to have been 'models of what camps should be.'

In the East we are told results varied considerably, several regiments showing distinct progress while others had deteriorated. The Inspector-General states that this deterioration may quite possibly have been caused by the reduced establishments, and he concludes, as to the Eastern cavalry, that the 'standard of efficiency previously noted was maintained, but hardly improved.'

There still exists the necessity for increased attention to troop and cavalry drill, but musketry shows a distinct advance in most regiments.

Experiments with a new method of carrying the rifle, which, it is hoped, will obviate the frequent loss of the bolts, have been carried out by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, with satisfactory results, and new directions founded thereon are expected to cure this serious evil.

The Stetson hat is criticised as being hardly less satisfactory than the helmet, and changes in both clothing and headgear have been provided.

In many cases the saddlery is not properly cared for between training seasons, and even during the training, and the General regrets that some regiments neglected to bring field forges into camp, thus losing an opportunity of practising their own shoeing. 'A Cavalry regiment that cannot shoe its own animals would be very badly off on field service.'

The quality of the horses has not improved, and their inspection by the Veterinary is said to be not as strict as it should be.

The maximum amount of compensation payable by Government for horses killed or injured will now be \$175.00 each, and it is hoped that this may induce some owners of good horses, who have refused to allow them to come to camp, hereafter to do so. (*Canadian Military Gazette.*)

## SECOND LIFE GUARDS

Past members, officers, N.C.O.s, and troopers of the 2nd Life Guards will be pleased to hear that the preliminaries for forming an 'Old Comrades' Association' in connection with their old corps have now been settled.

The objects of the Association are to keep old comrades in touch with one another, to mutually assist each other in obtaining situations, and to form a 'Helping-hand Fund' to assist those who should require help. An annual dinner will take place in connection with this on the last Friday in November every year. Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dundonald, K.C.V.O., C.B., colonel of the regiment, has consented to act as the first president. All communications should be addressed to the Hon. Secretary, 'Old Comrades' Association,' Hyde Park Barracks, London, S.W.

## FOREIGN

*Austria.*—A change has recently been effected in the system which Mr. Haldane has lately imitated—under which so-called *Urlaube-Pferde* are lent out to farmers and others. Horses to the number required to complete peace establishments to war effectives are in the first instance purchased by the Government and are, after a preliminary five months' training, loaned out to those who engage to maintain them in an efficient condition, subject to an inspection every spring and to the liability of being called out in the autumn for manœuvres. Up to now these farmers have received with their horses a premium of 21 krone (about 16s. 6d.), but this is now withdrawn, although to make up in some measure for this deprivation the farmer is henceforth to become the actual owner of the animal after five years instead of, as at present, after six.

Wire-cutters of two patterns—light and double-handed—are in future to be issued to the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry in the proportion of eight of the light pattern per squadron, two of the larger description being carried by each Cavalry pioneer detachment.

*Germany.*—The Cavalry manœuvres for this year will be taken part in by five divisions. One of these will during four days carry out an *exercice d'exploration* against another. General von Kleist, Inspector-General of Cavalry, will direct the manœuvres.

The report on the Remount operations for the year 1909 seems to prove that automobilism and the large demand for heavy draught horses have had so far little or no effect upon the supply of half-bred horses suitable for military purposes. During last year 554 horse fairs were held in Prussia alone, at which 23,964 horses were put up for sale, and 10,926 or 46 per cent. of these were purchased by the Remount. The total number offered for sale in the whole of Germany was 28,478, and 14,247 or 50 per cent. were bought for the army.

It is stated that Cavalry horses are increasingly subject to diseases mainly attributable to the heavy and continuous work now required of them. The Inspector-General of Cavalry suggests that the following remedial measures, among others, be adopted :—

1. Increase of the forage ration.
2. Lessening the work now done in brigade and division.
3. Doing away, as far as possible, with picketing out in the open at night during the manœuvre period.

*France.*—*La France Militaire* is responsible for the announcement that the French Cavalry is to be re-armed with a new carbine with bayonet attached. The new weapon will consist of an improved pattern of the present carbine ; the whole barrel will be cased with wood, while the bayonet will be triangular and will be carried folded back under the fore-end.

*Turkey.*—In the army reorganisation now proposed one Cavalry regiment will form part of each division, the divisional Cavalry being, as in Germany, entirely at the disposal of the divisional commander. Each Cavalry regiment will consist of three squadrons only.

## A DEFENCE OF MOUNTED INFANTRY

AN ANSWER TO 'LANCER'

BY A. B. B.

It would be the greatest pity if 'Lancer's' disparaging and, for the most part, inaccurate statements concerning the usefulness of Mounted Infantry in war were allowed to go unchallenged. I will therefore venture a few remarks that may help to correct any false impression that may have been made by his wild and baseless assertions.

I think that the reason for 'Lancer's' attack can be readily deduced from his arguments. He seems to have come to the erroneous conclusion that Mounted Infantry are eventually intended to replace Cavalry, and all his criticisms are framed from this point of view. Had he but taken the trouble to refer to 'Mounted Infantry Training Manual, 1909' (a work surely more relevant to the question than most of the authorities quoted by him), he would have been disillusioned. He would find it distinctly laid down that only in very exceptional cases will Mounted Infantry fulfil the functions of Cavalry. At other times they will use their mobility for (1) rapid concentration (S. 47); (2) relieving the Infantry of their more onerous duties in protection, &c. (S. 48); (3) fulfilling certain definite functions in support of Cavalry in action (S. 52).

Surely even 'Lancer' will admit that Mounted Infantry can at times be most usefully employed to perform protective duties impossible to Infantry. As these duties would otherwise fall to the lot of the Cavalry, relieved of them these are free to fulfil their proper *rôle*, *i.e.*—independent action far in advance of the main body they are working with. Surely under these circumstances the Mounted Infantry deserve the gratitude of the Cavalry, not the scorn and derision so freely indulged in by 'Lancer.'

I will now try to deal with some of his more detailed examples. He has assiduously followed what may be called the cocoanut-shy line of argument—that is to say, setting up extreme cases and demolishing them with great gusto. Nevertheless, some of them are not very convincing. For instance (1) he cites the case of a Mounted Infantry patrol meeting a Cavalry patrol coming round the corner of a lane. Mounted Infantry are quite aware of their vulnerability when mounted (S. 50), so if the patrol consisted of a group (4 men), a file would probably be a few hundred yards ahead of the remainder if in close country. Therefore when the Cavalry patrol gave chase they would ride into the magazine fire of two rifles. In this case I do not think the advantage would lie with the Cavalry patrol. (2) Instances of historic charges, however interesting they may be, are hardly relevant. For one thing, they are taken from campaigns since which tactics have been considerably modified by the adoption of the magazine rifle. For another, the presence of Mounted Infantry in support could have nothing but a beneficial effect on a charge. (3) General French, as quoted by 'Lancer,' says distinctly that Cavalry charges should be supported by rifle fire. If Mounted Infantry are present to render this support the whole of the Cavalry are left free to charge. (4) The argument that Mounted Infantry take horses that would otherwise strengthen the Cavalry ranks need not be taken seriously.

Very few of the Mounted Infantry cobs could be used for Cavalry purposes—5 per cent. would be a liberal estimate.

I hope the above will be sufficient to impress on anyone with an unbiassed mind how unjustifiable is 'Lancer's' attack. He seems to have borrowed most of his arguments from the supporters of *l'arme blanche* in the controversy now raging—hence their irrelevancy. Should he take the trouble to glance at the training manual of the arm he is attacking, he would realise that the object of Mounted Infantry is to live up to its name—not to become a second-rate imitation Cavalry.

## THE FUTURE OF CAVALRY

By V. NOVITSKI

A SUMMARISED TRANSLATION OF AN ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE 'RUSSKI INVALID' OF FEBRUARY 1, 1910.

The disappointing performances of the Russian Cavalry during the Manchurian campaign, and especially the futility of such operations as the raid on Ying-k'ou, have resulted in much discussion as to the part which Cavalry will play in the wars of the future. The great improvements effected in firearms during the past thirty to forty years have conferred upon them a preponderance of power, as compared with cold steel, such as never obtained in olden times. The Franco-Prussian war showed that Cavalry was already losing its important, and often decisive, rôle on the battlefield, and none of the more recent wars furnish examples of the successful employment of Cavalry masses.

Unfortunately, attempts to explain the diminishing importance of the rôle of Cavalry are prone to ascribe any lack of success in Cavalry operations to fortuitous circumstances rather than to general principles. The smallness of the results attained by the German Cavalry in 1870-71 is ascribed to its unsuitable equipment, the failure of the Russian Cavalry in 1877-78 has been explained away by the incompetence of the Cavalry leaders, while the inactivity of the Russian Cavalry in the recent war with Japan is excused by reference to the absence of regular Cavalry. Those who put forward such pleas are apt to overlook the fact that the other arms have also suffered, more than once, from the same and similar drawbacks, and yet their power and importance, so far from being diminished, have constantly increased, at the cost of Cavalry.

In the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1877-78 the conditions were extraordinarily favourable for the employment of Cavalry masses. The proportion of regular Cavalry was large; the Commander-in-Chief in the field himself was (at that very time) the Inspector-General of Cavalry, and was considered to be one of the best Cavalry leaders of his day; among the general officers there were brilliant Cavalry leaders like General Gourko; and, finally, the character of the theatre of war and of the hostile Cavalry was such as to afford the Russian Cavalry full scope for the display of its quality. And yet it is a matter of common knowledge how small a part was played by the Russian Cavalry in that campaign, and not one single Cavalry leader came to the front or left his mark on the pages of history.

Notwithstanding the advantage which the mounted arm derives from its



mobility, it has been, owing to its extreme sensitiveness to modern long-range fire, to a large extent, banished from the sphere of tactical operations. The fact is that the general conditions and vast expanse of modern battlefields do not permit the presence of any considerable mass of Cavalry in sufficiently close proximity to the fighting lines to enable it to seize promptly any fleeting opportunities which may occur for Cavalry action.

There are in modern tactical conditions two insurmountable obstacles to the employment of Cavalry masses on the battlefield—the absence of suitable objectives, owing to modern dispersed and invisible formations, and the impossibility of getting within reasonable distance of the enemy owing to long-range fire. As the evolution and improvement of firearms will undoubtedly continue, the prospects of Cavalry, as far as tactical work is concerned, seem absolutely hopeless.

For this very reason the mounted arm must concentrate all its strength, skill and attention upon strategic work, in which it can still play a very leading part. It may be said, indeed, that the strategic importance of Cavalry is greater now than it has ever been before.

The strategic employment of Cavalry may be directed either against the front of hostile armies or against their communications. In the former case, the main bodies of the opposing forces must be some considerable distance apart for the Cavalry to have adequate space and scope for manœuvre; in the latter there will usually be plenty of room. In operations along the front the perfection of modern firearms is, here again, liable to hamper even the strategic employment of Cavalry masses. It will often be impossible to avoid tactical contact with the enemy under conditions entirely foreign to the characteristics of Cavalry, because such tactical episodes may be essential for the achievement of the strategical object in view. At all events, as the distance between the opposing forces is gradually reduced, the scope for such Cavalry operations on a large scale will become less and less, and the opportunity for this particular form of strategic Cavalry work must be necessarily of short duration.

On the other hand, in the case of operations directed against the enemy's flanks and rear, it will seldom be necessary, or even desirable, to come into actual tactical contact with hostile troops, first, because the few and small detachments usually found on the communications may be ignored, and, secondly, because it will generally be possible to achieve the object in view without collision with hostile troops. Indeed, the more such collision can be avoided the better, for time will be saved and the strength and energy of the Cavalry will be husbanded for the main object in view—cutting the enemy's lines of communication and the destruction of everything immediately connected therewith. In short, whereas on the front the objective is the living, active force of the enemy, operations against his rear are directed upon the dead or passive elements of his military strength (*e.g.* depots, stations, roads, bridges, tunnels, &c.), and actual fighting will be comparatively seldom necessary.

Again, whereas the difficulties attending the employment of Cavalry along the front will go on increasing with the continual improvement of firearms and the further development of field fortification, the tendency is for a modern army's communications to become more and more sensitive as every fresh

technical development and improvement is introduced. We are thus forced to the conclusion that, under modern conditions, the action of large independent masses of Cavalry should be confined to far-reaching strategical operations directed against the enemy's communications.

Such operations must, however, to be of value, constitute a real and effective menace to the security of the enemy's communications. As a matter of fact, railway lines, upon which a modern army chiefly depends, can be cut easily, but it is extraordinarily difficult to demolish them to such an extent as to deny their use to the enemy for any length of time. Similarly, damage done to roads is scarcely perceptible in its net results.

It must, moreover, be remembered that, however weak the line of communication troops may be, the time available for free operations will be comparatively short, because the enemy, unless threatened in some other direction or held by being attacked elsewhere, will be able to detach sufficient force to deal with any Cavalry raid. Even if the communications are successfully and effectively interrupted, unless the enemy is attacked in front, the inconvenience caused by deficiency of supplies will be comparatively small. In other words, a raid on the enemy's communications will rarely be of any real strategic importance unless the enemy is attacked in front at the same time. Such raids can only yield fruitful results where carried out in combination with a vigorous offensive against the enemy's front or as a merely subordinate episode in the general strategic plan. If attacked in front at the same time, the severance of his communications is not only brought home to the enemy materially by the shortage of supplies, and especially of ammunition, but his action in the whole theatre of war is paralysed owing to the two-fold necessity in which he finds himself of maintaining his position at the front and of re-establishing his communications in rear before it is too late. Under such conditions, comparatively small damage, or even merely a menace, to the communications of a hostile force will sometimes have a really important effect upon the course of the fighting at the front.

It is in this direction that the Cavalry of to-day must direct its energy and display the true Cavalry spirit which can no longer find scope upon the actual battlefield.

On the other hand, to suppose that Cavalry has lost its military importance is to misread entirely the character of modern war. The part formerly played by Cavalry on the battlefield has undoubtedly lost its pristine glamour, but Cavalry still retains its own individuality and inherent characteristics with regard to all the other phenomena of war. Any proposal to replace it by Mounted Infantry, cyclists or motorists merely betrays ignorance of the art of war.

Cavalry is no doubt the 'arm of the gods'; but, alas! how seldom do the gods take part in human warfare!

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Captain B. E. Sargeaunt, late Assistant-Secretary of the Royal United Service Institution, has recently been appointed by H.M. the King to be Clerk of the Council in the Isle of Man. He has taken an active part in the editorial branch of this JOURNAL since it was founded, and has himself contributed several articles on Arms and historical subjects. The Editorial Staff desire to place on record their appreciation of the work done by him.—A. L.

WITH A PRUSSIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE  
IN ARMY CORPS MANŒUVRES

It is four o'clock on a misty September morning, and the reveille, sounded on Prussian trumpets, is ringing out in the single, and cobbled, street of the quaint little town of Bobersberg. Five minutes later a buxom *fräulein* appears with some varieties in the shape of sausages, milkless tea, black rye bread, and a cheerful smile, to which is added no small amount of curiosity as *der Engländer* struggles into his British uniform—a rare sight apparently to this Prussian maid.

From the window one watches the now busy street. Uhlans are leading their horses out of stable yards, and, after final handshakes with kind hosts and still kinder hostesses, are mounting and riding away to their squadron rendezvous. Sections and companies of Infantry march by on a like errand, and a Staff officer slowly rides past, followed by a battery of howitzers. Pictures of the '70 war are called to mind as one watches. Blue uniforms are everywhere, the light blue of the Prussian Dragoon being conspicuous amongst the darker hue of the Uhlans and Infantry.

A Uhlan orderly has arrived with the good horse placed at our disposal by a kind squadron leader of his regiment, and we mount, as a regiment of the Life Grenadiers is forming in the street, and are giving vent to their feelings in a patriotic '*Hoch*.' A slow ride up the street to the *Rathaus* and we join the Staff of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, the General and all the members bidding one a courteous welcome. Meanwhile regiment after regiment swings past, and a serviceable looking lot they are. A few minutes later and, following the General, we are threading our way through the column—an easy enough proceeding, for the troops are taught to march on the side of the road. What a weight these Prussian Infantry carry! Heavy blue uniforms, and, in addition to the packs on their backs and great coats, each man carries a portion of a *tente d'abri*.

Passing the head of the column we soon get into the track of the advanced Cavalry, and one especially notices the number of connecting files passed; for nothing is left to chance, and the numerous roads and tracks through the dense pine forest we are traversing, are apt to send the best of scouts, to say nothing of squadrons, astray. It is heavy going, but delightful riding along these forest paths in the cool of the morning. A cheery lot is the Staff, chaffing and joking at each other's expense, and none more so than the General himself as he rides along on a grand horse, which he laughingly describes as '*Englisch, ach! sehr gut!*' At the hamlet of Muckrow Uhlan scouts begin to come in with news of the enemy's march, and the numerous orderlies in our train soon begin to disappear in all directions with information. It is interesting to note the care with which the men ride their horses; never faster than a trot, choosing the soft places, and dismounting at once if standing still. A hound trot is the fastest pace all bodies move at, and a troop leader is covered with confusion at the reprimand of the General for exceeding it.

Contact with the enemy is soon gained and a battle is the natural result. Its description, however, has no place in these few notes. 'Stand fast' sounds, and a conference, which lasts an hour and a half, ensues, at which all mounted officers of both sides, and such dismounted officers who happen to be near by,

attend. All the events are discussed, and it is worth noting that the action of a regiment of Uhlans in moving round the enemy's flank and annoying his reserves with dismounted action is complimented. A fresh situation resulting from the battle is issued by the Director at the end of the Conference, and operations recommence. The Blues are driven south by the victorious Reds. Three noteworthy incidents are seen : one is the narrow escape a battery has of capture by Infantry ; another, two opposing forces of Infantry meeting, to their mutual astonishment, in thick wood ; and, thirdly, a Cavalry regiment being caught under a rifle fire at some three hundred yards in a column of half-sections, from which, however, they cleverly save themselves by the quickness of the leading squadron commander, who at once forms his squadron into line and charges the annoying riflemen, who are put out of action.

Operations cease for the day about 6 p.m. The Staff quickly issue out billeting areas to the mounted forces of both sides in accordance with the tactical situation, and squadrons and batteries are as quickly given the names of their villages from their more immediate superiors, while the Infantry go into bivouac. All classes are called upon to provide billets, and one finds oneself in the comfortable quarters of a *Schloss*, or perhaps an inn of doubtful comfort, or, as happened in Sagan to a British officer, in the kindly quarters of a high school for young ladies. Whatever the quarter may be, however, a British uniform is sure of a hospitable welcome.


A detailed account of the manœuvres is out of place here ; suffice it to say that the first six days are devoted to divisional operations, for which the Cavalry brigades are divided, and the units attached to each side. A rest day marks the interval between the divisional and the Army Corps manœuvres. These latter last two days, and are continuous, while the former are divided into two periods marked by Sunday, each period also being continuous.

Two brigades of Cavalry are taking part in the operations, and most interesting it is to compare their work with that of our division on Salisbury Plain in August. Their equipment is much the same as ours, but the Cavalryman of England rides lighter than his comrade of Prussia. The lance, the recognised weapon of Hussars, Cuirassiers, Uhlans and Dragoons, is of hollow steel, and is some eighteen inches longer than that of England, but it is well balanced and no heavier. The flag varies in the different provinces ; in Prussia it is black and white, corporals carrying a white flag with a black eagle, which is furled on manœuvres. No part of the lance is bright. It is generally carried at the trail, and in reconnaissance and on despatch riding with the point downwards. The Prussian Cavalry is at present armed with a carbine, which is being replaced by a short rifle. Their horses come from East Prussia chiefly, and are of a good serviceable stamp, but they take longer to mature than English horses and are not put into the ranks until they are turned seven years, and so consequently have a longer period of training than ours. Many officers ride English and Irish horses.

An instance of Cavalry tactics in the Army Corps manœuvres may be quoted (see sketch). The Red Cavalry brigade, acting as a right flank guard to an Infantry division, is in touch with hostile Infantry and Cavalry at the mill at Wittgendorf. The brigade retires on the windmill at point 164, leaving a rear-guard squadron in touch with the enemy, and reports to its Infantry. On the appearance of the Red Infantry, half an hour later, the brigade moves

West to Hirschfeldau and then turns south to point 143 at the edge of the pine woods.

The Brigadier, riding out to the cover of a small copse, discovers hostile guns, escorted by Cavalry, in action near the village of Kunzendorf against the advancing Red Infantry. He orders his brigade to attack, and in a column of troops Red move out from the cover of the pine woods. The 2nd Dragoons leading form a line of half-squadron columns as they pass the copse, followed by the 3rd Uhlans in echelon on their left rear as second line, at a distance of 300 yards. The brigade, covered by the fire of its two field guns, is now in full view of the hostile guns and Cavalry. Blue's artillery turn on to the advancing horsemen, while his squadrons move round the flanks of the guns. Line is formed by Red, the charge is sounded, and squadron leaders quickly select their own objectives. The going is deep and heavy, the pace is slow, and the



whole distance, some 1,600 yards, is galloped by Red, while some of the squadrons have to jump a small drain. Lances are carried at the 'engage,' and the men cheer lustily. The squadrons attacking the guns go through them, and are in turn attacked by hostile Cavalry. The regimental standards are carried, and the absence of combat patrols and scouts on both sides is noticeable. As a result of the attack all the eight Blue guns and seven squadrons are ruled out of action.

In every charge witnessed during the manœuvres the good order in the squadrons is most noticeable. The men ride knee to knee, and no horse is seen out of the ranks, while there is a complete absence of crowding and opening out. This happy state of affairs is due no doubt to the long period of training of the Prussian remounts, but the slow pace must also be taken into consideration. In this latter respect one wonders whether a slow and steady gallop, and its

consequent good order and discipline, is not of more use in the preparation for the attack than a faster pace which so often means disorder and open files at the critical moment.

Dismounted action the Prussian Cavalry has but lately taken to seriously, but the advent of a new rifle, and possibly a bayonet, will increase its importance in the view of the Cavalry officer.

In scouting and reconnaissance, while every advantage is taken of cover from view, it is noticeable that imaginary bullets do not deter the scout officer or man from obtaining valuable information ; it may be that such necessary caution is expected to come naturally in war. The instructions as to not taking prisoners may also have an emboldening effect.

Fine regiments are the Prussian Cavalry, with their light corps of Hussars and Dragoons, and their mediums of Uhlans and Cuirassiers ; and very pleasant it is to recall the *camaraderie* of their welcome. But this kindly feeling is not confined to the Cavalry brigades, for the utmost hospitality is extended by the veteran Commander of the Army Corps, and his officers of all arms, to the British officer.

#### FORTY-FOUR YEARS AGO : THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR

The 3rd of the present month was the forty-fourth anniversary of the battle of Königgrätz or Sadowa, the culminating struggle of the short campaign of seven weeks, which, for the time being, broke the power of Austria and established Prussia's hegemony in Germany. The campaign is notable also for the shattering of the reputation of the Austrian Cavalry, which, up to that time, had been considered the finest in Europe. Seydlitz, Ziethen and Frederick the Great himself were taught many lessons by the Austrian Cavalry during the Silesian wars, but in the campaign of 1866 the tables were completely turned and the Austrian Cavalry found their masters in the Prussian.

At the action of Trautenau on June 27, the Windischgrätz Dragoons, one of the most celebrated Austrian Cavalry regiments, were overthrown and swept from the field by the 1st Prussian Dragoon Regiment. At Nachod, on the same day, the 1st Prussian Uhlan Regiment and 8th Prussian Dragoons charged and routed an Austrian Cuirassier Brigade of nearly double their strength.

At Königgrätz Marshal Benedek had a force of some 20,000 Cavalry at his disposal, a force which, had it been boldly handled at the right time, might, in the opinion of more than one competent authority, have completely changed the fortunes of the day. It was, however, kept inactive in reserve, and it was not until the Austrian Infantry were in full retreat that any attempt was made to use the Cavalry, when, attacking the pursuing Prussian squadrons, they fought hard and gallantly sacrificed themselves. It may interest readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL to recall that the most stubborn Cavalry charge of that day was made by a Cuirassier Brigade under the command of an Englishman in the Austrian service of the name of Beales. The charge at first was successful, the 3rd Regiment of Prussian Dragoons being nearly cut to pieces, but, charged in their turn by Hohenlohe's Prussian Uhlans and by Ziethen's Hussars, who took them in rear, the Austrians in their turn were worsted, and only ten of them are reported to have escaped unwounded from the *mêlée*, their gallant leader Beales being himself among the badly wounded.

'WAR AND THE *ARME BLANCHE*'

By E. CHILDERS. 379 pp., with Introduction by Field-Marshal Earl ROBERTS, V.C., K.G., and Index. 8vo. (London: Edward Arnold, 1910.) 7s. 6d.

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In this book Mr. Erskine Childers maintains, and claims to have proved, that for mounted troops in modern war the *arme blanche* is 'as dead as the dodo.' The essential points of the theories he advances are—that the rifle is always the master of the sword; that although the latter may be of use on some occasions those occasions are very few, and that even then the rifle can be used instead of the sword, with better results; that it is as impossible for mounted troops to become efficient in the use of both rifle and sword as it is for a man to serve two masters; and that the only way to ensure the efficient training of our Cavalry in the use of the rifle is to deprive it of lance and sword altogether. Mr. Childers favours bold offensive action, but always with the object of overwhelming the enemy by fire and never with the object of using cold steel. Cavalry charges he believes in, but not the charge as now understood; in his view Cavalry should charge to 'within 5, 10, 50, or 100 yards' of the enemy, and then shoot him down, either from the saddle, or dismounting to fire. In the term 'Cavalry' he would include all mounted troops, maintaining that all should be armed alike and act on the same principles. Fire from the saddle should be freely used, even, it would appear, when moving at speed, as in pursuit.

Mr. Childers bases his views mainly on the experiences of the South African War, but he quotes the Russo-Japanese War in confirmation, and he claims that the American Civil War and the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71 also illustrate the truth of his contentions. The fact that a decided majority of the leaders of military thought throughout the civilised world are believers in 'the terror of cold steel' is an argument to which he attributes no importance. He is quite satisfied that their judgment is misled either by the glamour of cold steel, or by a mistaken belief that the South African War was abnormal, a view with which he is in entire disagreement.

Before discussing Mr. Childers's theories, it will be well to consider the value of the evidence on which they are based. It has been claimed that his arguments are historically correct. This claim cannot be admitted. He quotes historical facts, certainly, but the deductions he makes from them are his own. Facts, as a great lawyer has said, 'cannot lie, but they can and often do deceive.' The point which the reader of 'War and the *Arme Blanche*' has to decide is whether, in this case, they have deceived Mr. Childers or those who differ from him. Judging by the official training manuals, the ruling military authorities of every civilised nation are numbered amongst the believers in cold steel. Amongst them are many able, earnest and experienced soldiers, by no means all Cavalrymen. They have as deep a knowledge of historical facts as Mr. Childers has. They have even more at stake to induce them to weigh deductions carefully, since they may be called upon to act on them at any moment. They have more practical knowledge of human nature in war to guide them in drawing conclusions from history, and human nature in war is a consideration

on which the practical applicability of all military theory depends. Remembering that it is deductions from facts that are in dispute, and not the facts themselves, we cannot think that any impartial reader will be prepared to follow Mr. Childers in throwing the opinions of such men aside as being biassed and worthless. We claim no infallibility for them, but neither do we concede any to Mr. Childers. We cannot agree that Mr. Childers has established his charge of undue bias in favour of the sword, and we cannot see that he is any less open to a charge of undue bias in favour of the rifle. Having said so much as to the value of the evidence to be weighed, we may now turn to the matter in dispute. A careful perusal of 'War and the *Arme Blanche*' leaves us under the impression that the difference in opinion between Mr. Childers and our Training Manuals is by no means so great as he seems to think it is. His views on the value of vigorous offensive methods and on the combination of fire power with mobility are, up to a certain point, in agreement with 'Cavalry Training.' No one is likely to deny—'Cavalry Training' certainly does not do so—that the general principles of fire action are the same for all mounted troops, although the degree of skill with which they may be able to employ those principles must be expected to vary with the duration and thoroughness of the training they have undergone. No one can deny that favourable opportunities for the use of the *arme blanche* are not numerous in modern war as compared with the number of opportunities for using the rifle.

Mr. Childers is not one of those who consider it impossible for Cavalry to charge home, under favourable conditions, in the face of modern rifle fire; and he clearly recognises the need to charge home in order to force a decision. So far, therefore, no great principle seems to be in dispute. The first real point of difference that we can find between Mr. Childers and 'Cavalry Training' is his statement that when Cavalry has charged home it will always find the rifle a more effective weapon than cold steel. The next is the statement that Cavalry cannot be trained to efficiency in both rifle and sword. If the first of these two statements be true it is unnecessary to examine the second, since there would obviously be no further need for the sword if the rifle is always more effective at close quarters. If the second theory be true, we agree that the rifle is so much more generally useful than the sword that the latter should be abandoned in its favour. These two questions are, therefore, worthy of very close consideration. A decision on the first of them seems to depend a good deal on the value of fire from the saddle. If it is really possible effectively to use the rifle from the saddle at close quarters, we can believe that Cavalry would soon throw away sword and lance in war. If it is not possible, however, then mounted Cavalry without a steel weapon has no adequate means of offensive action at close quarters or of self-defence if surprised when in motion.

Turning to such facts as we have at our disposal we cannot find that the efficacy of saddle-fire has been established. It was used in the American Civil War. It was also used by both sides in South Africa. In both wars its use appears to have been exceptional, while its material effect is stated by those who experienced it in South Africa to have been very slight, although the Boers who used it had had exceptional training, and were probably greater adepts than town-bred soldiers could ever become. The most claimed for it by British officers who used it is that it may sometimes have a useful moral effect.



To fire from the saddle at the halt and in motion would necessitate the prolonged and habitual training of the horse as well as of the Cavalry soldier, and we can find no grounds for a belief that such fire would prove effective, except, perhaps, in the case of individuals in special circumstances. The difficulty in shooting with any degree of accuracy from a horse moving at speed requires no explanation. The difficulty in shooting from a horse pulled up short from a charge and under fire—since the enemy must be presumed to be resisting—does not seem likely to be less.

For these reasons it seems to us that Cavalry, charging on the principle advocated by Mr. Childers, must dismount to fire on reaching close quarters. When the enemy is sufficiently accommodating to leave cover close to him unwatched and unguarded, to which the Cavalry can gallop, and behind which the horses can be left, this operation is feasible. If he does not do so—which we take to be the normal case—it seems to us that it would be more difficult for Cavalry to pull up and dismount in the open, under close rifle fire, than to charge home, led by its officers. It is worthy of note that troops using a rifle cannot be so led. Further, it seems to us that this pulling-up and dismounting at the last moment—even if men could be got to do it, which we doubt—would be likely to prove a very costly proceeding, and that the enemy, if he could be given a choice, would prefer to meet such a manœuvre rather than a charge home with cold steel.

In considering the question of weapons, it is not sufficient to confine our investigations to the original attack. We must also consider possible counter-attack. For instance, Mr. Childers's analysis of the Boer charge at Roodeval is incomplete. He considers what might have been the value of the steel weapon and a knee-to-knee formation to the Boers, and he concludes that they would have been useless. We agree. The failure of the Boers on this occasion must be attributed to the absence of any moral ascendancy over the enemy. The surprise failed; they had no numerical superiority, and there was no fire preparation except the totally insignificant saddle-fire during the charge itself.

Grenfell met the attack by fire; but if his force had been armed with sword or lance, and trained to rapid manœuvres combined with cohesion, it is an interesting speculation whether he might not have gained better results by means of a 'shock' counter-attack. It seems to us that Grenfell's most effective reply to the Boers would have been to meet them by fire from a portion of his force till their attack faltered, and then to clinch the matter by a charge of the remainder with the *arme blanche*.

This is one of the examples quoted by Mr. Childers. It seems to us to show the value of a training in which various tactical methods and various weapons can be utilised and combined. It provides also an example of the failure of Mr. Childers's method, and affords an opportunity of illustrating how an effective use can be made of the *arme blanche* against that method when wrongly applied.

We will next consider an example of the success of Mr. Childers's proposed methods, namely, Bakenlaagte; but before doing so we desire to say a few words as to certain conditions on which the chances of success of any method of attack seem to depend.

Mr. Childers is emphatic in his view that it is not necessary or even desirable

for the form of offensive which he advocates, to depend on covering rifle fire or artillery support, to enable the objective to be reached. He disclaims the need for any such assistance for his charges, and bases this belief on the invulnerability to rifle fire of the horseman moving at speed.

Here we are in direct conflict with him. We believe that charges against riflemen, whether made as he proposes or with cold steel, can only be successful, in the face of opposition which is not altogether insignificant, if the conditions allow the attack a certain moral ascendancy. This moral ascendancy may result from surprise or overwhelming numbers, but where these conditions are absent it can only be obtained by establishing superiority of fire as a preliminary step. The mere movement at speed aided by saddle-fire is, we contend, insufficient to produce it.

We believe, further, that when once sufficient moral ascendancy has been gained the nature of the weapon with which Cavalry is armed will not affect the chances of its being able to charge home. The question at issue is as to the most effective means of obtaining good results after charging home.

On this point Bakenlaagte seems to offer some evidence. On the British side there was a harassed rear-guard which had been withdrawing for many hours in the face of vigorous attacks, and was, in addition, facing a cold driving rain. On the Boer side we have the arrival of reinforcements at the critical moment in sufficient strength to give it an overwhelming numerical superiority. The arrival of these reinforcements was quite unknown to the British till the charge actually took place, so that a certain element of surprise was introduced.

For the details of the action we must refer the reader to the *Times* 'History of the War' and the map contained in that work. According to the author of this account, Botha initiated his charge at the very moment that he saw the British rear-guard rise and mount in order to withdraw from Ridge A to Gun Hill. The moment was admirably chosen, and the circumstances all contributed to increase the *moral* of the attack while reducing that of the British rear-guard.

As to the opposition encountered, we read that Greatwood's and Lynch's detachments of the Buffs (infantry) were overwhelmed between Ridge A and Gun Hill, the Boers 'dropping a few men to disarm their prisoners.' It is a small point, but we doubt whether this slight weakening of the attacking force would have been necessary if these detachments had been ridden over, say, by a Lancer brigade.

The description of the remainder of the charge is worth quoting in full:— 'With scarcely a check the charge continued; it caught, swallowed up and captured both the covering sections of Scottish Horse and Mounted Infantry, and ended finally in the hollow at the foot of Gun Hill. This was dead ground both from Ridge B and Gun Hill, and here the Boers flung themselves from their ponies and pressed on foot up the hill, firing and shouting as they came.'

No account could illustrate more clearly the essential difference between Cavalry action and that of Mounted Riflemen. The Boers, in the full tide of success, judged it necessary to dismount at this critical moment. The result was that they were obliged to enter into a fire struggle which lasted twenty minutes before the hill was captured. We are told that during that time 'no reinforcements reached the hill,' and that the only counter-attack attempted

during the action was an effort made by two companies of the Buffs under Major Eales, after the hill had been captured, when the conditions were entirely unfavourable ; but it is easy to conceive what a difference the twenty minutes' delay in the attack might have made in the results of the day.

We claim that a Cavalry force as ably led would not have dismounted at the foot of the slope and afforded the enemy the opportunity to recover his initial disadvantage. We are told that the dead ground reached to within thirty yards of the British firing line. We do not believe that a charge of disciplined Cavalry which had reached the foot of the slope would have pulled up, or could have been stopped by fire in the last thirty yards. We must remember the absolutely overwhelming numbers and the elation of the initial success. In our opinion Cavalry handled on the principles inculcated in 'Cavalry Training' would have ridden over the hill inflicting many casualties on the British on the way ; the original line would have swept on to the farm at Nooitgedacht, and spread consternation and havoc amongst the convoy, while the supporting squadrons dealt with any resistance that might be left in the defenders of the hill. In fact, a partial success might have been turned into a complete victory.

Our conclusions from the facts of Bakenlaagte are that the success was due to causes other than the armament of the Boers and the formation in which they charged, and that the limitations in the measure of the success is evidence in favour of the *arme blanche* and of the methods laid down in 'Cavalry Training.'

It may be claimed that if the Boers, armed as they were, had not halted they would have gained a complete success. The reply seems to us to be that they would not have halted if they had been armed with steel and trained to depend on it under such conditions.

In fact, the example we have just quoted illustrates an important virtue claimed for the *arme blanche*. The tendency of human nature under fire is to seek cover and hold on there, since to rise from it increases the danger. This tendency works in two ways when both sides are under heavy fire ; just as the defending side inclines to hang on in its trenches, so the attacking side tends to remain under cover and to seek to shoot the enemy out of his position without exposing itself. If proof of this tendency under modern conditions is required, a study of the operations in Natal for the relief of Ladysmith will afford it.

The chief reason why Infantry soldiers are given a bayonet is to foster in them the desire to close with the enemy. They are taught that this must be their object and that the primary use of fire is to assist their forward movement in the direction of the enemy with a final bayonet charge in view. The actual amount of killing done by the bayonet in modern war has been comparatively small. After South Africa many theorists recommended its abolition. Yet deeper thinking has led to the conclusion that the moral effect of the bayonet is out of all proportion to its material effect, and not the least important of the virtues claimed for it is that the desire to use it draws the attacking side on. This theory has been accepted by those best qualified to judge by experience of human nature in war. There seems to be a great similarity of thought between those who favoured the abolition of the bayonet and those who desire to deprive Cavalry of the *arme blanche*. We also think there would be a similarity in the results. To take the sword from Cavalrymen would be, to some extent, to take away their desire to close—to encourage them to seek

for effect by long-range fire. It might constitute a serious obstacle to the realisation of Mr. Childers's methods of charging.

This encouragement of an offensive spirit is one effect of a steel weapon. What is its effect on the enemy? Is the 'terror of cold steel' really a myth? On this point let us examine, for example, the battles of Wörth and Gravelotte. Time and again the Germans held on to the ground they had won under a devastating fire. Time and again they fled before French bayonet charges, without awaiting them. Are foot soldiers charging with bayonets more terror-inspiring, or more difficult to stop by bullets, than charging Cavalrymen, who believe in their ability to charge home?

Mr. Childers may not agree in the value of examples taken from a war which was fought before the introduction of the magazine rifle, but if the magazine rifle is to be upheld as a nerve soother where cold steel is concerned, we must not ignore the effect of the same weapon in producing nerve tension when in the hands of the enemy. We hold that this attribute of the magazine rifle will in reality tend to maintain if not to enhance the terror of cold steel in the battles of the future. In fact, we look to the magazine rifle to produce the situations in which the fear of cold steel will give us the victory. This is indeed the basis of all modern tactics.

Although we maintain that the *arme blanche* is by no means obsolete, it must be admitted that if Mr. Childers's contention could be upheld as to the impossibility of training Cavalry to the efficient use of both rifle and cold steel, there would be a strong case against the retention of sword or lance. The arguments given in the foregoing pages refer more particularly to the battlefield, on which the results of all military operations are decided. Even on the battlefield, however—still more in the operations preceding the battle—it cannot be denied that for one opportunity of using cold steel effectively there will be many of using the rifle. For this reason there can be little doubt that, if Cavalry cannot be made efficient in both weapons and must be restricted to one, that one should be the rifle.

Mr. Childers maintains that experience shows that Cavalry cannot be trained to both weapons. He appeals to history. Has history spoken definitely on this problem? In what campaign, up to date, has Cavalry been employed that had been carefully trained in the use of both weapons? We are not aware of one. The Boers were not trained in the use of the *arme blanche*. Our own Cavalry in South Africa had not been seriously trained in the use of the rifle. It was armed with an inferior firearm, and had fired a few rounds with it annually, but rifle shooting and rifle tactics held a very different position in its training, and in its regard, from what it holds now.

Mr. Childers quotes the American Civil War. In his reference, however, to this war, he omits to mention that, although a rifle was added to the equipment of the United States Cavalry soldier shortly after the war commenced, the sword and revolver for use at close quarters were not discarded, and that this equipment, as a result of the experience gained in the American Civil War, has been retained ever since.

It would be out of place here to discuss the merits and defects of the breech-loading pistol in addition to or in substitution for the *arme blanche*, as the

main point is whether the mass of the Cavalry employed in that war was trained at all before the war.

It is useless to claim that history has given a final verdict on this problem. So far as history has spoken, its voice appears to us to be in favour of the possibility of Cavalry being trained to use both weapons—i.e., the rifle and the *arme blanche*. Our Cavalrymen, trained to *arme blanche* work, adapted themselves, with considerable success, to the use of the rifle in South Africa. Although there seems to be a good deal of popular misapprehension on the point, Cavalrymen used the *arme blanche* freely in the American Civil War, and it appears that the use of it tended to increase as the war went on; they also used the rifle with considerable efficiency.

¶ We believe that Cavalry which is capable of using either weapon, as occasion may demand, will be more useful in war than Cavalry which can only use one of the two. We believe that the possibility of becoming efficient in both must remain a matter of opinion until Cavalry which has been carefully trained to both has been fully tried in war. And we believe, meanwhile, that the opinion of experienced Cavalry officers on training is a safer guide to follow than the opinion of Mr. Childers. Their opinion is that regular Cavalry can be trained to both. It must be remembered that our present peace training aims at producing dash, cohesion, and discipline, combined with an offensive spirit and good horsemanship; and that, even if Mr. Childers proves correct in his views, the time spent in inculcating these qualities cannot be said to have been thrown away unless it can be proved that the training in fire tactics has been neglected in consequence to a dangerous extent.

The truth seems to be that the real difficulty of the problem lies less in training the men to be capable of using both sword and rifle than in educating their officers to judge rapidly which weapon to employ at any given moment. No doubt errors of judgment must be expected in this matter, as they must be expected in all operations of war; but we cannot afford to abandon a valuable weapon for that reason. Moreover, it does not seem to us that there will be much—if any—more difficulty in judging when to charge with the *arme blanche* than there would be in judging when to undertake the style of charge that Mr. Childers recommends.

The judicious selection of opportunities for, and the skilful execution of, a charge undoubtedly call for much previous study, thought, and practice; but, so far as our regular Cavalry is concerned, the necessary attention can, and will, be given to the problem. Professional officers, and men who serve for seven or eight years with the colours, have both the time and the opportunity to learn. It is different with our mounted troops other than regular Cavalry, however. There can be no reasonable doubt that neither the officers nor the men composing these troops can learn the use of both rifle and *arme blanche* in their short peace training. This being so, it seems obvious that they should train in peace with the rifle only, that being far the more generally useful arm.

It may be argued that it is illogical to claim that the *arme blanche* gives additional power to Cavalry, and then to recommend that mounted troops, other than Cavalry, should be armed with the rifle only. The reply to such a contention is that Yeomanry and similar bodies of troops, who train only for a

few days in the year, cannot be expected to meet highly-trained regular Cavalry on equal terms, however we arm them ; and matters cannot be equalised by any increase in the number of weapons they carry. On the whole they will stand a better chance armed with one weapon which they have acquired some skill in using, than if they had more than one, were unskilful with each, and lacking in judgment as to which to use. Moreover, there are other factors which considerations of space forbid the discussion of here, such as the nature of the country that Yeomanry are primarily intended to fight in, the nature of the duties that would be allotted to them in war, and the possibility of arranging for them to work with regular Cavalry, thus combining fire power with the sword. Moreover, if time were available after embodiment, it would be possible to equip Yeomanry with the sword and to instruct them in its use.

The combination of the power of the two weapons seems to us the ideal to aim at, and we cannot agree that it is beyond our reach.

It may be that there is sometimes a tendency to favour training with the steel weapon at the expense of training with the firearm. We agree that this is unsound, but we do not agree that it is necessary to take away sword and lance altogether in order to correct this tendency, and we think that in proposing such a remedy Mr. Childers has rushed into the extremes that he complains of in others.

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### MEMORIAL TO THE ROYAL DRAGOONS

On Monday, June 27, in the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, Major-General F. S. Russell, C.M.G., Colonel of the regiment, unveiled the memorial of the 1st (Royal) Dragoons who fell in South Africa during the late war.

A large gathering, including several past members, was present. There was a short service of dedication, after which the trumpeters of the regiment sounded the 'Last Post.'

By special command of his Majesty William II., Emperor of Germany, Colonel-in-Chief, Major Ostertag, the German Military Attaché, placed a wreath at the foot of the memorial.

The memorial is a handsome tablet of fine white marble with black centre, on which appears the names of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men in gold. Surmounting the tablet is the regimental crest with the motto 'Spectemur agendo.'

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Colonel the Hon. O. V. G. A. Lumley, the first editor of this Journal, who recently vacated the command of the 1st South Midland Mounted Brigade (T.F.), has now taken up the duties of officer in charge of Cavalry Records at York, in succession to Colonel E. R. Courtenay.

Both these officers previously commanded the 11th (P.A.O.) Hussars.

### 'KING EDWARD'S HORSE'

His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve of the regiment of Yeomanry now styled 'The King's Colonials' being in future designated : 'King Edward's Horse (the King's Oversea Dominions Regiment).'

## SPORTING NOTES

SPORT throughout the world has suffered an irretrievable loss in the death of the first sportsman in the land, our late loved sovereign King Edward VII. Nowhere has it been more felt than throughout the Army. There was no good honest branch of sport that His Majesty did not as far as possible pursue himself with great success, and encourage in his Army. Space forbids enumeration of details, which would require volumes. If proof were needed of the great national feeling of loss, it is in the fact that for weeks after His Majesty's demise there was no heart in the land for sport of any kind ; despite the personal loss of employment, &c., the general public refused to participate in sports ; although the Whitsuntide holidays came on, and executives were anxious in the view of employment to carry out prearranged sporting fixtures, the people refused to have it so, and every meeting, notably on the Turf, was abandoned. Our heartfelt sympathy goes forth to Queen Alexandra, and the memory of our late King will ever be cherished by us.

*Nil desperandum* must ever be the soldier sportsman's motto, and we can safely look forward to the prestige of all that is good in sport being upheld by King George, who is known to be a true sportsman, and one of the finest shots in the kingdom. The great interest taken by King George and Queen Mary in Army sport has been repeatedly shown this year by their presence at most of the large Army football and racing events, and we look forward with confidence to the true sporting instincts, which are so essential to the training of soldiers, being worthily maintained and encouraged by their Majesties King George and Queen Mary.

## PIG STICKING

The Kadir Cup for Pig Sticking at Meerut this year received a record entry of 136. Many competitors came to grief. In the semi-final three heats, Capt. E. G. Thompson (17th Lancers) got first spear against Lieut. E. Corbould-Warren (R.F.A.), who fell, and Major A. E. Wardrop (R.F.A.). The second heat was won by Lieut. Palmes (10th Hussars), who beat Lieut. E. F. Norton (R.H.A.) and Capt. J. A. C. Forsyth (R.F.A.), who fell. Lieut. W. P. Paynter (R.H.A.), won the third heat, pricking the pig in a clever fashion, and defeating Major R. J. W. Carden (17th Lancers) and Lieut. W. L. Palmer (10th Hussars). The final was won by Lieut. Paynter (R.H.A.), who thus carried off this coveted cup for the Gunners. Capt. Forsyth won the Hog Hunters' Cup, a four mile steeplechase, while the Pony Hog Hunters' Steeplechase was secured by Lieut. Corbould Warren. There was a large gathering, including the Vice-regal party.

## RACING

The popular meeting of the Household Brigade Steeplechases took place early in April over the Hawthorn Hill Course. Despite the inclement weather a large and aristocratic gathering was present ; on the second day H.R.H. the Prince of Wales (our present King) patronised the races and took a lively interest in the sport. Results :—

*1st Day*

The Grenadier Guards Challenge Cup : Capt. C. R. de Crespigny's Kinton (owner).

The 1st Life Guards Challenge Cup : Mr. J. J. Astor's Sidbrook (owner).

The Coldstream Plate : Mr. F. W. Gore Langton's Crimson Rambler (owner).

The Household Brigade Plate : Capt. E. G. Christie-Miller's Sprinkle Me (Capt. C. W. Banbury). This was a fine race, and won for the third year in succession by Sprinkle Me.

The 2nd Life Guards Regimental Challenge Cup : Mr. C. Noel Newton's Silverspring (owner).

The Royal Horse Guards Regimental Race : Mr. A. Mackintosh's Moy (owner).

The Irish Guards Challenge Cup : Capt. Butler's Blackcock III. (owner).

*2nd Day*

The Household Brigade Selling Hurdle Race : Mr. C. Noel Newton's Port Meadow (owner).

The Open Military Selling Steeplechase : Capt. C. de Crespigny's Bush Rose (owner).

The Household Brigade Hunters Challenge Cup : Mr. J. J. Astor's (1st Life Guards) Monk V. (Capt. Brassey).

The Household Brigade Handicap Steeplechase : Capt. G. Paynter's Romer (owner).

For the Household Brigade Hunters Challenge Cup there were twenty-three runners, and Capt. Brassey, as last year, rode the winner, and his Regiment, the 1st Life Guards, secured the Cup by fifty-six points to the 2nd Life Guards' fifty points, with the 1st Coldstream Guards third with forty.

Punchestown Races this year were a record success. Despite the torrents of rain on both days, there were huge fields, and a great gathering, including their Excellencies the Lord Lieutenant and Countess of Aberdeen, took part in magnificent sport. The feature of the first day was the victory of the veteran Mr. Harry Beasley, in the Kildare Hunt Cup ; for the second year in succession he won on his horse St. Colombas ; thanks to a fine piece of horsemanship, he got home by a head amidst a scene of indescribable enthusiasm. The Maiden Plate of 500 sovs., also a four mile steeplechase, was won by Capt. H. Chippendale Higgins's Rathangan (Mr. L. Brabazon) from a field of seventeen runners. The Irish Maiden Military Hunters Race, about 3½ miles, brought twenty-one horses to the post, nearly all ridden by their owners, and was won by Capt. E. Lloyd, Royal Irish Regiment, on his horse A.D.C.

On the second day, the Irish Grand Military, a three mile steeplechase, brought out thirteen runners and resulted in a win for Capt. E. Bradbury's



(R.F.A.) Sloppy Weather (owner), with Mr. Parbury's (R.F.A.) El Chico (owner) second, and Capt. Lloyd's (R.I.) A.D.C. (owner) third. It was a good sporting race.

At the Bungay Races the 16th Lancers Challenge Cup, a two and a half mile steeplechase, was won by Major C. L. K. Campbell's Playfair (owner), and the 16th Lancers Subaltern Challenge Cup, a similar race on the second day, was won by Mr. Malise Graham's Weathercock (Mr. G. Brooke).

Despite the bad weather the Aldershot Spring Races this year drew a large gathering and capital sport was witnessed. Results :—

The Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase : Mr. D. McCalmont's (7th Hussars) N.B. (owner), nine runners, won cleverly by two lengths.

The Tally Ho Hunters Steeplechase : Mr. C. T. Walwyn's (R.F.A.) Anndora (Mr. A. K. Main).

The Aldershot Command Light Weight Hunters Steeplechase : Mr. W. H. Unett's (Yorkshire Light Infantry) Nimrod VIII. (owner).

The Hunters Handicap Steeplechase : Mr. J. J. Astor's Sidbrook (owner).

The Aldershot Cup : Mr. C. W. Banbury's (Coldstream Guards) Noble Roy (owner).

An Open Military Hunters Hurdle Race : Mr. A. Fitzgerald's The Cherub (owner).

#### POINT-TO-POINT RACES

At the Shropshire Hunt Meeting, held near Shrewsbury, the Yeomanry Race was won by Sergt. C. Edwards's Alberta (Sergt. Beddington).

The City of London Yeomanry (Rough Riders) Regimental Race was run for at the Middlesex Farmers' Draghunt Meeting, and won by Mr. C. Pemberton Stedall's Potsey III. (owner).

At the Kirkham Harriers' Meeting the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry Race was won by Capt. W. E. Royd's Gallstone (owner). The Lancashire Hussars' Challenge Cup was secured by Capt. Dewhurst's Performer (owner), and the Earl of Derby's Challenge Cup by Lt.-Col. Tilney's Grey Dawn (owner).

The 1st Cavalry Brigade (Aldershot) held their races near Hursley. Results : Aldershot Command and Winchester District Light-weight Race : Mr. E. C. Anstey's (R.A.) St. James, 1. The Charger Race : Mr. T. A. Thornton's (7th Hussars) Thomas, 1. Team Race for Cup presented by Brig.-Gen. Kavanagh, C.B., 7th Hussars, 1. Aldershot Command and Winchester District Welter Race : Capt. Jackson's (Bedford Regt.) Barmaid, 1. Hunt Race : Mr. H. C. Porter's Mount Russell, 1.

We regret to state that in the first race Lt. C. Eyre (King's Royal Rifles) met with a crushing fall at the last fence in the first race, sustaining a fractured skull, which resulted in his death the following day.

#### TENT PEGGING.

The Indian Cavalry Tent Pegging Competition took place at Umballa. Twenty regiments competed. The 23rd Cavalry won, and retain the Cup which they carried off last year.

In the Tent Pegging by Sections, the 36th Jacob's Horse won. At the conclusion Brigadier-General Rivett-Carnac presented the trophies.

## POLO

Magnificent weather favoured 'Aldershot Day' at Ranelagh this season. A large and fashionable crowd attended to witness the Polo and to hear the playing of the massed military bands of 680 performers under the direction of Mr. Henry Sims, the bandmaster of the Royal Artillery Mounted Band.

Both tournaments started at eleven in the morning, play taking place on three grounds, the ties being limited to four periods of eight minutes each.

For the Aldershot Challenge Cup there was an entry of eight teams. In the final the 7th Hussars won, defeating the Royal Horse Guards by a goal. Teams—7th Hussars: Mr. E. G. K. Cross, Capt. W. Gibbs, Mr. E. P. Brassey, and Capt. C. H. Rankin (back). Royal Horse Guards: Lord A. Leveson-Gower, Mr. J. F. Harrison, Capt. G. V. S. Bowlby, and Capt. Lord A. Innes-Ker (back). The other tournament for the Infantry Cup was competed for by eight teams, and resulted in the Irish Guards beating the Rifle Brigade in the final by four goals to three. It was the Irish Guards' third successive victory, for they won in 1907, when it was started, and again in 1908, while last year it had to be abandoned owing to the wet.

Unusual interest was attached to the match between England and Ireland for the Patriotic Cup from the fact that England's representatives were four old Etonians. Their match with Ireland was fast and exciting, and although winners in the end there were times when their defeat seemed certain. In the first six minutes Ireland scored three goals, and at half time led by six goals to four. Then England began to improve and the final *chukker* opened with the scores seven all. In this *chukker* England put on four goals, and won a splendid game by eleven to seven. The teams were:—England: Mr. R. Grenfell, Mr. F. Grenfell, the Earl of Rocksavage, and Lord Wodehouse (back). Ireland: Mr. Morrough Ryan, Mr. J. McCann, Capt. Hardress Lloyd, and Capt. F. W. Barrett (back).

## THE INTER-REGIMENTAL TOURNAMENT

Seventeen teams entered this year for the Inter-Regimental Tournament. There was only one tie in the first round, the Rifle Brigade beating the 19th Hussars at Aldershot by six goals to love. In the second round, also at Aldershot, the Rifle Brigade easily defeated the 3rd Dragoon Guards, and the Royal Scots Greys beat the 7th Hussars by five goals to one. In the third round the Royal Horse Guards and the 11th Hussars had walks over owing to the scratching of the two Coldstream Guards teams. At Cambridge the 16th Lancers easily beat the 5th Lancers. At Dublin the 20th Hussars easily defeated the 5th Dragoon Guards, and at Ranelagh the 2nd Life Guards were quite outclassed by the 4th Dragoon Guards. At Aldershot the Royal Scots Greys beat the Rifle Brigade by eight goals to four.

In the fourth round the 16th Lancers at Cambridge just beat the 4th Hussars by five goals to four. At Hurlingham the 11th Hussars defeated the 1st Life Guards by seven to three. At Ranelagh the 4th Dragoon Guards beat the 20th Hussars by seven to four, and at Roehampton the Royal Horse Guards beat the Royal Scots Greys by nine to four.

In the semi-final at Roehampton the 4th Dragoon Guards opposed the 16th Lancers, and at half time had a lead of four goals to two; but on call of time the Lancers had equalised, so extra time had to be played during which the 4th Dragoon Guards gained the winning goal and so qualified for the final.

The other semi-final at Hurlingham, between the Royal Horse Guards and the 11th Hussars, resulted in a win for the former by four goals to two. The final was, therefore, between the Royal Horse Guards and the 4th Dragoon Guards. The Royal Horse Guards proved victorious by six goals to one.

#### ABROAD

The fatal accident, at Bloemfontein, to Lieut. R. Barry, 15th Hussars, has cast a gloom over the South African inter-regimental tournament, and the final between the 9th Lancers and the 3rd Hussars was in consequence cancelled. Lieut. R. Barry was a most promising young officer, and his death is deeply lamented.

#### OLYMPIA HORSE SHOW

The great International Horse Show at Olympia this year was, as usual, a huge success. Jumping was again the chief feature of the Show, and showed that England is a long way behind other nations in the *haute école* of horsemanship. For that now more than ever coveted trophy, the Gold Cup offered by his late Majesty King Edward for an officers' International Jumping Competition, there were three entries, viz., Belgium: Lieut. Lancksweert (Speranza), Lieut. Ripet (Miss Kitty), and Lieut. Landrain (Armidi); France: Capt.-Commandant Meyer (Ursula), Lieut. J. Brondehous (Henode), and Lieut. H. Hounent (Cyrano); England: Lieut. Godfrey Brooke, 16th Lancers (Harriet), Lieut. T. Lawrence, 18th Hussars (One Two Three) and Lieut. A. S. Summers, 19th Hussars (Ginger).

France, who won last year with three other officers, led on the first round, closely pressed by Belgium, but England (save Lieut. Brooke) did badly. In the second round Belgium were slightly better than France, but the English team fared worse, and the judges announced that Belgium were the winners, France second, only a point behind. The Cup was handed to the winning team by the Lord Mayor of London, with souvenirs of gold sleeve links set with diamonds.

There was a large entry of 106 for the Connaught Gold Challenge Cup, value £200, a jumping competition open to officers serving in the British Empire. It was won by Lieut. Godfrey Brooke, 16th Lancers, with his mare Harriet. As Lieut. Brooke won the Cup last year for the 16th Lancers, it becomes the absolute property of the Regiment. Capt. H. W. Parsons, 19th Hussars, on Ginger, was second, Lieut. H. E. Macfarlane, 19th Hussars, on Ginger, third, and Major C. Beddington, Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry, on Philippe, fourth. Many other officers received prizes, but, with a few notable exceptions, the performances were disappointing.

The High Jumping, open to the world, was carried off by Mr. Xavier Riant's Jubilee (ridden by Lieut. Hounert of the 7th Hussars, France), height, 7 feet 1 inch, with Mr. Alfred Lowenstein's All Fours second and Mr. Paul D. Cravatti's New York City, U.S.A. third.

In the class for light-weight officers' chargers open to all nations, Russia, France, Belgium, Norway, Great Britain and Ireland competed, the prize being awarded to Col. A. V. A. Vaughan Lee's, R.H.G., handsome black gelding Election; Commandant Féline's, 6th French Cuirassiers, Montet Prospect's Pride was second and Lieut. P. Thwaite's, Cavalry School, Prussian Eagle third.

In the heavy-weight charger class the Royal Horse Guards were again successful with Capt. Lord Alastair Innes-Ker's Castlethorpe; Lieut. F. B. Barrett, of the Field Artillery, U.S.A., was second with Artillery, and Capt. Fellowes's, 1st Life Guards, Maxim, third.

In the Canadian Challenge Cup, a jumping competition open to officers of all nations, no fewer than 112 of the entries were made by English officers, as compared with a total of fifty-six entries by all other nations. It was won by Russia's single representative, Capt. Bertran, of the Cavalry School at St. Petersburg. Capt. Bertran on his beautiful jumper was most popular, and had a great reception. Lieut. T. Lawrence of the 18th Hussars shared the second, third, fourth, and fifth prizes with the French and Belgian competitors. Another English officer who did remarkably well was Colonel Paul Kenna, V.C.

The Territorial Jumping Competition for a £100 Cup was most disappointing. There were only five teams of three each, and apart from the winners, the Staffordshire Yeomanry, it was a sorry exhibition. No commissioned officers competed, and both horses and riders seemed quite untrained.

Foreign officers took nearly all the open jumping competition prizes, and gave us a fine exhibition of what careful training in horsemanship can do. This in spite of the fact that those exquisite horsemen, the Italians, were not competing this year, and neither were the Germans represented.

A storm of criticism has rightly been aroused by the poor performances of many British officers in the Show ring, and undoubtedly we are behind other nations in the arts of horsemanship. To remedy this a few years since our late beloved King gave a magnificent trophy, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught did likewise, and Lord Lonsdale has worked very hard, but the Army has not responded as it might. There has been a great improvement as shown by a very few of our representative officers, but the competing in open events at the biggest International Show, by a great number of young officers, insufficiently trained themselves with insufficiently trained horses, causes criticism and should not be allowed. At the London Military Tournament soldiers allowed to compete have previously proved their merit at their local tournaments.

Little is known in England of the *enormous improvement* and equally great encouragement that is given, public and private, by foreign nations, first to a better system of horse training, and secondly military equitation. Take Germany, which was behind some other nations, as an instance. There the Inspector General of Cavalry has in hand a new edition of the 'Horse Training Regulations' (the present one is an excellent work in two volumes). Compare this with the few pages on the same subject contained in our Cavalry training. Then in addition to the Central Cavalry School, other special riding schools are being opened, so that in due course, apart from their Regimental

training, all young Cavalry and Artillery officers will be well grounded in horsemanship. Besides all these official measures, an *Offizielles Organ des Kartells für Reit- und Fahr-Sport* has been founded, under whose guidance *Horse Shows* are held at big towns all over the country; each of these consist of trials of *equitation* and *horsetraining*; such Shows are also given by the Berlin Polo Club, the Hamburg Polo Club, Frankfurt Polo Club, Cologne and Munich Riding Clubs, &c. Germany has formed these horse Shows by the dozen all over the country—Hamburg to Munich or Dresden to Frankfurt. The result must be in due course a great average or general improvement in horse and rider. A few months since there was an excellent local Show at Frankfurt, which the Crown Prince has never failed to attend. There were over 300 entries for the eleven events, which included an Army riding competition for the Crown Prince's prize, a jumping competition for prize winners (first prize given by the Grand Duke of Hesse), two women's jumping competitions, a maiden jumping competition, which was won by the Crown Prince's Herero, ridden by Lieut. Mitzloff, heavy jumping competition, and riding competition.

In addition Cavalry Regiments themselves hold local tournaments or 'displays of riding' as ours do gymkhanas; for instance, on July 3 and 4 at Mainz the 6th Dragoons are giving an historical tournament, with all the costumes of the date—1745.

Many years back the Italian Cavalry at Rome, the French at Saumur, the Belgian at Brussels and the Russian at their Cavalry School (where Mr. Fillis, such a well-known expert in England, was employed) adopted the scientific training of horses and riders in the *haute école* of horsemanship. Germany, noting this, set to work on the plans enumerated above and is now equally proficient, whereas England is far behind the other nations, and hence the success of foreigners at the jumping competitions at Olympia.

We recently called attention to the great encouragement given abroad to officers in race riding, and consequently their growing proficiency over ours in this respect. There is no doubt that these fine horsemen would be in the first flight in our hunting fields. At our own game of Polo foreigners are coming on apace, and only last year our supremacy in this game was wrested from us by America.

To urge that our non-success at Olympia is due to our occupying our time and being superior at other sports is the 'Valour of Ignorance,' the title of an American book by Homer Lea, which Lord Roberts urges everyone to read.

It is gratifying to note that at the forthcoming Dublin Horse Show there will be a jumping competition open to officers riding in uniform. This is one small step in the right direction, which we trust other executives will follow.

At the Richmond Royal Horse Show a jumping competition for officers was won by Lieut. Gordon Dickson's (R.H.A.) *Mystery*, with Lieut. W. McNeil's *Kitten* second and Lieut. F. G. Colman's (Surrey Yeomanry) *Butterway* third.

#### FOOTBALL

The Association football match between the Army in England and the Army in Ireland, played at Aldershot, resulted in a draw, each side scoring three goals.

## ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

Owing to the lamented death of King Edward, the Naval and Military Tournament this year was abandoned, but in view of the great good it does in encouraging skill at arms in all ranks, and its great benefit to charities, by King George's command it took place at a later date. In the past fourteen years no less than £75,000 has been devoted to charities, and if this year's tournament had been abandoned there would have been a loss of £10,000, so His Majesty's decision gave great satisfaction, and the Tournament has been more popular and better attended than ever. Space forbids full details, but we may mention that one of the chief features was 'Britannia's Muster,' in which 400 men and 175 horses represented the various forces of our Empire. Some results of the various competitions which took place during the fortnight the show was open are as follows:—

Foil *v.* Foil (Territorials): Sergt. H. Sanderson, 2nd County of London Yeomanry.

Riding and Jumping (Territorials): Corporal J. Ransom, Surrey Yeomanry.

Sabre *v.* Sabre (Territorials): Lance-Sergeant R.W. Badman, 16th Battalion London Regiment.

Bayonet *v.* Bayonet (Territorials): Corporal Ellem, 5th City of London Regiment.

Sword *v.* Sword (Regulars): Corporal Radcliffe, 1st Life Guards.

Lemon Cutting (Regulars): Sergeant Rolfe, 18th Hussars.

Sword *v.* Lance (Regulars): Sergeant W. Sharpe, 4th Dragoon Guards.

Tent Pegging (Regulars): Sergeant J. Mann, Riding Establishment, R.A.

Heads and Posts (Regulars): Sergeant Vesey, 18th Hussars.

Foil *v.* Foil (Officers): Lieut. A. V. Keene, 28th Battalion London Regiment.

Sabre *v.* Sabre (Officers): Lieut. D. W. Godfree, 21st Lancers.

Épée *v.* Épée (Officers): Assistant Paymaster C. C. Drake, Royal Navy.

Bayonet *v.* Bayonet (Officers): Captain R. E. Kilvert, R.M.A.

Sword *v.* Lance (Officers): Captain C. Van der Byl, 16th Lancers.

Sword *v.* Sword (Officers): Lieut. D. W. Godfree, 21st Lancers.

Sabre *v.* Sabre (Navy and Army): Sergt.-Major A. Langley, Army Gymnastic Staff.

Tent Pegging (Officers): Lieut. T. Sinfield, A.S.C.

Lemon Cutting (Officers): Lieut. D. W. Godfree, 21st Lancers.

Heads and Posts (Officers): Lieut. H. Boyd-Rochfort, 21st Lancers.

## NAVY AND ARMY CHAMPIONSHIPS

Bayonet *v.* Bayonet: Corporal of Horse H. Grainger, 2nd Life Guards.

Sabre *v.* Sabre: Sergt.-Major Langley, Army Gymnastic Staff.

Lemon Cutting: Captain W. Paget Tomlinson, 7th Hussars.

Heads and Posts: Sergt. Lee, 21st Lancers.

Tent Pegging: Sergt. Vesey, 18th Hussars.

Foil *v.* Foil: Lieut. J. Betts, Army Gymnastic Staff.

Sword *v.* Sword (Mounted): Lieut. H. Boyd-Rochfort, 21st Lancers.

Riding and Jumping: 19th Hussars.

Officers' Jumping Competition : Lieut. G. Brooke, 16th Lancers (riding Alice), first ; Lieut. M. Crawshay, 5th Dragoon Guards, second ; Major F. W. Wormald, 8th Hussars, third.

Colonel P. A. Kenna, V.C., 21st Lancers, made the best round in the semi-finals and was close up.

### CRICKET

The annual match between the Royal Navy and the Army took place at Lord's, and after some exciting cricket, resulted in a decisive victory for the Army by an innings and 33 runs.

Upon paper the Army, with the assistance of old county players like Major Poore, Capt. White, and Capt. Du Boulay, appeared the strongest side, but the Navy, starting well with 70 for two wickets, ended their first innings for 137.

The Army following, had eight wickets down for 117 runs, and did not appear likely to reach the Navy score ; a few more runs and the eighth wicket fell, then Capt. Lupton joined Lieut. C. D. Robinson, and the last wicket put on 119 runs in slightly over an hour.

Capt. Lupton steadily kept up his wicket whilst Robinson scored a faultless and dashing innings of 105, hitting brilliantly all round the wicket. This quite changed the aspect of affairs, and the Army innings closed for 263. The pitch assisted the bowlers when the Navy went in for the second time, and thanks to the capital bowling of Wilson and Lupton, the Senior Service was all out in two hours for 93.

#### THE NAVY


1st Inn.		2nd Inn.	
Lieut. P. H. Irwin, b Lawrence	15	b Wilson	23
Asst.-Paymaster C. Williams, c Wilson, b Lawrence		c Wilson, b P. G. Robinson	20
Asst.-Pymstr. E. B. Elstob, b Wilson	23		
Lieut. M. C. Allenby, c and b Wilson	32	b Lupton	10
Lieut. A. E. H. Wright, c Lupton, b Wilson	11	c Lawrence, b Wilson	11
Lieut. C. H. Abercrombie, b Lawrence	13	b Lupton	1
Asst.-Pymstr. G. J. Rapkin, c Lawrence, b Wilson	26	st D. Robinson, b Wilson	1
Commander C. L. Lewin, b Lawrence	0	c Wilson, b Lupton	0
Staff.-Surg. A. H. Skey, l.b.w., b Wilson	1	c Legard, b Lawrence	0
Lieut. G. M. Herford, not out	5	not out	4
Lieut. A. A. Scott, b Wilson	0	st D. Robinson, b Wilson	7
Byes, 7, 1-b 2, n-b 1	1	c Du Boulay, b Wilson	12
	10	Byes	4
Total	137	Total	93

#### THE ARMY

Major E. R. Bradford, c Herford, b Skey	10
Capt. A. D. Legard, b Scott	8
Capt. W. N. White, b Skey	9
Capt. A. H. Du Boulay, b Skey	10
Lieut. P. G. Robinson, b Scott	20
Lieut. H. W. M. Yates, b Abercrombie	35
Capt. F. T. D. Wilson, b Scott	0
Major R. M. Poore, c Irwin, b Scott	13
Lieut. D. C. Robinson, hit wkt, b Scott	105
Lieut. H. M. Lawrence, c Irwin, b Abercrombie	9
Capt. A. W. Lupton, not out	29
Byes 8, 1-b 4, w 2, n-b 1	15
Total	263







**GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT, G.C.B.**

**1808-1875**

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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OCTOBER 1910

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*SIR HOPE GRANT*

BY COLONEL H. W. PEARSE, D.S.O.

THE name of Hope Grant, though well enough known in its day, never became a household word in the ears of his countrymen, nor, even at the time of his most important public services, was it as familiar as those of men vastly his inferiors. Yet he was one of the ablest Cavalry soldiers ever produced by our Army; a commander who handled the three arms in action with the highest skill and with invariable success, and a man who through a long life never committed an unworthy action. Such a man should not be forgotten.

Born in 1808, the youngest son of a Perthshire laird of ancient race, Hope Grant joined the 9th Lancers, then stationed at Glasgow, at the age of eighteen. His equipment for life may be summarised as follows. He was well born and well bred, and though indifferently, even badly, educated, he had a good colloquial knowledge of French, and was an accomplished musician. Devoted to all field sports and excelling in them, he was a first-rate horseman. Nature had provided him with a tall and wiry frame, a pleasant countenance, good health, high spirits, a decided character, and a cool judgment; and last, not least, he had at his disposal a good younger-son's portion of £10,000.

Against these advantages must be set one or two defects. We have it on the authority of one of his warmest admirers that Sir Hope Grant had no eye for country; he was quite unable to read a map,

and strangely for a man devoted to hunting, he could never find his way even in familiar ground, nor even tell the points of the compass. That a man with so serious a deficiency should have proved an exceptionally able tactician, proves that the leader in war is born not made, and that he whom nature has fitted for command will rise superior to defects of capacity, as of education, however serious they may be. Grant's other salient defect was unreadiness of speech. He had not the gift of clear explanation, and in argument or discussion never could do himself justice. To this deficiency may possibly be attributed the very meagre scale on which rewards were allotted him, but it is better to be neglected with men of the stamp of Hope Grant than to prosper with the glib-tongued and plausible.

Grant's life in the early portion of his service gave no promise of distinction. It may be assumed that he was not altogether idle, for in 1827, with only one year's service, he was appointed adjutant of his regiment, a post for which, even in those easy-going days, he must have been quite unfit; but we have it on his own authority that in his first fourteen years in the Army he sought for little but amusement, spending his money and his time with considerable extravagance and little wisdom. Fortunately, he remained faithful to his love for music, and by a curious freak of fortune he owed the success of his career to this pursuit. Grant had purchased his troop in 1835, and had paid no less than £5,000 for his commissions; by 1841 the residue of his patrimony had been spent, and, seeing no prospect of active service, he was on the point of selling out when his chance came.

A force under Sir Hugh Gough was sent to China, and Major-General Lord Saltoun, an old Guardsman who had distinguished himself at Waterloo, received command of one of the Infantry Brigades. Lord Saltoun was an ardent violinist, and was on the look-out for a Brigade-Major who could play the violoncello. Hope Grant was probably the only officer in the Army who filled the bill, and being recommended also on professional grounds he obtained the appointment. By a further stroke of good fortune one of Grant's fellow-passengers on the long voyage to Hong Kong was Lieut.-Colonel Colin Campbell, 98th Regiment, afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Clyde; and the two Scots became friends for life.

The China war of 1841-42 afforded Hope Grant no great opportunities of distinction, and was, in fact, one of the old bow-and-arrow

campaigns familiar to our Army, in which most of the casualties were caused by bad climate and bad management. Grant, who was absolutely fearless, and, in all his war service, forward to a fault, proved himself a useful Staff Officer, and having, with his usual good luck, been promoted during the campaign to a regimental majority, was liberally rewarded by a companionship of the Bath. Lord Saltoun left China in March 1844, and Grant accompanied him as far as Calcutta, proceeding thence to join the 9th Lancers, then at Cawnpore. His fortune held good, and the two Lieut.-Colonels of the regiment having been appointed by seniority to brigades, Grant at once fell into the command of his regiment.

The first Sikh war was now imminent, and hostilities began in December 1845, the 9th Lancers joining Sir Hugh Gough's army after the battles of Mudki and Ferozeshah, but in time for Sobraon. This was Grant's first serious fight, and as it happened the 9th Lancers were but slightly engaged. Sir Hugh Gough, however, made favourable mention of the conduct of the regiment. It was at Sobraon that Hope Grant found himself confronted with one of those emergencies which many men encounter in the course of their life, and deal with according to their character. It was his task to decide whether to leave an officer senior to himself and a drunkard in an important command, or to take the risk of exposing him. Grant took the upright course, and for his reward narrowly escaped losing his commission. Being strongly supported by men who knew his worth, he was eventually forgiven for doing his duty. The whole story, which is a curious one, is told in full detail in the *Life of Sir Hope Grant*, by Colonel H. Knollys, and conveys hints that might be of value to many officers.

After Sobraon a temporary peace was made with the Sikhs, and a great banquet was given at Lahore by Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, at which General Sir Charles Napier made a striking appearance. Sir Hope Grant thus described the incident in his diary. 'Sir Charles . . . was an extraordinary-looking person. . . . He wore large spectacles, and had small eyes, large dark shaggy eyebrows, an aquiline nose, and a most fearful quantity of grizzly grey whiskers, beard, and moustache, with hair streaming down his back. His costume consisted of a general officer's frock-coat, buff-corduroy breeches, and an English hunting-cap peaked in front, and behind swathed in white cotton. Thus he appeared at the Governor-General's

State dinner. When his health was drunk the band appropriately struck up "The King of the Cannibal Islands."

After the first Sikh war the 9th Lancers were stationed at Meerut, and in that station Major Grant held command of the regiment for two or more years, during which time, thanks to his system of training and discipline, it attained a very high reputation. Grant also commanded the 9th during the second Sikh war of 1848-49, including the ill-managed battle of Chilianwallah and the victory of Gujarat. In spite of the Cavalry reverse in the former battle, Grant's services met with approval, and were rewarded with the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In rendering his official report on the conduct of the Cavalry at Chilianwallah Grant once more showed his exceptional strength of character and straightforwardness, and the reward given him was rightly considered in the Army as being highly honourable to him. A year later, in consequence of two nearly simultaneous death vacancies, Grant obtained the command of his regiment, being, he thought, the only Cavalry officer in the Army who at that time had obtained both his majority and Lieutenant-Colonelcy without purchase. His regimental career was, in fact, very fortunate.


Early in 1851, Grant's health having suffered from ten years' foreign service, he went to England on leave, and remained at home for three years, a privilege hardly obtainable by a commanding officer nowadays. Grant returned to India in 1854, and the outbreak of the great mutiny of the Bengal army in May 1857 found him stationed at Umballa. It would be impossible to give in a short article an adequate account of Sir Hope Grant's services in the Mutiny campaigns, and a brief sketch alone can here be attempted.

Delhi, the old Muhammadan capital of India, having fallen into the hands of the rebels, a small English army was rapidly collected at Umballa, and marched towards Delhi on May 17 under General Anson. Lieut.-Colonel Grant was appointed Brigadier of Cavalry in this force, and in that capacity did priceless service until the capture of Delhi in September. During these four months of perhaps the most severe and critical work ever performed by British troops Hope Grant's personal services were conspicuous. It need hardly be said that owing to the weakness of the British Force it was, while carrying on a siege, constantly fighting in its own defence, and Grant's gallant handling of his small mounted force frequently averted imminent disaster. Even when the arrival of reinforcements from the Punjab



CHINESE WARFARE.  
1860.





SIR HOPE GRANT WATCHING THE BOMBARDMENT OF TAKU FORT.

enabled General Wilson (who had succeeded to the command) to assault Delhi, the available force was so inadequate that every unwounded infantry man had to be thrown into the city and the defence of the breaching batteries was committed to the cavalry. To carry out this duty Grant was obliged to expose his troopers to close fire from the walls of the city, and he did not escape criticism for the loss thus incurred. War, however, cannot be carried on like a book: special emergencies must be met by special action. The value of Grant's work at Delhi was fully recognised, Sir Archdale Wilson eulogising in his despatch his activity and 'unsurpassed vigilance.'

Very shortly after the fall of Delhi Colonel Grant was appointed to the command of a column, at the head of which he arrived at Cawnpore towards the end of October. Here a despatch from Sir James Outram fell into his hands, calling for the immediate relief of Lucknow. Grant at once prepared to undertake this serious operation with the weak force at his disposal, but was stopped by orders from his old friend Sir Colin Campbell, who had arrived in India as Commander-in-Chief. Sir Colin, who had formed a high opinion of Grant during the Sikh war, and relied greatly on his loyalty and talent, placed him in command of his cavalry, and Grant served in that capacity in the second relief of Lucknow, and the subsequent operations round that city.

Early in 1858 Grant, who had been promoted Major-General and appointed a Knight Commander of the Bath for his services at Delhi, was entrusted by Sir Colin Campbell, then Lord Clyde, with an independent command, which he held until the final suppression of the Mutiny; being until January 1859 in sole charge of the operations in Oudh and along the Terai border. Sir Hope Grant maintained as an independent commander the reputation which he had earned at Delhi: he could not increase it. Lord Clyde, in his final despatch, wrote of Grant: 'I cannot say too much in his praise. He has the rare merit of uniting the utmost boldness in action, a firm and correct judgment, and the most scrupulous regard for his orders and instructions.' On another occasion when referring to Grant's capacity as a soldier, Lord Clyde wrote: 'As to handling troops in the field he is quite perfection, and has no master.' Grant's mastery of the art of war owed little to study, and was, in fact, intuitive. In the heat of action he instinctively used each arm at the right moment and in the best manner; he lost no opportunity and made no mistake.



Sir Hope Grant, it must be remembered, was fifty years old when, through two long Indian hot weathers he performed the services which earned such high praise from Lord Clyde, a soldier whose approbation was worth earning. It is, therefore, a proof of Sir Hope Grant's remarkable strength of constitution that he was able to proceed direct from India to take command of the British Force engaged in the China war of 1860. The history of this nearly forgotten campaign is interesting, but can only be touched on in these pages. Suffice it to say that Sir Hope Grant's conduct of the operations was masterly, and that, thanks to his decision of character and intuitively correct methods, he carried the campaign, with little loss of life, to a successful conclusion. It must be added that in securing the assent to his plans of a sensitive French colleague, Sir Hope showed tact at least equal to his military skill.

The China war of 1860 lacked two of the most familiar characteristics of our minor campaigns. It was signalised neither by initial disasters nor by heavy expenditure, and to these circumstances Sir Hope Grant's biographer attributes the faint interest taken by the nation in the war, and the meagreness of the reward accorded to the successful commander, who merely received the Grand Cross of the Bath.

After his eminent services in the Indian Mutiny and in China Sir Hope Grant was Commander-in-Chief in Madras, where he did much to improve the condition of the private soldier. He was subsequently Adjutant-General at the Horse Guards, and finally held the command at Aldershot. In each of these posts he earned the respect and affection of all worthy men. Sir Hope Grant died on March 7, 1875, his last thoughts and words relating to the storm of Delhi, the great event of his career.

No sketch of the life of this good soldier would be complete that omitted a reference to his strongly religious character. He was in many respects a man of the type of General Gordon, and his religion influenced all his actions. Lord Wolseley, who knew Hope Grant well and admired him greatly, thus described him: 'So lived and died this remarkable soldier of whom no truly good man was ever an enemy. He had spent most of his life in helping to build up and consolidate the Empire of which he was proud, and of whose honour he was fiercely jealous. It may be truly said of him that he loved his God sincerely, and served his Queen with all his heart.' No English soldier need desire a better epitaph.

## *PRINCE RUPERT AS A CAVALRY LEADER*

BY SIR GEORGE ARTHUR, BART., M.V.O.

(Lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, March 2, 1910).

AMONG the romantic and picturesque figures recalled by the annals of the Great Rebellion, if the supreme place in point of interest belongs to King Charles himself, the second undoubtedly is occupied by Prince Rupert, who, during the early years of the Civil War, was the moving spirit and, indeed, the virtual director of the military operations on the Royalist side.

Prince Rupert was born at Prague in 1619, during his Calvinist father's brief tenure of the kingdom of Bohemia. On the panic-stricken flight of the latter before the advancing Austrian army, the poor baby prince, who had accidentally been discovered by a lady of the Court lying on the floor where his nurse had thrown him down, was uncere- moniously bundled into the rearmost carriage of the stampeding caval- cade, to be at last rescued from imminent suffocation in the boot of the vehicle. Thus early was Rupert initiated into that experience of hardship, poverty, and misfortune which to a soul naturally noble proved so admirable a school of discipline and self-control.

For the right understanding of Prince Rupert's qualities as a great Cavalry leader, it would have been useful, had time permitted, to study the circumstances amid which his youth was passed, and which had so profound an influence in shaping his personal character; for it is in the personal characteristics of the man that we find the explanation, not only of the general career of the soldier, but even of his fighting qualities in detail.

Rupert's was, in a sense more than ordinary, a strong character—strong in its simplicity, and simple in its strength—a character marked by a singleness of heart and a directness of aim which, taking small account of obstacles and paying little regard to side-issues, made straight for the goal, and made for it at once. There is rarely found in human history a personality less complex, less beset with contradictions or inconsistencies, less difficult—we might have thought—to compre-

hend at a glance. Whatever the surrounding conditions, Prince Rupert is seen to be always true to himself—not less in reverses than in successes. As we shall have occasion to note, his successes were his own, while his failures were, in the majority of cases, due in no small measure to the hindrances caused by others. Prince Rupert conforms very nearly to Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος*—the man who is too proud to be wicked, who is inspired by ideals so lofty that a mean or a base action is something to be spurned with contempt. You find in him nothing of self-seeking; and there was a peculiar clumsiness, as well as an inordinate malignity, in the charge brought against him of greed, the fact being that the man was as poor at the noontide and evening of his career as he had been at its dawn. It was a part of his unswerving loyalty to principle that his fidelity to the King, his adopted master, was boundless and absolute—a fidelity that was limited by no conditions, and checked by no misgivings. Further, having no axe of his own to grind, he despised, and took no pains to conceal that he despised, the self-love, the halting half-heartedness, and the incurable individualism—to use no stronger word—which marked too many of the leading Cavaliers. Rupert was utterly intolerant alike of their leisurely delays, of their military ineptitudes, and of their hesitating counsels. Believing that his august master had his quarrel just, it was to him unthinkable that Charles's sovereign rights should be re-established by any other method than conquest of arms. He was wholly unable to appreciate the feeling which caused some of the so-called moderate Royalists to fear lest victories too complete should prejudice the cause by closing the door to parliamentary *pourparlers*. On the other hand, he was even at the outset of hostilities prepared to advise the King to accept any honourable terms if frankly proposed, and if based on recognition of the King's rights. The dictum *noscitur a sociis* was true of him. The men he liked and made his friends were such as the unselfish and unassuming William Legge; as Richmond, the grave and religious Churchman; as Lucas, of whom it was said that he 'loved virtue, practised justice, and spoke truth—was constantly loyal and truly valiant.' There were men of another mould—the Gorings, the Digbys, the Wilmots—whom he could barely tolerate. He disliked Goring for his profligacy, and mistrusted him for his treachery, just as he hated Digby's intrigues and Wilmot's self-interested caution. Earnest and faithful himself, Rupert was for that very reason intolerant of those

who failed to attain his standard of duty. And this, not so much on account of their personal shortcomings—he did full justice to Goring's military achievement and capacity—as because those shortcomings did infinite dis-service to the King's cause.

For two centuries and a-half Prince Rupert has been represented as possessing little other merit than animal courage—as being, on the other hand, hot-tempered and impatient. Under the first head something will be said later. As regards the other two, it might well be asked whether heat of temper and impatience might not be readily excusable in the soldier who commanded a Cavalry corps in his teens, whose years when he fought at Edgehill numbered no more than twenty-three, and whose age at Naseby was still only twenty-five.

So vigorous and virile a character as Rupert's must needs have its roots deep down in the soil of his inmost being. His moral strength was derived from a profound conviction of the truth of his religious belief. He exhibits the nobler side of Calvinism in its stern and austere self-repression—a religion which had nothing in common with the epileptic fanaticism of home-grown Puritanism.

Rupert's mastery over self-indulgence was not fitful or occasional; it asserted its supremacy in life-long habits, such as extreme abstemiousness—habits which at times arose almost to the level of asceticism. Only once during his life did the spirit of self-discipline suffer a temporary breakdown, in the lapse which followed the bitter disappointment of Marston Moor. It might, indeed, be thought that this power of self-control was irreconcilable with that fierce and fiery impetuosity with which his name is popularly identified. The inconsistency is apparent rather than real. The key to the puzzle lies in his intensity of conviction and the simple directness with which he realised it in action. He did not concern himself primarily with the refinements of diplomacy or with attempts at compromise. When taken as a prisoner to Vienna, his sense of duty led him to spurn the Emperor's offer of liberty on the single condition of never again drawing sword against the Imperial forces. Yet the same sense of duty presently made him obedient to King Charles's peremptory command to give the promise required. The fine quality of Rupert's character comes out in all sorts of connections. His scrupulous honesty in money matters is of a piece with his absolute loyalty to his pledged word, with his soldierly chivalry towards an enemy, with his punctiliousness in all matters of honour. One of

his officers said of him, 'The Prince uses to make good his word, not only in point of honour, but as a matter of religion too.'

The magnetic force of Rupert's personality was revealed in a courage and cheerfulness which fired the zeal of his friends and subordinates, and in a generosity which won the hearts even of his enemies. Rupert's faults were neither few nor inconspicuous; but they were the failings which often attach to great qualities, and which contain no germ of anything petty or ungenerous.

That he gave mortal offence to many highly placed personages whose follies he derided and whose faults he criticised, is a fact that brings more strongly into relief the affectionate admiration which he won among the good men and true of every social rank. Noble and simple alike found inspiration in his ardour. His soldiers' devotion to him was boundless. Probably one of the secrets of his power over them, and of his success as a Cavalry leader, lay in a quality which soldiers intensely appreciate—namely, that of never asking his men to undergo a hardship or fatigue which he was not ready to share with them, or to undertake a task which he was not himself able to perform as well as, or better than, they could do it themselves. In soldiers' parlance he 'knew his job.' He was a better rider, a better swordsman, and a better shot than any of his men. He gave evidences of his skill with a pistol in one of his first marches, when at Stafford he sent a bullet twice in succession through the tail of the weathercock on St. Mary's steeple, at a distance of sixty yards from the church.

Rupert's indomitable energy in the Civil War was manifest from the very outset. His first 'go-off'—if I may use the word—was marked by an untoward accident. Hurrying to join the King on an unseasonably frosty morning, his horse slipped and fell on the road, and the Prince's shoulder was put out of joint. Yet within three hours of its being reset he was again in the saddle and continuing his journey. War having been formally declared by the solemn unfurling of the Royal Standard at Nottingham, Rupert, whom the King had just invested with the Garter, was given the post of General-of-the-Horse, a force consisting of about 800 men, ill-equipped, ill-mounted, undisciplined, and unpaid.

The young General-of-the-Horse must have gazed ruefully at the handful of raw troopers that represented the Royal Cavalry. Some had only buff coats and hats; some only the cuirass and steel cap; very few

had any weapons but the sword. Rupert, nothing daunted, set to work to recruit, arm, and equip. He flew like wildfire, men said, from place to place, breathing and inspiring an ardour hitherto incredible. As one writer<sup>1</sup> says, 'This Prince, like a perpetual motion, with those horse that he commanded, was in a short time heard of in many places at great distances.' He infected his men with his own daring. They were soon to find themselves irresistible under his command, and were most of them to die under his banner. Rupert was not the prototype of that modern monster, the hustler, but he certainly possessed in eminent degree the extraordinary driving power which characterises our youngest Field-Marshal to-day.

Nor was it the Cavalry alone that felt the beneficial effect of Rupert's inspiring presence. The Prince's correspondence proves him to have been the real director of the war, and the King's sole referee upon every point connected with military affairs. The first state of the Royal cause was as bad as it could be. Rupert raised up the King's Army from destitution and indiscipline to a condition of strength and serviceableness. The Royalists plucked up heart under the influence of this brilliant example. It was the Prince's function to bring order out of chaos—truly a heavy task for a mere youth and a foreigner. An army of volunteers, raised by noblemen and gentlemen from their private resources, was a difficult force to control. They had no idea of discipline. There were private quarrels amongst the leaders. They were jealous of each other and jealous of Rupert, in whose way, especially at headquarters, every obstacle was from the first thrown by envious opponents and civilian critics. But as a contemporary observer, Sir Philip Warwick, testifies, 'he was of such intrepid courage and activity that he ranged and disciplined that small body of men. He put that spirit into the King's Army that all men seemed resolved (*i.e.*, resolute). *Il était toujours soldat*, for he was never negligent by indulgence to his pleasures.' His work had its reward, for—to quote another writer of the time—'There was no more consternation in the King's troops now. Every one grew assured. The most timorous was afraid to show fear under such a general, whose courage was increased by the esteem we had of him.' Rupert, declares another, was 'adored by the hot-blooded young officers, as by the sturdy troopers.' Sir Edward Southcote relates how his own father, who fought under the Prince, describes him as

<sup>1</sup> May.

'the greatest hero, as well as the greatest beau,' and as being 'always very sparkish in his dress.' Among friends and foes Rupert had the reputation of bearing a charmed life. Though 'prodigal of his person,' and constantly exposing himself to heavy fire, he always came off unscathed; while his brother Maurice, who was his constant companion in the field, was wounded in every battle.

Though it is not my part to pass a detailed judgment on the Prince's customary tactics, or to defend him from the rather cheap criticism that his Cavalry charges, however spirited, lacked science, it is possible, without any disrespect to the British subaltern of to-day, to suggest that few of our young officers at the age of twenty-one can lay claim to an experience of command in the field such as had already fallen to Rupert's lot, supplemented by a fifteen months' close and uninterrupted study of strategic and tactical theory.

Prince Rupert, after ranging himself under the King's Standard, was not long in making the discovery that among his Royal uncle's military advisers there were few adepts in the art of war. The speechifying and dawdling counsels at Nottingham were not at all to Rupert's taste, and early in September he set off to scour the country for recruits, horses, arms, and money in aid of the Royal cause. The lack of arms was acutely felt. A few had arrived from Holland. Private armouries were ransacked and despoiled, and every possible effort made to remedy the deficiency. Clarendon speaks of the Cavalry being deemed well off if they could get old back and breast pieces, with pistols and carbines for their two or three first ranks and swords for the rest. Some of them supplemented these weapons with a short poleaxe. As an instance of contributions in money, 'the diabolical Cavalier,' as a Puritan soldier dubbed him, prevailed on the Mayor of Leicester to hand over £500, partly by assuring him that the King's word to redeem a debt was a better pledge than the so-called public faith of the Parliament; partly by hinting that a refusal would cause the Prince to adopt a posture such as 'shall make you know it is wiser to obey than to resist his Majesty's commands.' This rather high-handed proceeding, which, by-the-by, the King deprecated, was followed by a graceful episode. Appearing suddenly with 500 men, early on a Sunday morning, before a house belonging to a Puritan soldier named Purefoy, Rupert summoned it to surrender. On his demand being refused, he ordered an assault, but the defenders made so stout a resistance that it was several hours

before they were compelled to yield. Mrs. Purefoy came out and sued Rupert for the lives of the garrison. The request was at once granted, and Rupert, in gallant terms, expressed his astonished admiration at the wonderful defence by a garrison consisting only of the lady, with her three daughters and four servants.

Rupert met the King, who was on his way from Nottingham to Derby, at Stafford, whence on September 19 a night march brought him to Bridgnorth. Finding there that it was Charter Day, when the town bailiffs were appointed for the year, Rupert, who always made every post a winning-post, addressed a letter to the jury, urging them to elect men well affected for the King's service. A peremptory order to support Sir John Byron at Worcester was superseded by another message giving him a perfectly free hand. On arrival at Worcester, he had unhesitatingly decided that its crumbling walls were beyond the possibility of fortification, and arranged to cover Byron's retreat from that town. An afternoon reconnaissance to the south failed to get touch with the enemy, and a bivouac in a field near Powick Bridge was ordered. The officers had just stripped off their armour, and were stretching their legs on the grass, when Rupert, as usual on the alert, heard the sound of horses' hoofs, and caught sight of a mounted troop, which, led by Lord Say and Colonel Sandys, was advancing along a narrow lane. The policy of a word and a blow never came amiss to him, and shouting out an order to charge, he vaulted on to his horse, followed in quick succession by his brother and the other officers, and rode straight at the enemy, while the men, grasping their swords, but otherwise unarmed, mounted and hurried up into their places as best and as fast as they could. Rupert's pluck and resolution were fully justified; he just caught the head of the column trying to emerge from the defile. Unable to form up and show a front, the Parliamentary Horse, though over a thousand strong and fully armed, was beaten back in dire confusion. Sandys, though severely wounded, made desperate, but vain, efforts to rally his men. But a panic had set in, and the files in the rear were overturned and trampled on by the leading men as they bolted back. The fugitives were far too busy trying to save their own skins even to be able to capture young Bulstrode, the future historian, who had been run away with and got mixed up with the retreating sections. Rupert having fairly got his enemy on the run, kept him there for a nine-mile stretch, even for a consider-



able time after the pursuit had been switched off. Statements have varied as to the length of the chase; there is no variation as to that of the Roundhead flight, which lasted till Pershore was reached. Arthur Goodwin—Hampden's friend—relates how 'they presently cried "faces about." I will not tell you,' he adds, 'in how disorderly a manner they came back to the quarter; I think there was killed in this skirmish about forty or fifty men. . . . We had a terrible report of this at the Army.'

This 'scrap' at Worcester was neither insignificant or unimportant. Essex had proof of the inferiority of his horse, and realised that Rupert was able to infuse a dash and spirit into his followers which was wanting in his own, even to the so-called gentleman who had undertaken to form his so-called Life Guard.

With the first blow struck by Rupert began a veritable campaign of Puritan lies, which chiefly took the form of attributing to him the conduct of the war by 'methods of barbarism.' That these slanders should have been accompanied by nauseating religious cant was almost a matter of course. For example, a letter written by one Nehemiah Wharton, a Roundhead soldier, stationed at Worcester, says: 'Sabbath day we peaceably enjoyed with Obadiah Sedgwick, who gave us two heavenly sermons. On Tuesday morning Prince Rupert entered the city at a by-passage, most of the city crying "Welcome," but principally the Mayor, who desired to entertain him; but Prince Rupert answered, "D—— him, he would not stay, but he would wash his hands in the blood of Roundheads," and immediately set some to lie in ambush, and with the rest sallied out. Major Sands came bravely to the Prince's very breast, the rest following undaunted. Our wounded men they brought into the city and stripped, slashed and stabbed their dead bodies in a most barbarous manner. We are much enraged against the Cavaliers for their barbarism, and shall show them little mercy.'

Three days later, however, our Nehemiah is constrained to admit that 'owing to over-hasty writing,' there were many errors in his statement! Another story put about was that a certain Captain Wingate, who had been taken prisoner, had been made to ride naked back to camp; but this malicious falsehood was refuted by a Puritan officer in these terms: 'Captain Wingate is used like a gentleman by the Cavaliers, and the printed pamphlets do much injury that express any

hard usage of him by them. Give the devill his due, and doe so to the Cavaliers in this thing.'

To this sort of misrepresentation Rupert was perpetually subjected; and peculiarly sensitive, generous, and warm-hearted as he was by nature, these monstrous accusations wounded him deeply. Rupert, of course, realised that the essence of war, and especially civil war, is violence, and that so-called moderation in war is usually not policy, but imbecility. A soldier by instinct, by choice, and by training, when he leapt to arms and drew the sword, he threw away the scabbard. But the blows which he dealt, however heavy and incessant, were never the blows of a bully or a coward. No accusation against Rupert has been more persistently repeated than the statement that at Bolton in 1644 he slaughtered men, women, and children indiscriminately. Yet no more complete disproof of this monstrous charge could be framed than is supplied by the words of Professor Gardiner: 'On the 28th, with Lord Derby riding by his side, he stormed the town. Sixteen hundred of the enemy were cut down on the spot, and seven hundred carried off as prisoners. The massacre was, as usual, followed by a sack of the houses of inoffensive citizens.' There is not a word as to the killing of non-combatants. It is to be remembered that Rigby, the rebel commander, had hung some of Rupert's soldiers over the wall. Although one prejudiced historian has remarked that Rupert's courtesy to Mrs. Purefoy was a solitary exception to his usual brutal procedure, countless instances can be cited of his generosity and chivalry towards an opponent. When in 1644 he was quartered at Denton, in Yorkshire, the house of the Puritan General, Lord Fairfax, he noticed the portraits of two Fairfaxes who years ago had fallen in the fight for the Palatinate, and he preserved the house uninjured for their sakes—'such force hath gratitude in noble minds,' as another Fairfax wrote later. The Puritan Lady Sussex wrote: 'Sir Edward Tyrell was a little fearful. Prince Rupert had been hunting in his park, but he took him much with his courtesy towards him.' The testimony of Sir Thomas Rowe, a severe critic of Rupert's every action, is to like effect: 'I cannot hear anything credibly averred which can be blamed by those who know the liberty of wars.' Rupert strictly insisted that his men should behave honourably and with due consideration. Thus, when a party under his command snatched the colours of an enemy to whom a safe conduct had been given, some of them were known to have felt the edge of their

leader's sword, while the colours were courteously restored. After Edgehill, when Rupert was assuring the King that he would be able to give a good account of Essex's Horse, a bystander sneered: 'Yes, and of his carts also.' This suggestion that his men, whom he had trusted, had forsaken their duty for the mere purpose of plunder, so stung Rupert that a stand-up fight in the King's presence was barely averted. And as regards his subordinates, although Rupert, lavish of his own exertions, was a rigid disciplinarian and a relentless taskmaster, he was always ready, in awarding any blame, to distinguish between misconduct and an error of judgment. When, in answer to the despairing message from Reading: 'If Prince Rupert come not speedily, Reading will be lost,' he hurried to its relief, he found that the commandant, young Colonel Fielding, had been compelled to make a truce with Essex. Fielding was tried and condemned to death, but Rupert, having satisfied himself as to the extremities to which he had been reduced, got the little Prince of Wales to plead with the King for his life. On another occasion he made every effort to obtain a pardon for Colonel Windebank, who in a moment of panic had surrendered Blechingdon House; and the plea for mercy would in all probability have again been successful had not the Prince's letter been intercepted by the rebels. Rupert's acts of reprisal in March '45, when he hanged thirteen Roundhead prisoners because Essex, without any show of trial, had strung up thirteen Irish troopers, evoked a solemn denunciation of Parliament, to which Rupert's secretary replied: 'You gave the first example in hanging such prisoners as were taken, and thereupon the same number of yours suffered in like manner. If you continue this course, you cannot in reason but expect the like return. But if your intention be to give quarter and to exchange prisoners upon equal terms, it will not be denied here.' Rupert's action had precisely the result expected and desired, and for the rest of the war the Puritans regarded Irish soldiers as human beings, and not as beasts of prey. In the stern duties which devolved upon him, Rupert acted up to the dictum of a famous historian that 'if there be any truth established by the universal experience of nations, it is that to carry the spirit of peace into war is a weak and cruel policy.' All history points to the fact that the time for negotiation is the time for deliberation and delay, but when an extreme case calls for that remedy which is in its own nature most violent, and which in such cases is a remedy only because it

is violent, it is idle to think of mitigating or diluting. Languid war can do nothing which negotiation or submission will not do better, and to act on any other principle is not to save blood and money, but to squander it.'

The brilliant little action fought at Worcester laid the foundation of Rupert's reputation as a leader of Cavalry, and exhibited the tactics which he constantly employed in the wielding of that arm.

As to the *rationale* of Rupert's employment of Cavalry, Mr. Fortescue, with his unrivalled power of interpreting the facts of military history, has, in a lecture familiar to many of us, shown what were the conditions under which, during the opening years of the Civil War—that is to say, up to the battle of Marston Moor—Cavalry actions were fought. Previously to this time the English Cavalry were in a vague and uncertain state. Throughout the whole of the Middle Ages the horses used in battle by the mailed men-at-arms had been selected for their ability to carry an enormous weight. They were great heavy brutes brought from the Continent, principally from Flanders. During a long period Infantry were at an almost hopeless disadvantage against a mounted enemy. It was the English archers who at Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, showed how the balance could be redressed. The shock action of Cavalry could not be met and defeated by the passive resistance of Infantry. It was defeated by arrows—that is, by missile action. Our Infantry won renown chiefly as masters of missile action. Then came the Swiss Infantry tactics, the foot being armed with long pikes, an expedient which soon spread itself over Europe, and whose effectiveness, as we shall presently see, was exemplified in the English Civil War at the first battle of Newbury. The introduction of fire-arms placed the Cavalry at a further disadvantage, so that they ultimately found it necessary to lighten, or even to abandon, their armour, and also to exchange shock action for missile action, arming themselves with pistols so as to be able to shoot down the enemy's Infantry from a distance before charging. This Cavalry use of the pistol continued well into the middle of the eighteenth century, and is illustrated by the well-known incident at Dettingen, where the French Cavalry, on charging the British Infantry, first emptied their pistols, and then, as the custom was, hurled the weapons in the faces of their enemies. It also explains how, at Dettingen, the Life Guards were expressly

ordered, when charging the French foot, not to use their pistols, but their swords only.

To return, however, to the seventeenth century. For various reasons, Army reform had made little progress in England throughout the whole epoch covered by the Wars of the Roses, the era of the Tudors, and the earlier Stewart period. The old war-horses had disappeared with the disuse of heavy armour, and the English Cavalry henceforth used only English horses, mostly under 14 hands high. Some, indeed, in Henry VIII.'s time, were probably merely ponies of 13 hands and under.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century Englishmen who wished to learn the art of war went to study it on the plains of Flanders, with the result that when our Civil War broke out, the whole of the Cavalry on either side had been drilled, not for shock, but for missile action. The drill, be it noted, was planned solely for the troop of a hundred men; of regimental drill there is not a trace; *a fortiori*, none of brigade drill. Until 1645 the war, in respect both of Cavalry and Infantry, 'was a sort of confused scramble between two parties of undisciplined and half-trained men.' Neither side could be said really to possess an Army at all, in the modern sense of the term.

Rupert had to do his best with what he found ready to his hand. Young as he was, he was possessed of a knowledge of war such as was not to be learned in England; he knew enough to enable him to develop the training of Cavalry on the right lines. He had studied the tactical methods of Gustavus Adolphus, and fortified his study of that extraordinary commander by personal intercourse with Lord Ruthven, a soldier whom Gustavus himself had delighted to honour, and who backed up Rupert against Lindsay with regard to the forward tactics at Edgehill. Rupert was quick also to recognise the magnificent Cavalry material that had been entrusted to him. He realised that he was about to command men who would follow wherever he chose to lead them. He began by making the daring innovation of departing altogether from the principle of missile action for Cavalry, as hitherto understood. The custom of firing their pistols while charging necessarily involved a halt, or at least a check, for this purpose. This Rupert abolished, restoring shock action as the normal fighting method for his Cavalry.

Nothing illustrates this better than the battle of Edgehill, fought on

October 23, 1642, the particulars of which need not detain us, being familiar to everybody. Edgehill is usually selected by Rupert's critics as the most striking example of his over-impetuosity and devil-may-care bravery. The plain facts fail to justify this censure. At this early period in the war it was Rupert's aim to inspire his own troops with confidence and those of the enemy with terror. Rapidity, promptitude, and the utmost mobility were of the very essence of his designs. Remembering his brilliant little success at Worcester, Rupert made it his primary object at Edgehill once more to get his enemy and to keep his enemy on the run. Before charging, he rode right along the front rank, instructing his men that at the first word they were to advance at full gallop. On the authority of one of his officers, a precise account was handed down of Rupert's mode of attack: 'His way of fighting was, that he had a select body of horse that always attended him, and in every attack they received the enemy's shot without returning it; but one and all bore with all their force upon their adversaries till they broke their ranks, and charged quite through them. Then they rallied, and when the enemy were in disorder, fell upon their rear and slaughtered them with scarce any opposition.'

As to the Cavalry at Edgehill getting out of hand and riding too far, the same thing has happened over and over again to the best Cavalry in the world when employed on shock tactics. Horses no less than men are liable to get beyond control, and it is often impossible to check an advance at the psychological moment. Something of the kind happened to the Blues at Dettingen exactly a hundred years afterwards. Lord Amherst, fifty years later still, laid down a rule that Cavalry should advance to the charge at a trot, and only break into a gallop when within fifty yards of the enemy—a rule rigidly observed, no doubt, on Wimbledon Common, but broken on the very next occasion on which British Cavalry took the field in Flanders. A case in point is certainly that of both brigades of heavy Cavalry at Waterloo. History is not going to deprive Lord Anglesey of his reputation as a great Cavalry leader because his brigades, in their pursuit of Milhaud's Cuirassiers, followed the enemy too hard—not even though this distinguished commander took his wrong place at the head of a brigade instead of at the head of a division. The launching of a body of horsemen at full gallop is the letting loose of a

torrential flood that is not easily to be checked in a moment. Probably this consideration may have been in the mind of the Duke of Wellington when he declared that his Cavalry always got him into trouble. Such being the lessons of experience, even in more modern days and with perfectly drilled and disciplined troops, surely the fullest excuses are allowable in the case of the troopers at Edgehill, whose drill had been of the sketchiest, and whose horsemanship—the outcome of independent riding from childhood—had been learnt in the chase, and not in the *ménage*.

Against the criticism that Rupert's charge left the King unprotected, it is a fair rejoinder that, as the King elected to leave his position of safety on the brow of the hill, he would have been the first to recognise that he must take his chance in the fortunes of the day.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the responsibility for the condition of affairs on the field did not rest with Rupert, who was answerable only for his own arm of the service. Having been ordered, in accordance with the express decision of the Council of War, to assault with that branch, he was bound to prosecute the movement to the best of his judgment and ability. In attempting with mounted troops only to deliver a blow which should finally crush and pulverise the rebel force, Rupert may possibly have attempted too much; but he was fired with that enthusiasm—with that almost fanatical conviction that the Cavalry under his command could go anywhere, do anything, accomplish the apparently impossible—which has so often empowered the most brilliant Cavalry leaders to reap the richest and ripest fruits of success. To illustrate this idea one need, perhaps, go no further back than General French's ride to Kimberley.

If Rupert's too rapid and prolonged advance argues an excessive volatility on the part of his Cavalry, it is at least equally arguable that the lack of any support from the main line indicates a certain amount of "stickiness" on the side of the Infantry, whose five-mile morning march to get into position would surely not in ordinary circumstances have exhausted their energy. It must be remembered, on the other hand, that a great many disabilities attached to both arms on this occasion. They were on half-pay and quarter-rations; the blacksmiths

<sup>1</sup> Clarendon writes: 'At the entrance into the field, the King's troop, provoked by scoffs (to the effect that they were only a "Show Troop") the day before, asked the King to let them be absent that day from his person, and charge in front among the horse. They desired Rupert to "give them that honour which belonged to them." They were about 300 in number, all volunteers, and men of such considerable position that the estates of the whole troop were valued at £100,000 a year.'

of the neighbourhood were so ill-affected that they hid themselves, and the horses, which sorely needed shoeing, were in this important respect neglected; while the hostile feeling of the local hinds rendered it almost impossible for the prototype of the modern intelligence officer to obtain trustworthy information.

After all, Rupert's charge home was thoroughly justified. Boldly conceived, it was brilliantly executed. He brushed aside all resistance, swept his opponents off the field, and by going straight for the enemy's headquarters very nearly brought off what might have been a stunning *coup de main*. It is on record that Essex himself would have been captured by his daring young adversary, had not that astute nobleman hurriedly concealed himself in an ale-house hard by.

Further criticism has been passed on Rupert's conduct at Edgehill, with reference to his supposed arrogance in objecting to receive the King's orders from Lord Falkland. Apart from the general consideration that military men from Rupert's day down to quite modern times have been prone, not always unjustifiably, to fret under inexperienced civilian interference, it is to be borne in mind that Rupert, when appointed General-of-the-Horse, had been explicitly and expressly exempted from receiving his orders from any but the King himself. There is no reason to believe that Rupert intrigued for this favour. The King himself, being in supreme personal command, may well have deemed it wise to allow Cavalry so mobile as Rupert's a free hand, so that it need not be tied to conformity with the movements of a somewhat leisurely Infantry. The principle is illustrated a century later, when Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick appointed Lord Granby to a quasi-independent Cavalry command, with a result at Warburg constantly cherished in the regimental memory of the Royal Horse Guards (Blue), though only quite recently recorded on their regimental colours. Those who are disposed to criticise Rupert's employment of his Cavalry on this and other occasions may be invited to recall the fact that, as Cavalry, they were entirely his own creation; he knew their capabilities and their limitations; he knew what to get out of them.

It has been sought to discredit Rupert's Cavalry for their failure at Edgehill to respond to the King's urgent request for a final charge. Their inability to comply was, in fact, purely physical. Flesh and blood, human and equine, have their limitations. The Cavalry



movement of the afternoon had covered an immense amount of ground, and the return to camp was made amid the gloom of an October evening. The horses, ill-shod and ill-fed, were utterly exhausted. The men, willing enough, had in the fast-gathering darkness got separated from their own officers and from each other.

The King himself, in his official account of the battle, attributed the cessation of fighting to the true cause—the approach of night. ‘A Relation of the Battel, printed by H. M. Command,’ says: ‘If we had light enough to have given one charge more, we had totally routed all their army. Whereupon both armies retreated, ours in such order that we brought off all our own cannon and 4 of the Rebels. . . . It is certain we killed 5 for 1.’

The Royal Army could fairly claim to have had the best of the day, the King at its close being the nearer London—the strategic point which both sides had for their objective.

The Roundhead ‘relation to the Speaker and Commons,’ however, makes mention of ‘a blessed victory which God hath given us upon the Army of the Cavaliers and of those evil Persons who engaged His Majesty in a dangerous and bloody fight against his faithful subjects.’

Cromwell, however, tells his friends the truth—of course, privately: ‘Your troops are, most of them, decayed serving men, and tapsters, and such kind of fellows; and the King’s troops are gentlemen’s sons, younger sons, and persons of quality. Do you think that the spirit of such base and mean fellows will be ever able to encounter gentlemen that have honour and courage and resolution in them?’

It was of the utmost importance that such strategic advantage as had been gained by the King’s side at Edgehill should be followed up at once. Rupert’s plans invariably depended for their success on extreme promptitude of execution. It was the curse of the Royalist cause that the Prince and his jealous rivals alternately obtained the upper hand in the King’s counsels. The ‘hot fits’ of following Rupert’s advice were succeeded by the ‘cold fits’ of delay and inaction caused by others. Continuity broke down just where continuity was absolutely essential.

On the morrow of Edgehill the two armies remained facing each other, Rupert watching Essex as a cat watches a mouse. Towards evening the rebel forces retired in the direction of Warwick, and Rupert instantly pounced on Essex’s rearguard, capturing money,

baggage, prisoners, and, above all, some valuable papers. It was typical of the kind of disappointments to which Rupert was continually liable that, when he pressed on the King his plans for a combined rush on London—where he believed that prompt action would enable him to dissolve the pretended Parliament—his enemies were able to checkmate this scheme by representing to the King that the Prince's soldiers would plunder and burn the city. Rupert's indignation at so preposterous a calumny was extreme.

It was a particularly exasperating sequel that the Royalist Army did march on London after all; only it was a month too late, and the enemy had meanwhile had ample opportunity to concentrate in defence of the capital. This unfortunate procrastination prevented Rupert's effecting anything more than the capture and subsequent evacuation of Brentford, both of which events really militated against the King's interests. Rupert's successful dash on Brentford was therefore thrown away. But still he managed that the retreat should be made in excellent order, he himself standing his horse in the river beside the bridge to watch his men pass over, and remaining thus for hours exposed to a heavy fire to which he paid not the slightest heed, encouraging them to keep order and to fire steadily. It was no small achievement, and a striking testimony to the improvement he had effected in their discipline, that Rupert's troops should have shown themselves able to fight so steadily in a rearguard action. Nevertheless, it was galling to reflect that he failed in November to attain the success which might well have been his in October.

The events of the early part of 1643, when Oxford was the Royal headquarters, point the same moral. While others were hesitating and delaying, Rupert was continually circling round Oxford engaged in various minor expeditions, always with a definite purpose, and almost invariably with some tangible result. He was all activity. The entries in his diary during the first three months of the year, which are crowded with incident, exhibit his extraordinary and resourceful energy. Cirencester was taken by assault, Warwick and Gloucester were reconnoitred, Birmingham was captured, Lichfield had to surrender, Reading was only lost by a hair's breadth.

Rupert's enemies unfortunately succeeded in hampering his action, until a fresh feat—the well-known exploit at Chalgrove Field, resulting in the lamented death of Hampden—raised his reputation yet

higher, and with it his influence at headquarters. Sallying forth from Oxford, in the hope of capturing a Roundhead convoy, he missed, indeed, the object of his expedition, but by a leisurely retreat accomplished his subsequent design of drawing the enemy after him. Suddenly halting at Chalgrove Field, he faced about, set spurs to his horse, and in the face of hostile Dragoons lining the hedges, led a steeplechase charge which carried all before it. The enemy, 'though better officered and better disciplined than heretofore, could not stand before the charge of the terrible Prince.' The good fortune which the summer of 1643 brought to the Royalists in the West—in particular Lord Wilmot's brilliant victory at Roundway Down—made Rupert emulous of capturing Bristol, the second city in the kingdom, and being joined by Maurice and Hertford, led fourteen regiments of Foot and a few troops of Horse towards Bristol, the rebel General Waller retreating before him. That Rupert lost no time is clear, the city being invested on July 24, when the Governor, Nathaniel Fiennes, a son of Lord Say, was summoned to surrender. On his refusal, the attack began the same night, and continued the following day; the next morning the general assault took place. That the Royalists found the taking of Bristol a tough job is evident, and Rupert himself had to lead back to the attack some of the troops who had begun to retreat. His horse shot under him, he sent for a fresh charger. As Warburton records, 'he rode up and down from place to place, wherever most need was of his presence, here directing and encouraging some, and there leading up others. Generally,' adds the same writer, 'it is confessed by the Commanders that, had not the Prince been there, the assault, through mere despair, had been in danger to be given over in many places.' Prince Maurice was equally active on the opposite side of the city. The Governor ultimately demanding a parley, and the Royalist losses having been very heavy, terms were agreed upon, the garrison being allowed to march out with the honours of war, and promised the protection of a convoy of Rupert's men. Unfortunately, the Roundheads marched out two hours in advance of the time fixed, and before the convoy was ready, and they were attacked and plundered in retaliation for recent Puritan perfidy at Reading. The thing was, of course, indefensible; Rupert was keenly ashamed of his men's breach of faith; but Fiennes generously acquitted him of all blame.

Rupert, as we have seen, greatly resented all civilian interference,

but he was not sufficiently careful to avoid giving like cause of offence himself. Hertford, as Lord-Lieutenant of the Western Counties, was entrusted with supreme authority in that district, and felt keenly the slight put upon him when Rupert and Maurice not only settled the terms of the Bristol surrender without his being consulted, but claimed the right of choosing the new Governor. The King, at his wits' end to reconcile the disputants, came to Bristol in person. Although he stood by Rupert, whom the Army vehemently supported, Charles took Hertford away with him on the pretext of requiring his counsel at headquarters.

Rupert's renewed plan of campaign for the King's advance on London postulated that Newcastle from the North and Maurice and Hopton from the West should concentrate and co-operate in support of the movement. Like country-folk elsewhere whose patriotism is of a strictly local complexion, both the Northern and Western county levies refused to fight at a distance from their homes, and the King could not advance alone. As has been well said, 'when the enemy had left their own particular quarter, they thanked God that they were rid of him, and returned to their usual avocations.' Following upon some fruitless operations in Gloucestershire, Rupert, alone in realising the necessity of preventing a junction between Essex, who had advanced westward, and Waller, dashed off to overtake the former. Marching night and day, he at last trod upon his enemy's tail at Aldbourne Chase. Essex, though defeated, was not crushed, and Rupert, aware that his adversary's provisions were running short, urged that time was on the King's side, that the Royalists should be content to block Essex's line of communication with London, and that hunger and mutiny would do the rest.

Essex, in sheer desperation, challenged a fight, and on the morning of September 20 had taken up an advantageous position on the slopes above the Kennet Valley. Then ensued the first battle of Newbury, which, if it enabled the King to occupy Newbury, also left open Essex's road to London. The Royalist Cavalry were committed to a charge *up-hill* foredoomed to failure. Rupert, who was operating on the left, made repeated efforts to regain the ground, but the whole fight was of a jerky and disjointed character, made up of a series of disconnected rushes, and was as devoid of design as it was of decisive results. It is specially memorable for two incidents. The first was

that Rupert's fierce Cavalry charges made no serious impression on the London trained bands, who were formed in square, and armed with long pikes, after the Swiss fashion. The second was the personal encounter, related by Whitelocke, an eye-witness, between Prince Rupert and Sir Philip Stapleton.

Rupert, never greater than when trying to retrieve misfortune, succeeded in rallying some of his exhausted Horse. He followed closely at Essex's heels all night, surprising him at dawn; but, though he threw the rebel rearguard into confusion, he failed to prevent Essex's arrival at Reading.

Taken as a whole, the autumn months of 1643 were marked by a series of Royalist reverses, many of them due to disregard of, or inability to act upon, Rupert's advice. To the unsuccessful ventures already named must be added the abortive attempt to surprise Aylesbury during a blinding snowstorm. It is true that on the other side of the account are to be set the taking of Bedford and the recapture of Cirencester. But the general trend of the operations was unsatisfactory, the situation being greatly aggravated by the intrigues of the Court faction hostile to Rupert at Oxford, which was headed by the Queen. The King, however, who thoroughly appreciated Rupert's merits, sought to support and to enhance his nephew's prestige, and enable him to sit in the Parliament at Oxford, by creating him, at the beginning of 1644, Earl of Holderness and Duke of Cumberland. He also gave him a separate command of great importance, as Captain-General of the North-Western Counties and of Wales. This occurred in February, and Rupert thoroughly realised the magnitude of a task which required constant and concentrated efforts for its due fulfilment. His annoyance may be imagined when, having only just settled down into his new position, he was suddenly summoned away to relieve Newark. Well backed up by a plucky sortie of the garrison, Rupert inflicted a heavy defeat on the besiegers, who, however, he permitted to march off with the honours of war.

His success at Newark brought Rupert congratulations from all sides. He had reached the high-water mark of his military reputation. Yet on himself personally, ever since Newbury, the chill conviction had begun to creep that the tide of his success had turned.

Having returned to his administrative duties at Shrewsbury, the Prince was almost immediately harassed anew by a call to Oxford to

consult on the plan of the next campaign. A sharp turn had been given to affairs by the entry of the rebel Scots into England to co-operate with their congeners in the south. Rupert, when occasion demanded it, knew the value of defensive strategy. He now advised a reinforcement of the garrisons of Oxford, Wallingford, Abingdon, Reading, and Banbury, with all the Infantry; some Horse being left in and about Oxford, and the rest being sent to join Prince Maurice in the West. The plan was adopted at Rupert's instance, only to be at once abandoned the moment his back was turned. Early in May he once more returned to his Welsh command at Shrewsbury. The needs of the North were now pressing, Yorkshire being overrun by rival armies. In the middle of May, Rupert left Shrewsbury to begin his long-contemplated march to York, where Lord Newcastle was being besieged by three Roundhead armies—those of the Scots, of the two Fairfaxes, and of Lord Manchester. Both sides understood the value of the stake for which they were playing. On the King's side there was no one but Rupert equal to grappling with the situation. On his way through Lancashire the Prince had several successful brushes with the rebel forces, sending a detachment to relieve Latham House, which had been held for eighteen weeks by the gallant Lady Derby. The town of Bolton, where the inhuman Puritan, Rigby, had hanged some of Rupert's soldiers over the wall, was taken and sacked. Recruits now flocked to the Prince's standard, and his march became a triumphal progress. At Wigan flowers were strewn in his path. Liverpool was shortly captured and treated like Bolton. The state of York became ever more urgent, Newcastle reporting that he could hold out only six days more. Rupert, already irritated past endurance by signs of the King's distrust, lingered for ten days at Latham House, and only set out for York on June 22, joining on his way Lord Goring, who, at the head of 8,000 Horse, was on the Yorkshire borders. Advancing through Skipton and Knaresborough, the Prince was twelve miles distant from York on June 30, the enemy thereupon withdrawing from the city and taking up a position to the west of it on Marston Moor, in order to bar his passage. Rupert out-manceuvred the rebel general by crossing the Ouse considerably to the north of York, and halted outside the city. As a Scotch Puritan commissioner wrote: 'We were in a sad condition: Prince Rupert had done a glorious piece of service; from nothing, he had gathered,

without money, a powerful army, and in spite of our three generals, had made us leave York after a long siege.'

There can be no doubt that Prince Rupert fought at Marston Moor against his better judgment. It was not, in fact, his judgment at all. The King's written orders were not very clearly expressed; they emphasised the paramount necessity of saving York, but do not seem absolutely to have deprived Rupert of his discretion as to the when and the where and the how of fighting. It is impossible to suppose that if the King had known, as Rupert knew, of the dissensions and jealousies between the three rebel armies, that he would not have approved the policy of leaving them to 'stew in their own juice,' if I may borrow a classic phrase. Rupert was really driven to fight, not by his so-called 'rashness,' but by the bitter tongues of his traducers at Court. There are various indications of the Prince's mind having been unhinged by the treatment he had had to endure. It was bad enough that his military plans, the strategy of almost the only strategist his side possessed, should have been contemptuously rejected. But the injury that roused his whole being, which stung him to the quick, was the abominable and, on the face of it, absurd, accusation of personal disloyalty to the King, and even of aspiring to the throne itself. We have seen what Rupert was, how his loyalty was ingrained. Small wonder, indeed, that he threatened to resign his commission and retire abroad. It was no empty threat—he meant it. His indignation reached white heat, he was beside himself with rage, and it looks very much as though he were restored to something approaching equanimity solely by the grateful kindness and considerate attention of Lady Derby at Latham House, during his ten days' stay.

Under the walls of York, then, there seemed no help for it. The die was cast, and the fight was fought, with the result that the King's cause received a blow from which it was never to recover.

Lord Newcastle was averse from a battle, but Rupert alleged the King's orders, and more than 23,000 soldiers on either side stood to arms on July 2. Rupert submitted his scheme of battle to the German officer who commanded his Infantry, Lord Eythin, who said, 'Very fine on paper, but no such thing in the field.' Rupert suggested drawing his men further back, but it was then too late.

Both armies were drawn up in the customary formation—Infantry

in the centre and Cavalry on either wing. Rupert, as usual, led the Royalist right, consisting of 5,000 Horse; his centre, under Eythin, numbered 14,000 Infantry; and his left was led by Goring in command of 4,000 men. Opposite Rupert was Cromwell, on the rebel left; the centre, principally Scottish Infantry, was commanded by Leslie, Earl of Leven; while Lord Fairfax was in command of the right wing of Horse. Through the afternoon, dark with storm, the forces stood inactive facing one another on either side of a ditch. Shortly before seven o'clock both Rupert and Newcastle thought there would be no fight that day. Rupert sat down on the ground and began his supper, while Newcastle retired to his coach and lighted a pipe. Cromwell suddenly crossing the ditch, charged and routed the leading squadrons of the Royalist Horse. Rupert, rushing to the head of his men, rode straight at Cromwell, and threw the rebel left flank into disorder. Then David Leslie brought up the enemy's supports, and in turn routed the Royalists, who fled away in disorder. At the other end of the line, however, Goring was entirely successful against Fairfax. After the Swedish manner, he had distributed musketeers among his Horse. A part of Goring's troopers went in pursuit of Fairfax, and began to plunder the enemy's baggage; the rest turned against the enemy's centre and broke most of the Scottish battalions. Of these, however, three stood firm until Cromwell came to their rescue. This turned the scale, and the rebel victory was complete.

No fight between the rival forces had hitherto been so fierce as this; nor, with the exception of Naseby, was there one whose consequences were so serious. Prince Rupert left behind him three or four thousand in slain and prisoners, the whole of his cannon, many colours, and a quantity of arms. The losses on the other side have never been truthfully estimated. It is remarkable that there were three generals on each side. A Puritan writer cynically declared that within less than half an hour all six took to their heels, the three Roundheads believing that their cause had been lost. A Royalist gentleman who was present wrote, 'The runaways on both sides were so many, so breathless, so speechless, and so full of fear, that I should not have taken them for men, but by their motions, which still served them very well.' It was the first time that Cromwell and Rupert had met since the startling improvement of the rebel Cavalry, and Rupert, quick to recognise merit, named his victorious opponents 'Ironsides.'



One personal loss at Marston Moor distressed him greatly. His favourite dog, Boy, his constant and devoted companion, escaped from the baggage where he was always tied up during any action, and his poor mangled body was found amongst the slain. Boy is generally represented as a poodle, but if so, he must have been a poodle of extraordinarily active habits and abnormally sporting instincts, for Lady Sussex relates that when Rupert shot five bucks, 'his dog Boy pulled them down.'

The morning after the fight Rupert and Newcastle had a brief interview. The latter, who was probably more at home in the riding-school than in the battlefield, declared the game was up, and that he would make his way to the coast and Holland. Rupert, though the King's unfortunate letter had been burning a hole in his pocket, vowed that he would stick to the cause, and rally both his own and Newcastle's men as best he could.

It is evidence of Rupert's generosity that he promised to report in so many words that Newcastle had behaved like an honest man, a gentleman, and a loyal subject; and evidence of his forethought that he had in his mind a plan of retreating to Wales, which, with the shattered remains of the two forces, he was able to carry out in good order, although threatened by the attentions of a considerable body of the enemy's Cavalry.

Arriving in the Welsh marshes at the end of July, he spent the following month in desultory skirmishes with the enemy, but in a state of mind and of soul so abnormal with him as to be evidently due to a complete nervous and moral breakdown. It was probably the news of Charles's success in forcing the capitulation of Essex's army in Cornwall, coupled with his own appointment as Commander-in-Chief, that braced Rupert up again, and brought him back to his better self. A meeting with the King at Sherborne at Michaelmas assured him of Charles's unabated confidence. A forced march from Bristol to Newbury was unfortunately just too late to save the King from defeat, but the Prince immediately joined his Royal master at Batt, whence their combined forces marched to Oxford. Rupert, whose temper was perhaps less under control than formerly, felt so aggrieved at not receiving the colonelcy of the Life Guards, that he once more nearly resigned his commission.

At the beginning of 1645 occurred an incident which highly amused

the King's nephew. The occasion was the presentation, by one of the Parliament's commissioners sent to negotiate with the King, of a long list of persons 'who shall expect no pardon,' which was headed by the names of Rupert and Maurice. 'Prince Rupert and Prince Maurice being present,' writes Whitelocke, himself a commissioner, 'when their names were read out as excepted persons, they fell into a laughter, at which the King seemed displeased, and begged them be quiet.' Nevertheless, Rupert warmly supported the idea of a treaty of peace, and he deeply deplored the failure of the negotiation, knowing that the King's power waned while that of his opponents waxed.

In the spring of 1645 the situation of the Royal cause had become grave almost to desperation, and in May the King summoned Rupert in hot haste to Oxford to discuss what proved to be the last plan of campaign. He persuaded the King to set out northwards in spite of the protests of Digby and the Court party, who wanted to join Goring in the West.

'All is governed by Prince Rupert,' sneered Trevor, 'but whether his power be supported by the present occasion, is a question for a conjuror. Certainly Lord Digby loves him not.'

Rupert's energy enabled the King to double his force within a month, during which time also he took Leicester and actively threatened Derby. Then once more the King was distracted between soldiers and courtiers. Digby urged that Fairfax was menacing the safety of the Council, the stores, and, above all, the ladies in Oxford. Rupert insisted on the first-rate importance of delivering a blow in the North. As usual, the King hesitated and doubted, and then sat down at Daventry to make up his mind.

Rupert made the mistake of holding too cheap the New Model Army, as to whose development in military proficiency his information was seriously defective. His intelligence also was so faulty that he was unaware of Fairfax's movements until his opponent was within a few miles of him, and, indeed, until on the evening of June 13 Ireton captured a party of Royalist Cavalrymen as they were enjoying a game of quoits in an inn at Naseby. One or two of these escaped and made their way to the King with the serious news that Fairfax was in force and almost within striking distance. The King sent for Rupert, who, realising the situation and his own great numerical inferiority, for once in his life counselled retreat; but then, as a

matter of course, the civilian opinion, voiced by Digby, was for a fight, and the inexpert advice was fatally adopted.

At eight o'clock the following morning the Royal Army was in position and prepared to act on the defensive. Rupert sent out his scout-master—one Luce, who was either a coward or a liar, and very likely both, for he returned after a purely perfunctory search to say he could get no sight of the enemy. A rumour, too good to be true, that Fairfax was retiring, caused Rupert to ride out and see things for himself. He had hardly gone a mile when he espied the Parliamentary Army shifting their ground. He jumped to the conclusion that Fairfax really was retreating, and summoned the Royalist Army to join him on a ridge. At ten o'clock he led the right wing of Cavalry forward, leaving the Infantry under old Astley and the left wing under Langdale, with three regiments of Infantry in reserve. He soon found himself in face of a much larger force than he had anticipated, and checked his pace rather abruptly, an unusual occurrence with him, but of which Ireton, who was evidently rather at sea with a Cavalry command, failed to take advantage. Rupert then spurred on, and, well-supported, rode through Ireton's squadrons, and, although exposed to a galling fire from behind hedges, swept the field, as at Edgehill, up to the enemy's guns and parked baggage. Here he was mistaken for Fairfax, both being dressed in red cloaks—one the Royal livery, the other a part of the officers' uniform in the New Model. But, again, as at Edgehill, while Rupert was carrying everything before him, the main body and reserve were getting into a hopeless plight. Cromwell at Naseby proved himself a Cavalry soldier who to natural aptitude had recently added a close study of problems likely to arise on the field. To his masterly performance was due the Royalist rout. Ireton on the left had hesitated, bungled, and been wounded; the like fate had befallen Skippon in the centre; but Cromwell on the right, too hampered by bad ground to move in line, made an advance in echelon from the left. His leading troops collided with Langdale, and firing their pistols at close range forced him to retire behind the reserve, where he rallied his men; but Whalley, in support, making his way over the rabbit-warren'd ground, drove Langdale's men back a quarter of a mile by a series of rushes. Cromwell, seeing that Langdale had then rallied once more, sent a small body of Cavalry to demonstrate towards him, and himself delivered three complete regiments of Horse

*From the original Mezzotint  
by Wallerant Vaillant  
in the British Museum.*

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**PRINCE RUPERT.**

**1619-1682.**



against the Royalist reserve where the King himself was. Charles bore himself gallantly, and with the old cry, 'For Queen Mary,' was leading forward the reserve headed by the troop of Guards, when his bridle was seized and his horse swung round by Lord Carnwarth. Before the King could recover himself, the front rank had gone about also, and swept their leader and their comrades to the rear. Rupert now appeared, breathless himself, and with his horses so blown and beaten as to be entirely ineffective to stem the tide; and with Ireton's rallied wing hanging on to their rear, the King's Army was pushed off the field.

The Parliamentary victory was marred by the cold-blooded murder of over a hundred helpless women, who were on the field and unable to make good their escape.

In July, Rupert was despatched to put Bristol in a state of defence. The chill sense of depression which already at Newbury had crept over him, and which Marston Moor only deepened, had by this time become an icy conviction that the cause was now hopeless. He urged the Duke of Richmond to represent to the King the necessity of making peace while it was still possible to do so on anything like dignified terms. 'His Majesty,' he wrote, 'hath no way to preserve his posterity, kingdom and nobility, but by treaty. I believe it to be a more prudent way to retain something than to lose all.' The King indignantly repudiated the suggestion, and Rupert thereupon determined to show a bold face as long as possible, announcing that he could easily hold Bristol against a four months' siege. This was, of course, a bit of pure bluff, for he found the place scantily supplied, seriously undermanned, and very despondent, the officers assuring him that the walls were not proof against any sort of vigorous assault. On September 4 Fairfax sat down before the town, and in a summons, half coaxing, half threatening, called for surrender. Rupert tried to gain time, and asked to be allowed to communicate with the King. This was refused, and at dawn six days later Fairfax assaulted and within an hour or two was in possession of the line of fortifications. Rupert had now to choose between a desperate sortie with the Cavalry, which would, even if successful in itself, have exposed the residue of the garrison to Fairfax's mercy; or a retreat to the castle with the Infantry, which would have left the Cavalry and townspeople exposed; or an honourable surrender, the last course being strenuously advocated

by his council of war. Rightly or wrongly, and Rupert has had all posterity for his critic, he entered into a treaty with Fairfax, and on September 10 the garrison marched out of the town. Fairfax promised and accorded all and more than all the honours of war; he himself rode for two miles by the side of Rupert, who, clad in scarlet and mounted on a superb black horse, had no look of a broken-down cavalier. If Rupert was overbearing in success, his demeanour in reverse was inimitable, and he won even the cold hearts of the Round-head soldiers. His parole to return the muskets he asked for was unhesitatingly accepted; the officer who escorted him to Oxford bore witness, 'I am glad I had the opportunity to see him; I am confident we have been mistaken in our opinion of him. I beg that nothing be printed that may derogate from his worth, for the delivery of Bristol; on my word he could not have held it; no man can blame him.' The King's resentment, however, was deep and bitter. All the self-sacrifice and superb courage which the nephew had shown were in a moment of blinding anger forgotten by the uncle, and in a letter none the less wounding because written by a broken-hearted man, he dismissed the Prince from his service and bade him begone. Rupert's reply was dignified and pathetic: 'I only say that if your Majesty had vouchsafed to hear me inform you, before you had made a final judgment, you would not have censured me as it seems you do. As you refused to see me, I owe myself that justice as to publish to the world what I think will clear my erring in all this business now in question, from any foul deed or neglect, and vindicate me from desert of any prevailing malice, though I suffer it. Your commands that I should dispose myself beyond seas be pleased to consider of, whether it be now in my power to go by it.' The sequel is well known: Rupert's determination at all costs to see the King and submit his case at first-hand for his uncle's consideration; his daring ride from Banbury to Newark, threading his way through the enemy's pickets, his dash under heavy fire, and hot pursuit to Belvoir Castle; his demand for a court-martial, and his acquittal by that tribunal of any lack of courage or fidelity.

So far, Rupert's conduct in circumstances which might well have strained his patience to snapping-point was irreproachable. Not so the subsequent incident which no aggravation could excuse. Incensed by an appointment to the Life Guards, which he misconstrued into a

further proof of Charles' ill-will, he forced his way into the Royal presence, behaved with great disrespect, and demanded, in almost mutinous terms, a pass to go over the sea. The King gave the pass with no word of farewell, but burst into tears as from the window he watched his gallant nephew ride away. Happily, before long the breach was repaired. Rupert's friends were able to bring him to his better self, and induce him to write an apology. 'I humbly acknowledge that great error which I find Your Majesty justly sensible of, which happened upon occasion at Newark.' The King sent Rupert a paper requesting him to sign an official acknowledgment of his disrespect. Rupert returned a blank sheet, with his signature subscribed, to signify his entire submission to the Sovereign's will. Rupert rejoined the King at Oxford, and was re-admitted to his confidence, but not reinstated in military command. This latter point, however, had little importance, as the war was practically over. The King left Oxford secretly on April 27 on his futile and fatal errand to the Scots Army, refusing his nephew's passionate request to be allowed to accompany him on the ground that Rupert's great stature would betray them. Oxford was now almost the last town to defy the Parliament, and Rupert kept his hand in by frequent sorties and skirmishes, in one of which, curiously enough, he was for the first time wounded. The end, however, was at hand. With the failure of the water supply the capitulation of Oxford was only a matter of time, and the terms of surrender included a clause permitting Rupert and Maurice to remain in England for six months, provided they did not approach within twenty miles of London. This condition was considered to have been broken by a visit they paid to their brother at Oatlands, although Fairfax had given them special permission to do so. The Parliament insisted that if in ten days they were to be found in England they should be treated as prisoners, and on July 4 Rupert took ship for Calais; his suite, for whom he insisted on passes, including a chaplain, seven gentlemen, footmen, grooms, a tailor, a gunsmith, a farrier, a secretary, his brother's secretary's brother, a laundress and her maid. Rupert's secretary kept a journal while in England, and its concluding clause is a pious ejaculation: 'Blessed be God for Prince Rupert's and our deliverance from the Parliament.'

Rupert, grown old in experience, was still young in years, and his energy was unquenchable. After a brief period of service in the



French Army, when he served unattached although offered the highest military rank, he entered on an entirely fresh career, being appointed "Admirall and Generall at Sea" of that part of the Navy which had remained loyal. The Prince took the sea with the same intrepidity with which he had taken the field. The very qualities which had distinguished him as a brilliant Cavalry leader now made of him a bold, adventurous, and expert seaman. His amphibious experience was, of course, not unusual at that period. Perhaps the memory of it may not unfittingly be recalled in connection with the present-day suggestion for closer co-operation between the sister services, a suggestion which our INSTITUTION may play an important part in fostering. With a miserably small squadron of inefficient and barely seaworthy vessels, Rupert long kept even the redoubtable Blake constantly employed in vain endeavours to effect his capture. Cornered at last at Carthagen, Rupert, with great pluck and with odds against him in the number of ships of three to one, engaged Blake in a desperate fight. Though his ships were run ashore, he himself escaped, and after further adventures set out with Maurice on a long buccaneering expedition in the Atlantic. Yet throughout the years of his sea-life none could ever allege against Rupert a single act of harshness, let alone cruelty. He met with the great sorrow of his life when in a violent storm Maurice's ship disappeared and the younger of the Princes was never heard of more. The buccaneering days over, the not unnatural sequel to four years' hardships was a serious illness. On his recovery his cousin of France gave him the Mastership of his Horse. After the Restoration, Rupert, who was now for six years First Lord of the Admiralty, was once again called to the administration of naval affairs. His hatred of bribery, jobbery, and peculation found vent in vehement protest. The indolent and good-natured King's only answer was, 'If you intend to man the fleet without being cheated by the captains and pursers, you may go to bed and never have it manned at all.' Rupert's naval duties, however, did not keep him on land. He was appointed to an active command in 1666, and ordered to attack the French with half the fleet, while Monk attacked the Dutch with the other half, the result being indecisive. Later, when the Dutch came up the Medway and burnt Sheerness, Rupert, by his previous fortification of Upnor, which he had armed with the best guns procurable, gave the enemy such a reception the moment they came within range

that the latter were compelled to retire. Although Rupert was to fight his last battle at sea in 1673, his greatest naval exploit was the defeat, in 1672, of no less a commander than Van Tromp, and this notwithstanding the fact that his own flagship was nearly sinking.

One might well think that Rupert's career on land and sea was already sufficiently crowded with incident, but strenuous work was to him as the air hē breathed, and it is therefore not surprising that he should have attained a degree of renown as a practical lover of science and art. When a boy prisoner in the Castle of Lintz, he had exercised his always busy brain and fingers in etchings, some of which, bearing the date of 1637, are, I think, still in existence. The story that he actually invented mezzotint from watching a soldier clean a rusty gun is, I fear, mythical. The process was invented by a soldier in 1642, when Rupert was very differently employed; but the inventor explained the process to him sixteen years later in Vienna. The two agreed to keep the secret from all but a select few, while Rupert's delighted interest and powerful influence materially encouraged the beautiful art, which, moreover, he did actually introduce into England. But several other discoveries are really attributable to Rupert's imagination and research. Prince's metal—a combination of copper and zinc; Rupert's drops—a bubble of glass which has amused children and puzzled their elders—remain to his credit as a chemist; his method of boring guns was afterwards carried into useful effect, but his contrivance for annealing metal was locked so tight in his breast that the invention died with the inventor. In 1662 Rupert was made a member of the Royal Society, whose records mention, among other items, his fabrication of a gunpowder ten times stronger than that in ordinary use, a mode of blowing up submarine rocks, a hydraulic engine, and an improvement in the naval quadrant. While Rupert's fertile brain had full play in his laboratory, his great physical strength was abundantly exercised in his forge. The writer of his funeral ode described him as 'forging the thunderbolts of war his hands so well could throw.' The King, with the Duke of Buckingham, would frequently drop in when he was at work, and when Rupert had enough of their society he used to throw some chemical on the fire which emitted such a horrible smell that his distinguished visitors, half-choked, would rush out of what they called 'the alchemist's hell.'

One word as to Rupert's private life. His affections were centred

in his family. His open-handed devotion to his mother was in sharp contrast to the churlish and niggardly conduct of her eldest son; his care for his brother Maurice, whom he considered as a kind of sacred charge, was proof against many trials and difficulties, and ended only with the death of that rather unsatisfactory Prince. During the years before the Restoration, Rupert paid more than one visit to his mother at The Hague. In what was perhaps the last letter written to her favourite son from Holland, before her death in London in 1662, she ends with the words: 'I love you ever, dear Rupert.'

But his sympathies ranged widely, and few who appealed to his generous heart, and even to his very narrow resources, appealed in vain. In particular, his unceasing care for the distressed Cavaliers is to his undying credit. Rupert's devotion to the person of Charles I. was extended as far as possible towards his son and successor; but the enervating circumstances of the Caroline Court after the Restoration were suited neither to his tastes nor to his temperament. At the same time, he could not complain of any lack of attention, or even of gratitude on the part of the King, and the appointment to the Governorship of Windsor Castle was the happiest mark of affection his august cousin could pay him. Although Rupert was only sixty-three when he died, he had outlived almost all his contemporaries and early friends, and one figure alone was able to ward off the sense of loneliness and disappointment which oppressed him.

It has been hitherto commonly supposed that Rupert never married, and to rank on equal terms the episode with the fascinating actress Mrs. Hughes and the long and tender associations with Francesca Bard, the daughter of that gallant Cavalier, Lord Bellamont. This view has been taken by so great an authority as the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, but it has recently been proved that a marriage did take place at Petersham, and by the courtesy of Rupert's distinguished biographer, Miss Scott, I am able to produce a copy of the certificate. After Rupert's death Francesca found, not only a sisterly welcome from, but a permanent home with, the Electress Sophia, the illustrious ancestress of our Sovereign. Many reasons can be suggested why, if a marriage took place, it should have been concealed; not the least plausible one being that, as Francesca was a devout Roman Catholic, a public acknowledgment of his marriage would have raised a 'No Popery' hue and cry after

Rupert, who might have been forced, not only out of the service of the Crown, but out of England itself.

It is agreeable to think that the evening of Rupert's life was solaced and his death-bed cheered by the presence of the woman to whom he was both lawfully united and devotedly attached. For Rupert, a little out of sympathy with his surroundings, and perhaps a little out of sorts with himself, was also prematurely worn out. The intense strain and stress of early and middle life had begun to take their toll; the old wound in his head and the more recent injury to his leg gave him constant and acute physical suffering, and perhaps also caused the many hard blows he had received and the many disappointments he had undergone to stand out in too sharp mental relief. For Rupert would have been the last to think that if many of the efforts of his life had failed in their immediate results, the failures were only removed by a hair's breadth from many undying triumphs. The end came in November 1682, in Rupert's town house in Spring Gardens. A sharp fever attacked him, pleurisy supervened, and though the brave eyes looked bravely as ever on the last enemy to come within range, the tired body could do no more. So with no special quarrel against Fate, yet I think not all unwillingly, Prince Rupert, than whom no braver soldier ever drew a sword, no truer friend ever grasped a hand, having stoutly fought life's hard battle,

Surrendered his fair soul  
To the great Captain, Christ.



*CHARGE OF BREDOW'S BRIGADE**VIONVILLE, AUGUST 16, 1870*

BY MAJOR P. A. CHARRIER, ROYAL MUNSTER FUSILIERS

ON the Prussian side General Alvensleben's corps had been fighting since the morning, and had drawn on the whole French army. The Prussian official account says, 'General Alvensleben might be contented with such a result; nothing should induce him to push further; for the present the essential was rather not to allow himself to be crushed under heavy numbers of the adversary. It was nearly two o'clock P.M., and the day was yet long; no reserves were left, not a gun, not a rifleman, and the 20th Infantry Division, the nearest available troops, were still very far off. Nothing remained but to see what the gallantry of the Cavalry could do.'

The French corps under Marshal Canrobert was just coming into action, 'and clouds of dust warned the approach of further reinforcements for the French.'


General Bredow's brigade was the nearest Cavalry available, and as he was moving towards Vionville he was met by Colonel Voigts-Rhetz, who brought him the order to attack.

After some extraordinary palavering Bredow agreed to attack. At this moment his brigade was reduced to 2 squadrons and 3 troops 7th Cuirassiers and 3 squadrons 16th Uhlans (the other squadrons being detached). The brigade trotted in mass past the left of Major Koerber's batteries, 'Troops left wheel,' as soon as the head of the valley 280 was reached.

Then under cover until Bredow judged he had cleared the left flank of his own Infantry, when 'Troops right wheel' brought him into mass under the brow of the slope. On reaching ground close to contour 285 he had deployed into squadron column, and just before

cresting the slope 'Line to the front,' followed by 'Gallop,' was sounded.

The charge rode through the French guns (plate 2), sabring the gunners, and through the Infantry.




They were now attacked by Forton's and Valebregue's Cavalry Divisions, and cut their way through once again back to their own lines.

They reformed south of Flavigny. While Bredow was moving to

the attack, Major Koerber to mask and support Bredow's approach, concentrated the fire of his batteries on the portion of the enemy's line where he thought Bredow's charge would get home. This co-operation had the best results, the fire of the Artillery efficaciously prepared the Cavalry attack. When Bredow crested the slope the gunners continued the fire just clear of the right of the 16th Uhlans.

*Result.*—The French official account says, 'The heroic charge of the German Cavalry had well attained its object. . . . The ground which it had traversed was momentarily abandoned by the greatest



part of the French Infantry which had occupied it, and the Artillery north of the high road (*i.e.* road Vionville-Rezonville) completely dispersed. . .

'Generally speaking, the calm which succeeded the vigorous action of Bredow's brigade, heightened the morale of the Prussian troops by the feeling they had of having got out of a period of crisis, which otherwise might have terminated badly for them long before their reinforcements could come up. . . . It seems that the moral impression produced by the charge on the French, along with the material dis-

order worked by the Prussian Cavalry in their track, was the principal cause why the combat on the French side on this part of the battlefield was only very slowly re-established. It was a positive result, and very important for the III. Corps (Alvensleben's III. German Corps).'

The losses suffered were mostly after the charge had successfully got through, and Bredow's men were set upon by the French Cavalry north of Rezonville.

The 7th Cuirassiers lost in horses, killed or wounded or captured by enemy during the whole day, 261.

The 16th Uhlans lost during the whole day, 172 horses killed, 28 wounded.

Plate 2 shows the fire brought to bear by the French on this attack.

The French 10th Infantry Regiment, part of the 9th and 85th fired into Bredow's left flank within 600 yards distance.

The guns immediately attacked had hardly time to fire.

The 93rd Regiment fired into Bredow's front.

The 70th Regiment and the 91st Regiment fired into Bredow, both on his arrival and on his return.

The fire from the French Infantry rifle of the day was a very heavy fire, yet all witnesses agree that the losses suffered by Bredow were mostly on his way home again, and not during the attack.

The days of Cavalry are not over. For can they not 'ride rapidly into the danger that the Infantry can only walk into'?





A CONSIDERATION OF OPPOSITE VIEWS  
CONCERNING CAVALRY

BY GENERAL OF CAVALRY VON BERNHARDI

[This article is a criticism of Mr. Erskine Childers' book, *War and the Arme Blanche*, by General von Bernhardt, who is rightly considered one of the most eminent Cavalry authorities of the day.—Translation from *Militär Wochenblatt*, by 'White Horse.']

A SHORT time ago a certain Mr. Erskine Childers published in England a book entitled *War and the Arme Blanche*, in which he pleads—basing his arguments essentially on the experiences of the South African War—for a radical reform of the English Cavalry.

The author himself is not a soldier, and naturally is devoid not only of all war experience, but also of a practical understanding of the questions which concern peace training and military possibilities. His military studies do not appear to have been sufficiently exhaustive to outweigh these deficiencies. Of this he is in no way conscious. In consideration of this fact his ideas would command little respect, if it had not been for a special circumstance which give them a certain importance. No less a person than Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, England's premier soldier, has written a preface to this book, and declared himself in accord with the views and proposals of the author except for a minor essential detail. He is in direct opposition to General French, the Cavalry General *par excellence* of the South African War, Inspector-General of Great Britain's forces, who, owing to these very self-same African experiences, has arrived at quite different conclusions to Mr. Childers. Lord Roberts invites all officers of the English Army not to carelessly throw aside Mr. Childers' book, because it is written by a civilian, or to be horrified at the first chapters—which at all events in abstruse theory do all in that way which is possible, and are very unpalatable—either to refute the matter contained in the book, disprove the arguments, and to show that the conclusions and demands arrived at are untenable, or to reconcile themselves to the author's views.

If a man with the war experience of Lord Roberts, whose importance is recognised in England, takes up his pen, his views without doubt demand attention; so much the more when they concern questions which for us Germans as well are of far-reaching importance. Besides, Mr. Childers' book is interesting from a general point of view. It lights up in quite a peculiar way the whole of the South African War, and its military and political events. Thus it may not be uninteresting to become acquainted with the views of this author which have had the sanction of the English Field-Marshal, and to show shortly how Lord Roberts and General French approach these questions under discussion, at any rate, the most notable representatives of the English Army. The demand of the former, either to refute Mr. Childers or to accept his views as conclusive, I will willingly comply with, even if it is not possible for me, on account of space, to follow him in all the tortuous paths of his subtle casuistry. I will attempt to confine myself to the essential.

Mr. Childers starts his considerations by a number of suppositions and assertions, which simply have for him the importance of an axiom, and which according to him, therefore, do not require to be proved. The theoretical manner of looking at military problems he holds to be unfruitful and likely to lead in the wrong direction. With mighty disdain he speaks of theoretical reflections in contradiction to living experience. As authoritative experiences he counts only those which took place after the introduction of smokeless powder and small-bore rifles. At the most, he allows the Cavalry of the American Civil War to count, as long as their action is useful to prove his views. For Englishmen, according to him, the Boer War is really the only war. The experiences gained in this war are especially applicable to the Cavalry, and finally authoritative, so much the more as according to his views they have been confirmed by the Russo-Japanese War. With ever-renewed zeal he contests the idea that the war in South Africa was of such a peculiar type that the experiences gained there can be based as of general application without anything further being said. He accepts as indisputable, that no nation, and especially the Germans, could have done any better than the English in South Africa. This he repeats quite plainly.

He differentiates further, as far as I can understand his somewhat unclear statement, between 'shock' and 'charge.' By 'shock' he

understands the mechanical collision of a knee-to-knee mass against another mass of the same sort at the fastest pace; by 'charges,' the attack in open order on foot or mounted, and maintains that the use of the *arme blanche* is bound up with shock tactics, and it is not to be thought of without it. He further maintains that it is impossible to keep the horses fresh enough in modern war so that they will be able to move fast enough for shock action. He declares that it is impossible to train Cavalry for shock action with *arme blanche* and for use as mounted riflemen. He can only understand the mounted man with the *arme blanche* or the rifle; a man trained for both is for him in every particular a useless hybrid.

According to these standpoints the author views the Boer War, and in a short sketch the Russo-Japanese War. He arrives at the following conclusions:—

The *arme blanche* is a thing of the past, Cavalry should be armed only with a rifle carried on the man. Rifle-fire rules the battlefield and dictates the tactics. The idea that in future wars such a thing as a Cavalry duel could take place either during the strategical plan or during the battle appears to him simply absurd. Neither in Africa nor in Manchuria did such a thing happen, therefore cannot take place in the future. Therefore, all such ideas as shock tactics must be given up; there must only be one sort of horseman—the mounted rifleman. This rifleman must be at least as well instructed in horsemanship as the cavalryman of to-day. The distinction between the duel on horseback and the fight on foot is unnatural and must be given up; both modes of fighting must be employed together. The horseman must also use his weapon on horseback, both in reconnaissance as in the charge. This can be carried out, as the danger zone to horses in open order can be quickly overcome by continuous fire from the saddle, and then the men can dismount and continue the fight on foot. One can, according to circumstances, dismount at effective range, or, if better, ride right up to the enemy, and then dismount for a hand-to-hand fight, of course only employing the rifle. In this manner even entrenched positions can be attacked mounted.

Horse Artillery is no auxiliary, but much more a disadvantage to Cavalry.

One must give up all idea in the strategical advance of riding through fire; the *arme blanche* should be abolished, and every trace

of tactical theory connected with the same cast into oblivion; the preparation of the battle and artillery support, as far as possible, should be done away with; one should be content with a sensible superiority in numbers; then one has the true tactics for the offensive of mounted troops in modern war. What the author understands by a sensible numerical superiority is not quite clear. In the Boer War, according to his own calculations, superiority in numbers of from ten to twelve times did not suffice to really defeat the Boers.

With these truly radical ideas Lord Roberts is in complete agreement. As well, he holds that the rifle is the chief weapon for the cavalryman, and looks upon the re-introduction of the lance in the British Cavalry as a retrograde step. He does not wish, however, to take all steel weapons away from the Cavalry; in this alone he differs from Mr. Childers; he wishes to arm them with a sword-bayonet, which the man will carry on his body, a view which unfortunately has its supporters amongst us. But in general he is in accord with all that Mr. Childers proposes, and, indeed, as he expressly mentions, on the ground of personal experience.

All operations leading up to the battle, he says, fall to them. The results of their reconnaissance must often serve the Commander-in-Chief as the reason for his decisions. They can help in certain circumstances to decide the battle. They reap the fruits of victory. They prevent a defeat becoming a rout. But with the *arme blanche* with the knee-to-knee attack they cannot obtain such results opposed to an enemy equipped and trained with a magazine rifle. The charge in close order belongs to a past era, and the more as the effect of the rifle in the future will increase with the introduction of an automatic rifle with increased velocity. Mounted attacks will probably still take place, in open order, against Cavalry surprised, and demoralised Infantry. But they appear to the Field-Marshal of very little importance. To-day, on the other hand, two essential things must be demanded from the Cavalry: mobility, and the ability to use the rifle with effect.

Mobility must be maintained by the most careful horse management. The rifle is the decisive factor in the charge as well. The deductions of Mr. Childers, together with his own experiences, has convinced the Field-Marshal that all attacks with the rifle can be more effectively carried through than with the sword. As well, it will be often possible

to advance mounted, like the one General French carried out at Klip Drift, and there is no doubt that such a method on many occasions would be much more effective than an attack dismounted. But such an advance must be made by mounted riflemen, threatening the enemy with the mighty power of the rifle. Finally, Lord Roberts expresses his opinion about the 'Cavalry spirit.' He believes that by this is meant a special 'spirit for the charge,' and maintains that Cavalry require no other spirit than the soldierly qualities which the remainder of the troops must possess. Also, as Mr. Childers is incapable of thinking of the Cavalry spirit, except the wish to charge, one is able to see that the true *rôle* of the Cavalry arm, as we Germans understand it, is quite foreign to the understanding of both gentlemen. How differently did old Blücher think, who had quite a different war experience to help him than Lord Roberts: 'An enduring courage and perseverance,' he once wrote in his despatch to the King, 'give the Infantry, as a rule, the victory; if the Cavalry is to carry out much, a certain inspiration which must arise from confidence in themselves must inspire the mass, and the power of invention rule their footsteps.'

As a general rule the Infantry advance to a known danger with conscious courage; the Artillery as well reckon in battle with known movements of danger; on the other hand, the cavalryman rides, in all independent operations, at least, on patrol, to an unknown fate. Any moment he can be surprised in a ticklish position, which demands quick resolve and often bold horsemanship. His whole service is a continuous daring, and it is just this pleasure in such daring, and the confidence, the steadfast courage, quick soldierly instinct, determined riding, and the use of each of his different weapons when required in dangers which are unforeseen, that rests really the true Cavalry spirit. Whoever wishes to arrive at it let him read Blücher's life by Unger, and study the deeds and the personality of the great Stuart in the American War of Secession. But this is only a part, although in itself quite instructive, in making clear what is the true Cavalry spirit.

In opposition to the views of Lord Roberts stands General French, who has personal experience as well of the South African Campaign. He believes that Cavalry certainly need the rifle to carry out their important tasks against the hostile army and their communications, that these tasks give to their activity and wish to undertake operations the

widest scope, but that they can only carry out these tasks after they have defeated the enemy's Cavalry. He maintains, in contradiction to Mr. Childers, that the Cavalry duel is a necessity, and believes that it must be fought out with the *arme blanche*. As regards the Cavalry spirit he takes quite a different view to Lord Roberts. He does not limit it to the sense of a one-sided wish to charge, but looks upon it in a broader sense, combining as well the fire fight of Cavalry. The English Cavalry appear essentially to lean to the views of General French; they are trained with this idea, and principal stress is laid on the mounted attack. On the other hand, Lord Roberts has his supporters. At any rate, the question is an interesting one, how much importance one should attach to the firearm as a Cavalry weapon, and what rôle the *arme blanche* still plays. The experiences of the South African War, as a basis for the discussion of this question, I look upon as a great mistake; on the other hand, they should not be placed too high. But as such a man as Lord Roberts, who took a decisive part in this war, has declared himself in accord with the view of Mr. Childers in this particular, it will be most convenient to examine the ideas of the latter in opposition to those of General French in order to arrive at a correct conclusion. It is most important for every German Cavalry officer to be perfectly clear concerning the value of the experiences of the South African War.

Let us now keep critically before our mind's eye Mr. Childers' train of thought; we will then, at any rate, soon discover that his standpoint is extraordinarily assailable. In the first case it is quite wrong to accept as of general application simply the experiences of a single campaign, without taking into consideration the special circumstances which it required. Without the theoretical or speculative consideration that the thing under other general and special conditions could or must be the same, the single experience leads only too easily on a wrong road, which is shown in numerous cases in the history of war, as we ourselves know only too well. The next war is always different to the one preceding it, especially when it has to be fought out under peculiar conditions. To foresee and to estimate correctly what is new, taking into consideration all earlier experiences, as far as they have a lasting importance, this is what is of consequence. This proceeding is not quite so simple as that of Mr. Childers', but it is necessary if one really wishes to benefit by experiences. It must be applied

to the South African War, even if it allows itself to be compared at least in its general character with probable great European wars. But that is, in spite of Mr. Childers, not the case.

In Africa a standing army trained in quite antiquated methods, which was reinforced only during the course of the campaign by considerable hordes of Militia from all parts of the earth, fought against a peasant Militia, entirely mounted, who were tied to their ox-waggons for their active operations, quite incapable of assuming the offensive on a large scale, and only during the latter stages of the campaign, in guerilla and partisan warfare, learnt the tactical offensive. This Militia fought entirely with the rifle, and this the mounted troops of England had to learn. Superior numbers fought besides against disappearing smaller numbers, which on their side were far superior in the fire fight, and, therefore, in the defence took up extensions which would never occur in a European war. Mr. Childers maintains that it is quite normal if 900 men take up ground of 2 to 3 k.m. extension, as the Boers did, for example, at Elandslaagte.

During the whole first part of the war the Boers as a general rule kept on the defensive, and allowed the English as much time as they wanted for their preparations. All considerations of time were in a way influenced as they could never be in a European war, in which probably both sides would press forward to a decision. Quick offensive reconnaissance would not be necessary, and already this gives the whole *rôle* of the Cavalry activity quite a different complexion. Besides, reconnaissance by Cavalry patrols neither the Boers nor the English understood, as even Mr. Childers allows. Reconnaissance was as a general rule carried out by local spies. After the conquest of the country a national war developed, which had nothing to do with the conflict of large armies against each other, and which can be compared best with the Patriot War of the Spaniards against Napoleon. These are, in my opinion, conditions which can only be thought peculiar.

As regards what specially appertains to the Cavalry charge, the Boers were often not strong enough to charge either the English Cavalry or to attack the English Infantry. The English had, finally, 70,000 to 80,000 horsemen in the field—that is, more than the entire Boer army. The latter were, quite apart from the partisan warfare, after they had failed to take advantage of the favourable opportunity

for the offensive at the commencement, directed by halting leadership which could only lead with the rifle in entrenched positions, that made an attack on horseback impossible. Besides, the English Cavalry made no relentless pursuit despite the lack of operative mobility in the enemy, partly because the horses would not allow of it, and partly because the well-posted flanks of the Boers were not to be overcome by the Cavalry masses carrying out a parallel pursuit, thus making it possible to launch an attack. In my opinion one cannot consider these conditions as normal. One could scarcely find a European Cavalry which was tied down to such an extent during the big operations as the Boers', or one which against such little resistance did not try to overcome it as the English. If, only to use an example, 150 Boers with one gun were in a position at Dronfield to beat off successfully the attack first of a Cavalry Brigade consisting of 1,200 men and three batteries, and later the attack of three Cavalry brigades with five batteries, then this cannot be considered as normal. Mr. Childers relates the story without any spite, only to show the little value of English Cavalry equipment and training. I think it shows much besides, especially as lack of energy cannot be imputed to the attack, as General French was there himself and guided the fight. Very peculiar is the assertion that under such circumstances no army in the world could have done better in South Africa than the English. The last thing in the world I should do is to belittle the bearing of the English soldier. They have always borne themselves under the most diverse conditions with the greatest fortitude. But Mr. Childers disproves his own statements, because he explains frequently why the English performed such an extraordinary little. The first reverses caused a wholesome respect to be felt for the Boers; losses were avoided; in general they avoided the frontal attack; the troops were not permeated with the conviction that in face of the crushing numerical superiority it was necessary to dare their utmost; the attempts of the superior leading to inspire the leaders and troops with an energetic spirit remained unsuccessful; the moral impulse was not anything like that of the enemy, and other reasons more so. That the meagre performances are to be written down to the fact that a great part of the army consisted of Colonial Militia troops is never mentioned, probably for political reasons. Besides, single fights, which Mr. Childers openly mentions as worthy of notice as conspicuous



for the performances of the troops, are such which no one would term as especially brilliant; besides, the casualty lists tell a plain tale. I would recommend Mr. Childers to compare them with the casualty lists of the Germans and French in the 1870-71 campaign, or those of the Russo-Japanese War; perhaps he will then obtain quite a different picture of what good troops can perform.

As well, Mr. Childers is not very happy in his tactical presuppositions. His opinion that the use of the *arme blanche* is bound up with shock action—that is, in the knee-to-knee charge—is naturally quite wrong. As long as a body of troops are closed, they can only use the lance just as far as they can reach forward over the horses' heads; the real use of the weapon only, as a matter of fact, starts during the break up, be it in a *mêlée* or in the pursuit, or when the attack is entirely carried out in open order. If the author further maintains that in a modern campaign it is impossible to keep the horses fresh and capable of galloping, it may be so in the English Cavalry—I do not know and certainly do not believe it. At any rate, for other Cavalry it certainly is not true. He should read what exertions Stuart's horses underwent on his different raids, and in spite of all how fresh they still were for the attack. He should above all read military history in order to study the capability of the horse. But he really does not need to go so far; he himself relates that the Boers, who had truly to perform much greater exertions than their enemy, who was many times superior to them in numbers, rode attacks at the gallop from 2,000 metres distant at the utmost speed of their small horses.

Just as in respect of the galloping capabilities of the horse, Mr. Childers errs when he maintains that it is impossible to train Cavalry both for the *arme blanche* and the rifle. He, however, disproves himself also in this case, as he mentions the Cavalry of Stuart and Sheridan. The latter, according to Stuart's judgment, fought better on foot than their own Infantry, and that they knew how to charge on horseback is proved in numberless battles and combats; especially Stuart's squadrons, which always tried to bring a decision about mounted whenever possible, and charged not only Cavalry—as Mr. Childers says—but also attacked Infantry and Artillery with cold steel. They were trained for both methods of fighting just as I have tried to bring about in our Cavalry, and in both rôles did wonders. Against Cavalry they often attacked in closed and dense columns. Also in

their raids they often cut their way through with the sword, which Mr. Childers seems to be ignorant of. Also our German Cavalry is in part excellently trained to use the rifle, and in South-West Africa the German Cavalry, in spite of the fact that they were also armed with the sword and lance, showed what they were able to do as mounted riflemen. Their endurance in the fight was probably much greater than ever was that of the Boers. True they were not trained to fire from the saddle. What this interesting question means I will discuss minutely in its place, as such a man as Lord Roberts speaks of the 'Rifle Attack Mounted.' If Mr. Childers' suppositions, on which he bases his argument, are easily assailable, so much the more are his conclusions.

In one particular, however, I will own he is correct: the rifle rules tactics. That is indisputable. Nobody can with the *arme blanche* compel an opponent on his side tactically to use the *arme blanche*. To the will of the firearm everything must be subordinated in war. But that, as a necessary corollary from this, to say that there can be no fight with the *arme blanche*, is a mischievous sophism. Every Infantryman carries a bayonet, because he requires it for the assault. Even Lord Roberts will not take this away, as we saw above, and mentions specific cases in which Cavalry might use the bayonet: 'In night attacks, in thick fog, or when a fire fight from some cause or other is neither possible nor advisable.'

I maintain, and from every practical point of view I am right, that for the *mêlée* mounted the rifle is absolutely useless, and in the collision of the mounted fight is as dangerous for their own people as for the enemy. In the *mêlée* mounted the *arme blanche* is decidedly superior to the rifle, and in general to the revolver as well. That a Cavalry battle, that a duel between the two opposing Cavalries will ensue, in the strategical use of Cavalry as well as in the decisive battle of both armies, I maintain will occur without any doubt, and I incline to the opinion of General French, that this combat will be fought out essentially with the *arme blanche*. The mass and approach march conditions of European armies force a quick decision. Quick reconnaissance is necessary for both opponents. In general this must be attained by the Cavalry, supported by captive balloons. This will be pushed forward on both sides, and the necessity of both will be to come to a quick decision. This condition of affairs must lead to a

shock decision, for the fight on foot on one hand decreases the mobility of the Cavalry, wastes a lot of time, and, on the other hand, often brings no real decision. Therefore, as long as the opposing Cavalries take the field with a sure purpose and unbroken power, they must meet each other, and will try to defeat each other by shock action; in this fight shock will be decisive, the cohesion and power of the attack, in spite of all the mockery and scorn which Mr. Childers above all other representatives pours out, and in spite of the opinion of the English Field-Marshal. The same will occur during the battle and in the pursuit. Each side must try to act with their Cavalry against the flanks and rear of the enemy; this task the Cavalry can only solve if the opposing Cavalry is beaten from the field. Quick decision is absolutely essential if it is wished to act at the right time against the hostile main body, therefore, shock action. Only then, supposing one side from the beginning does not feel equal to the enemy, will it shun a decision by shock action, and take up the defensive rôle with the rifle. This we can certainly learn from the Boer War, and this lesson is certainly confirmed by the Russo-Japanese War. Therefore, we must equip and train our Cavalry so that under all circumstances we shall be able to compel a quick decision with the rifle, and when opposed to a superior enemy try for a positive goal in an offensive sense; therefore, greatest cohesion and power in the attack, so that even superior numbers will be broken against them, and a reinforcement of the fire power of our Army Cavalry so that they can meet every eventuality. That our Cavalry is capable of this double rôle, just as well as the Stuart's and Sheridan's, one can see on nearly all exercise grounds.

In his criticism of the Horse Artillery the judgment of Mr. Childers is equally one-sided. He fears that it will impede their power of surprise and their wish to attack, and maintains that the offensive spirit of the Boers only began after they had lost all their Artillery. That an arm can be used incorrectly, and that the Boers learnt the offensive, in spite of the fact that they had no more Artillery, proves nothing against the value of Horse Artillery. Mr. Childers ought only to study the War of American Secession, which he is so keen to refer to, in order to see what Horse Artillery in co-operation with Cavalry can accomplish. The celebrated horse batteries under Stuart would teach him.

Further, that there were no Cavalry duels in South Africa was caused, on the one hand, by the fact of the armament and the numerical weakness of the Boers; on the other hand, by the English Cavalry themselves, who sometimes did not attack, even when they had the opportunity, for example, in the battle of Roodewal, and, as already mentioned, never attempted to overcome the resistance of small well-posted flanking detachments which barred their way for attack—*i.e.* at Poplar Grove. In Manchuria the conditions were similar. The Japanese Cavalry were, numerically, much too weak to attack mounted, and the Russian Cavalry was so extraordinarily bad, and lacked all sense of energy, that they cannot be taken as an example of what Cavalry can perform, either with the *arme blanche* or the rifle, and least of all in a strategical sense. Also the horse management was so bad that in consequence of the most horrible galls and sore-backs the troops were frequently only able to move at a walk. That such a Cavalry is not keen to attack goes without saying, quite apart from the foolish handling of the leadership. Even supposing they had relied on the rifle, they would scarcely have achieved more; at least it would be perfectly arbitrary to assume so. For other armies and conditions the South African and Manchurian campaigns, as far as they concern the Cavalry fight, have a very limited importance. In Mr. Childers' eyes, indeed, they have an extraordinary importance, and it is bound up exclusively with their armament. This question of armament has, in his eyes, an extraordinary importance. Men with the *arme blanche* cannot possibly penetrate the fire zone; however, if they are armed with the rifle and without cold steel, then they may take on even entrenched positions. It is quite ridiculous to read what General French could have done at Klip Drift if he had had no *arme blanche*. The horses of the men equipped with cold steel cannot possibly be kept fresh enough to attack at the gallop; however, if they carry only rifles, then they can gallop far and fast enough to get into the danger zone with very slight losses. On this ability to ride through fire scathelessly moves, indeed, the climax, the acme of the whole of the Childers-Robertsonian Cavalry tactics: the rifle charge. It is incontestable that the Boers repeatedly attacked horseback, and fired during these gallops, and then either at effective range, or close to the enemy, dismounted and carried on the fight with the rifle. They left their horses quite loose, or took the reins over their heads and held them on their arms.

By this means it was always possible for them to escape from their opponents on horseback if the victory was not on their side. The case which Mr. Childers cites is highly interesting, but the conclusions he draws are extremely original. Let us take two specially instructive episodes upon which Mr. Childers himself lays special stress, and which he reports from the official history, even if it is at times not quite clear. Colonel Benson, who commanded on October 30, 1901, a mixed force of 650 Infantry, 950 Mounted rifles, and 6 guns, was on the point of going into camp, or, at any rate, had already bivouacked with the main body. A rear-guard, which consisted of a company of Infantry, 380 Mounted rifles, and 2 guns, were still on the march, and various other flanking detachments. The weather was moist and cloudy. Louis Botha, who is said to have had about 1,000 Boers with him, demonstrated from all sides against the enemy, attacked the rear-guard under a continuous fire from the saddle from about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile in a long gallop across open undulating country. The English rear party, which consisted of Mounted rifles, were taken prisoners, and the company of Infantry was overwhelmed, whilst the remainder of the Mounted rifles with the guns drew back towards a neighbouring kopje, which sloped away to the plain without any physical obstacle. Right up to the foot of this kopje the Boers rode, then immediately dismounted in dead ground immediately in front of the enemy, attacked the English on foot, dashed upon them and captured the two guns. One must remember that the quickest gallop the Boer horses were capable of was only equal to a quiet canter of the English Cavalry horses.

The second example which I wish to mention is the attack of the Boers at Roodewal on April 10, 1902. It occurred during one of the great drives, which by Kitchener's orders was undertaken at this time. One of the driving columns consisting of 4,000 under Colonel Kekewich was moving along in two parties in a westerly direction; on his right and to the north, as far as one can gather from Mr. Childers' narrative, Colonel von Donop, and on his left, Colonel Grenfell. Each column was about 2,000 strong; Grenfell's column appears to have consisted of about 1,200 Mounted rifles and of Infantry and guns. This latter is not clear from the account. It had 280 horsemen in front as scouts, it appears, thrown well forward, and moved itself in column of route. The whole open country sloped in the direction of

the march, right up to the plateau about Roodewal Farm. Behind this plateau the Boer leader, Kemp, had assembled a force of Boers, which consisted of from 1,000 to 1,500 men. This force Kemp now deployed in two long lines with their flanks thrown forward with wide intervals, and advanced at a slow trot. As the Boers approached the English scouts, they broke into a quiet gallop and began to fire. The English advanced horsemen retired quickly, but left 40 prisoners in the hands of the enemy, who continued his advance. Arrived at the above-mentioned plateau of Roodewal, the Boers caught sight of the English columns, and now, for the first time, the surprised English saw the enemy. It appears that Grenfell's column marched as quickly as possible in the direction of its head—1,200 Mounted rifles deployed in a line of defence and dismounted. Von Donop's column took longer to deploy. Against this column, however, only the northern part of the Boer line rode, without attacking. But about 800 Boers closed and attacked Grenfell's column, which was still about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile away, in the slow gallop of the small Boer ponies over a completely flat open plain, firing continuously from the saddle. From about 600 yards the Boers received the fire of 1,500 rifles and 6 guns, whilst they themselves rode closed, knee to knee, and two to four men in depth. The English appeared to have fired in a wild and uncontrolled manner, the enemy advancing up to about 100 yards. Potgieter, the brave leader of this determined attack, fell about 70 yards in front of the English, and the attacking line retired without disorder until it disappeared behind the plateau of Roodewal. One would have thought that no Boer would have escaped unwounded. But this was far from the facts. Fifty dead and 30 wounded they left upon the battlefield, whilst the English suffered a loss of 7 killed, 56 wounded, and 150 horses. Mr. Childers adds that through this loss in horseflesh the English Cavalry lost their mobility, and were unable to carry out a counter-attack, for which, undoubtedly, the opportunity was very favourable.

If one looks at these two episodes critically and without bias, one especially notices the following facts in the first: (1) The English reconnaissance appears to be absolutely *nil*; (2) the company which allowed itself to be overwhelmed in this fashion must either have had their fire masked by their own mounted men, or they must have been a most miserable lot of men, for otherwise the episode appears in-

explicable; (3) the troops who occupied the rearward hill must have been little trained and were completely taken aback, for otherwise they would have taken up a position which commanded the dead ground in their front; for then they could have shot at the advancing Boers, who, in fact, dismounted 30 yards from the English front, so that they would have had no wish to dismount. The English appear to have sought protection behind the hill, for otherwise the Boers could not possibly have dismounted immediately in their front; if the attack had been carried out with the *arme blanche* and in a real charging gallop of a well-trained Cavalry, then the power of resistance of the English would have certainly been much less. Possibly the position on the rearward hill could not have been captured. The Boers at the critical moment should have avoided dismounting immediately in front of the enemy, an attempt which, against intelligent troops, would have led to annihilation.

We are brought to the same conclusions about the second episode : (1) It shows incomplete or really no reconnaissance on the part of the British. (2) Further, one arrives at the conclusion that, if the attack had been carried out with the *arme blanche* at a proper gallop, the English would have suffered a complete disaster. The Boers approached to within 600 yards at their slow pony gallop before the English had advanced far enough to direct an effective fire against them; if the Boers had gone double the pace they would have broken through before the English had marched up at all, and the *arme blanche* would have reaped a terrible harvest. (3) The English must have lost their heads completely, for the 1,500 rifles and 6 guns scarcely caused any appreciable loss against an enemy advancing comparatively slowly in dense closed-up lines, two to four ranks in depth—of the 80 men whom the Boers left behind, at least half must have been placed *hors-de-combat* during their retreat—shows clearly that they must have shot into the air blindly, and that the Boers only had to reckon with chance bullets. (4) It is also quite inexplicable that the English mounted troops, which were far superior in numbers to the enemy, should have awaited the enemy on foot, with their horses either immediately behind them or near them, and thus give the irregular saddle-fire of the Boers an ideal target. They could not have been handled more favourably for the attackers. If a few well-trained squadrons, capable of manœuvring, had been on the spot, they could

have gone out at the gallop right and left in column, gained the enemy's flanks, wheeled, and rolled up the Boers, who were incapable of manoeuvre in their wide extension and closed-up lines. (5) Further, it is quite astonishing that nobody thought of going after them as the Boers retreated. Mr. Childers insists that the force was completely demobilised through the loss of 150 horses. This circumstance, as well as the fact that the Boers were not completely cut up in their retreat, is evidence that the English troops fighting here—let us say it at once—were quite insufficiently trained. What such troops can perform obviously cannot be described as normal, and leads by no means to any general tactical application.

Mr. Childers, however, thinks otherwise of the fight at Brakenlaagte, he concludes that an attack with the *arme blanche* must have failed, if the hill on which the English guns and horsemen had taken up their position constituted a difficult approach. That the English guns found it difficult in the hurry to get up it, and that the rifle attack as it was carried out against well-trained troops under all circumstances must have failed, he does not mention. He infers much more, that the rifle attack offers under all circumstances the most favourable chances. He says the same of the fight at Roodewal. Let one only think, he says, of an attack here with the *arme blanche*, then 'the advantage in an overwhelming manner would be on the side of the rifle attack. Fire from the saddle, with its ability of making the enemy immobile long before the actual collision, is a decisive advantage.' It is doubtful whether a Cavalry, equipped with sword or lance, would have attacked at all; at any rate, their attack in the face of the enemy's fire would have been brought to a standstill, and entirely broken up against their counter-attack.

It is inexplicable to me how Field-Marshal Lord Roberts has admitted this and similar instances of the author's as conclusive. It is naturally the last thing in the world I should do to offer criticism about a soldier so experienced in war as the English Field-Marshal, and I cannot at all know the reasons why, perhaps through some special English circumstance, and for a necessary purpose, he plumps so decidedly for the rifle as a Cavalry weapon.

As far as Mr. Childers is concerned, I describe his views and detailed statements only as amateurish and illogical.

General French, who is himself a Cavalryman, and has to his



credit the real experience of his own Cavalry activity during the Boer War, will certainly appraise the Cavalry views of Mr. Childers at their real worth. Probably the English Cavalry will decline to practise themselves in the 'fire attack.'

With the small Boer pony, galloping over the undulating ground, it may be quite feasible to direct an aimed fire for people who have been trained to it for the whole of their lives. To cause losses to the enemy in this manner is only possible against such targets as the English gave. At any rate, no troops with confidence in themselves would allow themselves to be morally shaken by such a fire. Besides, the Boer pony may be trained under all circumstances to remain standing—even under fire—when the rider dismounts. With European Cavalry horses, however, the whole manœuvre is quite impracticable, quite irrespective of the fact that the men halting and dismounting would be simply shot down by the enemy quietly firing before ever their own fire could become effective. Their horses which survived they would never see again. They would gallop away into space; for to train them as the Boer ponies, which live under quite different conditions, is naturally quite impossible.

The whole question really needs no earnest discussion, and I have only taken up the cudgels because such a man as Lord Roberts has expressed himself quite clearly for the fire attack, in open, unmeasured opposition to General French, who, as a Cavalryman, cannot really have such ideas. That the Cavalry must use their mobility in order to gain a favourable point of attack, and under certain circumstances also pass mounted over part of the battlefield, if the conditions are especially favourable, that is certain, and at the same time nothing new. But when dismounting they must be concealed completely from view and fire.

Thus the theoretical statements of Mr. Childers have little practical use for us, and show only that in the English Army a movement is present which, in my opinion, is entirely wrong.

Interesting and instructive, however, in this book are the candid descriptions of fights and its general criticisms. The whole campaign failed; neither Lord Roberts nor Kitchener succeeded in defeating the Boers; the country was conquered, but the race was not overcome; positions were taken, but no battles won; they never succeeded in beating the enemy in the open field—the highest object of every war.

To break the national spirit of the Boers, and to obtain a permanent political superiority for England, the might of England's Empire could not do. Peaceful union under the English flag, only a conditional surrender with a promise later of independence, was all that was attained. A small crowd of brave veterans with limited means, without any help from outside, succeeded in obtaining conditions from a World-Empire with inexhaustible means, which placed them later on political equality with the victor.

Thus judges—uncontradicted by Lord Roberts—an Englishman who holds this war of a small peasant population against a World-Empire as quite normal and general, and the conviction lives that no people in the world could have attained more than the English. At any rate, the fact is that to-day General Botha is Prime Minister of South Africa, and the Boers have the majority in the South African Parliament, that the Dutch and English languages are on an equality, and that the English have granted in a magnanimous manner political autonomy in South Africa.

## THE 'RÔLE' AND EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY

A précis of Colonel Aubier's article in the June *Revue de Cavalerie*

[The above-named paper appeared originally in the form of a lecture delivered at the School of Instruction at Nancy, and was made up of three articles which had already been published on 'Cavalry in Modern War,' 'Cavalry of the Napoleonic Era,' and 'The Cavalry in the Manœuvres of the Centre,' and it is now reproduced as a whole, so that on the eve of a general discussion of a new *Loi des Cadres* the principles governing the organisation and employment of the Cavalry of the *Grande Armée* may be clearly recognised.]

THE writer begins by admitting that it is scarcely to be wondered at if many thinkers and writers have begun to inquire whether—in view of the small part played by Cavalry in recent wars and of the increasing power of firearms—an arm relying purely upon shock action and upon moral effect is not at once too expensive and too useless to be any longer maintained, and whether the time is not in sight when it will disappear altogether from the field. There would seem to be a great gulf fixed between those who believe in the future of Cavalry and those who deny that any future lies before it, and in any consideration of this burning question it is not merely the relative value of any one particular arm which is under discussion, but the whole psychology of future wars, the terrible mystery of approaching battles must be studied. The author agrees that Cavalry, in common with other arms, has had to bow before the progress of modern firearms, and that by reason of the improvements in guns and small arms the approach, the attack, and the final charge by Cavalry now demand either a longer preparation or a more complete surprise. But the influence of modern fire is not specially, and still less exclusively, felt by Cavalry, and those writers who have endeavoured to prove the contrary have based their premises rather upon theory than upon fact. History does not prove their contention, and it would be very difficult to explain why Cavalry was able to perform services of immeasurably greater value under Frederick and under Napoleon than in the days of Francis I. or of Louis XIII., why at Auerstädt the repeated charges of the Prussian Cavalry failed to break the Infantry under Davoust, while at Marengo the charges of a few squadrons led by Kellermann put to flight masses of victorious Infantry, or why, again, at Custoza, where fire effect was

infinitely greater, the charge of the brigade commanded by Pultz was enough to bring an Army Corps to a standstill. On these occasions, as on others more recent, it is not so much the power of the firearm as the ignorance or want of recognition of its *own* powers which have paralysed the work and employment of the Cavalry. The dogma of the impotence of the mounted arm rests not on experience but on theory, and in proof of the small value of purely theoretical opinions the writer draws our attention to the numerous instances in the war in Manchuria when it came to the 'push of bayonet,' although the utter impossibility of such ever again occurring had been almost mathematically proved by the theorists. Colonel Aubier then relates incidents from the campaign of 1813, from Gettysburg, from Custozza, from Vionville, and from the South African War in support of his contention that Cavalry is the arm of opportunity and that the moral factor is to be reckoned with no less than the material factors upon which the theorists base all their arguments; that, moreover, the moral effect of Cavalry has actually increased with the advent of the young conscript armies in place of the old professional armies, and that, despite the growth of *des forces ballistiques*, Cavalry continues to emphasise the existence and the superiority of *des forces morales*. It is idle, says the writer, to endeavour to estimate the value of Cavalry by the actual losses which it inflicts or is capable of causing. In no single one of the instances recorded above by Colonel Aubier were the actual casualties caused by the Cavalry worth considering, and yet the tactical results were immense, and for this reason he urges that in estimating the effect of Cavalry action the tactical result, and not the numbers sabred or ridden down, should alone be taken into account. It cannot be too much insisted or too often repeated that Cavalry by its property of speed is essentially the arm productive of surprise, of opportunity, of *renversement d'équilibre*, capable of creating in critical moments a moral crisis, when its opponents may be tumbled into ruin—moments when it matters little whether the enemy is armed with flint-locks or repeating rifles.

Colonel Aubier ascribes the past successes or failures of the mounted arm to the presence or absence of commanders who have known how to get the best out of it, and in order to start upon a like base and a guide for this point, which he proposes to labour, he proceeds to go back a hundred years and examine into the causes which made the Cavalry of the *Grande Armée* so extraordinarily effective

an instrument of offence. He reminds us that in 1805 the Cavalry was contained in eighty regiments—fourteen heavy, thirty-six of dragoons, and twenty-six of light Cavalry—each of four squadrons of two companies, each 100-120 strong. In round numbers there were, therefore, 65,000 horsemen out of a total effective strength of 345,000, so that in those days the mounted arm constituted about a fifth of the whole force. Neither these numbers nor this proportion, however, satisfied Napoleon, who two years later pressed for bigger regiments, for squadrons 300 strong, until in 1812 his Cavalry numbered 100,000 men. In regard to the organisation of this immense mounted force Colonel Aubier reminds us that under Napoleon there was nothing answering to the present organisation in Cavalry divisions and divisional Cavalry. In peace time the Cavalry *was* territorially attached to Army Corps for purely instructional purposes, but then peace was hardly the normal condition of affairs under the First Empire. As a matter of fact, in time of war there was no fixed and immutable system of Cavalry organisation, but at the commencement of each campaign the Emperor apportioned to each corps a body of light Cavalry, the strength of which varied with the importance of its mission; it was not, however, definitely attached for good and all, and changes were often effected in the course of the campaign, and particularly on the eve of a battle. But the whole of the remainder of the Cavalry formed a huge reserve under his own hand, often containing from 100 to 150, and even to as many as 250, squadrons. Thus in 1805 the 1st Corps (Bernadotte) had four regiments of Cavalry attached to it; the 2nd and 3rd Corps (Marmont) had three each; the 5th and 7th (Lannes and Augereau) had each one only. On the other hand the Cavalry reserve under Murat numbered 128 squadrons. Again, in 1809 the corps of Bernadotte and Lefèvre had each five regiments, while Oudinot and Masséna had each only two squadrons; in the reserve, however, there were 170 squadrons. By 'reserve' is not meant a force retained for the close of a battle, but rather a reservoir of disposable forces, and it was altogether separate and distinct from the true Cavalry reserve, formed from the Cavalry of the Guard—a supreme reserve, rarely employed with success, as at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Wagram, and less happily at Borodino and Waterloo.

The Emperor further recognised and insisted upon the special characteristics and scope of employment of his three descriptions of Cavalry. 'The Cuirassiers, Dragoons, and Light Cavalry,' he wrote

to his War Minister, 'are to be looked upon as composing three separate arms, and no officer should ever be transferred from one to any of the others.' To Murat he wrote: 'I am sorry to see that the Light Cavalry and the Dragoons are not kept separate: they are two different arms.' Lassalle, Colbert, Pajol, Curély, Méda, Piré, and others were exclusively light Cavalry officers, as D'Hautpoul, Nansouty, Latour-Maubourg, and Caulaincourt were magnificent leaders of heavy Cavalry. Napoleon's light Cavalry was more generally employed on detached duties of all kinds—on advanced guards, reconnaissance, &c.—while the heavy Cavalry regiments were carefully held back for serious efforts and decisive moments. The Dragoons, again, were used to support either of the other Cavalries, sufficiently mobile to follow the light and of sufficient weight to, occasionally, take the place of the heavy Cavalry. The Emperor had also formed the intention of creating a fourth description of Cavalry in the *éclaireurs d'infanterie*, who were to be mounted on small horses and relieve the Cavalry of all duties which removed it from its more legitimate employment; of these a squadron of 360 men was to be allotted to each Infantry division.

The strategic Cavalry was never sent by Napoleon on any vague missions; Murat and Lassalle were always told where and how far they were to go and exactly what was required of them and their commands. See Napoleon's orders during the deployment on Ulm, after capitulation, and during the advance on Vienna, and again in 1806. His employment of his Cavalry was characterised by *l'audace et la force*; his Cavalry reconnaissances were conducted by specialists; he knew how to adapt his means to the end, and prior to Austerlitz and Jena, while his Cavalry was still young and inexperienced, he was careful to see that his detached parties were numerically superior to those of the enemy. Later, when he was satisfied that his Cavalry had the upper hand, his measures were bolder, while after 1812 he returned to his former and more prudent methods. But Colonel Aubier insists that it was the excellence of his Cavalry during his chief campaigns and the methods of its employment which enabled the Emperor to discover betimes the plans of his opponent, to veil his own, to manœuvre on a clear field, to keep the initiative in his own hands.

So far as the tactical rôle of his Cavalry was concerned, when the various *corps d'armée* had received their allotments of Cavalry, the

remaining squadrons were grouped and employed in from one to three masses, according to the situation and requirements. These masses were placed in immediate proximity to the line of battle, and frequently, as at Eylau and Borodino, remained under fire. By keeping his squadrons in such close proximity to the point of probable action they were more quickly available, and their charges and intervention in the fight were more decisive than if they had been held back further from the scene. The actual position varied with each battle; at Austerlitz the Cavalry was massed on the left, only the Cavalry of the Guard—the true Cavalry reserve—being behind the centre; at Eylau the whole of the Cavalry was in rear of the centre, while at Friedland the Cavalry was contained in four groups, of which the largest—the divisions of Espagne and Grouchy—was behind the left wing. But if the Cavalry was well placed for action it was employed with equal energy and vigour: at Austerlitz the charges under Murat, Rapp, and Bessières; at Eylau Murat's final charge at the head of eighty squadrons; at Essling the help afforded Lannes and Masséna by the Cavalry under Lassalle, Nansouty, and Espagne; at Wagram the charge of Nansouty's Cuirassiers; and at Borodino the resistance of the Russians finally crushed by the Cavalry charges which cost the lives of Montbrun and Caulaincourt, who led them. While, we see again, when the Cavalry of the *Grande Armée* had disappeared or deteriorated, the victories of Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden remained indecisive.

The battle tactics of the Cavalry of the First Empire were simplicity itself. Placed close to the front, it was drawn up in successive lines of regiments or brigades, with the Light Cavalry in front, behind them the Dragoons, and in rear of all the Cuirassiers. The lines thus placed one behind the other formed *une colonne serrée*. It attacked in successive lines of regiments or brigades at varying intervals, according to the course of events. After the charge or the *mêlée* the rally was to the flanks, where column was rapidly formed in order, if necessary, to advance again by passing through the intervals of the supporting lines. There was little occasion for manœuvre, owing to the proximity of the Cavalry to the front, but all movements were executed at the trot, the gallop only being sounded for the last 100 or 150 yards. Practically the only manœuvre attempted was to take ground to the right or left and form again to the front; the success of the charge was due to the irresistible onset of the successive lines and the skill in the *mêlée* of the individual swordsmen, the whole constituting a moral factor of the

first importance and value. The writer then passes in review the Cavalry commanders of the Napoleonic era, from Murat—a fantastic figure uniformed *en tambour-major*—to the minor satellites who revolved around him and who were worthy leaders of the magnificent Cavalrymen who followed them.

Colonel Aubier then asks himself the question, Why, the Cavalry arm having attained such super-excellence under Napoleon, has it come to pass that in none of the succeeding wars from 1815 to 1870 is there any trace of the same *emploi intensif*? The same thing had already been before noticed in the Prussian Cavalry of Frederick: in both Cavalries there was a period of uniform success; in both of them when at their zenith the principles of organisation were simple, the distribution supple and elastic, the commanders young and brilliant, and the employment of the arm was the actual embodiment of the offensive spirit. Either Cavalry attained its apogee, followed by a period of decadence; each in turn was content to rest upon its past fame, to rely merely upon tradition, until reverses and disaster led each in succession to examine into and correct the causes which had resulted in its overthrow. The author finds that during long years of peace men fall back upon mere formula, trust to theory rather than to practice, consult schoolmen rather than leaders; that during peace time the natural tendency is to place undue reliance upon regulations, form, and *dilettantisme tactique*, while overlooking the factors of energy and overpowering moral force which, through all material changes in armament, must ever remain among the keenest weapons of Cavalry. In proof of the errors into which even brilliant Cavalry leaders have been tempted when induced to try and put into rigid formulas the solution of the questions which have confronted them for instant decision in the field, Colonel Aubier mentions the Cavalry regulations of 1804, drawn up, or at least signed by, men like Nansouty, Klein, D'Hautpoul, Kellermann, and others, and which constituted a very monument of form, a *vade mecum* for mere schoolmen rather than a doctrine for the guidance of leaders. It took the Prussian Cavalry sixty years of patient labour to return to the main principles of Cavalry employment, and even then their teachers—Wrangel, Prince Frederick Charles, and von Schmidt—did not succeed in evolving a Cavalry of high ideals. In spite of the inaction and lack of initiative in the French Cavalry in 1870 the strategic employment of the Prussian horsemen effected



nothing, since they never left the neighbourhood of their armies, while they effected even less when employed tactically. Rezonville is given as the only occasion when the Prussian Cavalry achieved a real tactical success, and then they were used by the higher command for a definite purpose and at a given moment—all in the old Napoleonic way. Bredow's charge immobilised the corps of Canrobert, that of Redern overthrew the Artillery of the 2nd Corps, the Dragoons of the Guard checked Cissey's division, and Rheinbaben threw his opponents into disorder. These results, moreover, as Aubier is careful to point out, were effected with a loss which is as nothing to that suffered on occasion by the Cavalry of the *Grande Armée*. The eighteen regiments engaged had one thousand casualties—that is to say, they lost a tenth of their effectives. Indeed, of the 65,000 German horsemen who crossed the frontier into France in 1870 no more than 3,000 were killed and wounded during the war. Compare this with the Cavalry losses in Napoleonic days: at Eylau and Essling, at two battles, and in the days of flint-locks, the French Cavalry sustained greater losses—divided, moreover, among some twenty regiments—than were endured by the whole body of German Cavalry during the war of 1870. How are these facts to be reconciled with the statements of those who would have us believe that the superiority or impotence of Cavalry depends upon variation in the armament of those opposed to it? 'Hypnotised by the dogma of the power of small arms, the Cavalry often hesitated in the war of 1870 to venture across the bloody threshold of the gate of victory.'

After the war of 1870 men stated that Cavalry was no longer a weapon for the battle, that all that could be asked of it were certain vaguely defined duties of reconnaissance; it was then recognised that opposing Cavalries must meet and fight, and by both German and French authorities it was conceded that the first duty of Cavalry is to defeat the Cavalry of the opponent, while many efforts were made to formulate a doctrine of profitable employment. This heroic age, when it seemed that Cavalry should be employed again in masses and by shock, was followed by the Russo-Turkish, the South African, and the Manchurian campaigns, where such methods were impracticable, and a reaction set in in favour of the employment of smaller units and of fire action. But, in regard to the value of abnormal experience, Colonel Aubier's remarks may be quoted in full and in the original: 'ce qui s'est produit au Transvaal et en Mandchourie, où il n'y eut

*jamais de terrains ou d'opérations présentant l'analogie même la plus lointaine avec les terrains et les opérations d'un théâtre de guerre européenne; où d'autre part, il n'y eut de cavalerie que d'un seul côté; où l'emploi de cette cavalerie fut manifestement défectueux, ne pourrait constituer qu'un enseignement purement négatif.'* We, he declares, have not to consider abnormal conditions, or to propound abstract theories, but our duty is to hold ourselves ready at all times for every portion of our rôle—not to confine ourselves to exploiting some novel and narrow doctrine.

The writer then draws attention to certain paragraphs in the new German Cavalry regulations, whereby it is clear that while admitting the need for frequent intervention in the fire-fight the doctrine of employment in mass and mounted is preserved intact; that while there may be occasions, limited by circumstance and by *terrain*, when dismounted work must be done, there will frequently be others when there will simply not be enough time available to prepare for the fire-fight in face of a mounted opponent resolved to come to close quarters.

Colonel Aubier then reminds us anew that Infantry must breathe an atmosphere of security, and that Cavalry alone can ensure this for that arm; that, in order to retain in our own hands the complete control of the operations, a well-trained and numerous Cavalry is absolutely essential; that mainly by shock must the opposing Cavalry be swept aside; and that Cavalry must, in the future as in the past, remain the arm *de renseignement et de bataille*. He then devotes a long and searching criticism to the different methods of employment of French and German Cavalry—the Cavalry tactics of Frederick as modernised by Moltke, and those of Napoleon; of the line as opposed to the *échelon*. He shows that by the year 1876 each of these Cavalries had evolved normal types of combat which were practically the same; then they thereafter diverged, and that they have recently again arrived, by devious paths, at methods of Cavalry employment which in both letter and in spirit are to all intents and purposes identical.

The author concludes by affirming again that the foundation of the tactics of Cavalry is not to be found in the text of regulations, but in the brains of the leaders and in the hearts of the men, and that the real strength of this arm lies in a proper understanding of the importance of the moral factor and in guarding jealously *l'idée de la guerre*, which last is in danger during peace of becoming distorted or obscured, or even altogether lost in the mists of rule and formula.

**THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUND  
ON SHOCK ACTION**

By CAPTAIN E. FF. LASCELLES, 3rd (P.W.) *Dragoon Guards*

To say that all movements on the battlefield are mainly dependent upon the nature of the ground is but to repeat the obvious; but there is inherent to all things apparently obvious a grave danger—that they may be taken at face value and passed into circulation without analysis or investigation. How often is the popularly accepted idea as to the qualities or attributes of any given thing vastly different to what the reality is! And that the factors affecting operations in the field of war are no exception is amply demonstrated by the magnified and distorted ideas that have at times during recent years become apparent as to the nature and importance of ground in certain respects.

That one of the first essentials to success in battle consists in an intelligent use of the physical features is, of course, recognised as a fundamental axiom; but to suppose that ground merely as ground is possessed in itself of any peculiar virtue is to countenance a dangerous fallacy. The value of ground depends upon the end in view, and success can only result from the adaptation of the means—of which the ground is one—to that end. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that any qualities that ground may possess are of a distinctly passive nature, whereas the principal element in successful war is action. The value of the ground in any given case is dependent solely and absolutely upon the requirements of such case, and upon the class of tactics it is intended to adopt.

The one constant factor in the wars of all time—the factor that retains most definitely its original form—is the ground. The characteristic of peoples and of armaments have throughout the centuries been constantly undergoing a process of evolution; the ground is in form the same, and in effect the least changed of any of the factors in war. In this respect the operations of the past and

those of to-day may best be likened to chess played on a small board and chess played on a board of much larger dimensions.

If it can be said that a knowledge of ground is absolutely essential to officers of all arms, it is nevertheless true that an officer of Artillery or Infantry may possess this knowledge only in a limited degree, and yet be by no means inefficient or incapable of performing any duty allotted to him, whereas a leader of Cavalry, without a thorough knowledge of ground, and incapable of reading the *terrain* as an open book, is, under the conditions prevailing on the modern battlefield, well-nigh useless.

The individual possessed of a knowledge of ground is generally described as having 'a good eye for country.' The use of this term is likely to lead to much misconception, unless an understanding is first arrived at as to its exact meaning and import. The officer obsessed with the fallacious idea that the secret of successful war lies in the passive occupation of defensive positions, may be possessed of a good eye for the class of country that he deems suited to his requirements, and at the same time be utterly devoid of even the rudiments of such an 'eye' as would be looked for in the scout or despatch-rider.

While the continued improvement in the rifle has greatly increased the importance of a knowledge of ground to officers of all arms, to no branch of an army has the value of this knowledge become so great as to the Cavalry.

Considerations of the *rôle* of Cavalry on the modern battlefield, and of the demands made upon the arm, together with consideration also of the various forces and conditions exerting an influence on its actions, will perhaps result in some conclusion as to the qualities the sum of which may be said to constitute a good 'Cavalry eye' for country, the possession of which can be the outcome only of a thorough and complete understanding of the influence of ground, and its bearing upon the movements, formations, and action of Cavalry, particularly in regard to the exercise of shock tactics.

The great improvement in firearms—with the possible exception of the creation of increased facilities for observation and communication—constitutes about the sole factor differentiating, when viewed from the Cavalry standpoint, the battlefield of to-day from that of the past. Particularly is this the case in so far as shock action is concerned.

For very many years—and consequent upon each and every improvement in firearms—has followed prophet after prophet foretelling the relegation of shock tactics to the limbo of the past. Yet Cavalry still retains its place in the armies of the world, and it is hardly conceivable that any improvement in the present class of firearms will be such as to render the use of shock tactics entirely out of the question, though the Cavalry soldier of to-day must realise that the opportunities afforded will be fewer, and the amount of skill and knowledge demanded of leaders much greater, than in the days of shorter effective ranges; but the points to be gained by timely intervention and the disturbing of the equilibrium of battle in favour of one's own forces will be greater than those that have fallen to Cavalry, even when that arm was invariably the decision-compelling factor in the decisive conflict.

Essential, as indicating the greatly increased importance of a knowledge of even the most minute details of the *terrain*, is a clear understanding of the powers and influence of the Infantry weapon, for the factors affecting the problem of attack on the principal arm are of paramount importance, as no idea of co-operation in the decisive battle is complete that does not include consideration of the attack on Infantrymen, though they may be unshaken, and Cavalry trained with this end in view will be in possession of all qualities and attainments necessary to enable them to cope with guns and with hostile bodies of their own arm.

The extent and nature of the zone of effective rifle-fire appears as the first factor influencing the problem. The more the range of the firearm is increased the more difficult it is for the attacker to reach close quarters. This is true even of attacking Infantry having in their hands weapons equally as good as those with which their opponents are armed. How much truer must it be of the Cavalry, whose power of action with the *arme blanche* has, since the days of Cromwell, Seydlitz, or Napoleon, not increased in the same ratio as has the power of the foot soldier with the rifle.

At the date of the battle of Waterloo the effective range of the musket was only 200 yards; at the time of the Crimean War this had increased to 400-500 yards; while the rifle in use to-day is considered effective at a distance of 1,400 yards, and the limit does not even yet appear to have been reached. Other points in progress have also to

be noted: it was not until 1839 that the flint was superseded by the percussion system of ignition; in 1848 the breech-loader was introduced, but not until 1864 was a rifled breech-loader used in war. The two most recent great wars have seen in use rifles of great accuracy, the trajectory very flat, the propellant smokeless powder—adding greatly to the difficulty of locating an enemy—and loading from the magazine greatly increasing the rate of fire.

Now the advent of a reliable automatic rifle is confidently looked for; and some advance has been made towards ensuring absence of noise on the discharge of firearms.

The greatly increased depth of the zone beaten by rifle-fire, together with the very largely increased number of bullets that can be directed upon a given area in a given time, would appear distinctly to favour the rifleman as against the man using the sword or lance. The balance is, however, to some extent redressed by the fact that the arming of the Cavalry soldier with a firearm similar to, or identical with, that carried by Infantry has conferred upon him a power, both for offence and defence, that he did not previously possess, and enables a leader of horse, by means of skilfully detaching portions of his command, to create opportunities for and to support shock action in a way and to an extent not hitherto possible. Moreover the characteristics of the modern rifle are such as to greatly facilitate the rendering of effective fire support by the Infantry to the Cavalry attack by shock.

The first essential to success in shock action is surprise, and the very extended nature of the modern battlefield ensures to the Cavalry a less restricted area for manœuvre than it has enjoyed in the past, and consequently affords a more varied choice of concealed avenues of approach. The wider the front of battle the less of the element of cohesion and unity present among the troops engaged. Also the difficulties in regard to intercommunication are such that it may well be anticipated that opportunities will not be lacking for either rolling up the opponent's line of battle or splitting it in twain.

This question of the front occupied by armies appears to be one of the most important of the points influencing the problem of Cavalry action. At Waterloo Wellington's army of 70,000 men held a front not exceeding three miles in extent; at Gravelotte the German Army, numbering 203,000 men, occupied a front of seven miles; at Diamond Hill the troops under Lord Roberts's command—40,000 men—extended

over a front of twenty-three miles; while at the battle of Mukden the Russians, with 325,000 men, held a front of sixty miles.

During the Napoleonic wars a commander electing to accept battle might, when only requiring to occupy a front of three miles in extent, be expected to experience less difficulty in securing ground suitable for his purpose than would be encountered by the commander of to-day in the occupation of a front twenty times the length of that covered by his predecessor.

The very expansiveness of the modern battlefield goes far to ensure that it must embrace ground of a nature unfavourable to the occupier, and such as will afford on occasion ample opportunity for the exercise of shock tactics by masses of highly mobile horsemen, thoroughly trained and disciplined, and well led by men taught to regard the ground as their most valuable ally, and able to turn its every fold to use, and to adapt its every feature to their purpose.

Sufficient having been said to emphasise the difficulty of the problems likely to confront the Cavalry leader of to-day, and also to indicate that without a knowledge of ground amounting almost to an instinct the possibility of delivering a successful charge—except on very rare occasions—is questionable, it now remains to consider what steps should be taken in time of peace to ensure that the proper use is made of ground on the battlefield.

The necessity for thorough and methodical study of ground has not as yet had sufficient attention directed to it by any authority, it being presumably supposed that merely as a result of squadron, regimental, and brigade training, the topographical study entailed by preparation for the examinations for promotion, and a few staff tours, the leaders of all units will have acquired the necessary proficiency in respect to what may be aptly termed 'the handling of ground.' It is very doubtful if the requisite knowledge can be gained in this way. At any rate, it cannot possibly be assured that all leaders will so acquire it, and the matter is of such importance as to demand that steps be taken to ensure that from the outset of his career the officer shall regard the systematic study of ground as an essential part of his military education.

In moments of crisis habit alone will dictate the action to be taken; habit is the result of constant association, training, and experience; the times when Cavalry can obtain the greatest results are in moments

of crisis; decisions must be made instantly, and these decisions may be disastrous unless the process of reasoning by which they are arrived at is thoroughly sound and the outcome of 'habit' acquired in days of peace.

It is palpable that the ground must dictate the formation in which an attacking body of Cavalry is to approach the enemy, and may also affect the actual formation to be adopted during the delivery of the charge. Ground, then, must be studied in regard to the formations to be employed by Cavalry when moving over it *with a definite end in view*.

It is necessary that the mere *drilling* of units in a flat and uninteresting drill-field, with a view to ensuring precision of movement and instant response to command, should, as soon as this object is achieved, be discontinued and all drill and manœuvre be then carried out, so far as is possible, on ground presenting a variety of features, both natural and artificial, and directed against a definite objective. Unless this is done it is questionable whether any educational results of appreciable value will be the outcome. Mere mechanical precision similar to what might be looked for in a body of automatons is naught but evidence of the handiness of the tool, and is no criterion of the ability of the officer to handle the tool with the skill of the master workman when on the battlefield.

Leaders must by constant practice acquire the ability to recognise instinctively and instantly the area of ground occupied by bodies of Cavalry in all conceivable formations, not only on a level surface but also on ground of a broken and undulating character. Frequent practice in leading—concealed from view of a specified objective—small and large units from point to point, first at a slow pace, and then ultimately at speed, is necessary, if in war the presence of the essential element of surprise is to be assured in Cavalry tactics.

Thorough training on these lines cannot be effected during the time that men and horses are on the drill ground or in the manœuvre field, and it is neither possible nor necessary to insist on the presence of complete units as an accessory to instruction. Skeleton formations should suffice—and would afford an opportunity for imparting knowledge to the non-commissioned ranks as well as to the officers.

A well-contoured, large scale map, together with wooden or metal blocks cut to scale, would constitute a valuable auxiliary means of instruction which might be used indoors.



Either with or without the assistance of the map the formulation of simple tactical schemes, involving the approach and attack on a defined objective, with the view of ensuring methodical study of the ground in regard to the effect of hostile fire, the applicability of the various formations, and the delivery of the final thrust, presents no difficulties.

These few suggestions are put forward as an indication of the direction in which it is thought that valuable food for reflection on the part of Cavalry officers may be found.


The importance of the methodical study of ground cannot be exaggerated. To officers of all ranks knowledge of the class indicated is a necessity—to the commander of the division, of the brigade, and of the regiment; the leader of the squadron, the troop, and the patrol; and this knowledge varies nothing in kind and but little in degree, for upon the most junior in rank may fall the duty of reconnoitring the ground with a view to the action of even the largest bodies. It will thus be seen that study must commence at the outset of the career and continue until its close.

The difficulties in the way of successful Cavalry co-operation by shock tactics in the decisive battle have vastly increased. A century ago the passage of the zone of effective fire—a couple of hundred yards only—was a mere matter of moments; the firearm in the hands of the hostile troops was capable of firing only from three to five rounds per minute; while to-day the distance to be traversed while within effective rifle range is almost ten times as great as was the case at Waterloo, and the number of rounds that the hostile individual can fire during the time occupied in passage by the horseman has increased five-fold. The improvement in Artillery and the introduction of the machine gun are also factors adverse in their nature from the Cavalry point of view.

Of a surety on the battlefield of the future the use of ground in a manner indicative of the possession by leaders of knowledge accruing from previous lengthy and arduous study will be an outstanding feature in successful action by Cavalry; and in the train of ignorance engendered by neglect to attach in peace to this knowledge its full measure of importance will come the disaster always consequent upon lack of education, training, and preparation for war.



**SPANISH HUSSAR.**  
(‘Regimiento de Lusitania.’)



13th LIGHT DRAGOONS.  
1841.

(Hampton Court Barracks.)

## MACHINE GUNS

### THEIR ATTACK AND DEFENCE DURING THE CAVALRY COMBAT

BY CAPTAIN V. MIERKA

*Translated from the 'Kavalleristische Monatshefte' (June 1910),  
by Captain A. H. Ollivant, R.A., G.S.*

THE subject of this essay deals with two new groups of problems with which our Cavalry will be confronted in future wars, and which cannot be solved without careful consideration and preparation in time of peace.

Successful preparation is mainly dependent on two conditions. These are that every Cavalry officer shall, firstly, possess an intimate acquaintance with the material and tactical use of machine guns; and, secondly, be frequently practised in actual tactical situations which call for their attack or defence.

Such situations present to every officer, however junior in rank, and, indeed, to every non-commissioned officer, a new field for the exercise of initiative, daring, and skill, and in our next war we can safely anticipate that our Cavalry will find a fertile field of glory in the struggles which centre round the machine guns.

As far as dash and daring are concerned there is no reason to apprehend failure; but calm and careful consideration in time of peace is a factor of equal importance. It is the importance of this latter factor which it is the object of the writer to demonstrate in this essay. It was a saying of our great Archduke Charles that those men only are in the long run 'lucky' who are 'capable.'

There can be no better way of increasing the numbers of those who are 'capable,' or of promoting rational methods of using machine guns with Cavalry, than by considering carefully and pondering over the experience of others, by systematic study at manoeuvres of the joint rôle of machine guns and Cavalry, and by steadfastly opposing

the constant tendency to employ stereotyped forms of tactical action in their use.

(a) Frontal attack on machine guns in open country.

In such cases the best prospect of success is offered by an attack in one or more loose elastic lines, the attacks being simultaneously delivered from different directions against the front and flank of the machine guns.

From a comparison of the form of attack shown in fig. 1 with that shown in fig. 2, it is evident that in the latter case the arc of fire of the machine gun is largely increased. Hence the delivery and distribution of fire is made more difficult; there is more room for bad laying and confusion, and the intensity of the fire is diminished.




FIG. 1




FIG. 2

Again, in opposing the form of attack shown in fig. 2 it is very difficult for the mounted escort of the hostile machine gun to act with effect against the attackers; for, if the escort is brought up in close order, it can only act against a portion of an attacking line, the other groups of which are left at liberty to pursue their object. A formation of the nature shown in fig. 2 should, therefore, always be adopted, if time and the *terrain* permit. If such a formation cannot be adopted the only course possible is to make the utmost use of speed and mobility, and to charge the hostile machine gun with the minimum of delay and hesitation.

It is paying no exaggerated tribute to the fire effect of machine guns if we emphasise the opinion that a frontal attack, delivered by a force smaller than a squadron, can hardly be expected to succeed (however skilful the use of ground, and however suitable and swift the method of attack) unless it comes as a surprise, and is made from such a short distance that the detachments of the machine guns are given no time to take suitable measures to meet it.

(b) Attack on machine guns from a flank or from the rear.

When the *terrain* is open, and when machine guns are able, in consequence, to produce the full effect of their fire, the situation is in its essentials the same as that previously considered under the heading of frontal attacks. When, however, circumstances permit of an unobserved approach on the part of the attacker the main point is to make the utmost use of the time during which the enemy is suffering from surprise. In such cases the chances of success are increased if the attack is delivered against the limber, led horses, &c., of the gun, so as to keep these between the gun and the attacking party. If this is done the fire of the gun will certainly be partially masked; and in some cases it will not be possible to fire the gun at all (see fig. 3).




FIG. 3

The defender in such circumstances will seldom be in a position to meet the attack with fire of any long duration. It will, therefore, be advisable for the attacker to divide his force into two portions, one of which will be told off to deliver a charge in close order against the mounted escort of the guns, while the other deals successively with the limbers, &c., and with the guns.

If an attack is possible only against the limbers and horses of a machine gun it will generally be well worth while to make it, for in such cases no great loss is to be expected by the attacker; moreover, not only is the ammunition supply of the machine gun momentarily interrupted, but damage can be caused which may cripple the action of the gun for days or weeks.

Having now sketched in outline the main principles of Cavalry action against machine guns, certain special phases and situations which may arise remain to be considered.

Often an enemy will avail himself of the assistance of machine guns to oppose an attack or advance on a large scale. The task of




FIG. 4

dealing with machine guns, which are being thus employed, will fall, as a rule, either to units specially told off for this purpose by the higher Cavalry Commanders, or to those squadrons of the main body which are in closest proximity to the guns and which have no other adversary in their immediate front. Units also, such as advanced and flank guards, &c., which have been detached from the main body for special purposes, and which subsequently return to the battlefield,

can be used for this purpose at the discretion of their commanders, if opportunities of surprise action occur.

It is laid down in regulations that squadrons, which outflank the enemy, are to continue their advance beyond the scene of immediate conflict, in order to hinder fresh bodies of the enemy from coming up and taking part in the combat.

If, however, such squadrons find hostile machine guns in position in the proximity of the line of advance it will be their duty to attack them without

delay. It would be a serious error if they were to neglect and ride past such machine guns with the intention of attacking formed bodies of the enemy further in rear. Such guns are in a position to exert an immediate and dangerous influence on the operations and form a definite objective. Since, therefore, the success of the




FIG. 5

operations as a whole is the main object it is obviously more important to seize or silence these guns than to continue a movement which has as its object an attack on hostile forces which may prove to be non-existent.

Immediately before and during the actual clash of the conflicting Cavalry forces, peculiarly favourable opportunities will be offered for successful attacks on machine guns; for at such times the latter will find themselves under the necessity of constantly ceasing and re-opening fire against fresh and rapidly moving targets. Those attacks will be most successful of all which are delivered from the direction of the actual Cavalry *mêlée*.

It cannot be denied, however, that such attacks, partially frontal as they must be, will be attended by heavy losses. More especially will this be the case when squadrons have to disengage themselves from the main front of attack before proceeding to the attack of the machine guns.

Machine guns will, of course, be silenced as soon as the attackers succeed in getting into their position. Yet the gun detachments will, no doubt, make use of repeating pistols, and (more especially if they can take cover under the gun-carriages) will have a certain advantage over troopers armed with sabres.

When it is a question of silencing the fire of machine guns against the main front of the Cavalry attack, the capture of limbers, horses, &c., is a matter of secondary importance only. Such an attack would only be undertaken after the guns themselves had been rendered impotent, or in a case where sufficient forces were available to admit of detaching against the limbers without endangering the success of the main object, which is, of course, the capture of the guns.

#### MACHINE GUN ESCORTS.

We have seen that bold and skilfully delivered Cavalry attacks on machine guns will be far from uncommon in future wars. Often, indeed, advanced guards will be largely increased in strength for the explicit purpose of enabling them to brush aside weapons which present such formidable difficulties to the deployment and offensive action of Cavalry masses. It is an obvious deduction that escorts of suitable size must be provided for machine guns which are attached to Cavalry.



When our Cavalry machine gun detachments were instituted the minimum possible establishment, both of men and horses, was allotted to them. This was done not so much on the ground of economy as for the purpose of ensuring the mobility necessary to enable them to keep up with Cavalry, and even in certain circumstances to precede it at a more rapid pace.

Consequently a machine gun commander has nothing except a few odd mounted men (orderlies and range-takers) at his disposal for the reconnaissance of a fire position, and to repulse any attack with these mounted men is entirely out of the question. The necessity for an escort is just as great in the case of machine guns as in the case of Artillery or of Cavalry when fighting dismounted.

The analogy can be clearly seen if we glance at the *Exersier-reglement (Cavalry Training)*, Part II., paras. 18, 59, and 60. Here it is laid down that Cavalry, when dismounted and using their carbines, are always to keep a mounted escort. A squadron when fighting on foot as an independent unit always keeps one or more troops as a mounted reserve. We have also regulations for the

protection of Artillery attached to large Cavalry units, and it is laid down that 'if Artillery is threatened by a hostile attack it is the duty of every commander in the vicinity to protect it.'

That such measures are equally necessary in the case of machine gun detachments is obvious. Machine guns must in all circumstances be given an escort of suitable strength, so that the commander relieved from all responsibility for the safety of his horses and limbers, may devote himself entirely to the distribution of his fire.




FIG. 6.

An escort commander, if he is to take suitable and proper measures for the protection of the machine gun detachments under his charge, must have an intimate knowledge of all phases of machine gun action from the moment when the guns leave the column of march onwards.

He should accompany the machine guns during their approach to the enemy, guarding them on the exposed flank. He should reconnoitre constantly in all directions, without, however, dissipating his strength to such an extent that he is unable to carry out his primary duty of protection.

It appears, therefore, that an escort should be of such size that after sending out the necessary scouts and patrols it still retains considerable offensive power. The regulations for machine gun detachments lay down the strength of an escort as one troop. The pioneer troop (twenty-five mounted men) is usually employed for the purpose. In this case, after despatching the necessary patrols, &c., only about ten mounted men remain available to repulse an attack.

Hence an ordinary troop is a more suitable unit for the purpose than a pioneer troop.

The question of when and where to meet an attack depends chiefly on the direction in which the attack is made. In the case of a frontal or oblique attack it is desirable that the machine guns should keep up their fire as long as possible, and the escort should not be thrown into the fight until the enemy are close on the guns (see figs. 6 and 7). In such a case it would be an error for the escort to engage the enemy at a distance, for, in the first place, the fire of the gun is thereby masked, and, secondly, an attack on an enemy who has just been subjected to short range machine gun fire is much more likely to be successful. We have already seen that Cavalry in close formation, if they attack a body of equal strength which is in loose formation, only succeed in overthrowing a small portion of the latter.

On the other hand, attacks in flank or rear should generally be met at a greater distance, unless, indeed, they are subjected to flank fire from neighbouring guns. It will often be advisable to meet attacks of all the natures above mentioned by dismounted fire action. For instance, the ground may be of such a nature that hostile mounted action need not be feared, while an attack by dismounted Cavalry




FIG. 7

is quite possible. In such cases the enemy's attack may have to be met by dismounted fire action only.

Finally, allusion must be made to the periods during which machine guns are particularly vulnerable. Such moments are: When




FIG. 8

limbering up or unlimbering when an escort is absent or is insufficiently strong; during bursts of intense fire, when the attention is distracted from the possibility of Cavalry attack (for instance, when the machine guns are firing on the main front of attack); immediately before the main Cavalry charge or

during the following *mêlée*; during breakdowns owing to damage or dislocation of *matériel*; or during short cessations of fire owing to the guns being masked by their own troops.

Moreover, clouds of dust often permit of unnoticed approach; a change of position lays machine guns open to the danger of being caught in column of route.

When Cavalry and their machine gun detachments are quartered in the same garrison great opportunities are afforded for constant practice together. Cavalry are then enabled to learn the best methods both of attacking and of defending machine guns, while the guns have ample opportunities of practising fire action against Cavalry in movement, and in repulsing actual Cavalry attacks. A deep mutual knowledge of each other's methods affords the best security for the successful co-operation of our well-tried Cavalry, with its young auxiliary arm, the machine gun service.

## *A BRILLIANT CAVALRY EXPLOIT*

### *AN INCIDENT IN THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR*

BY CAPTAIN H. GARBETT, R.N.

JULY 16 was the 150th anniversary of the battle of Emsdorff, where a French force, commanded by General de Glaubitz and the Prince of Anhalt-Coehen, was completely routed by the allied troops under the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick. Although the battle was only one of the numerous minor engagements of the war, its 150th anniversary is worthy of being recorded in the *CAVALRY JOURNAL*, as the victory was entirely due to the succession of brilliant charges made by Elliott's Light Dragoons, now the FIFTEENTH (The King's Hussars), who, on that day, covered themselves with glory.

The FIFTEENTH, or the King's Regiment of Hussars, has the honour of being the first British Regiment of Light Dragoons raised for permanent service. The order for its embodiment was dated March 17, 1759, the duty of raising it and the command being entrusted to Colonel George Augustus Elliott, a distinguished officer who was later created Lord Heathfield for his gallant defence of Gibraltar 1779-1783. As was generally the custom of those days the regiment was named after the officer who raised it, and it was as Elliott's Light Horse (or Light Dragoons) that it first made a name for itself in the annals of the British Army.

A year had scarcely elapsed from the date of the order for its formation when the regiment was directed to proceed on foreign service, where it soon had an opportunity of proving that the true Cavalry spirit had been thoroughly infused into it. Under the command of Lieut.-Colonel the Earl of Pembroke it embarked at Gravesend on June 10, 1760, and landed at Bremen on the 21st of the month.

After a short stay of four or five days in this town the regiment marched up country to Cassel, to join the allied army under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and the Earl of Pembroke having joined Headquarters as Adjutant-General the command devolved on Major Sir W. Erskine. The opportunity for distinguishing itself was not long in coming, for after a brief sojourn at Cassel the regiment received sudden orders to proceed by forced marches to Zewesten, there to join a force assembled under the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick.

The position of affairs at the time was somewhat as follows: On July 10 the Hereditary Prince had sustained a severe check at Corbach at the hands of the French Army under the command of the Marshal Duke de Broglie and the Count de St. Germaine, as the result of which Prince Ferdinand fell back with the allied army towards the Dymel and encamped at Saxenhausen. It was a matter of astonishment at the time that De Broglie had not pushed his advantage, but instead of doing so he remained after his victory inactive. The Hereditary Prince unjustly charged himself with being the author of a defeat, which, he imagined, had inflicted some dishonour on himself and the English force under him, although the latter had behaved with the utmost intrepidity, covering the retreat when the Germans, both horse and foot, had been broken, and he firmly resolved to retrieve it. Learning that a French force under General de Glaubitz and the Prince of Anhalt-Coehehn was marching against Ziegenhagen, a place of considerable importance in the Landgraviate of Hesse, which was still in the hands of the allies, he determined to intercept it.

For this purpose the Prince assembled at Zewesten, beyond Fritzlar, a force of six battalions of German Infantry, with a small Cavalry brigade, consisting of Luckner's Hussars, some squadrons of Jägers, and Elliott's Light Dragoons. Although not a man in the English regiment had seen active service, yet it was evidently in so high a state of discipline and presented so fine an appearance that the Prince had specially selected it to form part of his detachment, and the event fully justified his choice. He was at this time some fifty miles from Glaubitz, who imagined himself in the most perfect security. On the 15th the Prince had collected his whole force at Treysa, where he found that the enemy had moved from Marburg to Emsdorff. On the morning of the 16th the force advanced to Speckwinkel, arriving early in the forenoon and forming, unperceived by the enemy, under cover of

some rising ground about two miles from Glaubitz's position, whose left extended to a wood in front of Emsdorff, and his right behind the village of Exdorff. After reconnoitring the Prince formed his plan of attack, which presented some difficulty, as the enemy's position was such as to be inaccessible on his left, except by making a *détour* some six miles through woody, uneven ground, while his right was secured by the mountains. The Prince, with the bulk of his force, undertook, in person, the attack of the left, leaving General Luckner, with one battalion and the Cavalry, in front of Speckwinkel. About 2 P.M. he debouched from the woods, and attacking the enemy, whom he surprised in the act of issuing their rations, quickly routed them before Glaubitz had time to form; but they were routed with very little loss, and the advantage of their position was such that their main body were able to retire from one wood to another, while the Prince was unable to bring up his fatigued and harassed Infantry to the pursuit. It was then that Elliott's Light Dragoons distinguished themselves in a way that would have done honour to the best veterans in Europe.

De Glaubitz, after falling back through the woods, formed up his men again near the village of Neiderklein, and the Prince, placing himself at the head of Elliott's and a few of Luckner's Hussars, led them on to the attack, which was made with such impetuosity and intrepidity that the enemy were quite unable to resist. Five times their columns were charged and penetrated, and at last a body of 500, being separated from the rest, threw down their arms and surrendered. The remainder of the main body still endeavoured to gain the shelter of the woods, but on the Dragoons again advancing to the attack, and his men having suffered heavily, Glaubitz beat a parley and finally surrendered with his whole force. In all, 177 officers and 2,500 men laid down their arms, among the prisoners being De Glaubitz himself and the Prince of Anhalt, while nine pairs of colours, six guns, and all the enemy's arms and baggage were captured.

Such were the results of the first action in which the FIFTEENTH were engaged, the successful results of which were entirely due to their intrepidity and endurance. After a forced march of three days and nights from Cassel to engage the enemy, and on the Infantry becoming exhausted, to take up the pursuit single-handed, attack, break, and compel a far superior force to lay down their arms was an achieve-

ment of the first order. Their comrades in arms, Luckner's Hussars, also distinguished themselves by nearly annihilating Berchini's Regiment of Horse. The loss of the allies in this affair was 186 men and 180 horses, of which 124 men and 168 horses belonged to Eliott's gallant regiment.

For the success of the allies at Emsdorff the following thanks were returned by Prince Ferdinand, dated, Camp at Saxenhausen, July 20, 1760:—

'His Serene Highness orders it to be publicly testified to the whole Army how much he is charmed and satisfied with the good conduct and valour of the corps that fought on the 16th inst., under the orders of the Hereditary Prince.

'The praises the Prince gave of them to the Duke were such that nothing can be said in addition to them.

'His Serene Highness, therefore, gives his best thanks to those brave troops, and particularly to Eliott's regiment, which was allowed by everybody present to have done wonders.

'The Prince could not enough commend to the Duke the bravery, good conduct, and good countenance with which that regiment fought.

'His Serene Highness desires much to be able to find means to acknowledge to Major Erskine personally, who was at the head of that regiment, and led it so gallantly, as well as to the officers and men, his real satisfaction, and to have it in his power to do them service. He desires those gentlemen to furnish him with an opportunity of doing it, and he shall seize it with pleasure.'



'At Emsdorff.'

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

*Revue de Cavalerie.*—The opening paper of the issue for June of this journal is the reproduction of a lecture of great value and significance, delivered by Colonel Aubier at the Nancy School of Instruction on 'Le rôle et l'emploi de la Cavalerie'; this will not be dealt with in this review, as a *précis* will be found elsewhere. The discussion on the 'Règlement de 1910' is continued, the writer expressing the fear that in the new training manual, which is believed to be under preparation, simplicity of manœuvre may not be sufficiently kept in view. In a paper by Lieutenant Rolland, of the 27th Dragoons, on 'The Use of the Motor-cycle in Combination with Cavalry,' he recommends that men mounted on these machines should be employed, not only in replacement of the mounted orderly and for despatch riding, but even in reconnaissance à longue portée; that a corps should be formed of volunteers riding machines of not less than three-horse power and armed with carbine and bayonet; that a section, composed of one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and fifteen men, be attached to every division of Cavalry; and that each Cavalry division be accompanied by a repair motor-wagon carrying spare tyres, parts, a forge, and a stock of petrol.

The number for July has a long account of an incident in the history of the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique during the Mexican War; this is followed by 'La lettre ou l'esprit,' being a further contribution to the somewhat voluminous literature on the subject of the new regulations whose publication is shortly expected, and in which the all-importance of the possession of very special attributes in the higher command of the mounted arms is here once again emphasised. The translation from the German of the biography of Seydlitz is continued; and, finally, there is a paper on the methods of the conduct of fire in a small body of Cavalry, from which it would seem that the writer, a subaltern of Cuirassiers, does not contemplate dismounted Cavalry carrying through an attack in the same way as with Infantry, but considered that what will happen will be no more than a rapid deployment or extension dismounted, a sudden opening of a heavy fire at comparatively long ranges, followed and concluded by a mounted attack to confirm success or secure an unmolested retirement.

'Napoleon's European Campaigns, 1796-1815.' By Captain F. W. O. Maycock, D.S.O. (Gale & Polden.) Price 5s. net.

The author makes no claim to throwing fresh light on the stirring events of the Napoleonic era, but simply gives in a brief and concise form, illustrated by sketch maps and plans, an outline of the Emperor's campaigns as set forth by recognised authorities.



*Spectateur Militaire*.—There is little or nothing of Cavalry interest contained in the numbers of this 'fortnightly' during the last quarter, but this seems to provide an opportunity for inviting attention to a series which has been appearing, somewhat irregularly perhaps, in these pages, and which throw something of a new light upon incidents of the war of 1870. These are the 'Lettres de Kretschmann,' a translation of a collection of letters addressed to his wife by Major Kretschmann, of the staff of the 3rd corps of the Second Army. His letters appear to have undergone nothing in the way of editing; there is much in them of no general interest whatever—affectionate messages to friends and relations and remarks on the quality of the cake and chocolate sent him from time to time by his wife by means of the field post; but there are often many particularly outspoken criticisms which throw an entirely new light upon the conduct of operations and of those concerned in them. These letters were published some years ago in Germany—where their contents were not specially welcome—and their appearance in French has placed them now within more general reach. In the number of the *Spectateur Militaire* dated September 1, in describing the fighting about Orleans, Kretschmann speaks very strongly of the conduct of the Bavarians, then following up a defeated enemy. He describes them as having abandoned their corps and of wandering about in parties of three to six men, pillaging; that out of 30,000 men nominally with von der Tann only 5,000 hold together; that their officers are constantly 'going sick' on all sorts of pretexts; while the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin telegraphed that the 'Bavarians are an incubus, they do more harm than good,' and once during an action told von der Tann to 'get out of this with your rabble'! But Kretschmann's strictures on the Cavalry are even more severe. He draws comparisons between the Infantry and the Cavalry—to the disadvantage of the latter; that when the Infantry receive an order its execution is at once commenced, even if death seems certain, but that the Cavalry always make difficulties—their horses are done up, or the fire is too heavy. 'On August 16, the day of Vionville, Voigts-Rhetz and I,' he says, 'had occasion to speak to commanders in terms which one should never be forced to employ, but it was absolutely necessary, and only thus could we get orders obeyed. I said to one Cavalry commander, "Colonel, you can at least save the honour of your arms and carry those guns," and he simply rode off and gave me the slip.' Of the charge of the 7th Cuirassiers and 16th Uhlans he speaks in the highest praise; but the charge, he tells us, was only undertaken after at least a quarter of an hour's hesitation by the General (von Bredow) who had to lead it. In the end Voigts-Rhetz had to say: 'Well, General, I give you a definite order to charge; the battery is there; it is no business of yours to worry about possible losses'—'and to-day,' adds Kretschmann, 'that General is a hero, for the charge was a most brilliant success.'

In fact, Kretschmann clearly infers that the Prussian Cavalry was dominated by a dread of the supremacy of the breech-loader, and in the report on the Cavalry successes of Vionville, drawn up for the King of Prussia, he wrote: 'This proves that to-day, as in the best days of the Seven Years' War, Cavalry *can* play a part in the field of battle, provided always that, like the other arms, they are ready at any moment to sacrifice themselves.'

*Militär-Wochenblatt*.—The numbers from July 2 to August 6 inclusive are a good deal occupied, so far as papers of Cavalry interest are concerned, with some criticisms on General von Bernhardt's 'Reiterdienst'—recently translated into English by Major G. T. M. Bridges, D.S.O., and published under the title of 'Cavalry in War and Peace'—and the correspondence is concluded by a lengthy reply from Bernhardt himself, wherein he seems to admit that in his book he has occasionally given expression to some rather extreme views with the intention of arousing interest and provoking discussion. In his replies to three of his critics the General gives his reasons for some of the conclusions at which he has arrived, and his explanations will probably be of real interest to those who can read them in the original, though they are too long to be given, even in brief, in a review of this necessarily limited scope. General von Bernhardt replies also to some of the observations contained in the Introduction or Preface contributed by General Sir John French to Major Bridge's translation of 'Reiterdienst.' He expresses his gratification that our Inspector-General is on the whole in complete agreement with the principles of Cavalry training and employment put forward in his book. Only in one particular, says Bernhardt, does Sir John French appear to dissent from his views, and that is in regard to the employment of Cavalry for the purpose of raids, which the German Cavalry manual and Sir John French agree in holding to be likely to withdraw the Cavalry from their more legitimate duties of the battle. Bernhardt explains that what he meant to emphasise was the danger of expressing such an opinion in a book of regulations, the effect of which may be to bind Cavalry to the battlefield where, for various reasons, they may be able to effect little or nothing—that they may thereby be led to neglect really important duties in order to hold themselves ready for possible co-operation in the battle. He points out, as an example of what he meant to warn us against, the action of De Wet at Waterval, where a few hundred mounted men did infinitely more to bring Lord Roberts' operations to a standstill, than they could have effected had they been kept back for combined action at Paardeberg. The prosecution of a raid need not necessarily imply absence from the battle; on the contrary, the Cavalry leader must keep himself so informed of events that he may be available when required for the crisis of the battle. Thus Stuart's great raid before Gettysburg did not prevent his acting on flank and rear of the enemy during the actual battle.

Colonel von Wenninger has a long paper in the issues of August 16, 18, 20, and 23, on the neglect of reconnaissance in manoeuvres. In it he complains, insist upon the importance and describes the reconnaissance by the army Cavalry, close reconnaissance during the battle, but at manoeuvres the first of these has not been completed, while the second is generally neglected at the moment of encounter. The writer pleads for more attention to the subject, how increased practice may be afforded, and asks for more *fremdes Gelände*, where Cavalry may range wide.

In discussing the need for an increase in the strength of Cavalry, he states that since, for financial reasons, the Cavalry cannot be increased, efforts must be made to raise the standard of the Cavalry in all instances of the low standard of

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*Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.—General von Bernhardi opens the June number with a paper on 'Cavalry Corps and Cavalry Divisions,' wherein he expresses himself in general agreement with Major-General Buxbaum, who wrote on 'Cavalry Corps' in the May number. Both writers fear that the meagre results achieved with a Cavalry corps in last year's manœuvres may operate prejudicially against the formation in the future of such large masses of Cavalry, but Bernhardi bases his plea for employment of Cavalry corps upon three points; he considers that with the vast size of modern armies, the increased range of firearms, and the extension of the battlefield, a weak Cavalry force can effect nothing; in the strategical operations large forces are necessary to break down opposition and to carry out the work of reconnaissance and report; and finally, because the actual strength in mounted men is, compared with the other arms, so weak, that the Cavalry would simply be frittered away if divided up among the components of the army. He deals with the complaint which has found general expression—that a Cavalry corps is too 'unwieldy' a command, but is of opinion that it is far better to have a Cavalry corps united under one command than to endeavour to get two Cavalry divisions to work together for a common object without having one man in chief command. With regard to the poor results obtained by the employment of a Cavalry corps, Bernhardi urges that one should note not only what was *not* done, but what *might* and *ought* to have been achieved. In support of this contention he points out several incidents of the manœuvres. As regards the peace formation of Cavalry divisions, Bernhardi disagrees with Buxbaum, who would have these composed and commanded in peace as they would be in war. Bernhardi points out that this is only possible when the exigencies of the war are known beforehand; it could not be arranged for any war which might occur, and even, he says, 'the oft-threatened landing of 100,000 British troops on the German coast' might entail changes at the last moment in the composition of the Cavalry divisions.

In the last number the winner of the prize essay on 'The best armament for Cavalry and the best methods of carrying the different weapons' decided against the lance; another now takes his contentions *seriatim* and decides against the sword, declaring that even in the *mêlée* the lance has the advantage, but, his opinions being purely personal and unsupported by any proof, his views lose much of their weight.

The July-August issue commences with an article by Major-General Buxbaum, of which it is not altogether easy to capture the meaning and intention; the reviewer, however, gathers that the writer means to impress upon his Cavalry readers that, in spite of the changes in the mechanism and general conduct of war, 'Der Kampf zu Pferde' remains unaltered in its methods and practice; that what is chiefly wanted to-day are leaders—who are few—and men to follow who are imbued with the Cavalry spirit—which he is of opinion no longer exists. For this latter he blames what he calls 'the modern system under which all ranks have it "rubbed in" that the mounted attack is exceptional and that dismounted action only can be employed really effectively.' He believes that a really good leader will find his opportunity and know how to adapt his methods in the future as has been done in the past, and that the more highly-strung soldiers of the present day

—who, however, Buxbaum appears only to expect to find in the ranks of those whom Cavalry will oppose—will yield many such opportunities. In the essays which have appeared in this and the preceding number on 'The best Armament for Cavalry,' all the writers have expressed the opinion that, take it all round, the sword is a better weapon than the lance; all are in favour of the rifle or carbine being carried on the man and the sword on the saddle; but everyone of these essayists suggest the sword being carried, not behind the rider as with us, but on the near side in front. Major Immanuel has an account of the close reconnaissance and reconnaissance during the fight by the German Cavalry at Gravelotte-St. Privat; no map is given, but students are invited to avail themselves of that in the Staff History. Then follows a brief record of the work of the Polish Cavalry under Dwernicki in the Russo-Polish war of 1831, well illustrated with plans, a paper on 'The Temperament and Character of the Horse,' and, among shorter articles, an account of this year's Horse Show at Olympia, a critical description of the remount requirements in the United Kingdom, and a debate, conducted in all seriousness, as to whether gaiters or long boots are the most *praktisch* of footgear for the Cavalryman under all circumstances.

There is a short paper in the September number of this journal on 'Cavalry Machine-gun Detachments.' The writer, while deprecating the unavoidable increase in specialisation in his arm, considers that machine-guns are an absolutely necessary adjunct to Cavalry, and would have a detachment placed at the disposal of each Cavalry division in *addition* to the weaker detachments with all regiments belonging to the Cavalry divisions; he is of opinion that detachments are also required with the divisional Cavalry, but that the question of expense stands in the way of this being carried out. Rittmeister Baumann writes on the 'Bayonet Armament for Cavalry'; he considers this weapon a wholly unnecessary addition, and indeed positively injurious to the offensive spirit of the arm; but the arguments he employs in this connection are not particularly convincing, and they seem practically to amount to this: that there is already far too great a tendency with Cavalry to dismount and take to the carbine (or rifle), and that the possession of a bayonet will tend to increase the impression that the main weapon of the mounted man is his firearm. Lieutenant von Ricsovary, of the 4th Honved Hussars, describes the passage of the Danube last July by a patrol of sixteen men of his regiment, under an officer; the saddlery &c., was placed on a raft, which carried also four Hussars, whose horses swam across drawing the raft in tow. The rest of the patrol swam across with their horses. The breadth of the Danube was here 800 paces, but the distance actually covered by the two parties was respectively 1,250 and 1,400 paces, owing to the current here flowing at 2.06 metres per second. From the word 'dismount' on the left bank, until the patrol was mounted and ready to march forward on the other, the time was just under an hour and a half. The raft was put together on the spot from materials there available and picketing ropes, &c., carried by the men. Among short papers is one describing a new system of picketing necessitating the use of two pegs, to which, however, two horses can be secured.

'The Army Annual for 1910.' Edited by Major B. F. S. Baden-Powell and Lieut.-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker. (London: William Clowes & Sons.) 7s. 6d.

The new issue of the 'Army Annual' will be welcomed, and the joint editors may be congratulated on the result of their work. The 'Annual' contains, as usual, a good deal of general information on Army matters, while among the articles there is a *résumé* of the scheme for the formation of an Imperial General Staff, and an interesting one on 'The Military Forces of the Crown, including those of the Over-Seas Dominions.' Other articles are: 'The Manœuvres of 1909, compiled from Various Sources,' with three maps; 'Cavalry Training and Manœuvres, 1909'; 'Boy Scouts'; and one on 'The Legion of Frontiersmen,' mainly the work of Colonel Sir William Serjeant, C.B., the Commandant-General of the Legion; and there is also a short description of the 'Progress in Aerial Navigation during the Past Year.' In conclusion is appended a useful list of publications having a military interest.

'Sketches of Manchurian Battlefields.' By Major A. T. R. Glasfurd. (Hugh Rees.) Price 8s. 6d. net.

These panoramic sketches of some of the principal Manchurian battlefields were executed by Major Glasfurd when visiting the country as one of a party of officers from the Staff College in India. The maps which accompany them show the point from which each sketch was made, and adjust it so that the student obtains a really clear picture of the country. We can imagine no greater aid to officers who are studying the Russo-Japanese War.

'German Official Account of the Russo-Japanese War: The Shaho.' With eleven maps. Authorised translation. (Hugh Rees.) Price 15s. net.

This is the fourth volume of the work of the Historical Section of the German General Staff, the three that precede it dealing with the battles of the Yalu, Wafangou or Telissu, and Liaoyang.

The dispositions of both armies after the battle of Liaoyang, the Russian determination to assume the offensive, and the Japanese decision to await the attack and overwhelm it by a vigorous counter-stroke form the subjects of the first three chapters.

Then follow details day by day of the fighting of the first four days, October 9 to 12 inclusive, and the last days of the battle, October 13 to 18, and the volume concludes with the usual incisive comments, and appendices giving the full text of Kuropatkin's orders.

The Russian commander is justly censured—first, for the open manner in which he made his preparations and published his intentions; secondly, for his choice of the Japanese right flank as his objective rather than their left, which lay in open country and nearer to their lines of communications; and thirdly, for his lack of energy and determination in carrying out his plan, and for the absence of that true 'will to conquer' without which all military operations must prove abortive.

On the Japanese side, although the victory was not complete, resulting in the enemy's repulse rather than his destruction, the German General Staff

has nothing but praise for the Commander-in-Chief's determination, and for his trust in his subordinates, for the indefatigable energy of their attacks, and for the cheerful sacrifice of the troops.

Though barren of strategic results, the victory of the Shaho confirmed decisively the moral superiority won at Liaoyang. No student of military history can afford to neglect the German official account of the Russo-Japanese War.

'A Handbook of the Boer War.' (Gale & Polden.) Price 5s. net.

This summary of the events of the Boer War is condensed in 370 small pages, and provided with excellent maps and sketches.

The facts are taken from the *Times* and 'official' histories of the war.

'Cavalry in War and Peace.' By General von Bernhardt. Translated by Major G. T. M. Bridges, D.S.O., 4th Dragoon Guards. (Hugh Rees.) Price 7s. 6d. net.

The issue in 1908 of fresh German Field Service Regulations and subsequently of a new Cavalry Training led General Bernhardt once more to give his views on the organisation and training of Cavalry. Major Bridges' admirable translation of his work has placed it within the reach of all English officers, and Sir John French has repeated the endorsement which he gave to 'Cavalry in Future Wars.'

General Bernhardt wishes to retract nothing he has written before, but rather to develop and supplement his former teaching.

The arrangement of the work in three parts is, as usual, clear and logical—i.e. the employment of Cavalry in war; its training in peace to prepare it for war; its organisation.

The first part deals with the uses of the independent Cavalry and the divisional Cavalry—firstly, in reconnaissance screening and raids; and, secondly, in action both independently and in co-operation with other arms. The English reader must remember that in the German Regulations two groupings of Cavalry only are contemplated, i.e. the independent Cavalry and the divisional Cavalry, which latter includes our two echelons of protective and divisional Cavalry.

The second part deals with (a) individual and troop training, (b) field training, and (c) tactical training from the squadron upwards to the division and the corps.

The third part exposes the evils of the present peace organisation of the German Army, which scatters among the Infantry divisions in peace the Cavalry brigades which in war will form the independent Cavalry masses.

Space forbids a detailed examination of General Bernhardt's latest work; it is sufficient to note that Sir John French's preface recommends 'not only the Cavalry officer, but officers of all arms and services, to read and ponder this book, which provides a strengthening tonic for weak minds which may have allowed themselves to be impressed by the dangerous heresies concerning the armament and tactics of Cavalry to which some prominence has lately been given in England.'




*The Rifleman.* The organ of the Society of Miniature Rifle Clubs. New series. Monthly, 1d.

*The Rifleman*, the official journal of the Society of Miniature Rifle Clubs, was first started some four years ago, at which time the Society only numbered 300 affiliated clubs, which number has now increased to 2,000, with a membership of something over a quarter of a million. In view of the great progress which has thus been made, the *Rifleman* determined to mark the occasion by starting a new series, the first number of which appeared on July 15, to which Lord Roberts, who takes the keenest interest in the Miniature Rifle Club movement, contributed a stirring 'Foreword.'

After referring to the gratifying progress made by the Society, Lord Roberts briefly recapitulates its object, which is to encourage rifle-shooting by forming in every town and village of the United Kingdom miniature rifle ranges, by means of which, in default of full-sized or Service ranges, those wishing to fit themselves to take their place in the defence of their country may at least learn the use of the rifle and the rudiments of rifle-shooting. In the preamble to the recently published rules for 'the Promotion of Rifle Practice,' the American authorities give it as their opinion that, 'in estimating the military efficiency of a soldier, if we consider ten points as a standard of perfection, at least eight of these points are skill in rifle-shooting.' With this dictum Lord Roberts expresses himself in full agreement.

Among other contributors to the first number were Mr. Owen Seaman, the editor of *Punch*, and Mr. Rudyard Kipling. It may be said at once that the paper is full of interesting information, and we hope it will meet with the support which it deserves.

<b>Covers</b> <b>Vol. V.</b>	<p align="center"><b><u>NOW READY.</u></b></p> <p align="center"><b>A White Forril Cover with Red Design and Lettering for Binding Vol. V. (January to October), 1910.</b></p> <p align="right"><b><u>Price 2/-</u></b></p>
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## NOTES

His Majesty King George V. has been graciously pleased to confer upon the following regiments the honour of becoming Colonel-in-Chief :—

The 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).

Suffolk (The Duke of York's Own Loyal Suffolk Hussars) Yeomanry.

Norfolk (The King's Own Royal Regiment) Yeomanry.

King Edward's Horse (The King's Oversea Dominions Regiment).

### QUEEN MARY'S REGIMENT.

A recent Army Order announces that H.M. the King has approved of the Surrey (The Princess of Wales's) Regiment of Yeomanry being in future designated the 'Surrey (Queen Mary's) Regiment.'

### WAR HONOURS.

A recent Army Order announces that H.M. the King has approved of the following regiments being permitted to bear upon their appointments the undermentioned distinctions in recognition of services rendered during the engagements specified :—

1st (Royal) Dragoons—Fuentes d'Onor.

14th (King's) Hussars—Pyrenees.

### THE REVOLVER AS A CAVALRY WEAPON

By MAJOR MOLYNEUX, D.S.O., 12th Cavalry (I.A.)

(From the Journal of the United Service Institution of India.)

It may be safely asserted that the revolver is not much in favour with Cavalry officers, and it is unfortunately true that their distrust is only too well founded. The reason is not far to seek : real proficiency with any firearm is impossible without the expenditure of a good deal of time, money, and ingenuity, and the revolver has been, and still is, the most neglected of our firearms, never having received a tithe of the attention lavished upon the rifle by the Cavalry and Infantry, or upon their own weapons by the Artillery.

I have often heard Cavalry officers assert that the revolver is almost valueless for mounted use ; and the annual exhibition by gun-shy horses and untrained shots only tends to confirm them in that belief.

On the other hand, few will be found to deny the value of the revolver in the hands of a 'Buffalo Bill' who can make a practical certainty of hitting his man, at a dozen yards' distance, when riding at any pace.

It is the purpose of this article to show how easily this proficiency can be obtained by those who are armed with the revolver, and consequently bound




in duty to obtain at least an adequate degree of skill in its use, if only a fraction of the attention be given to the subject which we give, as a matter of course, to the attainment of proficiency in hitting moving objects with the rifle.

The horse must first be made absolutely reliable by the use of blank cartridge fired from his back until he takes no notice of it. A convenient method of determining whether the horses are sufficiently steady is to make the men armed with revolvers advance in single file on their way back from parade, firing blank from their revolvers as they advance. It is easy, from the front, to see whether any horse swerves from the covering alignment. If he does, he should be ordered extra practice. Australian horses require very little of this training; Indian country-breds are more troublesome.

The best training for the man is the mounted duel. This is far more interesting, as well as far more useful, than any kind of target practice. It can be carried out in perfect safety by the use of the wax bullets used by the French duelling clubs, provided that proper precautions are used; and the expense is very small compared with the results obtained; 1,000 shots can be fired for about 55 francs, or 34 rupees. The methods of practice which I have found best are the following:—

1. Mark out a track, as under, with a broad line of chalk or tape, the track to be about 100 yards long by 12 yards broad. The combatants start



from C and D respectively; on passing one another at A and B, they fire at one another at 12 yards' distance, continuing to move round the oval track and firing each time they pass one another.

2. Using the above track, one combatant fires mounted at the other dismounted, the latter being stationary at A or B.

In both the above practices the superintending officers station themselves at P and Q, where they can examine the coats, &c., of the combatants at the finish. Hits on the man alone count; hits on the horse count neither for nor against. Regulation revolvers only.

The following precautions are necessary in the case of each combatant when firing at so close a range as 12 yards:—

- (a) A special mask, with plate-glass front, on the head. This has also protection for the neck.
- (b) A small metal shield on the revolver, to protect the right hand.
- (c) A leather glove on the left hand.
- (d) A soft goatskin coat, covered with whitewash, reaching to the knees, split up behind.
- (e) A blanket all over the horse, tied with tape behind his quarters and round his neck; and cheap blinkers.

At first very few hits will be registered, even at a walk. The improvement, however, is extraordinarily rapid, and the canter will soon be found no more difficult for aiming than the walk.

A list of requisites for this training, with prices, is given in tabulated form below :—

	Francs
2 special masks, with plate-glass front, at 20 francs	40.0
1,000 wax bullets . . . . .	40.0
1,000 caps (appareil d'amorçage) . . . . .	14.25
6 false cartridges . . . . .	18.0
2 hand shields (for pistol hand) . . . . .	8.0
1 uncapping block (appareil pour désamorcer) . . . . .	2.0

Total . . . . . fr. 122.25 or Rs. 80

All the above may be had from Messrs. Lepage Frères (Piot-Lepage), 12 Rue Martel, 10 ième Arrondissement, Paris.

The following can be procured locally :—

One pair soft goatskin coats, to be whitewashed so as to show the splash of the black wax bullet ; cost about 6 rupees each.

Blinkers.

Eighteen false cartridges, to be copied by any mistri, in brass or iron, from the French pattern.

One pair of false sights to go just over back-sight, as wax bullets tend to shoot a little low.

The total cost will thus be seen to be under Rs. 100 (initial). Rs. 70 per annum, expended annually on the 2,000 caps and bullets per regiment, which should be ample, with care and supervision, to secure a high degree of skill, is the only recurring expense. It would not seem that the result obtained is dear at the price ; £6 10s. for initial expenditure, and £5 per annum recurring, will cover everything. No powder is required, for the cap alone propels the bullets.

#### TREASURE-CONVOY SCHEME.

The scheme was based on the familiar lines of the Irish ' Treasure Hunts,' and, briefly put, the treasure (run by Lancashire Hussars Scouts) started from Settle, in Yorkshire, and had to traverse the hostile district of Westmorland until it crossed the county boundary into Cumberland, where it was safe.

The scouts of the Westmorland and Cumberland Yeomanry endeavoured to stop its passage through Westmorland.

The Westmorland and Cumberland Fells are in places very boggy, and are difficult to negotiate at night.

The experience of this scheme has been beneficial to me in all ways, and should I ever be trusted with a treasure pack again I should be able to make an even better trip by the practical knowledge gained. If the enemy had had a few cyclists I should have been seen more often, as I consider they are splendid for message-bearers and can get about very quickly. I also should like to have a few lectures from the farrier sergeant given to the scouts on the ' first aid ' to horses and on shoeing. I had equipped myself with hammer, nails, and bandages, and was thus ready for any emergency. During the night we used the baa of sheep to keep in touch with one another in a certain way. I had a very useful lamp with me, and fastening it round my waist with a belt, made a dark shade for it ; I should not have liked to have

been without it. Questioning inhabitants is everything in scouting, and, putting things together which they tell you, you can easily tell if they are deceiving you; I had a few of either kind of answers on the journey. Being a civilian and not used to catering for men and horses, I think the 1s. 6d. for horses not enough, and as they are the only means you can get along with, they want every attention. In regard to 2s. 3d. for men, it requires a good soldier to work it out. I daresay with Regular soldiers, who know the dodges of grocers and farmers, they might work it out all right.

DIARY OF THE JOURNEY, BY SERGEANT THOMPSON (*Scout Sergeant*),  
*Lancashire Hussars Yeomanry.*

*Saturday.*—Arriving at Settle at 3 P.M. Saturday, May 14, after a tedious journey of five hours in horse-boxes, we unboxed the horses.

I took over four oil-sheets, eight blankets, five head-ropes, and five nose-bags. We fitted saddles and pack, watered and fed horses, and took refreshment; afterwards paraded at 5.40 P.M. before the officer, who inspected us.

We left Settle at 6 P.M. prompt, making for Kendal, about thirty miles distant, which I hoped to reach before midnight.

I settled on Kendal because I wanted to get to the enemy's right flank, and there were more routes to choose from on that flank. We commenced marching five minutes at walking pace, ten minutes trotting, and five minutes halt, when we examined saddles. Mounting again we continued in stages, ten minutes walking, ten minutes trotting, to Ingleton, arriving there at 8 P.M.; here we watered horses and rested twenty minutes.

Proceeding (with two scouts in advance with instructions to proceed in the same stages as before), Kirkby Lonsdale was ultimately reached at 9 P.M.; here I decided to bait the horses for half-an-hour. I found a farm one mile north-west of the town, where I bargained for a feed for the horses. I myself then went back to the town to purchase rations for the party sufficient to last over Sunday.

The night turning out clear and moonlight, we pushed on to Kendal, arranging to arrive there by midnight. Having achieved this in the said time, I dismounted, walked through the town, in order to make but little noise and to keep out of sight, and took the Windermere road from Kendal, keeping a sharp look-out for a place to bivouac in over Sunday. I climbed a small hill which was reached by crossing some fields, and here found a suitable place among some shrubs, though with difficulty, owing to the moon being then overclouded. I also found a spring, and watered and fed the horses, and then we took rest alternately.

*Sunday.*—At 7 A.M. we prepared breakfast (eggs and bacon and coffee). After breakfast rain came down heavily, and, as we had no tent or horse-rugs, I looked out for suitable shelter, and found a barn about a quarter of a mile away, where we went.

At a neighbouring farm I purchased hay for the horses, and also a sack of 'chop,' which ran about three feeds for each horse. I always carried sufficient for a feed for each.

During our spare time we planned the direction for our further movements, still intending to keep on the enemy's right flank.

*Monday.*—As it commenced to rain very heavily again at midnight I

decided not to get saddled up, but to wait till it had abated a little. What a dreary wait it was, too—six hours. It was fearfully cold in the old barn.

I again made breakfast and prepared to quit. We kept a sharp look-out round the country as soon as it was light, and were well rewarded for it, for at 7.15 A.M. two patrols came marching down the road towards Kendal; these we let slip by, after which we took to the Windermere road, questioning all comers.

We soon found out that they had come from Staveley. This place I decided to give a wide berth, making towards Crook.

One of my advance scouts brought me word that two more of the enemy were in a farm about a mile farther on. After finding the farm on the map I decided to capture them, as I could get close to the farm by a small wood on left of road. Leaving the pack horse hidden, we then dashed out—one past the farm, one at the near side, and I went in and told them to surrender. If all three of us had gone in they could have escaped by the back way farther up the road, but this outlet I had guarded against. I was proud of this achievement, as one happened to be the scout sergeant, whom I put out of action for six hours, viz. to 3 P.M.

Passing through Crook village I noticed one of the first two scouts following me. I then knew that one of the captured men had gone back with a message, so I decided to leave the roads and make my way over the fields by the bridle path towards Kentmere, two miles north of Staveley, at which place the enemy was stationed. This journey was pretty stiff, as I altered my course a lot to try to lose my follower, which I did. I took down a section of three stone walls and built them up again, blessing farmers who have fields without gates. Before getting out on to the road again I baited the horses for an hour, getting fresh feeds in the nose-bags in the meanwhile. Whilst I was here I learned that the picket at Staveley had followed me on the Windermere road, and if they had struck our path over the Falls our journey in charge of treasure would soon have been over. I then moved in the direction of Nan Biel Pass, 1484 on map. It was a stiff climb, and had to be worked in short stages. Nearing the top the pack-horse was getting very restive, and, as the path would only hold one horse comfortably, I took mine to the top and then came down for the pack-horse. Here I met a friendly tourist, who, after taking a snapshot of us, studied the map with me, as I had a difficult task before me—that was, to get across the Fells in the night-time.

After a short rest we found we had a harder task still to get down again. Having fastened the pack-horse behind one of the others, I sent one of them in front, and then with another man the other two horses tied together. Remaining at the top I watched them down a bit; sometimes the pack-horse would slide down on to the other horse, and when he stopped he wanted a little persuading to move on. It took us about an hour to get down and to get landed safely, without even a shoe loose.

There being no one in the vicinity, I decided to take rest for an hour or two at Grove Brea Inn, where I again purchased feeds for horses and a good tea for the men. I here gained information that to take the Fells from that point would be too dangerous on account of the bogs and marshy land, but that I might be able to do so from Bernfoot.

Saddling up again I sent the two scouts out towards Bampton. It was

very slow work and tedious, but hearing that Bampton was clear I moved to the north-west of it, arriving at 10 P.M. Here I learned that some of the enemy were at Wideworth Mill, just north of where I intended to get on the Fells. I passed them quite safely, not daring hardly to breathe. It was moonlight, and suited our work admirably. I very soon got lost, but not for many minutes. Knowing that I had to travel north-west to get to where I wanted on the other side, I worked across by the compass, only deviating a bit to avoid a few marshes.

*Tuesday.*—About midnight I came to a small wood, and about a mile beyond I could see the gleam of a large lake by the moon shining on it. Looking at the map I found I had worked very close to the spot which I had marked on the map, Elderbeck Farm being just beyond the wood.

I forded the Elderbeck river and got into the farm. Here I examined a few carts to see if I was right with my bearing on the map. As the name on the carts was Elderbeck, I knew I was within two miles of my destination.

As my movements in the farm were not noticed by anyone, not even the dog barking, I gave the horses another rest and the last feed we had.

Making a mental note of the rest of the journey, I took the lead myself at 12.45 A.M. If I had found any of the enemy at the cross-roads I should have crept back, and would have made one final dash over Pooley Bridge into Waterford.

Seeing everything clear, I waited till the men came up with the pack-horse; it had been only through hearing the pack-horse's feet on the road now and again which told me they were coming on, and found the county boundary north of Waterford and passed into Cumberland at 1.30 A.M. From there I tramped three of the last five miles to get us warm again, arriving at Lowther Park at 4.30 A.M.

### THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT IN CANADA.

The Boy Scout movement has ceased to be an experiment: it is now an assured success.

In holding Mafeking for Britain during the Boer War, Sir Robert Baden-Powell performed a service the magnitude of which cannot easily be measured, for its fall within a short time of the commencement of the siege would immensely have encouraged the enemy, and quite probably have spread the flame of war through Cape Colony, possibly with disastrous results.

Such a feat as holding the little South African town in the teeth of what seemed overwhelming odds would satisfy some men for life, and upon the reputation so obtained they would swim easily with the stream, not even striving to accomplish anything further of note.

For Baden-Powell, however, this was but the beginning of usefulness, and long after his notable defence has faded into oblivion he will be remembered as the founder and organiser of a movement that bids fair immensely to improve the future generations of his fellow-countrymen and even the race as a whole.

To quote from his speech at the Toronto Exhibition, as reported by the *Globe*: 'He believed that in the character of the individual units of a nation dwelt its prospects for ultimate national success, and that continued well-being could only be assured by training the rising generation in those qualities

of resourcefulness, loyalty, honour, honesty, energy, and devotion to duty which are urgently needed whenever great crises are to be met.'

These are indeed splendid principles to inculcate in our rising generation, and the task has been taken up by scores of earnest men—clergymen, school teachers, and others—who will see to it that our boys have a thorough training along these lines.

Again to quote from the General's Toronto speech : ' Each boy is expected, and we put him on his honour, to carry out at least one good deed every day to some animal or person.'

What a splendid foundation-stone for charity throughout all after life—this obligation undertaken in youth. Then there is that excellent thing called discipline which goes with the Boy Scout movement, and without which it would certainly fail.

An open confession is good for the soul, and we might as well admit that the average Canadian child does not appear to be well disciplined either in his home or his school, if we are to judge from the manners and actions of children when not under the immediate control of parents or teachers. If well disciplined, better manners would be noticeable, more politeness towards their elders, and a greater desire to keep within whatever rules and regulations might be laid down.

The encouragement of thrift is another prominent and excellent feature of the Boy Scout programme ; to put it in the words of General Baden-Powell, ' Less wasters will reach manhood.'

Now in these days we are giving great attention to the conservation of natural resources. Our ablest and most public-spirited men are addressing themselves to this necessary and rather difficult work, for in a country so prodigal of natural wealth as is our own the temptation to waste is almost overpowering.

Once let the idea of thrift take firm root in the individual of the up-growing generation and conservation of resources will follow almost as a matter of course.

The Empire owes this far-seeing man an ever-growing debt of gratitude, and we are both proud and pleased to note that Canada has realised the importance of his work and has entered with whole heart into its promotion.  
—*The Canadian Military Gazette*.

## FOREIGN.

*Denmark*.—With the reorganisation of the Danish army, consequent on the operation of the new law passed on September 30, 1909, the number of regiments of Cavalry has been reduced from five to four, and the 2nd Dragoons has therefore ceased to exist. In March last its three squadrons were reduced to two, and these are to form the nucleus of the new fourth squadron for the Hussars of the Guard—of which regiment the late King Edward VII. was Colonel-in-Chief—and of the 4th Dragoons. In Danish Cavalry circles the disappearance from the army list of so old-established a corps as the 2nd Dragoons is greatly regretted.

*France*.—Some new regulations have recently been published concerning the mounting of mounted officers. Certain officers of junior rank are mounted at the expense of the State ; others have to provide their own chargers, but

may purchase Government horses, and may even bring up horses before the Remount Commission for purchase in the first instance by the State, the bringer having the animal handed over to him on a monthly payment. Such animals are divided into four classes, the maximum prices to be paid in each class being 1,770f., 1,500f., 1,350f., and 760f. Officers can, however, only mount themselves from the class which is considered suitable for their arm or department; e.g. Cavalry and General Staff officers may mount themselves from Class 1, while Infantry captains and junior medical officers must be content to choose their chargers from Class 4, composed of Arab geldings, horses too small for Light Cavalry and *déclassé* Dragoon and Artillery remounts.

The intrenching tool carried up to now by the French Cavalry (a pick-axe) has been found to be too heavy, and experiments are to be conducted during the next four months with two models of a lighter pattern and having handles 0.48 and 0.80 cm. in length respectively.

The establishment for next year of the Horse Artillery batteries *not* at full strength will be raised by fifteen men—from 120 to 135. The establishment of horses remains, however, as now, at 120, including officers' chargers.

Cavalry regiments which have machine-guns on charge are to be issued with Barr and Stroud's Telemeter, with 0.66 base.

The question of the best method of carrying the sword has again come up for solution in Cuirassier regiments. Reports have been called for by the War Minister as to whether the present system shall be continued or whether the sword should be suspended on the *off* and the carbine on the *near* side of the saddle.

*Austria.*—"Die Trani-Ulanen: being a brief record of the 13th Austrian Ulans." Reprinted from the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*. Wien. 1910.—This Cavalry regiment completes in the present year its jubilee, and the record of its fifty years of existence has been compiled by three different hands. The regiment was raised in the spring of 1859, when more Cavalry was required to strengthen the army which, under Gyulai in the Somellina, was preparing for the outset of the forces of France and of Sardinia. The call went forth for volunteer Cavalry—that is, for regiments composed of men whose service had expired or who had not yet been called up, and officered by men on the active or retired list—and among the new regiments formed from those who responded to the summons was the 13th, or Trani Ulans, which was born just as the Peace of Villafranca was concluded. If the new regiment was to be denied any participation in the campaign for which it had been specially raised, it was fortunate in being formed, with two other regiments similarly constituted, into a brigade commanded by Freiherr von Edelsheim, to whose commanding personality the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry owes much. In 1863 the 13th Ulans were moved into Northern Italy, and there, in 1866, they covered themselves with glory at Custoza in a magnificent charge against a numerous and unbroken Infantry.

The little book is completed with some reminiscences of an officer who served with the regiment in the early days of its existence and a short poetical account of the fine achievement of Torresani and his eight troopers at Cimego in July 1866. The Trani-Ulans are to be congratulated on their short but stirring history and on having found writers so well qualified to recount it.

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAVALRY TRAINING IN THE WARSAW MILITARY DISTRICT.

AN ORDER ISSUED IN THE WARSAW MILITARY DISTRICT ON FEBRUARY 2, AND  
TRANSLATED FROM THE 'RUSSKI INVALID' OF APRIL 29 AND MAY 19 AND 31,  
1910.

### NOTE IN M. O. 3 (B)

As the latest edition of the Cavalry Training is dated 1896, these instructions have been issued in order to secure uniformity of training in the district, which contains more mounted troops than any other in Russia (viz. 8 cavalry divisions and 2 independent brigades, or in all 212 squadrons and 108 H.A. guns).

A letter in the *Razvyedchik*, signed by a General, has since been published pointing out that the issue of orders concerning the technical training of Cavalry would appear to be rather a duty of the Inspector-General of Cavalry than of the Commander-in-Chief of a military district.

The annual manœuvres show that the Cavalry is not yet fully prepared for war. There is little or no uniformity or agreement among Cavalry commanders regarding method; on the contrary, the most complete and incomprehensible variety in their views has been repeatedly noticed, and many of the methods themselves are far from sound.

In view of this fact a number of senior Cavalry commanders were assembled for ten days last December to consider and discuss the principles of Cavalry manœuvres and tactics in the light of existing regulations on the subject.

Several conferences took place, with Lieutenant-General Brusilov in the chair, and a war game was played.

The results of the committee's deliberations (approved by the General Officer Commanding Warsaw Military District) are now published for information and compliance.

### STRATEGICAL RECONNAISSANCE

1. The Cavalry commander is responsible for the reconnaissance duties of the Cavalry of an army. The commander of a force detailed for such duty will sub-divide the area \* allotted to him into sections, which will be examined by *reconnoitring squadrons* and *independent patrols*.

The frontage dealt with by a reconnoitring squadron will be some three to ten miles, according to the number of roads, nature of the ground, &c. Independent patrols will chiefly be used in cases where there is no necessity for reconnoitring the whole section.

2. The object to be attained by these reconnoitring squadrons and patrols will be clearly and definitely communicated to them.

3. The commander of a squadron will reconnoitre the ground allotted to him by means of his patrols.

4. It is impossible to lay down any rule as to the distances to which a Cavalry force, reconnoitring squadron, or patrol is to be pushed out. But the interval between detachments should be limited, so as to admit of adequate reconnaissance of the ground without undue haste and without hindering the advance of units behind.

\* Such an area allotted to a division may extend over forty to fifty miles.



At the outset the main body of a Cavalry force will move out (for example) some thirty to thirty-five miles in front of the army; the reconnoitring squadrons will be some sixteen to twenty miles in advance of the Cavalry main body; and the patrols again some ten to thirteen miles in front of the squadrons. Thus the leading Cavalry 'feelers' will be some sixty to seventy miles in advance of the army.

As the army draws near, these various distances will be proportionately reduced.

5. A Cavalry commander must remember that valuable information cannot be picked up for nothing, and he must not shrink from necessary casualties. On the other hand, it is culpable not to make the utmost of any information acquired at, perhaps, considerable sacrifice of men.

It is not enough merely to get information; it must be promptly reported. With this view communication and connection between the various portions of a Cavalry force must be most carefully organised.

6. Normally, such communication will be from front to rear; *i.e.* patrols will connect with the squadrons, and the latter with the main body of the Cavalry, which, in its turn, will communicate with the headquarters of the army.

The Cavalry commander will be informed by the staff of the army to what extent he must provide for his own communications.

7. Communications between patrols and the squadron from which they have been sent out is chiefly managed by indicating to the patrols certain points at which the squadron will arrive at a given time. If the squadron is compelled to alter its pre-arranged route, an orderly (a reliable old soldier) should be left behind to point out the road it has actually gone.

8. All available means of communication (cycles, motor-cycles, motors) must be utilised. In some cases it will be quicker to send a report by carriage than by a mounted orderly.

9. All reports will be sent in to the commander of the Cavalry, and he will forward them to the staff of the army. Circumstances may, however, arise in which it will be preferable for a reconnoitring squadron or independent patrol to send a report direct to the army staff. In this case a duplicate must be sent to the Cavalry commander. The Cavalry commander decides on what occasions this method of communication is to be employed.

If, when it has been originally arranged that reports should in the first instance be rendered to the Cavalry commander, circumstances arise (such as the Cavalry having to move to a flank, or otherwise) which make it necessary for certain squadrons to send their reports direct to the army staff, the Cavalry commander will leave posts at suitable road-junctions under a selected officer (if possible, with an officer of the General Staff), to receive and forward reports both to the army staff and to himself. Such a post will collate reports from the reconnoitring detachments, in the same way as would be done by the staff of the Cavalry force. Under certain conditions several such posts might be established.

10. The Cavalry commander will receive daily at specified times periodical reports from officers commanding squadrons and independent patrols dealing with the interval which has elapsed since the last report was rendered. He will himself render periodical summaries of these reports to the staff of the

army. Reconnoitring squadrons and independent patrols will also be required to furnish reports upon reaching certain specified points.

If any such periodical report is not received at the time expected, a fresh reconnoitring detachment must be sent to the section in question, for it may be assumed that something is wrong there.

All important reports must be despatched at once.

11. Reconnoitring squadrons must be relieved every seven to eight days, and independent patrols every four to five days.

The reliefs will be carried out as follows :—

The commanders of the relieving units will receive all available information from the staff.

The time of relief will be communicated to both the relieving units and those to be relieved.

The reliefs will reach the ground a little before that time.

The old reconnoitring squadrons will call in their patrols when those of the relieving squadrons have passed through the line upon which they were distributed.

The relieved squadron will then join the main body of the Cavalry force.

Independent patrols pushed out to a distance will be relieved in the same way, except that the old patrol, after relief, will not march off until, say, four hours after the arrival of the relieving patrol. In the majority of cases by that time the two patrols will be out of sight of each other.

12. As a rule reliefs will be carried out early in the morning, so as to give plenty of time to the new squadron to look round.

It must not be forgotten that until the relieved squadrons join the main body the latter is weakened by twice their strength. And, further, until they have so joined and *have had a rest*, they cannot be reckoned upon as available for duty.

These reliefs are a serious matter, and must be very carefully arranged.

It is best not to relieve all reconnoitring units at the same time, but by regiments. Again, convenient opportunities should be utilised for carrying out reliefs; for instance, if the main body happens to be close to any particular section, the chance of relieving the units there should be taken.

It is desirable that the commanders of the relieving and relieved squadrons should meet personally; at all events, one officer of each squadron should meet. The officer commanding the relieving squadron should put himself in communication with the squadron he is relieving, and the latter will then send to meet him.

13. In some cases Infantry units may be attached to a Cavalry force, and will add stability to the operations of the latter by occupying important points. If possible such units should be carried in carts, with reduced equipment, but with a large supply of ammunition. On the other hand, convenient opportunities for the use of Infantry are not frequent. It is essential that Infantry should not hamper the movements of Cavalry, but come up to its support when wanted,

## CAVALRY IN MOVEMENT

14. The advanced guard must not be too strong, lest the effective strength of the main body should be unduly weakened. If, on the other hand, it is too weak, it will not be able to gain sufficient time for the commander of the main body to decide whether he will accept or decline an engagement. In the case of a Cavalry division \* with two horse batteries it is not usual to detail more than one regiment with a horse battery as advanced guard.

15. The advanced guard will at once, without awaiting special orders, send out covering parties to its front and flanks.

16. The distance of an advanced guard from the head of the main column (in the case of a division) is usually about one to one and a half mile.

17. The commander of the force will march with the advanced guard when there is a prospect of an engagement. If need be, he will ride rapidly forward, so as to see the whole situation for himself.

He must study the map before starting, and during the course of the movement only consult it occasionally to verify his position. If he continually studies his map while on the march he will miss much of the characteristics of the ground, knowledge of which is so essential for Cavalry action.

A selected officer will ride close to him with a map in his hand, and ready at any moment to identify on it the actual position and neighbouring objects.

The column commander should have with him (in addition to the usual orderlies from regiments) a few men available at once for any special work.

18. Intercommunication on the march will be maintained from front to rear. The point and the patrols will regulate their pace by the advanced guard.

19. The movement of a Cavalry force will be more adequately protected by the close reconnaissance of the enemy than by the mere sending out of covering patrols.

However, units sent out far to the front have their own special work, and it is possible that the enemy may appear in the space between them and the main body. Therefore, in addition to such distant (strategical) reconnaissance there must also be protective reconnaissance. With this view the advanced guard will send out patrols some six to eight miles to the front and flanks of the main body. In case of need, additional patrols may be sent out by the main body itself to the flanks, and even to the rear.

It is very important that main roads should be traversed by officers' patrols. If such patrols are vigilant, the force cannot be taken by surprise.

During halts these protective patrols must work with special care, and posts should be established on the main roads.

20. Batteries will move close to the head of the main body, i.e. in rear of the two leading squadrons. Patrols will be sent out to the flanks as a matter of course. Such patrols should not, however, be too numerous, for it is not their numbers but their capabilities that count. They will ride across country, from point to point, crossing any open ground at a rapid pace.

21. Where there are several columns connection between them must be

\* The normal Russian cavalry division consists of three brigades of two regiments of six squadrons, with a total fighting strength of 3,466 sabres and 12 guns. (M.O. 3 [B]).

maintained. With this view 'communication officers' will be detailed, with an adequate number of orderlies.

If the columns are a considerable distance apart, an officer's patrol of adequate strength will move in the interval between them. This patrol will move from point to point, as previously laid down by the staff of the main body. It must reach each point at a given time, and stay there as long as may have been ordered. The 'communication officers' will be furnished with the programme of the patrol's movements, and will send their reports to its commander.

22. A normal march for a Cavalry division is about twenty-three to twenty-seven miles, at an average pace of five and one-third miles an hour; or, allowing for halts, &c., of about four miles an hour.

Where tactical work comes in, the length of march must depend upon circumstances.

In night marches the average pace of large Cavalry units is about three and one-third miles an hour.

#### HALTS

23. In halting for the night (usually in combined billets and bivouacs) the advanced guard will furnish the outposts.

24. In each village and bivouac a commandant and an orderly officer and an inlying picket will be detailed. The commandant is responsible for the maintenance of good order and security.

25. The entrance of a village will be barricaded. The first consideration is security from surprise by hostile Cavalry; after that against Infantry, if necessary. Hostile Cavalry can advance practically as rapidly as any report of their appearance can be brought in, so that there may not be much time available for preparation.

Obviously, security from surprise is best attained by adequate reconnaissance and good outposts. Still, instances of surprise by Cavalry may occur. In such a case the best means of defence is rifle fire.

If a village is suitable for defence it can often be held successfully against a considerably superior force. While units immediately attacked are defending themselves by dismounted fire, other units will mount and co-operate by shock tactics.

26. When the column marches off in the morning the outposts will remain in their positions until the new advanced guard, with its scouts, &c., has passed through them. The old advanced guard (outposts) will then join the rear of the column.

#### CAVALRY TACTICS

27. Action against the enemy's Cavalry masses may be, according to circumstances, either mounted, or a combination of mounted action with certain units dismounted. It is for the commander to decide which method is applicable to the given conditions—mounted or dismounted action, machine-gun or Artillery fire. The chief and most effective method is mounted action; the others are merely subsidiary.

28. On approaching the enemy the Cavalry commander will gallop to a commanding spot, reconnoitre, and decide what to do. It is most important

that he should quickly grasp the situation, arrive at a decision rapidly, and carry out his plan with energy. Thus alone will he retain the power of initiative in his own hands. If he is too long in grasping the state of affairs he throws the initiative into the hands of the enemy. A Cavalry commander should divine, as it were by instinct, what he has got to do.

29. When an engagement is sufficiently foreseen to admit of such a course the commander will occupy the enemy in front, with his advanced guard, and, if necessary, with any additional units—*e.g.* Artillery or machine guns—pushed forward for the purpose, while he himself with his main body manœuvres with a view to the delivery of the decisive stroke in the best possible direction.

It may be advantageous to occupy supporting points, as a means of clearing up the situation and facilitating the preliminary manœuvres, which are undertaken with a view to securing the best conditions for a Cavalry charge. Such points will be held by dismounted troops, and free use should be made of Artillery and machine-gun fire.

30. As an intermediate formation between column of route and the deployment columns of half-squadrons are useful, being capable of easy adaptation to the ground and of rapid deployment.

31. With a view to bringing a decisive blow to bear upon the enemy the Cavalry commander will decide the number and strength of the various groups of his force, and will assign them special duties (*e.g.* the charge and its objective, the flank attack, &c.). The reserve will remain in his own hands. In action his orders will usually take the form of instructions.

Up to the actual moment of charging, the largest possible portion of the force will be kept concentrated. The various groups must be so led forward that nothing but mechanical deployment is required before the delivery of the charge, and no flank movement is necessary in the close proximity of the enemy so as to gain space for deployment.

Units intended for outflanking or turning movements must be detached in adequate time, or they will not be able to co-operate at the actual moment of attack.

32. In the field, precise formations and the maintenance of exact intervals and distances cease to be of primary importance. They are used in peace in order to train units in pliability and rapidity of manœuvre; they are a means to an end, and must not be mistaken for the end itself.

In action, the formation must be such as the particular conditions require. The only thing to remember in the Cavalry battle is that units which are held back do not support the units in front when most needed, and risk the failure of the whole operation.

33. Horse Artillery may give valuable assistance, in a protracted dismounted engagement, from covered positions; but in a Cavalry charge it must go forward boldly, and support the Cavalry by direct fire. Machine guns can give very valuable support to the Cavalry charge.

34. While a Cavalry attack is in progress reconnaissance and measures of security must be continued with undiminished energy.

35. On the field of battle, where masses of Infantry are engaged, the Cavalry must co-operate to the common end. It will make the utmost of its mobility by appearing in directions most threatening to the adversary, and

menacing him with Artillery fire. It may take up flanking and out-flanking positions, and by dismounted action combined with machine-gun fire attract part of the enemy's force, and thus weaken the pressure on the Infantry. Finally, in the last phases of the action, when the Infantry is tired out, a skilfully led charge of Cavalry masses holds out the promise of success and far-reaching results. It must not shrink from any sacrifice. Where the Infantry is losing 50 per cent. of its strength, the other arms must bear their share. If Cavalry has made up its mind to losses on that scale, it may and must achieve, even at the present day, colossal results on the battlefield itself. Victory repays any loss; and what is the use of saving units at the cost of victory?

#### DIVISIONAL CAVALRY

36. A certain number of squadrons will be attached to each Infantry division.\*

37. The chief work of divisional Cavalry is reconnaissance at close quarters, outpost duty, and the maintenance of communication.

38. During the march of an Infantry division patrols of a strength of seven to eight troopers each will be sent forward some six to eight miles along the main and lateral roads, and four to four and a half miles to the outer flank. During a halt these patrols become observation posts.

39. The remainder of the divisional Cavalry is at the immediate disposal of the divisional commander. It usually moves at the head of the vanguard.

40. If there be a considerable distance between columns marching abreast an officer's patrol may usefully move in the interval, analogous to that mentioned above in paragraph 21.

41. If necessary the divisional Cavalry will furnish relays for the field posting service.

42. When the Infantry is halted for the night the divisional Cavalry furnishes the necessary number of troopers for maintaining communication between the various fractions of the outposts, and between them and the main body (in the absence of other means of communication, such as cyclists, motorists, &c.). Patrols may also be pushed forward half a day's march along main roads, and standing patrols may be posted at specified points. It is useful to connect such posts with the divisional headquarters by telephone.

43. As the enemy is approached, when the Cavalry force in front has cleared away to the flanks or has undertaken other work, the divisional Cavalry sends out officers' patrols (strength not less than twelve to fifteen men) for the distant reconnaissance. These patrols get into touch with the enemy along the front and to the flanks.

As the hostile forces get nearer and nearer together reconnoitring patrols will usually be furnished by Infantry. Small Cavalry patrols will continue to work along the front, if circumstances are specially favourable; but at this stage they may be of special value on the flanks.

When the opposing forces are in immediate presence of each other Cavalry

\* The number of squadrons to be attached to the division and to corps has never been definitely laid down in Russia. In the war of 1904-05 the number varied from two to twenty for the whole corps, and the proportion allotted to divisional and corps troops varied. (M.O. 3 [B]).

patrols will have to be dismounted, leaving their horses in some convenient spot under cover.

44. In action divisional Cavalry will be chiefly used on the flanks, which it will cover in the following manner :—

The staff of the division will select a supporting point on the flank, to be held by a special force, consisting of the divisional Cavalry, with a small party of Infantry. A specially selected officer, if possible belonging to the General Staff, will be appointed to command this flank detachment, receiving all necessary instructions from the staff.

This supporting point should be connected with the divisional staff by telephone or telegraph, and Cavalry relays will be required in addition in case the line is interrupted.

The officer commanding such a point will send out small patrols to watch the roads along which the enemy's outflanking columns might advance, and also to observe his flank. The distance such patrols could push forward must depend upon the ground and circumstances.

In the event of a turning movement being directed upon the enemy's flank the officer commanding the supporting point would place himself in communication with the column detailed for the purpose. He must at once inform the staff if he changes his position.

Such a post on a flank would not only be in immediate communication with the headquarters of the division, but also with any neighbouring unit on that flank, to which any news of importance would be immediately communicated.

45. Divisional Cavalry, both before and during an engagement, is extremely valuable if properly utilised. It is, therefore, essential that it should be very sparingly used for objects of secondary importance, such as orderly work, and reserved for work of vital necessity. It must be remembered that as the work is prolonged and wearing, reliefs are necessary, and these can only be found if the squadrons are employed with care and economy.

46. When a suitable opportunity offers during an engagement the divisional Cavalry must charge. Not only must no squadron, but no troop even may remain idle where success is in the balance. If mounted attack is manifestly impossible, the men must fight on foot.

#### MACHINE GUNS

47. As a rule machine guns will not be attached to reconnoitring squadrons. On the march it is useful to have them with the advanced guard. When halted for the night machine guns are useful with the inlying picket, and will afford valuable help in repelling any attack, especially by night.

On outpost duty they will preferably be posted with the reserve or at defensive posts.

In Cavalry action they will be attached to units detailed for the duties referred to above in paragraph 29. During the actual charge machine guns will move rapidly forward, and endeavour to bring a flanking fire to bear upon the enemy's lines. In dismounted action they act as with Infantry. In a retirement machine guns cover the retreat.

48. Machine guns should not show themselves before opening fire ; sudden, unexpected machine-gun fire produces a great moral effect upon the enemy.

49. Machine guns move as a rule under cover and keep out of sight, except when galloping forward to co-operate in a Cavalry charge. In the latter case the main thing is to reach the desired point as quickly as possible and to open fire.

50. Machine guns act independently of Horse Artillery. They are provided with an escort, which acts in the same way as an escort to Horse Artillery.

The above instructions are intended as a general guide only. In some cases figures have been given for the sake of clearness; but it is obviously impossible to lay down any rule—everything depends upon circumstances.

(Sgd.) SKALON, *General Adjutant*,  
*Commanding Troops in the Warsaw Military District.*

#### A GERMAN OPINION OF 'WAR AND THE ARME BLANCHE.'

The following is an extract from a review of the above-mentioned book by von Balck, in the Literary Supplement of the *Militär-Wochenblatt* :—  
 'It is well known that Lord Roberts, who was beyond doubt influenced by Colonel Henderson, the recently deceased officer of the General Staff, had pronounced against the use of the *arme blanche* and in favour of transforming the Cavalry into Mounted Infantry, and that these views actually found expression in the "Cavalry Training" of 1904. Curiously enough, Sir John French, the British Cavalry Commander in the Boer War, drew exactly opposite conclusions from the self-same events, and whilst endeavouring to explain the failure of the Cavalry as such by reference to the special conditions of the war, showed the Cavalry how in the future they might defy and break through a force armed with modern weapons of precision. The appearance of the "Training Manual of 1907" may be ascribed to his influence. The author of "War and the *Arme Blanche*" deals briefly with the Russo-Japanese War, and at more length with that in South Africa, describing what was there achieved by Mounted Infantry and by Cavalry acting dismounted; his critical remarks are generally conclusive. His views are especially worth reading in the chapters wherein he deals with the employment of Cavalry in rear of an enemy and with enterprises of *la petite guerre* both by day and night. The author, moreover, gives some interesting details of the Boer mounted attacks. The proofs, however, which he brings forward in support of his contentions are incomplete; to be convincing he should also have touched upon those instances in the war where a charge would of a certainty have destroyed the last shred of *moral* of a broken soldiery, who, even as it was, were able to hold on until dark. The author goes too far when, in demanding the withdrawal of the steel weapon from Cavalry, he accuses General von Bernhardt of lukewarmness and inconsistency for insisting on the increased employment of dismounted action while not denying the advantages of the charge. The opinions of the author will find small sympathy with us in Germany; the Boer War was a Colonial war on a large scale; the same conditions which in South West Africa necessitated the formation of Mounted Infantry exercised in the Boer War a paralysing influence on the action of Cavalry. The Boers have themselves admitted that when the Cavalry *did* charge, effect was certainly not lacking. The book is worth reading, but for us its actual value is but small.'



## SQUADRON SECTION COMPETITION

By MAJOR E. PATERSON, Inniskilling Dragoons.

CAVALRY training lays down that the troop must be organised into sections, under the immediate control of a non-commissioned officer or soldier.

When Adjutant of the North Devon Yeomanry, I carried the section organisation to such a point that each section of four men either lived in neighbouring farms or the same village; in camp they fed together, horses were picketed together, and the section was the unit throughout. On rejoining my regiment I at once took in hand the organisation of the squadron on similar lines—the section, however, in this case being from eight to ten men instead of four, as in the Yeomanry—but met with many difficulties; however, in a year's time, with careful training of the young N.C.O.s and the likely future N.C.O.s, the idea of the section system took shape, and then I organised and started the squadron on the following lines.

The section leaders were first carefully picked, and each one, if he so wished, was allowed to keep three men of his section and four of his original horses; if he wished for neither men nor horses, they went into a general pool.

The section leaders who had pooled all their men and horses were then allowed to pick three men and four horses out of the pool before any drawing took place. The drawing for the men was confidential and done by section leaders in the squadron orderly-room.

The men were divided into five classes :—

- (a) Trained soldiers,
- (b) Bandsmen,
- (c) Signallers,
- (d) Staff (including shoeing-smiths),
- (e) Recruits,

the men under each heading being pooled and drawn for separately.

The horses were drawn for in a similar manner and were classed as :—

- (a) Trained horses.
- (b) Band horses.
- (c) Remounts.

The section leaders took great interest in their selection of both men and horses, and I was surprised at the accuracy of their judgment.

There were many advantages obtained by starting in this manner, the first and great advantage being that all sections were equal in men and horses and equally distributed as to classes.

The section leader knew he had three men at least who would back him up through thick and thin, and four good horses.

The recruits and remounts are drawn for by section leaders as they join and vacancies occur in their sections; greater care and attention is given by the section leaders to the recruit and young horse, than by the troop leader, who has forty men to look after.

The signallers, bandsmen, and band horses are divided so that there is one in each section, also in the same manner with all the staff men; every section is the same.

Every man in the squadron, knowing that he is only one of eight or ten men, thinks in his own mind, and rightly so, that he is more noticed and more prominent than one of a unit of thirty-six or forty, as he would be in the troop.

I hope before the end of this year to have a signaller, scout, sketcher, and shoeing-smith in each section, and the latter, under the supervision of the staff sergeant, will be responsible for the shoeing of his section horses.

Every man is bound to know the peculiarities of the horses in a very short time, and all, without exception, learn how to feed their horses and make up the feeds.

There is never any grumbling about shortage of grooming men; if a section is very hard-up, they ask for help from their neighbouring section. Recruits at riding-school change horses every day right through their section; no recruit rides the same horse twice running.

The remounts as they join are also pooled and drawn for as there are vacancies in the section, and they are trained by the section leader or his second in command, who have naturally a tremendous interest in training them well, as they know that the future efficiency of the section depends on their care in training.

The sections shoot in their own sections and all preliminary instruction is given by the section leaders.

The whole system works most smoothly, and my experience is that a far greater interest is taken by all concerned and competition for efficiency is greatly stimulated by the section organisation.

I have a meeting once a month with the troop leaders and section leaders, when everything concerning the squadron is discussed, and expenditure of the various funds gone into, after which statements of all the squadron accounts are put up on the notice-board.

Every section was issued with a forage-box, lock and key, and, everything in each section being as complete and equal as possible, I called a meeting of the squadron, and put to them my proposal for a squadron section competition, to commence on October 1, 1909, and to finish on March 31, 1910. All the squadron seemed very keen on the idea and the following proposals were made and unanimously carried:—

1. That the competition should be voluntary, and anyone not wishing to join need not do so. (As a matter of fact, everyone joined.)

2. That each man should subscribe 8 annas, or 8d., a month to the prize pool.

3. Any man leaving the squadron through sickness, staff billets, or discharge should cease to belong, and his money already paid up be returned to him.

4. That a meeting of the section leaders be held every month for the inspection of the competition book.

5. That the following should be the events for the competition and the following marks allotted to each:—

- (a) Crime in sections ... .. Full marks 200  
 (1) N.C.O.'s reprimand; 8 days' C.B. ... .. Deduct 5 marks  
 (2) Over 8 days' and up to 14 days' C.B.; N.C.O.'s severe reprimand ... .. Deduct 10 marks  
 (3) Conviction by R.C.M. of N.C.O. or man ... .. Deduct 15 marks  
 (4) Conviction by a higher court N.C.O. or man ... .. Deduct 20 marks  
 (5) No entry of 7 days or under to count.
- (b) Preventable sickness amongst men in sections ... .. Full marks 100  
 Any case ... .. Deduct 10 marks
- (c) Preventable damage and casualties amongst horses ... .. Full marks 200  
 (1) Saddle sores, girth galls, thrush, bit injuries ... .. Deduct 10 marks  
 (2) Head-collar galls ... .. Deduct 5 marks  
 (3) Failing to report any of the above to troop officer or sergeants, 10 marks to be added to above.
- (d) Condition of horses at the end of the period ... .. Full marks 300  
 All horses to be judged by a veterinary officer and another officer from another regiment.  
 All horses to be mixed up and then placed in three rings by the judges.  
 (1) First-class condition ring ... .. 25 marks per horse  
 (2) Second-class condition ring ... .. 20 marks per horse  
 (3) Third-class condition ring ... .. 15 marks per horse
- (e) Condition of saddlery at end of the period ... .. Full marks 200
- (f) General knowledge of map reading ... .. Full marks 75
- (g) General knowledge of semaphore signalling ... .. Full marks 50
- (h) General knowledge of field calls ... .. Full marks 50
- (i) Highest number of points at Heads and Posts ... .. Full marks 50
- (j) Highest number of points at Tent-pegging ... .. Full marks 50
- (k) Best knowledge of Hindustani ... .. Full marks 25

The competition was judged by officers outside the squadron during the last week of March, and the attached copy of marks shows how sections came out of their examination, and the attached copy from the Journal shows any deductions made from sections.

## REDUCTION OF MARKS

SECTION.	TROOP.	CAUSE.	MARKS DEDUCTED.
No. 2 Section ...	No. 2 Troop ...	Preventable disease ...	10
No. 1 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Insolence to N.C.O. ...	10
No. 4 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Giving C.64 sore back... ..	10
No. 3 Section ...	No. 2 Troop ...	Giving C.35 sore back... ..	10
No. 2 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Giving C.88 saddle sores ...	10
No. 2 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Failing to report above case ...	10
No. 1 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Preventable disease ... ..	10
No. 3 Section ...	No. 4 Troop ...	Drunkenness ... ..	10
No. 3 Section ...	No. 4 Troop ...	Preventable disease ... ..	10
No. 4 Section ...	No. 1 Troop ...	Irregular conduct ... ..	10
No. 1 Section ...	No. 2 Troop ...	Reduction of Lance-corporal ...	10
No. 2 Section ...	No. 4 Troop ...	Irregular conduct ... ..	5
No. 4 Section ...	No. 2 Troop ...	Regimental court-martial ...	15
No. 2 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Drunkenness ... ..	10
No. 1 Section ...	No. 2 Troop ...	Drunkenness ... ..	10
No. 4 Section ...	No. 3 Troop ...	Breaking out of barracks ...	5
No. 4 Section ...	No. 1 Troop ...	Bit injury ... ..	10

[illegible]

Making a total of :—

Preventable disease ...	...	...	...	...	3 cases
Drunkenness ...	...	...	...	...	3 cases
Sore backs ...	...	...	...	...	3 cases
Bit injury ...	...	...	...	...	1 case
Miscellaneous ...	...	...	...	...	7 cases

A very small amount considering the length of time and close on 120 men competing.

The prize pool amounted to 520 rupees, or £35, and the N.C.O.s above the rank of corporal kindly gave 53 rupees, or £3 10s., for consolation prize, making a total of prize money £38 10s. in the pool for distribution. The result of the competition was kept secret until the night of March 31; no one except myself and the regimental schoolmaster knew the results. A supper and smoking concert was held that evening, and the last item of the programme was result of squadron competition and distribution of prizes.

The prize-list was as follows :—

Prize	Section Leader	Troop	No. Section	Amount
First . . .	Corporal Williams .	No. 1	No. 1	Rs. 208, or £14.
Second . . .	Lance-Corporal Davey .	No. 3	No. 4	Rs. 156, or £10 10s.
Third . . .	Private Courtney .	No. 2	No. 3	Rs. 104, or £7.
Fourth . . .	Lance-Corporal Crain .	No. 4	No. 4	Rs. 52, or £3 10s.
Consolation Prize, { divided . . . }	Lance-Corporal Keogh .	No. 2	No. 4	£3 10s.
	Corporal Roughan .	No. 3	No. 1	

#### POINTS NOTICED DURING THE COMPETITION

The section which won was no doubt the best section; they were as a whole good at everything. Other sections were extra good at special subjects and neglected some of the ordinary day subjects.

From the date of starting the competition an extra spurt of keenness was noticed throughout all ranks, greater interest was taken in all lectures, and the general impression given was that no one intended, if possible, to give Smith a chance of beating Jones and taking the latter's money, and right through the six months the best of good feeling prevailed through all ranks. The feeding of the horses and choice of foodstuffs were left entirely to section leaders.

The forage account was £100 in hand on October 1, and it was notified in squadron orders what the allowance in cash would be per horse per diem during the following week; section leaders then made out their forage requisitions and drew the section ration daily.

Section leaders by this method not only got to know the price of the various foodstuffs, but also quickly recognised which was the best value for their money, and all got into a regular system of bookkeeping.

Forage books were checked end of every month, and as long as there were no debit accounts they were passed without remark. Few sections fed the same, and in India, where there are so many kinds of food for horses, the experiment was most interesting, and the results clearly showed the benefit of

## INNISKILLING DRAGOONS. 'C' SQUADRON. SECTION COMPETITION.

October 1, 1909, to March 31, 1910.

—	Crime	Disease	Sick Horses	Horses	Saddlery	Map Reading	Sema- phore	Field Calls	Heads and Posts	Tent- pegging	Hindu- stani	Total	Prizes
I													First
1. Corporal Williams . . . . .	200	100	200	287	70	65	44	40	41	16	21	1,084	
2. Lance-Corporal Scarborough . . . . .	200	100	200	264	80	46	46	34	34	3	20	1,027	
3. Private Jones . . . . .	145	100	200	293	80	55	45	35	34	29	21	1,037	
4. Lance-Corporal Watt . . . . .	190	100	200	252	80	53	40	46	24	6	16	1,007	
II													Third Consolation
1. Private Dowds . . . . .	180	100	200	271	65	40	23	30	29	15	6	959	
2. Corporal Ogden . . . . .	200	90	200	294	80	55	47	32	26	13	12	1,049	
3. Private Courtney . . . . .	200	100	190	293	80	58	36	43	30	19	15	1,064	
4. Lance-Corporal Keogh . . . . .	185	100	200	278	85	58	46	40	27	15	16	1,050	
III													Consolation
1. Corporal Roughan . . . . .	190	90	200	293	85	60	34	42	33	6	17	1,050	
2. Corporal Elliott . . . . .	180	100	180	282	75	59	25	35	35	13	15	999	
3. Lance-Corporal Muncey . . . . .	200	100	200	294	75	40	34	24	33	11	15	1,026	
4. Lance-Corporal Davey . . . . .	185	100	200	300	80	68	32	40	34	5	21	1,065	Second
IV													Fourth
1. Corporal Simister . . . . .	200	100	200	269	80	63	23	31	24	4	7	1,001	
2. Corporal Jackson . . . . .	170	100	200	281	80	44	27	40	30	18	10	1,000	
3. Lance-Corporal Seaby . . . . .	180	90	200	259	80	68	25	43	24	7	13	989	
4. Lance-Corporal Crain . . . . .	200	100	200	294	65	63	41	41	26	15	9	1,054	

(Signed) E. PATERSON, Major,  
Commanding 'C' Squadron.

having sixteen stud-grooms to look after 132 horses, instead of four under the troop system.

The discussions amongst the men and the criticisms made were always instructive to all ranks, and I feel certain now, which I never was before, that every man is capable of feeding his own horse under any conditions, and if buying forage outside, they know what they should pay.

The squadron not only had a hard drill season, but also a 400-mile march to Baroda and back, in most trying hot weather, and the section principle of feeding was kept up all the time.

Hindustani as a subject was given low marks, as it was only a trial, and I did not look forward to its being a great success. I had a Munshi to instruct sergeants and section leaders for a couple of months; from five to ten words were learnt a day, and they passed it on to the men in their sections.

At morning and evening stables parade the whole of the vocabulary learnt was read out by the orderly sergeant, and the subject was a great success; the men entered into the spirit of the thing, and gradually commenced ordering the syces about in their own language, and all have now a fair knowledge of it, can ask their way about the country, and generally are far more useful when sent out to pick up information. I think it is the beginning of a most important subject which ought to be studied by all Cavalry soldiers of whatever rank in India, and next year, if another competition take place, the marks for this subject will be 200 instead of 25.

In the semaphore signalling it was most noticeable when the sections were judged that the reading was excellent as long as the sender was good, but the sending on the whole was bad; one trained corporal of signalling made no marks for his section entirely owing to his sender being very bad, and yet the sender, when he came to read the corporal's sending, got good marks.

Another year I would knock out the subjects of crime, disease, and tent-pegging, and in their places have:—

- (a) Best-trained section of horses.
- (b) Best knowledge of surrounding country without the aid of the map.
- (c) Best sight-seeing section.

This last subject should be one of great interest and will require a great deal of training.

My experience has been, both on service and training in peace time, that the British soldier sees things in his immediate front, but has little idea of expanse of view and taking note of things all round him quickly. Sections should be taken to riding ground, and given, perhaps, two or three minutes to note down any extraordinary things they may see, such as guns, troops moving, dust, &c.

There was little or no crime in the squadron, seven sections out of sixteen being quite clear; and also little or no disease, thirteen sections out of sixteen being clear; and only two sections out of sixteen had marks deducted for casualties amongst the horses.

I feel quite certain that if squadron leaders wish to give their men greater interest and make competition towards efficiency more keen during the drill season, a competition run on the lines which I have described will meet with great success.



(Kindly supplied by Messrs. Hawkes & Co.)



BRITISH CAVALRY TUNIC BUTTONS.





## SPORTING NOTES

### PATIALA

THE friendliest relations exist between the officers of the British Army in India and the principal Indian Princes, and it is no uncommon event for a party of our officers on leave to be entertained for shooting big game, elephants or tigers, and to have opportunities of pigsticking on the best hunting country in India. The writer had the good fortune to be entertained on a sporting trip while on leave by the Maharajah of Patiala, the chief of an important Sikh principality, whose loyal adherence to the British Government in 1857 was a most important factor in rendering the siege and capture of Delhi a feasible military operation. The Palace of Patiala is a big modern bungalow, surrounded by beautiful gardens laid out in European fashion. Some of the flower-beds, however, had patterns made of broken bits of black and white glass, or the remnants of whisky and mineral-water bottles, which



gave a bizarre effect to the whole. Such unexpected dashes of Oriental squalor and lapses from good taste in the vain attempt accurately to copy Western luxury are to be met with throughout the East, and have a dismal effect of disillusion amidst the real beauty of Oriental colours and designs. Attached to the Palace are extensive stables and kennels, a stud farm on modern lines, and a cricket ground with pavilion; the whole are lit up by an installation of electric light, and are supervised by an English secretary, with trainers and cricket professionals; and close to the Palace is the old city of Patiala, in the midst of whose narrow native streets and alley ways rises the fort, a fine building with a noble red-stone gateway, on which the colours of

the State flap round the flagstaff. The official reception-rooms are inside. The Bara-dara, or Hall of Audience, is a big empty room, hung as closely as they can be fitted together with glass chandeliers, whose total cost was said to have been 100,000 rupees. The walls are decorated with cheap German oleographs, and with pictures from the Christmas numbers of the illustrated papers. In one room we saw the contents of an English hardware shop, much of which had not even been removed from the packing-cases. It seems that a predecessor of the reigning prince had bought them while on a visit to England, to impress the shopkeeper with his exalted rank. We reached the club-house about 9 P.M. It had been built by the present Maharajah for the accommodation of his English guests, and contained quarters such as are found in all the best clubs at the principal Indian stations and cantonments. Here he and his officers received us, and greeted us with friendly hospitality. The principal officers all spoke English well, and were cheery, well-bred men, dressed in English riding or shooting clothes, but wearing the characteristic Sikh headdress—a tall turban of twisted linen, the colours of which were delicate tints of pink primrose, pale lilac, &c. Next morning, after a sumptuous breakfast, we drove out to the jungle where the



pigsticking was to take place. We drove to the meet in a brake drawn by four horses, and followed by a regiment of Patiala Cavalry to a point seven miles distant. There we found a strong army of beaters and a line of elephants. The beaters were formed in line, behind them the Sowars, or troopers, rode at several yards' interval, and finally the elephants formed a last reserve to drive the wild boar out of their lairs. The hunters are disposed in parties of three or four at the far corner of the patches of covert or jungle, so that the pig may be driven past them into the open. They keep still under the shade of trees or long grass until a boar of a size to be hunted has broken covert. He is allowed to proceed a couple of hundred yards on his way, lest he lose confidence and double back into the thicket. Then the party start in chase of him, hunt him across country, over ravines, through crops, thorn, thicket, and long grass, until they close on him. A race ensues for the honour of first spear. Whichever member of the party can spear the quarry so as to show blood on the blade of his lance is entitled to the tusks as trophies, so that the hunt becomes a race, and perhaps a steeplechase. It often happens that the first prick of the spear irritates rather than injures the gallant foe,

who thereupon turns to bay, and frequently rushes to meet the onslaught of the riders with head down, and the gleaming white tusks showing with which he purposes to rip open the horse or to strike at his legs.

The scene of our hunt was picturesque and lively in the utmost degree. The towering elephants, the line of horsemen with graceful lances, the bare brown-legged beaters grunting and shouting, made a brave array of life and colour, while a stout, elderly gentleman on a pony cantered sharply up and down the line issuing orders and directing the operations as chief huntsman. His comrades called him the elephant on account of his portly figure. The Maharajah himself is a first-rate horseman; he rode a handsome Arab, and wore a Sikh turban and spectacles, but carried no spear, as to-day he was not competing, but in his right hand held a long staff shod with steel for self-defence in case a boar should select him as the target for his rush. Ranjit Singh, the cricketer, was also in our party, but apparently he too had decided not to compete for 'first spears.' Our first chase was after a sow, and when we found our mistake and returned to our post at the corner of the covert, to our amazement discovered Ranjit still sitting there motionless, his horse pointing his nose and snorting at a 'sunder' of small pig, which had in the meanwhile attempted to break covert and had thus suddenly come face to face with the solitary rider at half a dozen yards' distance. After gazing at one another for thirty seconds, the sunder bolted back into the jungle, and I thought of a picture of 'Circe and her Admirers' which had impressed itself on my mind.

The morning's beat was not very successful, but after lunch we beat a new jungle, and then we had fine fun with several very fine, big, fighting boars. Preetan Singh, general in the Patiala forces, had a narrow escape of a bad fall, for he suddenly came on a well which was hidden by long grass round the edge, but his active little horse leapt the obstacle in his stride. When the boar is pressed he twists and turns with marvellous agility and cunning, selecting ground the most difficult for a horse, and displaying marvellous


speed and activity. His head is as hard as a wall, and his vital parts marvellously well protected by bone. It takes a good spearman to kill with a single lunge of the short lance, which is weighted at the butt with lead to give it the proper balance and weight. In a day and a half's hunting at Patiala we got twenty-one boars, all good big ones. One particularly fine fellow mea-

sured 36½ inches high, 6 feet 1 inch long, 5 feet girth, 14 inches forearm, and weighed 308 lb. After the day's sport we returned in our four-in-hand as we came through the fast fading twilight of the Indian spring evening. We dined at the club, but after dinner we were invited to the Palace. Here we found all the officers dressed in English-looking mess uniform, but still wearing the Sikh turbans. Our stout friend whom they



nicknamed the elephant, however, was in gorgeous native dress, and he was the centre of jokes and chaff. The Maharajah also was becomingly dressed as a Sikh chieftain, and carried his scimitar in his hand. He received us in a drawing-room which was furnished like a French hotel, with plush curtains, electric light, and ornamented by an array of silver race cups and other trophies won by his horses. The evening passed easily enough, for the common ground of sport brings East and West together as nothing else can. The next day we were promised a form of sport in which none of us as yet had taken part.

After lunch on the second day's pigsticking the Maharajah offered to show us some buckhunting with cheetahs. This was a new experience, and probably needs description for the reader who is not well acquainted with the different methods of the chase in India. A cheetah is a sort of leopard, which, however, strongly resembles a deerhound, with his long, lean body, but has a cat's head and ears, and a leopard's skin and tail. Caught as cubs and trained by native hunters, they become remarkably submissive and deft for the work required of them. The plan is to carry the cheetah, with his shikari, or hunts-



man, in a bullock-cart common to the country, and which is so commonly met with in the fields that it does not alarm the game. The cheetah has his eyes hooded with a leather cap, and the cart is driven along a country lane until a buck is seen, when the cart takes to the fields, and is driven round and round the quarry in gradually decreasing circles. When the cheetah winds his prey he becomes restless, and the shikari has to attract his attention and keep him quiet. The buck, all unsuspecting, allows the cart to come as near as sixty yards, when the leather cap is removed from the cheetah and his head is turned towards the antelope by his keeper, who at the same time releases him. The cheetah instantly slips noiselessly off the cart, and walks towards the buck with quick, springy steps until within about thirty or forty yards. He then makes a rush with incredible speed, and overtakes the buck with enormous bounds, although the latter is extremely swift in flight. When within springing distance, which he calculates unerringly, the cheetah leaps upon the back of the deer, bites savagely into his neck, and brings him down dead with a crash.

Early in the day our cheetah had a misfortune which rather spoilt his efforts that afternoon. While racing at top speed after a buck he suddenly

missed his footing, and went head over heels on some rocky ground. At the pace he was travelling he must have shaken himself severely. In another run the cheetah had overtaken his quarry and leapt on to his back. He brought the deer down, but missed his grip in so doing, and the buck sprang up again and was off before the cheetah could seize him a second time, wounded as he was. Directly the cheetah finds the buck has the legs of him he stops short in the most decisive and unenterprising manner, and gives up the pursuit. The



keeper then has to recapture him by coming up to him gently with a ladle of blood or a bit of cheese. Owing to the time required to stalk the buck with a bullock-cart and the difficulty for horsemen of getting near enough to see well without disturbing the deer, the form of sport is more curious than exciting for repeated events, but very interesting to witness for the first time.

It was already dark when we returned to Patiala, and we gladly found our comfortable quarters and an excellent dinner. The evening's amusement was to be the famous nautch, or native dance, an inseparable feature of Oriental




hospitality. We were ushered into a long apartment in the Palace garishly ornamented, and seated in a row with his Highness. Behind us sat the high military and civil officers of the State. At the far end of the room a sort of low stage was curtained off and dimly lit with native lanterns, and heavily scented with musk and other native scents of the rich and noble kind. At a signal the electric lights are switched off, and the curtain drawn aside to reveal an artiste draped very adequately in yellow muslins and heavily ornamented



on the wrist and ankles with silver bangles. She was young and rather pretty, and contrived to throw some grace into the most ungraceful and inartistic performance in the world—an Indian dance. The dance—if it can be called one—consists in a series of fantastic jerks and wriggles, the body poised and pirouetting on the ball of both feet, which scarcely leave the ground, while the dancer sometimes chants an accompaniment. The movements are extremely slow, and last long enough to send an audience of weary hunters to sleep, for behind the *prima donna* a chorus of native ladies of maturer age and inferior beauty, yowled appropriate songs to the accompaniment of native instruments and a ceaseless drumming on small kettledrums, or tom-toms as they are descriptively named in India. The whole entertainment, the like of



which every Sahib has beheld who has pried into the secrets of Indian social life, brought home to us inevitably the intellectual barrier which is fixed between Indian and European. In war and the chase, in the activities of many forms of manly occupation, comradeship and friendly rivalry are not only possible, but can be encouraged and developed; but so far is Hindustan behind the protecting nation in art, literature, and social evolution that no amount of sympathy and goodwill can bridge it over even between the best-bred and the best-educated representatives of both races. Another century has probably to elapse before the leeway is sufficiently regained to make real social intercourse possible, and on an equivalent footing to our relations with the Japanese, for example. Even when things have developed so far, can it ever be said with truth that East and West understand one another or frankly interchange ideas?



R. S. S. B.-P.

## POLO.

An important meeting of the Hurlingham Polo Committee was held at the Cavalry Club, Viscount Valentia presiding, at which it was decided to abolish the 'Recent Form List' and substitute a system of handicapping players by points according to individual merit, as is done in America. Over 200 players have already been handicapped, and the following are the new regulations laid down :—

All polo players in the United Kingdom to be handicapped by points. London players to be handicapped by a Committee consisting of a polo manager from Hurlingham, Ranelagh, and Roehampton, and of Mr. W. S. Buckmaster, Mr. R. Grenfell, Capt. Hardress Lloyd, Mr. P. W. Nickalls, and Capt. H. Wilson, and the representatives on the Hurlingham Polo Committee of the County Polo Association, South African Polo Association, the Army Polo Committee, Indian Polo Association, and the All-Ireland Polo Club; three to form a quorum. The Hurlingham Handicapping Committee will handicap any county, All-Ireland Polo Club, Army, Indian, Egyptian, South African, or other Colonial players whose form they know, and the various Army, county, and foreign associations are being invited to adopt the scheme. Once during the winter the Committee will meet to draw up the handicap, and meetings will also be held on the first Monday in May, the first Monday in June, and the first Monday in July to revise it.

The main idea of the scheme is that every player shall have his handicap as at golf, not necessarily that matches shall be played under the handicap, but that, instead of the system of allowing only one or two 'Recent Form List' men in one team in a tournament, the system in future shall be that in tournaments of different classes a different aggregate number of goals shall be allowed.

The arrangements in connection with the sending of a team to America to endeavour to win back the Cup which the Meadowbrook representatives carried away last summer are proceeding satisfactorily. The Recovery Fund is just under £5,000 and another £3,000 will be required, assuming that a minimum of sixteen ponies be bought. Owners of first-class ponies who wish to sell outright or with the option of taking them back after the Cup matches are requested to communicate with Capt. Hardress Lloyd, Lower Grove, Roehampton. Nine ponies have already been purchased.

Capt. Lloyd proposes taking the England team to America next spring, and, it is reported, to ask the following players to accompany him, viz. : Capt. F. W. Barrett, Capt. L. St. C. Cheape, Capt. Matthew-Lannowe, Mr. W. S. Buckmaster, Mr. A. N. Edwards, Mr. R. N. Grenfell, Mr. E. W. Palmes, and possibly one or two more. It will be noted that nearly all of these are Cavalry officers now serving. The regiments of several being abroad, however, makes it doubtful if all will be able to obtain the necessary leave. It is hoped that the International matches may be played towards the end of May so that players can get back in time for the Champion Cup, the final of which will be played on June 25 next year.

The ponies are to sail about March 20, so that players may get about six weeks' practice before the first Test Match. The four players who show the best form will then be selected for this match.



Six teams took part in the Subalterns' Inter-Regimental Polo Cup, played as usual at Ranelagh, viz. : Royal Scots Greys, 7th Hussars, Royal Horse Guards, Rifle Brigade, 1st Life Guards, and the Coldstream Guards. This tournament is now only open to regiments quartered within a radius of forty miles of London. In the semi-finals the 7th Hussars beat the Royal Horse Guards and the Rifle Brigade beat the 1st Life Guards. The final between the 7th Hussars and Rifle Brigade commenced with the Hussars hitting off 5 goals, but the Riflemen then played up well and were finally only beaten by 7 goals to 3.

Teams : 7th Hussars—Mr. G. L. Meyrick, Mr. E. P. Brassey, Mr. E. F. D. Kelly, and Mr. A. C. Watson (back). Rifle Brigade—Mr. W. Parker, Mr. G. C. Sladen, Mr. G. Phipps-Hornby, and Mr. R. H. Leyland (back).

For the Champion Cup at Hurlingham the Old Cantabs gained their fourth success in that event by defeating the Tigers in the final by 7 goals to 1. It was a fast and interesting match; the winners were, however, the better balanced team, and their captain, Mr. Buckmaster, was in great form. Every credit is due to Comte de Madre for having so sportingly raised such a fine team and led them into the final for this important event. Cavalry officers are deeply grateful to Comte de Madre for the generous assistance he gives to soldier players.

Teams : Old Cantabs—Capt. G. E. Bellville, Mr. F. Freake, Mr. W. S. Buckmaster, and Lord Wodehouse (back). Tigers—Comte de Madre, Mr. E. W. Palmer, Capt. F. W. Barrett, and Capt. L. St. C. Cheape (back).

Great interest was taken this year in the All-Ireland Open Cup, played for as usual during the Horse Show Week at Dublin. The Irish love polo, and about 50,000 spectators lined the ground for the final match between Co. Kildare and the Woodpeckers. The latter won a good game by 11 goals to 2, but the Irishmen claimed that at any rate two of the winning team were their own nationality.

Teams : Woodpeckers—Sir W. Bass, Hon. A. Hastings, Capt. H. Wilson, and Capt. H. Lloyd. Co. Kildare—Mr. H. Montgomery, Mr. S. A. Watt, Capt. A. Wills, and Capt. M. F. Dennis.

Umpires—Capt. E. D. Miller and Major C. K. O'Hara.

#### ABROAD.

Eight teams entered for the Mysore Polo Tournament. The final between Golconda Gymkhana and 20th Deccan Horse was won by the former by 6 goals to 3. The Maharajah at the conclusion presented the Cup to Capt. Shah Mirza Beg, the captain of the Golconda team.

The final of the Bangalore Tournament also rested between the Golcondas and the 20th Deccan Horse, and after a splendid struggle resulted in another victory for the famous Golcondas by 7 goals to 5.

## SPORTS

The 19th Hussars held their annual sports at Aldershot, under the patronage of Brigadier-General C. T. McM. Kavanagh, commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The weather being fine, there was a large attendance, the entries were numerous, and the sports proved a great success. The programme included open section tent-pegging, open mile race, open half-mile, and mounted events open to the Cavalry Brigade. The section tent-pegging was won by the Army Service Corps, with C Squadron 19th Hussars second, and the Royal Engineers third.

At the close the prizes were presented by Mrs. A. L. Powell.

## RIFLE MEETING

The forty-third annual meeting of the Southern India Rifle Association took place at Bangalore. Both the general interest and the usual high standard were well maintained throughout. For the various events there were in all 851 entries, made up as follows: British Army, 232; Volunteers, 127; and Native Army, 492.

## HORSE SHOWS

At the Dublin Horse Show the Military Jumping Competition for British officers took place before 24,000 spectators. There was a large entry, a good display, and an exciting contest. Lieutenant R. R. Grubb, 3rd Hussars, won the £50 cup with Tommy; Lieutenant A. Gordon Dixon, R.H.A., second with Mystery; Colonel W. H. Bowes, Royal Scots Fusiliers, third with Squash; and Major Burns Lindow fourth with Danny.

Captain Millar's Catch-my-Pole won event C, and Major Burns Lindow's Danny event D. Major Burns Lindow also won a pony-jumping competition with Dineen.

In an account of the recent Olympic Horse Show in our last issue we stated that no commissioned officers competed in the Territorial Jumping.

We regret this error, as it has been pointed out to us that there was only one team without a single officer. Further, the Territorials were handicapped from the fact that in the original conditions no mention was made of horses, so some teams secured show jumpers, but a few days only before the competition these were barred, and many members entered the ring on their own hunters, which had had no previous training. This accounted for some of the poor performances.

At the Bangalore Horse Show last July the 14th Hussars did remarkably well. Major Stephens took three first prizes, Major Lawrence took one, Captain Woodhouse won the jumping competitions for ponies and horses with Zoranda II. and Nynehead, Captain Astley took three first prizes, and 2nd Lieutenant Nicholson took no less than four. In the jumping competition for British N.C.O.s, Sergeant Goddard, 14th Hussars, was placed first.

## FOOTBALL

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to become patron of the Amateur Football Association, and also of the Army Rugby Football Union. The King, as Prince of Wales, always took a great interest in football, and particularly in any matches in which the Services were concerned, and was present at many of the big matches played last season. The continued interest of His Majesty will greatly benefit the game this season.

Captain Rainsford Hannay, Royal West Surrey Regiment (adjutant of the 22nd Batt. County of London Regiment), the Honorary Secretary of the Army Rugby Union, has been nominated as the Army representative on the Committee of the Rugby Union. Commander Royds is the naval representative.

## RUGBY

The prospects of the Army Rugby Union are excellent. Among other fixtures, matches have been arranged with both Oxford and Cambridge Universities.

The annual event *v.* Royal Navy this season is fixed for the first Saturday in March, at the Queen's Club, London.

## ASSOCIATION

## THE CAVALRY CUP

The following is the draw for the first round :—

- 5th Lancers *v.* 5th Dragoon Guards.
- 16th Lancers *v.* Royal Scots Greys.
- 18th Hussars *v.* 19th Hussars.
- 2nd Dragoon Guards *v.* 2nd Life Guards.
- 4th Dragoon Guards *v.* 7th Hussars.
- 1st Life Guards *v.* 3rd Dragoon Guards.
- 11th Hussars *v.* Royal Horse Guards.

Byes : 20th Hussars, 4th Hussars, and 9th Lancers.

The games to be played by November 12.

## ATHLETICS.

The thirty-first Army Athletic Meeting took place at Aldershot under the patronage of Lieut.-General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien, Commanding the Division, accompanied by Lord Kitchener and Major-General Robertson. Col. V. A. Couper, Inspector of Gymnasia, presided, and Capt. C. FitzG. H. Trueman, assisted by Lieut. J. Betts, discharged the onerous duties of hon. secretary and treasurer of the meeting. An especial feature was the fact that a large increase had taken place in the number of commissioned competitors, the officers coming out well to the front in the Army Championships. Excellent running was witnessed and good times were accomplished. The keenest rivalry was shown all through, and there were representative members present of nearly every regiment in the Service, but the attendance of the general public was small.

Some results of the two days' racing were as follows :—

High Jump (N.C.O.s and men) : Driver Lockton, 5 ft.  $4\frac{1}{2}$  in.

High Jump (Officers) : Major E. O'Brien, Indian Army, 5 ft.  $6\frac{1}{2}$  in.

One Mile Race (Officers) : Lieut. Kentish, R.E. Time, 4 min. 50 sec.

Quarter-mile Race (Officers) : Lieut. Bowring, 1st East Surrey Regiment.  
Time,  $53\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

Half-mile Race (Officers) : Lieut. G. L. Brown, 4th Middlesex Regiment.  
Time, 2 min.  $5\frac{3}{8}$  sec.

Half-mile Championship : Corpl. Heaver, 2nd Lincolns. Time, 2 min.  
 $1\frac{3}{8}$  sec.

Three Miles Race (N.S.O.s and men) : Gnr. James, 26th Heavy Brigade.  
Time, 15 min. 38 sec.

100 Yards Race (Officers) : Lieut. Loos, 1st Worcester Regiment. Time,  
 $10\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

Long Jump (N.C.O.s and men) : Lce-Corpl. Dunne, 1st Royal Irish  
Fusiliers, 21 ft. 2 in.

Long Jump (Officers) : 2nd Lieut. Naylor, 1st South Stafford Regiment,  
21 ft.  $5\frac{3}{4}$  in.

120 Yards Hurdle (Officers) : 2nd Lieut. Naylor, 1st South Stafford Regi-  
ment. Time, 17 sec.

100 Yards Championship : Pte. Vickers, 2nd Durham Light Infantry.  
Time,  $10\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

100 Yards (N.C.O.s and men) : Pte. Vickers. Time, 11 sec.

One Mile Championship : Corpl. Heaver, 2nd Lincoln Regiment. Time,  
4 min. 34 sec.

Obstacle Race (Teams) : 1st Royal Fusiliers.

Quarter-mile Championship : Lieut. F. A. Bowring, 1st East Surrey Regi-  
ment. Time,  $52\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

Quarter-mile (N.C.O.s and men) : Corpl. Payne, 1st Worcester Regiment.  
Time,  $54\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

120 Yards Hurdle Championship : Capt. C. Kinahan, 1st Royal Irish  
Fusiliers. Time,  $16\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

500 Yards Obstacle Race (Officers) : Lieut. Richmond, 1st Gordon High-  
landers.

Half-mile (N.C.O.s and men) : Corpl. Sharp, 2nd York and Lancaster  
Regiment. Time, 2 min.  $6\frac{3}{8}$  sec.

One Mile (N.C.O.s and men) : Lce-Corpl. Clarke, 2nd Connaught  
Rangers. Time, 4 min.  $4\frac{3}{8}$  sec.

200 Yards Handicap (Officers, a yard for every year over 25 years of age) :  
Major E. O'Brien, Indian Army.

Tug-of-War Championship : 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers.

One Mile Relay Championship (teams of four, each man to run quarter of  
a mile) : 2nd Lincolnshire Regiment (holders).

Three Mile Championship : Sergt. O'Neil, 2nd Connaught Rangers.  
Time, 15 min.  $10\frac{1}{2}$  sec.

At the close of the meeting Lord Kitchener, who was accompanied by  
Gen. Smith-Dorrien and Gen. Grierson, distributed the prizes.

## TERRITORIAL FORCE ATHLETICS.

The first Annual Athletic Championships of the Territorial Force were decided at the Crystal Palace. Among those present were: Mr. J. Lyons, D.L., Chairman of the General Council of Territorial Sports; the Duke of Fife, President; Viscount Esher, Vice-President; Major the Hon. A. G. Brodrick, Lieut.-Col. Hope, Members of Council, &c. The attendance was not very good, but the sports were a great success. Welsh, Scottish, and English regiments were all well represented. Owing to the heavy programme two enclosures were employed, the mounted events being carried on simultaneously with the foot. Great interest was taken in the Marathon race, a twelve-mile go in full complement. Six counties entered their champion teams, which consisted of one officer, one N.C.O., and fourteen men. Starting from Cheam Common over an unknown course the sixteen men of the London Scottish trotted into the ground in splendid style, having covered the twelve miles in 1 hr. 38 min. 41 sec., being easy winners, with the Edinburgh University O.T.C. second. After an exciting contest 'The Rangers' secured the Tent-pitching Championship, gaining a well deserved victory.

100 Yards Championship: Private Applegarth, 19th Batt. London, 10  $\frac{1}{8}$  sec.

120 Yards Hurdle Championship: 2nd Lieutenant Ward, King's School O.T.C., Lincoln, 17  $\frac{1}{8}$  sec.

Quarter-mile Flat Championship: Private R. Clark, 5th Batt. London, 51  $\frac{3}{8}$  sec.

One Mile Relay Championship: The London team.

High Jump: 2nd Lieutenant Ward, King's School, Lincoln, 5 feet 5 inches.

One Mile Championship: Private R. Yorke, 14th Batt. London, 4 min. 34  $\frac{3}{8}$  sec.

Tug-of-war: Glasgow (6th Batt. Highland Light Infantry).

Five-mile Cycle Championship: Private Matkin, 8th Batt. London.

Long Jump: Private Markham, 'The Rangers,' 18 feet 10 inches.

Heads and Posts (Officers): 2nd Lieutenant A. Bennett was the only competitor.

Heads and Posts: Staff-Quartermaster S. Cooper, King's Colonials.

Lemon-cutting (Officers): 2nd Lieutenant K. R. C. Holman, S.E. Mounted Brigade.

Lemon-cutting: Staff-Quartermaster S. Cooper, King's Colonials.

Riding and Jumping: Surrey Yeomanry.

Wrestling on Horseback: Glamorgan Yeomanry.

Tent-pegging (Officers): 2nd Lieutenant Holman, S.E. Mounted Brigade.

Tent-pegging: Corporal E. Adams, Glamorgan Yeomanry.

At the close of the meeting Viscountess Esher presented the prizes, which included many magnificent cups.





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